SUBODH NATH AND ANR.versusSTATE OF TRIPURA

                    [2013] 4 S.C.R. 581


                 SUBODH NATH AND ANR.                             A
                             v.
                    STATE OF TRIPURA
            (Criminal Appeal No. 1551 of 2007)
                      MARCH 19, 2013
                                                                  B
        [A.K. PATNAIK AND H. L. GOKHALE, JJ.]

     Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2000 [as amended by Amendment Act of 2006] - s. 7A; and
proviso & Explanation to s.20 - Applicability of the Act - To     c
offence committed prior to commencement of the Act - Held:
In view of the provisions in ss. 7A and 20, the Act would be
applicable - In the instant case, the accused was below 18
years on the date of commission of the offence, and hence
would be treated as juvenile under the provisions of the Act      o
- Therefore, case qua the juvenile accused remitted to
concerned Juvenile Justice Board - Penal Code, 1860 -
s.302134.

     Penal Code, 1860 - s.302/s.34 - Prosecution under -
Conviction by courts below - Held: Appellant No. 1-accused        E
is guilty of offence uls.302 - Prosecution case is supported
by eye-witness account corroborated by reliable evidence
direct as well as circumstantial - Therefore, his conviction
upheld.
                                                                  F
     Criminal Trial - Discrepancy in the version of witness -
Effect of - Court not to discard the evidence on the ground of
discrepancies, unless they are 'material discrepancies', so as
to create reasonable doubt about the credibility of witnesses.

    Motive - Relevance of- Held: Motive is relevant in case       G
where prosecution seeks to prove guilt by circumstantial
evidence - It becomes irrelevant if offence is proved by direct
evidence.
                             581                                  H
    582    SUPREME COURT REPORTS             (2013] 4 S.C.R.


A        Appellants-accused were prosecuted for having
    killed one person. Prosecution case was supported by
    evidence of one eye-witness. Trial court convicted both
    the accused u/s. 302/34 IPC. High Court confirmed their
    conviction.
B
       In the instant appeal, it was contended that appellant
  No.2 was less than 18 years of age on the date of
  occurrence and hence should have been treated as a
  juvenile within the meaning of s.2(k) of the Juvenile
C Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 and
  that the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 were not
  applicable. As regards appellant No.1, it was contended
  that conviction on the testimony of sole eye-witness (PW-
  13) was not correct because he was not reliable as he ran
  away from the place of occurrence and because his
0
  evidence was without any corroboration; that there was
  discrepancy in the evidence of PW-2 and PW-13; that
  there was no recovery of the weapon of offence and
  further that the motive to kill the deceased was also not
E proved.
         Allowing the appeal of appellant No.2 and dismissing
    that of appellant No.1, the Court

      HELD: 1. The accused is entitled to the benefit of the
F 2000 Act, as if the provisions of Section 2(k) thereof had
  always been in existence even during the operation of the
  Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 by virtue of Section 20 of the
  Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
  2000, as amended by the Amendment Act of 2006.
G Considering the provisions of Section 7A and 20 of the
  2000 Act and considering that the appellant No.2 was
  below 18 years of age as per his birth certificate, the
  impugned judgment of the High Court qua the appellant
  No.2 is liable to be set aside and the case would be
H
 SUBODH NATH AND ANR. v. STATE OF TRIPURA               583


remitted to the concerned Juvenile Justice Board for           A
disposal of his case in accordance with the provisions
of the 2000 Act. [Para 1O] [592-A-D]
     Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2009) 13 SCC
211 : 2009 (7) SCR 623 - relied on.                            B
   Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand and Anr. (2005) 3
SCC 551: 2005(1) SCR 1019 - held inapplicable.

     2.1. Appellant No.1 was guilty of the offence u/s. 302
IPC. It is not correct to say that the evidence of PW-13       C
was not reliable as he was a suspect and had ran away
from the place of occurrence. As explained by PW-13 he
left the place of occurrence because of his fear of the
appellants who had threatened him with dire
consequences if he disclosed the incident to anyone.           D
The evidence of PW-13 is also supported by the evidence
of PW-6. Moreover, the evidence of the Investigating
Officer (PW-19) read with Inquest Report (Ext. P-2)
prepared by him shows that there were injuries on the
dead body of deceased caused by an axe and a gun. PW-          E
19 has also stated that he recovered handle of the axe
near the dead body of the deceased and he seized the
handle of the axe after preparing a seizure list in presence
of the witnesses. Thus, the evidence of PW-13 is
corroborated by material particulars by reliable testimony,    F
direct and circumstantial. [Para 12] [593-B-E]

    2.2. Once the eye-witness account of PW-13 is found
to be corroborated by material particulars and reliable, his
evidence cannot be discarded only on the ground that           G
there were some discrepancies in the evidence of PW-1,
PW-2, PW-13 and PW-19. In the deposition of witnesses,
there are always normal discrepancies due to normal
errors of observation, loss of memory, mental disposition
                                                               H
    584    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 4 S.C.R.,


A of the witnesses and the like. Unless, therefore, the
  discrepancies are "material discrepancies" so as to
  create a reasonable doubt about the credibility of the
  witnesses, the Court will not discard the evidence of the
  witnesses. [Para 13) (593-F-H]
B
      State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki and Anr. (1981) 2 SCC
  752: 1981 (3) SCR 504- relied on.

       2.3. It is correct that the prosecution has not been
  able to establish the motive of appellant No.1 to kill the
C deceased but as there is direct evidence of the accused
  having committed the offence, motive becomes irrelevant
  Motive becomes relevant as an additional circumstance
  in a case where prosecution seeks to prove the guilt by
  circumstantial evidence only. (Para 13] (594-A-B]
D
       Badri v. State of Rajasthan (1976) 1 SCC 442: 1976
  (2) SCR 339; Lallu Manjhi and Anr. v. State of Jharkhand AIR
  2003 SC 854: 2003 (1) SCR 1; Suresh Chandra Bahri ~c.
  v. State of Bihar AIR 1994 2420: 1994 (1) Suppl. SCR 489 -
E referred to.

                       Case Law Reference:
     1976 (2) SCR 339             referred to        Para 5

F    2003 (1) SCR 1              referred to         Para 5
     1994 (1) Suppl. SCR 483      referred to        Para 8
     2005 (1) SCR 1019           held inapplicable Para 1O
     2009 (7) SCR623             relied on           Para 10
G
     1981 (3) SCR 504            relied on            Para 13
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
    No. 1551 of 2007.
H
    SUBODH NATH AND ANR. v. STATE OF TRIPURA                     585


    · From the Judgment & Order dated 08.06.2005 of the High            A
  Court of Gauhati at Agartala Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 22
  of 2004.

      Lalit Chauhan, Somanadri Goud, Kshatrashal Raj,
  Abhishek Vinod Deshmukh (for Parekh & Co.) for the
                                                                        B
  Appellants.

       Ritu Raj Biswas, Gopal Singh for the Respondent.

       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                        c
       A.K. PATNAIK, J. 1. This is an appeal by way of special
  leave under Article 136 of the Constitution against the judgment
  dated 08.06.2005 of the Gauhati High Court, Agartala Bench,
  in Criminal Appeal No. 22 of 2004.

       2. The facts very briefly are that on 09.10.1998, Ashutosh       D
  took out his cows for grazing but did not return home till dusk
  and his cousin, Kripesh, along with others searched for
  Ashutosh but could not find him. On the next day (10.10.1998)
  at about 8.30 a.m., he again went out looking for Ashutosh and
  found his dead body with injuries lying in a jungle at Nalia Tilla.
                                                                        E
  Kripesh then lodged an FIR at the Panisagar Police Station and
  the police registered a case and held an inquest over the dead
  body of the deceased. In course of the investigation, the police
, apprehended Pranajit, who was working as a labourer under             F
  Ashutosh and Kripesh, from District Cachar and brought him
  to Dharamnagar and during interrogation Pranajit disclosed that
  Ashutosh had been killed by the two appellants. The statement
  of Pranajit was also recorded under Section 164 of the Code
  of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'Cr.P.C.') and on              G
  completion of the investigation, the police filed charge-sheet
  against the appellants.

       3. At the trial, the prosecution examined a total of 19
  witnesses. Kripesh, the informant, was examined as PW-1,
                                                                        H
   586     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 4 S.C.R.


A Patal, the elder brother of Pranajit, was examined as PW-2 and
  he stated that PW-13 had disclosed to him that the appellants
  assaulted the deceased by an axe and a lathi. Pranajit was
  examined as PW-13 and he has stated that he had gone along
  with the deceased to graze cows at Nalia Tilla and the appellant
B no.1 had dealt an axe blow on the deceased while the appellant
  no.2 dealt a lathi blow on him. The appellants did not produce
  any evidence in their defence. The trial court convicted the
  appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian
  Penal Code, 1860 (for short 'the IPC') and sentenced them to
c imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.5000/- each and in
  default, to undergo further imprisonment for a period of one
  year. The appellants filed Criminal Appeal No. 22 of 2004
  before the High Court, but by the impugned judgment the High
  Court maintained the conviction and sentence and dismissed
D the appeal.

       4. Mr. Lalit Chauhan, learned counsel appearing for the
  appellants, submitted that on 09.10.1998 when the offence was
  alleged to have been committed, the appellant no.2, Paritosh,
E was less than 18 years of age and was, therefore, a juvenile
  within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Juvenile Justice (Care
  and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (for short 'the 2000 Act').
  He relied on the copy of the primary education certificate issued
  by the Teacher-in-charge of West Bilthai S.B. School,
F Dharmanagar, Tripura (N), to show that the date of birth of the
  appellant no.2 was 28.05.1983. He submitted that accordingly
  his age was about 16 years on 09.10.1998, the date on which
  the offence was committed. He submitted that the trial court and
  the High Court, however, took the view that the provisions of
G the 2000 Act would not apply to the offence which was
  committed on 09.10.1998 and instead the provisions of
  Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (for short 'the 1986 Act') would apply
  and under the 1986 Act only a person who is shown to be less
  than 16 years of age at the time of the commission of the
H offence is a juvenile and it was satisfactorily proved that the
   SUBODH NATH AND ANR. v. STATE OF TRIPURA                    587
               [A.K. PATNAIK, J.)
 appellant no.2 was 16 years of age on the date of commission          A
 of the offence~ He submitted that in Hari Ram v. State of
 Rajasthan and Another [(2009) 13 SCC 211 ], this Court has
 taken a view that all persons who were below the age of 18
 years on the date of commission of the offence would have to
 be treated as juveniles by virtue of the 2000 Act as amended          B
 by the Amendment Act of 2006. He submitted that, therefore,
 the appeal of appellant no.2 will have to be allowed and the
 impugned judgment of the High Court qua appellant no.2 will
 have to be set aside.
                                                                       c
      5. Regarding the appeal of the appellant no.1, Mr.
 Chauhan submitted that his conviction is based on the sole
 testimony of PW-13, but PW-13 ought not to have been
 believed because he had ran away from the place of
 occurrence in North Tripura district, where he was working as         0
 a labourer, to the Cachar district and he was thus a suspect.
 He cited the decision of this Court in Badri v. State of
 Rajasthan [(1976) 1 SCC 442) in which it has been held that
 in case of a witness who is neither wholly reliable nor whole
 unreliable, the Court must be circumspect and has to look for         E
 corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct
 or circumstantial. He also relied on Lallu Manjhi and Another
 v. State of Jharkhand (AIR 2003 SC 854) in which similarly the
 need to look for corroboration where the evidence was neither
 wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable was again emphasized.           F
       6,, Mr. Chauhan next pointed out some discrepancies in
· the evidence of PW-2 and PW-13: He pointed out that PW-2
  had stated in his evidence that PW-13 had told him that the
  appellant no.1 (Subodh) had restrained him and had threatened        G
  him if he disclosed it to anyone that he had dealt an axe blow
  on the deceased. PW-13, on the other hand, has not said that
  the appellant no.1 (Subodh) had restrained him and threatened
  him, but has only said that the appellant no.2 (Paritosh) ran
  after him. He also pointed out discrepancies in the evidence         H
    588     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 4 S.C.R.


A of PW-1 and PW-13. He submitted that while PW-1 has stated
  that PW-13 had accompanied him to search for the deceased,
  PW-13 had stated that he never accompanied PW-1 to search
  for the dead body of the deceased. He also pointed out some
  discrepancies in the evidence of PW-2 and PW-19, the
B Investigation Officer. He finally submitted that in this case the
  weapons with which the deceased was alleged to have been
  killed by the appellants have not been recovered nor any motive
  of the appellants to kill the deceased proved. He argued that
  this is a clear case in which the appellants should have been
C acquitted of the charge under Section 302 read with Section
  34 of the IPC.

        7. In reply, Mr. Rituraj Biswas, learned counsel appearing
  for the State of Tripura, relied on the decision of this Court in
0 Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand and Another ((2005) 3
  sec 551] to submit that the appellant no.2 was not protected
  by the 2000· Act and was liable to be punished for the offence
  under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC being more
  than 16 years of age when the offence was committed. He
E submitted that, therefore, this Court should not disturb the
  conviction of the appellant no.2 by the trial court as well as by
  the High Court only on the ground that he was entitld to the
  benefit of the 2000 Act.

F       8. Regarding the appellant no.1, Mr. Biswas submitted that
  it is not correct as contended by the learned counsel for the
  appellants that the weapons with which the deceased was
  killed by the appellants have not been recoveretbHerefeftect·
  to the evidence of PW-19, the Investigating Officer, as well as
  the inquest report, Ext. P-2, to show that pursuant to the
G disclosure made by the appellants, one blood stained wooden
  stick measuring three feet in length was found at a distance of
  two feet to the left side of the deceased's head, a wooden stick
  of about two and half feet was found nearby the place where
H the head of the deceased was lying and one takkal da~ was
   SUBODH NATH AND ANR. v. STATE .OF TRI PURA                    589
               [A.K. PATNAIK, J.]
  lying at a distance of two feet to the right side of the place where   A
  the deceased's head was lying. Mr. Biswas submitted that PW-
  13 had clearly stated that on the date of the incident, he and
  the deceased went to graze cows at about 2.00 p.m. in the
  rubber garden and at about 4.00 p.m., the appellants went there
  and they were armed with an axe, lathi and gun and that while          B
  appellant no.1 dealt an axe blow on the deceased, appellant
  no.2 started assaulting him with a stick and thereafter the
· appellant no.1 took a gun from the jungle and shot the
  deceased. He submitted that there is some corroboration of
  what PW-13 has stated before the court by PW-6 who has                 c
  stated in his evidence that on the date of the incident at about
  1.30 p.m. he found the deceased and the appellants grazing
  cows in Nallia Tilla. He submitted that PW-6 also identified the
  appellants in the court. He cited the decision of this Court in
  Suresh Chandra Bahri, etc. v. State of Bihar (Al R 1994 2420)          D
  in which it has been held that when a confessional statement
  of disclosure made by the accused is confirmed by recovery
  of incriminating articles, there is a reason to believe that the
  disclosure statement was true and the evidence led in that
  behalf is also worthy of credence.                                     E

       9. We have considered the submissions of the learned
 counsel for the parties with regard to the appeal of the appellant
 no.2 and we find that the High Court has held in Para 28 of the
 impugned judgment that Paritosh (appellant no.2) is                     F
 satisfactorily shown to be 16 years of age at the time of the
 alleged occurrence, i.e., on 09.10.1998, and he was not a
 juvenile under the 1986 Act. The questions that we have to
 decide in the appeal of the appellant no.2 are whether the
 appellant no.2 was entitled to claim that he was a juvenile as          G
 defined in the 2000 Act, and whether his claim to juvenility has
 to be decided in accordance with the provisions of the 2000
 Act, as amended from time to time and the rules made
 thereunder. Sections 7A and 20 of the 2000 Act, which are
  relevant for deciding these questions are quoted hereinbelow:          H
    590       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2013] 4 S.C.R.


A         "Section 7A. Procedure to be followed when claim of
          juvenility is raised before any court. - (1) Whenever a
          claim of juvenility is raised before any court or a court is
          of the opinion that an accused person was a juvenile on
          the date of commission of the offence, the court shall make
B         an inquiry, take such evidence as may be necessary (but
          not an affidavit) so as to determine the age of such person,
          and shall record a finding whether the person is a juvenile
          or a child or not, stating his age as nearly as may be:

          Provided that a claim of juvenility may be raised before any
c         court and it shall be recognised at any stage, even after
          final disposal of the case, and such claim shall be
          determined in terms of the provisions contained in this Act
          and the rules made thereunder, even if the juvenile has
          ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement
D
          of this Act.

          (2) If the court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date
          of commission of the offence under sub-section (1), it shall
          forward the juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate
E         orders and the sentence, if any, passed by a court shall
          be deemed to have no effect.

          Section 20. Special provision in respect of pending
          cases.- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all
F         proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court
          in any area on the date on which this Act comes into force
          in that area, shall be continued in that court as if this Act
          had not been passed and if the court finds that the juvenile
          has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and
G         instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile,
          forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders
          in respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provisions
          of this Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under this
          Act that a juvenile has committed the offence.
H
 SUBODH NATH AND ANR. v. STATE OF TRIPURA                    591
             [A.K. PATNAIK, J.]
           Provided that the Board may, for any adequate and        A
    special reason to be mentioned in the order, review the
    case and pass appropriate order in the interest of such
    juvenile.

          Explanation.- In all pending cases including trial,       B
    revision, appeal or any other criminal proceedings in
    respect of a juvenile in conflict with law, in any court, the
    determination of juvenility of such a juvenile shall be in
    terms of clause (I) of section 2, even if the juvenile ceases
    to be so on or before the date of commencement of this          c
    Act and the provisions of this Act shall apply as if the said
    provisions had been in force, for all purposes and at all
    material times when the alleged offence was committed."

     10. Section 7A and the proviso and the Explanation in the
aforesaid Section 20 quoted above were inserted by the D
Amendment Act of 2006, w.e.f. 22.08.2006 and before the
insertion of the Section 7A and proviso and the Explanation in
Section 20, this Court delivered the judgment in Pratap Singh
v. State of Jharkhand and Another (supra) on 12.02.2005 cited
                                                                 E
by Mr. Biswas. The judgment of this Court in Pratap Singh v.
State of Jharkhand and Another (supra) therefore is of no
assistance to decide this matter. After the insertion of Section
7A and the proviso and explanation in Section 20 in the 2000
Act, this Court delivered the judgment in Harl Ram v. State of F
Rajasthan and Another (supra). The facts of this case were
that the accused committed the offences punishable under
Sections 148, 302, 149, 3251149 and 323/149 of the IPC on
30.11.1998. The date of birth of the accused was 17.10.1982.
The medical examination of the accused conducted by the G
Medical Board indicated his age to be between 16-17 years
when he committed the offence on 30.11.1998. The High Court
held that on the date of the incident the accused was about 16
years of age and was not a juvenile under the 2000 Act and
the provisions of 2000 Act were, therefore, not applicable to H
   592      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2013] 4 S.C.R.


A him. This Court set aside the order of the High Court and held
  that the accused had not attained the age of 18 years on the
  date of the commission of the offence and was entitled to the
  benefit of the 2000 Act, as if the provisions of Section 2(k)
  thereof had always been in existence even during the operation
B of the 1986 Act by virtue of Section 20 of the 2000 Act as
  amended by the Amendment Act of 2006 and accordingly
  remitted the case of the accused to the Juvenile Justice Board,
  Ajmer, for disposal in accordance with law. Considering the
  aforesaid judgment of this Court in Hari Ram v. State of
C Rajasthan and Another (supra) and the provisions of Section
  7A and 20 of the 2000 Act and considering that the appellant
  no.2 is below 18 years of age as per his birth certificate, the
  impugned judgment of the High Court qua the appellant no.2
  will have to be set aside and the case will have to be remitted
D to the concerned Juvenile Justice Board, of North Tripura district
  for disposal of his case in accordance with the provisions of
  the said Act.

        11. Regarding the appeal of the appellant no.1, PW-13,
E who was working as a daily labourer under the deceased and
  PW-1, has clearly stated that he accompanied the deceased
  for grazing cows to the rubber garden at 2.00 p.m. on the date
  of the incident and at about 4.00 p.m., the appellant no.1 along
  with appellant no.2 went there armed with axe, lathi and gun
F and the deceased directed PW-13 to bring the cows so that
  they could proceed towards their house, but at that moment
  appellant no.1 dealt an axe blow on the deceased and
  thereafter he took out.a gun from the jungle near the place of
  occurrence and shot at the victim and on seeing the incident
G he tried to run away from the place of occurrence. PW-13 has
  further stated that he returned home and had not disclosed to
  anyone about the incident because he was afraid of the
  appellants. PW-13 has further stated that on the next day in the
  morning he went to the house of PW-2 and narrated the story
H to him and being afraid of the appellants, he left for Cachar and
 SUBODH NATH AND ANR. v. STATE OF TRIPURA                 593
             [A.K. PATNAIK, J.]
he was arrested by the Police and brought to Panisagar and        A
thereafter he narrated the entire story to the police officer.

     12. We are not persuaded by learned counsel for the
appellants to take a view that the evidence of PW-13 was not
reliable as he was a suspect and had ran away to Cachar. As
                                                                  B
has been explained by PW-13 himself, he left for Cachar
because of his fear of the appellants who had threatened him
with dire consequences if he disclosed the incident to anyone.
At any rate, we find that the evidence of PW-13 is supported
by the evidence of PW-6 who has stated that on the date of        C
the incident he had found the deceased and appellants grazing
cows in Nallia Tilla at around 1.30 p.m. Moreover, the evidence
of the Investigating Officer (PW-19) read with inquest report
(Ext. P-2) prepared b}( him shows that there were injuries on
the dead body of deceased caused by an axe and a gun. PW-
                                                                  0
19 has also stated that he recovered handle of the axe near
the dead body of the deceased and he seized the handle of
the axe after preparing a seizure list in presence of the
witnesses. Thus, the evidence of PW-13 is corroborated by
material particulars by reliable testimony, direct and
                                                                  E
circumstantial.

     13. Once we find that the eye witness account of PW-13
is corroborated by material particulars and is reliable, we
cannot discard his evidence only on the ground that there are
some discrepancies in the evidence of P\,1\4.1, PW-2, PW-13       F
and PW-19. As has been held by this COl!rt in State of
Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki and Another [(1981) t &CC 752], in
the deposition of witnesses there are alwa~ normal
discrepancies due to normal errors of observation}, 1oss of
memory, mental disposition of the witnesses and tire. like.       G
Unless, therefore, the discrepancies are "mate-i;ial
discrepancies" so as to create a reasonable doubt about the.
credibility of the witnesses, the Court will not discard the
evidence of the witnesses. Learned counsel for the appellants
                                                                  H
   594      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 4 S.C.R.


A is right that the prosecution has not been able to establish the
  motive of the appellant no.1 to kill the deceased but as there
  is direct evidence of the accused having committed the offence,
  motive becomes irrelevant. Motive becomes relevant as an
  additional circumstance in a case where prosecution seeks to
B prove the guilt by circumstantial evidence only.

       14. In the result, we hold that the appellant no.1 was guilty
  of the offence under Section 302 of the IPC and we accordingly
  dismiss the appeal of the appellant no.1. We, however, allow
C the appeal of the appellant no.2, set aside the impugned
  judgment of the High Court and the judgment of the trial court
  qua the appellant no.2 and remit the matter to the Juvenile
  Justice Board of North Tripura district for disposal in
  accordance with the 2000 Act withirt four months of receipt of
  a copy of this judgment.
0
   K.K.T.                     Appeal of appellant No. 2 allowed
                          & Appeal of appellant No.1 dismissed.