Supreme Court of India
SUBHASH BHANDARI & ANR. ETC.versusDISTRICT MAGISTRATE, LUCKNOW & ORS.
- Citation
- 1987 INSC 310
- Decided
- 3 November 1987
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- A P SEN
Holding
A solitary act that does not disturb public tranquility or affect a considerable number of people cannot form the basis for subjective satisfaction under Section 3 of the National Security Act to justify detention.
Summary
The appellants, contractors for supplying ballast to the Public Works Department, were detained under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 on grounds that they had attacked a rival contractor with firearms and grenades, allegedly to intimidate him and influence tendering. They challenged the detention, arguing that the alleged assault was a solitary act affecting only the individual complainant and therefore could not be deemed a disturbance of public order. The Supreme Court examined whether a solitary act, if it does not create terror, panic, or affect a considerable number of people, can satisfy the subjective satisfaction requirement for preventive detention under the Act. Relying on the principle that disturbance of public order must affect the even tempo of community life, the Court held that the alleged act was confined to the complainant and did not disturb public tranquility, thus cannot justify detention. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals and set the appellants at liberty.
Issues considered
- Whether a solitary act of violence directed at an individual can be considered a disturbance of public order for purposes of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980.
- Whether the detaining authority can be subjectively satisfied that such an act justifies preventive detention.
- Whether the grounds of detention under the National Security Act were valid in the present case.
Legislation cited
- Indian Explosives Acts. 6
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 147, s. 148, s. 149, s. 307
- National Security Act, 1980s. 3(2), s. 3(4)
Subjects
National Security Actpreventive detentionpublic ordersolitary actsubjective satisfactionbusiness rivalrycriminal law
Judgment
SUBHASH BHANDARI & ANR. ETC.
-{' A
v.
DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, LUCKNOW & ORS.
NOVEMBER 3, 1987
[A.P. SEN AND B.C. RAY, JJ.) B
-" National Security Act, 1980: Section 3-Detention-Grounds of
- detention-Subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority-Solitary
criminal act-Whether and when can be taken into consideration for
making detention order.
appellants were contractors for the snpply of ballast to PWD. c
,( They The
..
were detained under section 3(2) of the National Security Act,
1980. It was stated in the grounds of detention that on account of
bnsiness rivalry, appellants and their companions attacked the comp-
lainant with fire arms and hand grenades with intent to kill him, FIR
was lodged by the complainant, a case was registered against them D
under section 147, 149, 307 l.P.C. and section 6 of the Explosives Act,
and a chargesheet put up against the appellants, and since they had
applied for bail, and if released there was a possibility that they will
again start activities causing breach of public order, it was necessary to
, detain them in order to prevent them from so acting.
....
E
The detention orders were approved by the State Government
under section 3(4) of the Act, and the representations made by the
appellants having been rejected they were directed to be detained for a
period of 12 months.
Challenging their detention, the appellants filed writ petitions F
\ before the High Court contending that the alleged assault on the comp-
lainant affected only an individual and such a solitary act could not be
considered to be an act prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
The High Court, dismissing the writ petitions, held that tbe as-
sault was to teach a lesson to the complainant and serve as warning to
G
prospective tenderers who may not dare to submit their tenders and
that the impact and reach of the act went beyond the individual and
""'\ affected the community of contractors who take contracts for executing
the public works.
Allowing the appeals to this Court, H
773
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1988) 1 S.C.R.
A HELD: Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished ··-,...
from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the
society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public
tranquility. An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity.
In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality
it may be different. [778C-D)
B
A solitary act of omission or comm1ss1on can be taken into
consideration for being subjectively satisfied, by the detaining authority
to pass an order of detention if the reach, effect and potentiality of the
act is such that it disturbs public tranquility by creating terror and
panic in the society or a considerable number of the people in a specified
C locality where the act is alleged to have been committed. It is the degree
and extent of the reach of the act upon the society whicll is vital for
considering the question whether a man has committed only a breach of
law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause disturbance to
public order. [779A-C)
p
In the instant case, the alleged act of assault by fire arms is con-
fined to the complainant and not to others. It is an act infringing law
and order and the reach and effect of the act is not so extensive as to
affect considerable members of the society. In other words, this act does
not disturb public tranquility, nor does it create any terror or panic in \...
E the minds of the people of the locality nor does it affect in any manner
the even tempo of the life of the community. This criminal act emanates
from business rivalry between the detenus and the complainant.
Therefore, such an act cannot be the basis for subjective satisfaction of
the detaining authority to pass an order of detention on the ground that
the impugned act purports to affect public order i.e. the even tempo of
F the life of the community, which is the sole basis for clamping the order )
of detention. Moreover, no injury was caused to the person of the
complainant, by the appellants nor any damage was caused to the car
though hand grenade was alleged to have been thrown on the car. No
mark has been caused to the car also. [778E-H]
G Guiab Mehra v. State of U.P. & Ors., 4JT 1987 3 SC 559, applied.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 558 and 559 of 1985.
) ....
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.2.85 of the Allahabad
H High Court in W.P. No. 5805 and 5806 of 1985.
SUBHASH BHANDARI v. DISIT. MAGISTRATE, LUCKNOW IRA Y, J.] 775
Mohan Pandey for the Appellants.
A
Yogeshwar Prasad and Dalveer Bhandari for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B.C. RAY, J. These two appeals by special leave are against the B
order passed on February 14, 1985 by the High Court of Allahabad
~ dismissing the writ petition No. 5806 of 1984 and writ petition No.
-_ 5805 of 1984 as well as writ petition No. 309 of 1985 whereby the order
of detention passed against the appellants on October 1, and October
20, 1984 respectively under section 3(2) of the National Security Act,
1980, was upheld as legal and valid.
c
1 The copy of the order of detention as well as the grounds of
detention and the first information report on the basis of which the
detention order was made, were served on the appellants at the time of
their detention. The grounds of detention are as follows:-
D
"On 25.9.1984, Shri Surya Kumar, son of Shri Vishwa Pal,
resident of 33, Babuganj, P.S. Hasanganj, District
Lucknow, lodged a report at P.S. Hazratganj, Lucknow
that on 15.9.1984 there was a tender for !he supply of bal-
last in P.W.D. in which tenders had been submitted by him
in K.P. Singh's name. You keep share with K.P. Singh. On E
account of your and K.P. Singh's terror no other person
submits any tender against you people for which reason you
people obtain tenders at rates of your choice. If any other
person submits his tender you and K.P. Singh terrorise
him. On account of the rates of his tender being lower on
15.9.1984, the tender of the complainant was accepted ;n F
one group and in the remaining groups the tenders of K.P.
Singh etc. were accepted. For this reason you and K.P.
Singh bore a grudge against the complainant.
On 25.9.1984 at about 3.45 P.M. when Surya Kumar
was going, in connection with his tender, in his Am bas- G
sador Car No. USS-7418, accompanied by his brother-in-
law, opposite to the National Highway Khand, he saw some
contractors. On reaching near them the complainant had
just started talking to them, when suddenly in two cars, you
with a pistol, Phool Chand with a revolver, Jaleel with a
revolver, Ashok with Desi katta, Ashok Sonkar and Sarrif H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 1 S.C.R.
with hand grenade and Shankar Dey with a gun along with
A three other persons came and with intent to kill the comp-
lainant fired at the complainant, threw hand grenades
which fell on the car of the complainant. Consequently,
there was a commotion. Traffic was obstructed and public
tranquility was disturbed. The complainant immediately
B saving his life took flight in his car. On the above informa-
tion by the complainant a case FIR No. 1034 was registered
at police station, Hazratganj against you and your other
companions under Section 147, 148, 149, 307 I.P.C. and
Section 6 of Explosives Act and after investigation a
charge-sheet No. 279 has been put up against you for the
said offence.
c I
I have also been put up against you for the said-_)_·
offence.
I have also come to know that on your behalf an
D application for grant of bail has been moved in a competent
court, therefore, in case you come out on bail from the jail
you will again start activities causing breach of public
order.
On the abovesaid grounds, I have been satisfied that
E there is possibility of your acting in a manner prejudicial to
the maintenance of public order and in order to prevent
you from so acting, it is necessary to detain you."
The said order of detention was duly approved by the State
Government under section 3(4) of the National Security Act. The
F appellants made representation against the grounds of detention. The
representations were rejected by the Government and the same were )
communicated to the appellants by the Joint Secretary, Vigilance &
Home Department, Government of U.P. On November 26, 1984, the
Secretary, Vigilance & Home Department, Government of U.P.
informed the appellants that the Government after considering the
G report of the Advisory Board had confirmed the order of detention
and directed that the appellants be detained for a period of 12 months
with effect from October 1, 1984 and October 20, 1984 respectively.
·}-·
Aggrieved by this order of detention the appellants moved appli-
cations under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing of
H the order of detention made by the respondent No. 1 and for setting
SUBHASH BHANDARI v. DISTI. MAGISTRATE, LUCKNOW [RAY, J.] 777
them free. These were registered as writ petition No. 5806 of 1984 and
.......( writ petition No. 5805 of 1984. Another detenu who was detained ,on A
identical grounds also filed writ petition No. 309 of 1985 before the
High Court.
The main contention advanced on behalf of the appellants before
the High Court was that on the basis of facts alleged, at the most it B
could be said that the matter related to the maintenance of law and
order. It was not a matter relating to the disturbance of public order.
The assault on Surya Kumar can only be on account of an ill-will
arising out of business rivalry. It had been submitted that it affects only
an individual and the society or community were not affected by the
alleged act of omission on the part of the appellants. It therefore raised
( no problem of public order. It had been further contended that a C
.A.___ solitary act can not be considered to be an act prejudiced to the
maintenance of public order.
The High Court of Allahabad after hearing the parties and on a
consideration of the decisions cited before it found that whether an act D
creates a mere law and order problem or affects the even tempo of the
life of the community, it is to be seen what is the extent of the impact
of the act in question upon the society as a whole; whether the effect is
restricted to an individual or a few individuals alone or it creates a
sense of in.security, danger and apprehension in the minds of the
people in general apart from those who are the victims of the incident; E
whether the act or acts disturb the even tempo of life of the society or a
section of society; whether the act leads to disturbance of public order
or only law and order. The High Court further found that in the
context the act committed tends to teach a lesson to the complainant
and to act as a warning to prospective tenderers in future who may not
dare to avail of the opportunity to submit their tenders against that of f'
the appellants. It was also found that the impact and reach of the act in
question goes beyond the individual and affects the community of
contractors who take contracts for executing the public works. The
Court further held that the order of detention made by the detaining
authority is legal and valid and the writ petitions were dismissed.
G
Undoubtedly, on the basis of the FIR lodged by Surya Kumar a
case under Section 147/148/149/307 I.P.C. and under Section 5 of the
Explosives Act has been registered as crime No. 1034 and the said case
is pending for decision before the criminal court.
The main question which falls for decision is whether the act H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 1 S.C.R.
A referred to in the grounds of detention is directed against certain indi-
viduals creating a law and order problem or the reach and potentiality )-
of the act is so deep as to disturb the society to the extent of causing
a general disturbance of public tranquility.
It has n~w been well settled by several decisions of this Court
B (the latest one being Guiab Mehra v. State of U.P. & Ors., 4 JT
1987(3) SC 559 judgment in which case was pronounced by us on
September 15, 1987) that public order is the even tempo of the life of
the.community taking the country as a whole or even a specified local-
ity. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts
directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the
C extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquility. It is the
degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a 'i
locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a J
tireach of law and order or it affects public order. It has also been
observed by this court that an act by itself is not determinant of its own
gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another.but in its potential-
D ity it may be very different. Therefore it is the impact, reach and
potentiality of the act which in certain circumstances affect the even
tempo of life of the community and thereby public order is
jeopardized. Such an individual act can be taken into consideration by
the detaining authority while passing an order of detention· against the
person alleged to have committed the act.
In the instant case the alleged act of assault by fire arms is con-
fined to the complainant Surya Kumar and not to others. It is an act
infringing law and order and the reach and effect of the act is not so
extensive as to affect a considerable members of the society. In other
words, this act does not disturb public tranquility nor does it create any
F terror or panic in the minds of the people of the locality nor does it
affect in any manner the even tempo of the life of the community. This
criminal act emanates from business rivalry between the detenus and )
the complainant. Therefore such an act can not be the basis for subjec-
tive satisfaction of the detaining authority to pass an order of detention
on the ground that the impugned act purports to affect public order
G i.e. the even tempo of the life of the community which is the sole basis
for clamping the order of detention. Moreover, no injury was caused
to the person of the complainant, Surya Kumar by the appellants nor
any damage was caused to the car though hand grenade was alleged to
have been thrown on the car. No mark has been caused to the car also.
It is relevant to mention in this connection .that the appellants were
H released on bail by this Court after duly considering the facts and
SUBHASH BHANDARI v. DISTI. MAGISTRATE, LUCKNOW (RAY, !·I 779
circumstances of the case in July, 1985. The period of one year has also A
expired. We have already held hereinbefore that a solitary act of omis-
sion or commission can be taken into consideration for being _subjec-
tively satisfied, by the detaining authority to pass an order of detention
if the reach, effect and potentiality of the act is such that it disturbs
public tranquility by creating terror and panic in the society or a con-
B
siderable number of the people in a specified locality where the act is
alleged to have been committed. Thus it is the degree and extent of the
.. ~ reach of the act upon the society which is vital for considering the
question whether a man has committed only a breach of law and order
- or has acted in a manner likely to cause disturbance to public order.
It is pertinent to note in this connection that the.Criminal Appeal
( Nos. 826 and 827 of 1985 arising out of the same incident and identical
c
".._ grounds of detention, filed by Ashok Arora and Ashok Kumar Sonkar
have been allowed by this Hon'ble Court by its order. dated November
29, 1985 and the appellants were directed to be set at liberty forthwith.
D
For the reasons aforesaid, we allow the appeals without any
order as to costs.
N.P.V. Appeals allowed.
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "National Security Act"Sign in to search