SUBRATA CHOUDHURY @ SANTOSH CHOUDHURY & ORS.versusTHE STATE OF ASSAM & ANR.

                  [2024] 12 S.C.R. 1 : 2024 INSC 834

           Subrata Choudhury @ Santosh Choudhury & Ors.
                                 v.
                     The State of Assam & Anr.
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 4451 of 2024)
                              05 November 2024
               [C.T. Ravikumar* and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Whether after the acceptance of a negative Final Report in the
       first complaint, upon considering the written objections/protest
       petition and hearing the complainant, a fresh/second complaint
       on the same set of facts is maintainable or not.

                                  Headnotes†
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Second respondent-
       complainant filed second complaint dtd. 20.07.2011, after the
       dismissal of the protest petition and the acceptance of the
       negative Final Report in the first complaint dtd. 11.11.2010, on
       the same set of facts/allegations against the appellants and
       the other accused persons contained in the first complaint –
       Maintainability:
       Held: Not maintainable – Maintainability or otherwise of the
       second complaint depends upon how the earlier complaint was
       rejected/dismissed at the first instance – If the earlier disposal of
       the complaint was on merits and in a manner known to law, the
       second complaint on ‘almost identical facts’ which were raised
       in the first complaint would not be maintainable if the core of
       both the complaints is same – In the present case, the core of
       the first complaint dated 11.11.2010 and the second complaint
       dated 20.07.2011 was the same – Further, the CJM dismissed
       the first complaint vide order dated 06.06.2011 after accepting the
       Final Report, hearing the second respondent and considering the
       protest petition holding that the investigation did not suffer from
       any infirmity – Despite the said order, the second respondent
       did not challenge the same but, chose to file a fresh complaint/
       second complaint – Decision of the Sessions Judge and the High
       Court interfering with the order passed by the CJM which held that
       second complaint was not maintainable in law, set aside – Order
       of the CJM restored. [Paras 27, 31, 32, 34]
* Author
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     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.202, 203:
     Held: Merely because some of the decisions of this Court had held
     that when a Magistrate conducted an inquiry under Section 202
     Cr.P.C., and dismissed a complaint on merits, a second complaint
     on the same facts would not be maintainable unless there are
     very exceptional circumstances, it cannot be said that in all cases
     where a complaint to a Magistrate was not proceeded under
     Section 202, Cr.P.C., and dismissed not at the stage of Section 203,
     Cr.P.C., a second complaint or a second protest petition would be
     maintainable. [Para 31]

     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.156(3), 2(d) – Protest
     petition when to be treated as a complaint u/s.2(d):
     Held: A ‘narazi’ viz., disapproval against a final report submitted
     in a case investigated by the police on a first information report
     registered pursuant to a complaint under Section 156(3) for
     investigation should be treated as a complaint only if it satisfies
     the requirement in law to constitute a complaint as defined
     under Section 2(d) – In the present case, since the narazi
     petition dated 05.05.2011 did not satisfy the ingredients to attract
     Section 2(d), it could not be treated as a complaint. [Paras 17, 18]

     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.300(1) – When not
     applicable – Maxim –“nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem
     causa”:
     Held: No one shall be vexed twice for one and the same cause –
     However, in the present case, there was no conviction or acquittal
     of the appellants in regard to the Sections involved on the same
     set of facts, by a Court of competent jurisdiction – Section 300 is
     thus, not applicable. [Para 9]

                              Case Law Cited
     Samta Naidu & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. [2020] 2
     SCR 1127 : (2020) 5 SCC 378 – relied on.
     Vijayalakshmi v. Vasudevan (1994) 4 SCC 656; Bhagwat Singh
     v. Commissioner of Police and Anr [1985] 3 SCR 942 : (1985)
     2 SCC 537; Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Misra [1967] 3 SCR
     668 : AIR 1968 SC 117; Bhimappa Bassappa Bhu Sannavar
     v. Laxman Shivarayappa Samagouda & Ors. [1971] 1 SCR 1 :
     (1970) 1 SCC 665; Sunil Majhi v. The State AIR 1968 (Cal)
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          Subrata Choudhury @ Santosh Choudhury & Ors. v.
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     238; Shivshankar Singh v. State of Bihar & Anr. [2011] 13 SCR
     247 : (2012) 1 SCC 130; H. S. Bains v. State (Union Territory of
     Chandigarh) [1981] 1 SCR 935 : AIR 1980 SC 1883; Bindeshwari
     Prasad Singh v. Kali Singh [1977] 1 SCR 125 : AIR 1977 SC 2432;
     Poonam Chand Jain & Anr. v. Farzu [2010] 2 SCR 109 : (2010) 2
     SCC 631; Mahesh Chand v. B. Janaradhan Reddy & Anr. [2002]
     Supp. 4 SCR 566 : (2003) 1 SCC 734; Pramatha Nath Talukdar
     v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar [1962] Supp. 2 SCR 297 : AIR 1962 SC
     876; Jatinder Singh v. Ranjit Kaur [2001] 1 SCR 707 : (2001) 2
     SCC 570; Ravinder Singh v. Sukhbir Singh [2013] 1 SCR 243 :
     (2013) 9 SCC 245 – referred to.

                               List of Acts
     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860.

                            List of Keywords
     Protest petition; Second protest petition; Negative Final Report;
     First complaint/original complaint; Written objections; “narazi”;
     “Complaint”; Fresh/second complaint; Maintainability of the second
     complaint; Same set of facts/allegations; Identical facts; “nemo
     debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa”; Sections 202, 203 of
     the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 156(3) of the Code
     of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

                           Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
     4451 of 2024
     From the Judgment and Order dated 08.01.2021 of the Gauhati
     High Court in CRLRP No. 95 of 2013

                        Appearances for Parties
     S. Nagamuthu, Sr. Adv., Amicus Curiae.
     Pijush Kanti Roy, Sr. Adv., Pritthish Roy, Ms. Kakali Roy, Rajan
     K. Chourasia, M.P. Parthiban, Adv. for the Appellants.
     Nalin Kohli, Sr. A.A.G., Ankit Roy, Ms. Nimisha Menon, Anshul
     Malik, Ayuushman Arora, Ms. Shruti Agarwal, Manish Goswami,
     Rongon Choudhury, Priyonkoo Gogoi, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal,
     Advs. for the Respondents.
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                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
                                Judgment
     C.T. Ravikumar, J.
     Leave granted.
1.   An affirmative answer to the question of law raised before the High
     Court as to whether after the acceptance of a negative Final Report
     filed under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
     (for short, the ‘Cr.P.C.’), upon considering the written objection/
     protest petition and hearing complainant, a fresh complaint on the
     same set of facts is maintainable, by the High Court of Gauhati
     and the consequential confirmation of the order of the learned
     Additional Sessions Judge, Cachar, Silchar in Criminal Revision
     Petition No.101/2012, as per judgment and order dated 08.01.2021
     in Criminal Revision Petition No.95/2013 is under challenge in this
     appeal by special leave. As per the said judgment dated 08.01.2021,
     the High Court dismissed the revision petition and confirmed the
     order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge dated 28.02.2013
     in Criminal Revision Petition No.101/2012 whereunder the order
     dated 12.07.2012 of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cachar,
     Silchar dismissing the complaint filed by the second respondent
     herein was set aside and case was remanded for consideration of
     the matter afresh for the purpose arriving at a finding as to whether
     any case for taking cognizance of the alleged offence(s) and for
     issuance of process has been made or not.
2.   Facts and circumstances giving rise to the captioned appeal, in
     succinct, are as under: -
     The second respondent herein filed a complaint on 11.11.2010 before
     the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cachar, Silchar and it was forwarded
     for investigation under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. Consequently,
     on 05.12.2010, FIR No.244/2010 under Sections 406, 420 read with
     Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short the ‘IPC’) was
     registered at Dholai Police Station against the appellants. On completion
     of the investigation, Final Report under Section 173, Cr.P.C., was filed
     before the learned Magistrate on 28.02.2011. Virtually, it was a negative
     report as can be seen from Annexure-P3 – Final Report No.11 of 2011
     dated 28.02.2011. Aggrieved by the said Final Report, the complainant
     filed a written objection/narazi petition on 05.05.2011, alleging that
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     the investigation was not conducted properly and praying for taking
     cognizance on it. As per order dated 06.06.2011, the learned Chief
     Judicial Magistrate (CJM) accepted the Final Report, after hearing the
     second respondent-complainant and considering the narazi petition,
     upon holding that the investigation did not suffer from any infirmity.
     On 20.07.2011, the second respondent filed the second complaint
     with the same set of allegations against the appellants and the others
     who were shown as accused in the first complaint, before the learned
     CJM alleging commission of offence under the very Sections viz.,
     406, 420 and 34 IPC, and the same was numbered as C.R. No.159
     of 2011. On 19.09.2011, as per Annexure P-7 order, the learned
     CJM exercising the power under Section 202 Cr.P.C., directed an
     investigation after recording the initial deposition of the complainant
     and the statements of the witnesses. Feeling aggrieved by the said
     order of the learned CJM dated 19.09.2011, the appellant(s)/accused
     preferred a Criminal Revision Petition before the High Court. As per
     Annexure P-8 order dated 24.05.2012, the High Court set aside the
     order of the learned CJM and directed the appellants herein to file
     an appropriate application raising the question of maintainability of
     the second complaint viz., C.R. No.159 of 2011.
3.   Pursuant to the order dated 24.05.2012, the learned CJM considered
     the application filed by the appellants raising the question of
     maintainability of the second complaint and dismissed the second
     complaint holding it not maintainable in law. Against the said order
     of the CJM dated 12.07.2012, the second respondent-complainant
     filed Criminal Revision Petition No.101 of 2012. The learned Sessions
     Judge allowed the said Criminal Revision Petition as per Annexure
     P-10 order dated 28.02.2013 and set aside the order of the CJM
     and remanded the case for reconsideration of the matter afresh for
     the purpose of finding whether any case for taking cognizance of
     the alleged offences and issuance of process have been made out
     or not. Aggrieved by the said order dated 28.02.2013 the appellants
     preferred Criminal Revision No.95 of 2013 which was dismissed by
     the High Court as per the impugned order dated 08.01.2021.
4.   Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel
     appearing for the respondents.
5.   In the wake of aforesaid factual background, the appellants, relying
     various decisions of this Court, contended that the second complaint
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     filed by the second respondent-complainant is not maintainable. It is
     contended that the High Court had failed to consider the provisions
     under Section 300 (1), Cr.P.C., which resulted in dismissal of the
     revision petition. Dilating the said contentions, further grounds founded
     on Section 300 (1) of the Cr.P.C., are raised.
6.   Before dealing with the other contentions raised to assail the judgment
     dated 08.01.2021, we think it is only appropriate to consider the
     contentions raised by the appellants founded on Section 300 (1),
     Cr.P.C., reads thus: -
          “300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be
          tried for same offence.—(1) A person who has once been
          tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence
          and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while
          such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable
          to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same
          facts for any other offence for which a different charge from
          the one made against him might have been made under
          sub-section (1) of section 221, or for which he might have
          been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof.”
7.   In view of the indisputable and undisputed facts, referred hereinbefore,
     revealing the outcome of the first complaint dated 11.11.2010 and
     taking into account the stage of the second complaint the question
     is whether Section 300 (1), Cr.P.C., is applicable or not to the case
     at hand.
8.   Section 300 (1), Cr.P.C., is found on the maxim “Nemo debet bis
     vexari pro una et eadem causa”, which means that no one shall
     be vexed twice for one and the same cause. The Section provides
     that no man once convicted or acquitted shall be tried for the same
     offence again for one and the same cause. Thus, it can be seen
     that in order to bar the trial in terms of Section 300 (1), Cr.P.C., it
     must be shown: -
     a.   that the person concerned has been tried by a competent Court
          for the same offence or one for which he might have been
          charged or convicted at that trial, on the same facts.
     b.   that he has been convicted or acquitted at the trial and that
          such conviction or acquittal is in force.
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9.    This fundamental rule of our criminal law revealed from this
      Section enables raising of the special pleas of autrefois acquit
      and autrefois convict, subject to the satisfaction of the conditions
      enjoined thereunder. This position has been made clear by this
      Court in Vijayalakshmi v. Vasudevan.1 In the case at hand, the
      undisputed facts stated hereinbefore would reveal that the appellants
      were never ever tried before a Court of competent jurisdiction for
      the aforesaid offence(s) on the basis of the aforesaid set of facts.
      Therefore, indisputably there was no verdict of conviction or acquittal
      in regard to the aforesaid Sections in respect of the appellants on
      the aforesaid set of facts, by a Court of competent jurisdiction. When
      that be the position, we have no hesitation to hold that the grounds
      founded on Section 300 (1), Cr.P.C. raised by the appellants merit
      no consideration.
10. As noted at the outset, the question of law raised before and
    decided by the High Court was whether after the acceptance of
    the Final Report filed under Section 173, Cr.P.C., upon considering
    the written objection/protest petition and hearing the complainant,
    a fresh complaint on the same set of facts is maintainable or not.
    There can be no two views as relates the position that there can
    be no blanket bar for filing a second complaint on the same set of
    facts. We will deal with the moot question and the aforesaid position
    a little later.
11. Firstly, the question as to what are the courses available to a
    Magistrate on receipt of a negative report is to be looked into and
    in fact, that question was considered by this Court in Bhagwat
    Singh v. Commissioner of Police and Anr.2 This Court held that
    on receipt of a negative report, the following four courses are open
    to the Magistrate concerned: -
      1.     to accept the report and to drop the proceedings;
      2.     to direct further investigation to be made by the police.
      3.     to investigate himself or refer the investigation to be made by
             another Magistrate under Section 159, Cr.P.C., and



1    (1994) 4 SCC 656
2    [1985] 3 SCR 942 : (1985) 2 SCC 537
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     4.   to take cognizance of the offence under Section 200, Cr.P.C.,
          as private complaint when materials are sufficient in his opinion
          as if the complainant is prepared for that course.
     The indisputable position is that in the case at hand the learned
     CJM on receipt of the negative report accepted it after rejecting the
     written objections/protest petition, which is one of the courses open
     to a Magistrate on receipt of a negative report, in terms of Bhagwat
     Singh’s case (supra).
12. In view of the confirmance of the judgment of the learned Sessions
    Judge carrying the following observations/findings it is not
    inappropriate to delve into them for the limited purpose. They, in so
    far as relevant, read thus:-
          “(i) Thus, the present complaint in question is truly qualify
          to the definition of the term complaint and the same has
          been filed on being aggrieved against the final report,
          submitted against his previous complaint. Hence, in my
          considered opinion the learned court below misconstrued
          the definition of the term complaint, by treating the simple
          objection petition as Narazi complaint, whereas terming
          the present complaint in question as second complaint.
          (ii) Situated thus, the Hon’ble Apex Court of India, in the
          said decision, (referring to the decision in Abhinandan
          Jha v. Dinesh Misra, reported in AIR 1968 Supreme
          Court 117) specifically observed that even after accepting
          the final report, it is open to the Magistrate to treat the
          respective protest petitions as complaints and to take
          further proceedings in accordance with law.”
13. According to us, the observations/findings referred above as (i) is
    actually an outcome of a misconstruction on the part of the learned
    Sessions Judge. In troth, the learned CJM termed the subject
    complaint dated 20.07.2011 as second complaint not with reference to
    the written objection/protest petition dated 05.05.2011 and it was so
    treated with reference to the original complaint dated 11.11.2010. This
    fact is evident from the recitals in Annexure-P9 order dated 12.07.2012
    passed by the learned CJM in complaint numbered as Case
    No.159/2011, which was challenged before the learned Sessions
    Judge. In the said order the learned CJM observed and held thus:-
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            “After the original complaint has been duly investigated by
            the police and Final Report submitted therein has been
            accepted by the Court in a Judicial Proceeding; therefore,
            in my considered view it cannot be re-opened by means
            of filing of a second complaint in respect of the same facts
            and circumstances.”
     In view of the afore-extracted recital from the order dated 12.07.2012
     of the learned CJM, it is evident that it was with reference to the
     original complaint that he termed the complaint filed by the second
     respondent on 20.07.2011 as the second complaint.
14. The second observation/finding referred above as (ii) also requires
    a clarification. It is true that correctly this Court held in the decision
    in Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Misra3 that even after accepting
    the final report it would be open to the Magistrate concerned to
    treat respective protest petition as complaint and to take further
    proceedings in accordance with law. Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C.
    defines the term ‘complaint’. No doubt in Cr.P.C., no form for filing
    complaint is prescribed. However, the essentials to constitute a
    complaint can be briefly mentioned thus: -
     (i)    An oral or written allegation;
     (ii)   That some person(s) known or unknown has committed an
            offence;
     (iii) It must be made to a Magistrate with a view to his taking action.
15. In Bhimappa Bassappa Bhu Sannavar v. Laxman Shivarayappa
    Samagouda & Ors.,4 this Court, as regards the meaning of a
    complaint, held thus: -
            “11. The word “complaint” has a wide meaning since it
            includes even an oral allegation. It may, therefore, be
            assumed that no form is prescribed which the complaint
            must take. It may only be said that there must be an
            allegation which prima facie discloses the commission of
            an offence with the necessary facts for the magistrate to
            take action. Section 190(1)(a) makes it necessary that the
            alleged facts must disclose the commission of an offence.”


3   [1967] 3 SCR 668 : AIR 1968 SC 117
4   [1971] 1 SCR 1: (1970) 1 SCC 665
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16. In the decision in Sunil Majhi v. The State,5 the Calcutta High Court
    in paragraph 6 held thus: -
               “6.The term ‘naraji’ means ‘disapproval’ and in the
               context of things it signifies disapproval of the report in
               relation to which it is filed. It may simply challenge the
               report on grounds stated and pray for its rejection: it may
               while praying for rejection of the report also reiterate the
               allegations made in the petition of complaint and pray for
               further action by the court and in that view of the matter
               it would be a fresh complaint. In the case Jamini Kanta v.
               Bhabanath. AIR 1939 Cal 273, it was observed:
               “The word ‘naraji’ is often loosely used and it is necessary
               to examine the petition which is filed in a particular case “to
               determine its true import in that case on an examination of
               the petition it was found that it was not a complaint. The
               reports of the cases cited by Mr. Banerji do not contain
               any discussion about the nature of the statements made
               in the naraji petitions in those cases, but from the fact
               that the naraji petitions were treated as complaints it
               would appear that they did satisfy the requirements of a
               complaint as defined in section 4(h) of the Code in order
               to be a complaint the petition must contain allegations of
               an offence and also a prayer for judicial action thereon. If
               therefore, the protest petition filed against an enquiry report
               filed or to be filed, while lodging a protest recites also the
               allegations already made and prays for action of the court
               thereon, there is no difficulty in treating it as a complaint
               and taking action thereon under Sections 202, 203 or 204
               of the Cr PC. In the cases of Lachmi Shaw. AIR 1932
               Cal 383 (1) (Supra) and Satkari Ghose. AIR 1941 Cal 439
               (Supra) there were complaints to the police which were
               found on investigation to be false and the police submitted
               final reports and at the same time prayed for prosecuting
               the complainant under section 211 I.P.C. Naraji petitions
               were filed against the police reports but prosecutions were
               launched without considering them and it was held that


5     AIR 1968 (Cal) 238
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           the procedure followed was irregular and that the naraji
           petitions should be treated as complaints and treated and
           disposed of as such before the prayer for prosecuting the
           complainant could be entertained.”
17. In the light of the aforesaid decisions, we are of the view that a
    ‘narazi’ viz., disapproval against a final report submitted in a case
    investigated by the police on a first information report registered
    pursuant to the forwarding of a complaint under Section 156(3),
    Cr.P.C., for investigation should be treated as a complaint only if the
    same satisfies the requirement in law to constitute a complaint as
    defined under Section 2(d), Cr.P.C. As held in Sunil Majhi’s case
    (supra), if while praying for rejection of a final report after reiterating
    the allegations made in the original complaint and prayer for further
    action by the court, the same could be treated as a fresh complaint,
    but then, we may hasten to add that its maintainability depends upon
    the question as to how the original/protest petition was disposed of.
18. It is relevant to note that in paragraph 9 of the judgment dated 28.02.2013
    (Annexure-P10), the learned Sessions Judge after referring to the
    term ‘complaint,’ defined under Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C. and
    taking note of the aforesaid essentials to constitute a complaint
    made a scrutiny of the written objection dated 05.05.2011 submitted
    by the second respondent-complainant against the negative report
    dated 28.02.2011 held that the said objection dated 05.05.2011 could
    not be termed as a ‘narazi complaint’ and found that it did not qualify
    to the definition of the term ‘complaint’. In that context, with reference
    to the definition in Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C. and the essentials to
    constitute a complaint as referred above, it can only be said that
    the said finding of the learned Sessions Judge is perfectly in tune
    with the position of law. Once that is so found and when it is a fact
    that the negative report on the original complaint dated 11.11.2010
    was accepted after rejecting the written objection/protest petition
    dated 05.05.2011 it cannot be said that the learned CJM has gone
    wrong in describing the complaint dated 20.07.2011 as the second
    complaint. The clarification required to the observation/finding referred
    to as (ii), with reference to the Abhinandan Jha’s case (supra) is
    that though it would be open to the Magistrate to treat a protest
    petition as complaint and to take further proceedings in accordance
    with law even after accepting final report that is permissible only if
    the protest petition concerned satisfies the ingredients to constitute
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      a complaint as defined under Section 2(d), Cr.P.C. Since the narazi
      petition dated 05.05.2011 did not satisfy the ingredients to attract
      Section 2(d), Cr.P.C., it could not be treated as a complaint as held
      by the learned Sessions Judge. At the same time, in view of what is
      stated above and taking note of the fact that the allegations made in
      the original complaint are reiterated in the complaint dated 20.07.2011
      and pray for further action by the court, it is rightly taken by the
      courts below as a complaint. Since the final report on the original
      complaint was already accepted after rejecting the narazi petition
      the complaint dated 20.07.2011 which satisfies all requirements of
      a complaint, if at all having the characteristics of a protest petition,
      could be treated as a complaint and hence, the learned CJM and
      the learned Sessions Judge have rightly treated it as a complaint.
19. Now, we will consider the question whether the construction of
    the law laid down by this Court in regard to the maintainability of
    a second complaint, in the circumstances mentioned hereinbefore
    that led to the moot question, by the High Court as reflected under
    paragraph 20 of the impugned judgment and the consequential
    direction can be sustained. Paragraphs 20 and 21 in the impugned
    judgment read thus: -
           20. Evidently, the learned Magistrate did not act upon the
           said protest petition, inasmuch as, the learned Magistrate
           did not proceed under Section 200/202 of the CrPC treating
           the same as narazi complaint. When the learned Magistrate
           did not proceed under Section 200 to 204 CrPC for taking
           cognizance upon received of the first protest petition nor
           the protest petition was dismissed under Section 203
           CrPC, the complaint in question though considered to be a
           second narazi complaint with reference to the first protest
           petition as indicated above, the same is not barred under
           law, reason being that the alleged first protest petition
           did not contain detailed particulars of the case required
           for decision nor the learned Magistrate proceed on the
           basis of the first petition under Section 200/202 CrPC and
           therefore the alleged first protest petition in my cosndiered
           (sic: considered) view cannot be held to have been
           dismissed after full consideration under Section 203 CrPC.
           Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the
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          first protest petition was dismissed after full consideration,
          the narazi complaint in question is maintainable for special
          circumstances, namely the first protest petition did not
          contain the full facts and particulars necessary to decide
          the case and the same was considered on incomplete
          facts and particulars and the learned Magistrate also did
          not examined the complainant or any witnesses under
          Section 200 CrPC nor proceeded under Section 202
          CrPC to decide whether there was sufficient ground for
          proceeding. Therefore, in any view of the matter, the
          present complaint in question cannot be considered as
          second complaint and the same also cannot be held to
          be barred for acceptance of the final report. Secondly,
          even if it is considered to be second narazi complaint
          with reference to the first protest petition, then also the
          complainant is not barred in the facts situation of the case
          because of the special on exceptional circumstances as
          indicated above.
          21. For the reasons stated above, this court do not find
          any fault with the impugned order passed by the learned
          Sessions Judge and accordingly, the revision petition is
          dismissed. The matter be remanded back to the learned
          Magistrate to proceed with the complaint in accordance
          with law.
20. Paragraph 21 of the impugned judgment of the High Court, as
    extracted above, would reveal that the High Court also treated
    the petition dated 20.07.2011 filed by the second respondent as
    a complaint. Since it is filed by the second respondent after the
    acceptance of the original complaint dated 11.11.2010 that too, after
    the rejection of his protest petition dated 05.05.2011, there can be
    no dispute regarding the status of the complaint dated 20.07.2011
    as the second complaint of the second respondent.
21. The appellants herein contended that the second complaint
    carries the same set of allegations and in view of the dismissal
    of the first complaint after considering the protest petition and
    hearing the complainant, the second complaint filed by the second
    respondent dated 20.07.2011 is not maintainable. To buttress the
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       said contention, the learned counsel relied on the decisions of this
       Court in Shivshankar Singh v. State of Bihar & Anr.,6 H. S. Bains
       v. State (Union Territory of Chandigarh),7 Bindeshwari Prasad
       Singh v. Kali Singh8 and Poonam Chand Jain & Anr. v. Farzu.9
22. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent/
    the complainant contended that the acceptance of the Final Report,
    based on the first complaint could not be a bar for maintaining a
    fresh complaint on the same set of facts. It is submitted that virtually
    upon filing of the Final Report based on the first complaint only an
    objection was filed by the second respondent and therefore, it ought
    not to have been taken as the first narazi complaint. At the same
    time, it is further contended that even if it is taken as the first narazi
    complaint, a second narazi complaint is not barred by law. To fortify
    the said contention, the learned counsel relied on the decision of
    this Court in Mahesh Chand v. B. Janaradhan Reddy & Anr.10 and
    Shivshankar Singh’s case (supra).
23. In view of the plethora of decisions, there can be no doubt that
    even when Final Report filed after investigation based on the FIR
    registered pursuant to the receipt of complaint forwarded by a Court
    for investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C., is accepted
    and protest petition thereto is rejected, the Magistrate can still take
    cognizance upon a second complaint or second protest petition, on
    the same or similar allegations or facts. But this position is subject
    to conditions.
24. In Samta Naidu & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.,11 this
    Court considered all the relevant decisions including Pramatha Nath
    Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar,12 Jatinder Singh v. Ranjit Kaur,13
    Poonam Chand Jain v. Farzu,14 and Shivshankar Singh’s case



6     [2011] 13 SCR 247 : (2012) 1 SCC 130
7     [1981] 1 SCR 935 : AIR 1980 SC 1883
8     [1977] 1 SCR 125 : AIR 1977 SC 2432
9     [2010] 2 SCR 109 : (2010) 2 SCC 631
10    [2002] Supp. 4 SCR 566 : (2003) 1 SCC 734
11    [2020] 2 SCR 1127 : (2020) 5 SCC 378
12    [1962] Supp. 2 SCR 297 : AIR 1962 SC 876
13    [2001] 1 SCR 707 : (2001) 2 SCC 570
14    [2010] 2 SCR 109 : (2010) 2 SCC 631
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                         15

          Subrata Choudhury @ Santosh Choudhury & Ors. v.
                     The State of Assam & Anr.

     (supra) in regard to the moot question involved, in paragraphs 12
     to 12.3, 12.5, 13 and 16 thereunder. The said paragraphs, insofar
     as they are relevant to this case, are as under:
          12. The law declared in Talukdar has consistently been
          followed, for instance, in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. Kali
          Singh it was observed: (Bindeshwari Prasad Singh case,
          SCC p. 59, para 4)
                “4. … it is now well settled that a second
                complaint can lie only on fresh facts or even
                on the previous facts only if a special case is
                made out.”
                                                 (emphasis supplied)
          The view taken in Bindeshwari was followed in A.S.
          Gauraya v. S.N. Thakur.
          12.1. In Jatinder Singh v. Ranjit Kaur the issue was whether
          the first complaint having been dismissed for default,
          could the second complaint be maintained. The matter
          was considered as under: (SCC pp. 572-74, paras 9 & 12)
          “9. There is no provision in the Code or in any other statute
          which debars a complainant from preferring a second
          complaint on the same allegations if the first complaint did
          not result in a conviction or acquittal or even discharge.
          Section 300 of the Code, which debars a second trial, has
          taken care to explain that “the dismissal of a complaint, or
          the discharge of the accused, is not an acquittal for the
          purposes of this section”. However, when a Magistrate
          conducts an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code and
          dismisses the complaint on merits, a second complaint
          on the same facts cannot be made unless there are very
          exceptional circumstances. Even so, a second complaint is
          permissible depending upon how the complaint happened
          to be dismissed at the first instance.
          *                     *                         *
          12. If the dismissal of the complaint was not on merit but
          on default of the complainant to be present there is no
          bar in the complainant moving the Magistrate again with a
16                                                    [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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      second complaint on the same facts. But if the dismissal
      of the complaint under Section 203 of the Code was on
      merits the position could be different. There appeared
      a difference of opinion earlier as to whether a second
      complaint could have been filed when the dismissal
      was under Section 203. The controversy was settled by
      this Court in Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan
      Sarkar, (1962) 1 Cri LJ 770. A majority of Judges of the
      three-Judge Bench held thus: (AIR p. 899, para 48)
           ‘48. … An order of dismissal under Section 203,
           Criminal Procedure Code, is, however, no bar
           to the entertainment of a second complaint on
           the same facts but it will be entertained only
           in exceptional circumstances, e.g., where the
           previous order was passed on an incomplete
           record or on a misunderstanding of the nature
           of the complaint or it was manifestly absurd,
           unjust or foolish or where new facts which
           could not, with reasonable diligence, have
           been brought on the record in the previous
           proceedings, have been adduced. It cannot
           be said to be in the interest of justice that
           after a decision has been given against the
           complainant upon a full consideration of his
           case, he or any other person should be given
           another opportunity to have his complaint
           inquired into.’
                                       (emphasis supplied)
      S.K. Das, J. (as he then was) while dissenting from the said
      majority view had taken the stand that right of a complainant
      to file a second complaint would not be inhibited even by
      such considerations. But at any rate the majority view is
      that the second complaint would be maintainable if the
      dismissal of the first complaint was not on merits.
                                             (emphasis supplied)
      12.2. In Ranvir Singh v. State of Haryana Haryana, the
      issue was set out in para 23 of the decision and the
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                         17

          Subrata Choudhury @ Santosh Choudhury & Ors. v.
                     The State of Assam & Anr.

          discussion that followed thereafter was as under: (SCC
          p. 647, paras 23-26)
          “23. In the instant case, the question is narrowed down
          further as to whether such a second complaint would be
          maintainable when the earlier one had not been dismissed
          on merits, but for the failure of the complainant to put in
          the process fees for effecting service.
          24. The answer has been provided firstly in Pramatha
          Nath Talukdar case, wherein this Court had held that
          even if a complaint was dismissed under Section 203
          CrPC, a second complaint would still lie under exceptional
          circumstances, indicated hereinbefore. The said view has
          been consistently upheld in subsequent decisions of this
          Court. Of course, the question of making a prayer for
          recalling the order of dismissal would not be maintainable
          before the learned Magistrate in view of Section 362 CrPC,
          but such is not the case in these special leave petitions.
          25. In the present cases, neither have the complaints
          been dismissed on merit nor have they been dismissed
          at the stage of Section 203 CrPC. On the other hand,
          only on being satisfied of a prima facie case, the learned
          Magistrate had issued process on the complaint.
          26. The said situation is mainly covered by the decision
          of this Court in Jatinder Singh case, wherein the decision
          in Pramatha Nath Talukdar case was also taken into
          consideration and it was categorically observed that in the
          absence of any provision in the Code barring a second
          complaint being filed on the same allegation, there would
          be no bar to a second complaint being filed on the same
          facts if the first complaint did not result in the conviction
          or acquittal or even discharge of the accused, and if the
          dismissal was not on merit but on account of a default on
          the part of the complainant.”
                                                 (Underline supplied)
          12.3. In Poonam Chand Jain v. Fazru the issue whether
          after the dismissal of the earlier complaint had attained
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      finality, could a second complaint be maintained on
      identical facts was considered as under: (SCC pp. 634-36,
      paras 14-20)
      “14. In the background of these facts, the question which
      crops up for determination by this Court is whether after
      an order of dismissal of complaint attained finality, the
      complainant can file another complaint on almost identical
      facts without disclosing in the second complaint the fact
      of either filing of the first complaint or its dismissal.
      15. Almost similar questions came up for consideration
      before this Court in Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj
      Ranjan Sarkar. The majority judgment in Pramatha Nath
      was delivered by Kapur, J. His Lordship held that an order
      of dismissal under Section 203 of the Criminal Procedure
      Code (for short “the Code”) is, however, no bar to the
      entertainment of a second complaint on the same facts but
      it can be entertained only in exceptional circumstances.
      This Court explained the exceptional circumstances as:
      (a) where the previous order was passed on incomplete
      record, or
      (b) on a misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint, or
      (c) the order which was passed was manifestly absurd,
      unjust or foolish, or
      (d) where new facts which could not, with reasonable
      diligence, have been brought on the record in the previous
      proceedings.
      16. This Court in Pramatha Nath made it very clear that
      interest of justice cannot permit that after a decision has
      been given on a complaint upon full consideration of the
      case, the complainant should be given another opportunity
      to have the complaint enquired into again. In para 50 of
      the judgment the majority judgment of this Court opined
      that fresh evidence or fresh facts must be such which
      could not with reasonable diligence have been brought
      on record. This Court very clearly held that it cannot be
      settled law which permits the complainant to place some
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                          19

          Subrata Choudhury @ Santosh Choudhury & Ors. v.
                     The State of Assam & Anr.

          evidence before the Magistrate which are in his possession
          and then if the complaint is dismissed adduce some more
          evidence. According to this Court, such a course is not
          permitted on a correct view of the law. (para 50, p. 899)
          17. This question again came up for consideration before
          this Court in Jatinder Singh v. Ranjit Kaur. There also this
          Court by relying on the principle in Pramatha Nath held
          that here is no provision in the Code or in any other statute
          which debars a complainant from filing a second complaint
          on the same allegation as in the first complaint. But this
          Court added when a Magistrate conducts an enquiry under
          Section 202 of the Code and dismisses a complaint on
          merits a second complaint on the same facts could not
          be made unless there are “exceptional circumstances”.
          This Court held in para 12, if the dismissal of the first
          complaint is not on merit but the dismissal is for the default
          of the complainant then there is no bar in filing a second
          complaint on the same facts. However, if the dismissal
          of the complaint under Section 203 of the Code was on
          merit the position will be different.
          19. Again in Mahesh Chand v. B. Janardhan Reddy, a
          three-Judge Bench of this Court considered this question
          in para 19 at p. 740 of the Report. The learned Judges of
          this Court held that a second complaint is not completely
          barred nor is there any statutory bar in filing a second
          complaint on the same facts in a case where a previous
          complaint was dismissed without assigning any reason.
          The Magistrate under Section 204 of the Code can take
          cognizance of an offence and issue process if there is
          sufficient ground for proceeding. In Mahesh Chand this
          Court relied on the ratio in Pramatha and held if the first
          complaint had been dismissed the second complaint can
          be entertained only in exceptional circumstances and
          thereafter the exceptional circumstances pointed out in
          Pramatha were reiterated. Therefore, this Court holds
          that the ratio in Pramatha Nath is still holding the field.
          The same principle has been reiterated once again by
          this Court in Hira Lal v. State of U.P. In para 14 of the
          judgment this Court expressly quoted the ratio in Mahesh
          Chand discussed hereinabove.
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      20. Following the aforesaid principles which are more
      or less settled and are holding the field since 1962 and
      have been repeatedly followed by this Court, we are
      of the view that the second complaint in this case was
      on almost identical facts which was raised in the first
      complaint and which was dismissed on merits. So the
      second complaint is not maintainable. This Court finds
      that the core of both the complaints is the same. Nothing
      has been disclosed in the second complaint which is
      substantially new and not disclosed in first complaint.
      No case is made out that even after the exercise of
      due diligence the facts alleged in the second complaint
      were not within the knowledge of the first complainant. In
      fact, such a case could not be made out since the facts
      in both the complaints are almost identical. Therefore,
      the second complaint is not covered within exceptional
      circumstances explained in Pramatha Nath. In that view
      of the matter the second complaint in the facts of this
      case, cannot be entertained.”
                                             (emphasis supplied)
      12.4…..
      12.5. In Ravinder Singh v. Sukhbir the matter was
      considered from the standpoint whether a frustrated litigant
      be permitted to give vent to his frustration and whether a
      person be permitted to unleash vendetta to harass any
      person needlessly. The discussion was as under: (SCC
      pp. 258-60, paras 26-27 & 33)
      “26. While considering the issue at hand in Shivshankar
      Singh v. State of Bihar this Court, after considering its
      earlier judgments in Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj
      Ranjan Sarkar, Jatinder Singh v. Ranjit Kaur, Mahesh
      Chand v. B. Janardhan Reddy and Poonam Chand Jain
      v. Fazru held : (Shivshankar Singh case, SCC p. 136,
      para 18)
      ‘18. … it is evident that the law does not prohibit filing or
      entertaining of the second complaint even on the same
      facts provided the earlier complaint has been decided on
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                            21

          Subrata Choudhury @ Santosh Choudhury & Ors. v.
                     The State of Assam & Anr.

          the basis of insufficient material or the order has been
          passed without understanding the nature of the complaint
          or the complete facts could not be placed before the court
          or where the complainant came to know certain facts after
          disposal of the first complaint which could have tilted the
          balance in his favour. However, second complaint would
          not be maintainable wherein the earlier complaint has
          been disposed of on full consideration of the case of the
          complainant on merit.’
          27. In Chandrapal Singh v. Maharaj Singh this Court has
          held that it is equally true that chagrined and frustrated
          litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their
          frustration by enabling them to invoke the jurisdiction of
          criminal courts in a cheap manner. In such a fact situation,
          the court must not hesitate to quash criminal proceedings.
          *                  *                    *
          33. The High Court has dealt with the issue involved herein
          and the matter stood closed at the instance of Respondent 1
          himself. Therefore, there can be no justification whatsoever
          to launch criminal prosecution on that basis afresh. The
          inherent power of the court in dealing with an extraordinary
          situation is in the larger interest of administration of justice
          and for preventing manifest injustice being done. Thus,
          it is a judicial obligation on the court to undo a wrong
          in course of administration of justice and to prevent
          continuation of unnecessary judicial process. It may be
          so necessary to curb the menace of criminal prosecution
          as an instrument of operation of needless harassment. A
          person cannot be permitted to unleash vendetta to harass
          any person needlessly. Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in the
          inherent power of the court and the whole idea is to do
          real, complete and substantial justice for which the courts
          exist. Thus, it becomes the paramount duty of the court to
          protect an apparently innocent person, not to be subjected
          to prosecution on the basis of wholly untenable complaint.”
25. After referring to the aforesaid decisions in Samta Naidu’s case
    (supra) this Court further, held in Paragraph 13 thus: -
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          “13. The application of the principles laid down in Talukdar
          in Jatinder Singh shows that “a second complaint is
          permissible depending upon how the complaint happened
          to be dismissed at the first instance”. It was further laid
          down that: (Jatinder Singh case, SCC p. 573, para 12)
          “12. If the dismissal of the complaint was not on merit but
          on default of the complainant to be present there is no
          bar in the complainant moving the Magistrate again with a
          second complaint on the same facts. But if the dismissal
          of the complaint under Section 203 of the Code was on
          merits the position could be different.”
          “To similar effect are the conclusions in Ranvir Singh and
          Poonam Chand Jain. Para 16 of Poonam Chand Jain also
          considered the effect of para 50 of the majority judgment
          in Talukdar. These cases, therefore, show that if the earlier
          disposal of the complaint was on merits and in a manner
          known to law, the second complaint on “almost identical
          facts” which were raised in the first complaint would not
          be maintainable. What has been laid down is that “if the
          core of both the complaints is same”, the second complaint
          ought not to be entertained.”
                                                  (underline supplied)
26. It was further held in paragraph 16 of the decision in Samta Naidu’s
    case (supra) thus: -
          “16. As against the facts in Shivshankar, the present case
          stands on a different footing. There was no legal infirmity in
          the first complaint filed in the present matter. The complaint
          was filed more than a year after the sale of the vehicle
          which meant the complainant had reasonable time at his
          disposal. The earlier complaint was dismissed after the
          Judicial Magistrate found that no prima facie case was
          made out; the earlier complaint was not disposed of on any
          technical ground; the material adverted to in the second
          complaint was only in the nature of supporting material;
          and the material relied upon in the second complaint was
          not such which could not have been procured earlier.
          Pertinently, the core allegations in both the complaints
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                            23

          Subrata Choudhury @ Santosh Choudhury & Ors. v.
                     The State of Assam & Anr.

           were identical. In the circumstances, the instant matter is
           completely covered by the decision of this Court in Talukdar
           as explained in Jatinder Singh and Poonam Chand Jain.
           The High Court was thus not justified in holding the second
           complaint to be maintainable.”
27. Now, we will have to proceed with the appeal bearing in mind the
    exposition of law in Samta Naidu’s case (supra) that if earlier
    disposal of the complaint was on merits and in a manner known
    to law, the second complaint on ‘almost identical facts’ which were
    raised in the first complaint would not be maintainable. “If the core
    of both the complaints is same, the second complaint ought not to
    be entertained,” it was further held therein. In the light of the factual
    narration with respect to the disposal of the original complaint
    dated 11.11.2010, made hereinbefore and in view of the courses
    open to a Magistrate on receipt of a negative report and applying the
    exposition of law in Samta Naidu’s case (supra) with respect to the
    maintainability of a second complaint we have no hesitation to hold
    that the maintainability of the second complaint dated 20.07.2011
    filed by the second respondent would depend upon the question
    whether the core of the original complaint dated 11.11.2010 and
    the second complaint dated 20.07.2011 is the same as the disposal
    of the complaint dated 11.11.2010 was on merits and in a manner
    known to law. In this context, it is also to be noted after considering
    the final report, the protest complaint and admittedly, upon hearing
    the counsel for the complainant the protest petition was rejected not
    only by finding that the investigation suffers from no infirmity but also
    by finding that since it was conducted properly, no order for further
    investigation is invited and further that the materials are not sufficient
    to take cognizance. As noted earlier, despite the said nature of the
    order dated 06.06.2011 the second respondent-complainant has
    not chosen to challenge the same but, chosen only to file a fresh
    complaint, viz., the second complaint dated 20.07.2011.
28. In the contextual situation, it is relevant to note that earlier the learned
    Magistrate invoking the power under Section 202 Cr.P.C., postponed
    the issuance of summons. After recording the initial deposition of
    the complainant and the witnesses vide order dated 19.09.2011, he
    directed for police investigation and report. The High Court as per
    order dated 24.05.2012 in Criminal Petition No. 12/2012 set aside
    the order dated 19.09.2011 and directed the appellants herein to
24                                                         [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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      file appropriate application raising the issue of maintainability and
      in turn, directing the learned CJM to decide on the maintainability
      expeditiously. The order dated 12.07.2012 was passed by the learned
      CJM in compliance with the direction in the order dated 24.05.2012.
29. The order dated 12.07.2012 of the learned CJM where under he
    discussed the second complaint dated 20.07.2011 would undoubtedly
    reveal that after taking into consideration the entire factual background
    of the case and the nature of disposal of the original complaint
    dated 11.11.2010 under the order dated 06.06.2011 the application
    filed by the appellant herein raising maintainability of the second
    complaint was considered by the learned CJM.
30. We have already referred to the manner the original complaint
    was disposed of earlier. The submissions made on behalf of the
    parties, the documents annexed thereto and above all, the order
    dated 12.07.2012 of the learned CJM, would reveal that the second
    complaint was filed on the same set of facts contained in the first
    complaint and the second one was filed after the dismissal of the
    protest petition and the consequential acceptance of the Final
    Report in the first complaint. It is not in dispute that subsequent
    to the rejection of the protest petition and acceptance of the Final
    Report (Annexure P-5) as per order dated 06.06.2011, the matter
    was not taken forward further by the respondent/complainant. The
    second complaint was filed thereafter on 20.07.2011 reiterating,
    rather, reproducing the complaint dated 11.11.2010 and further
    adding allegations, virtually made by way of the protest petition
    dated 05.05.2011 that the investigation pursuant to the original
    complaint was done perfunctorily. It is to be noted that the said
    allegation against the investigation was also rejected earlier as
    per order dated 06.06.2011 holding that the investigation did
    not suffer from any infirmity and further that it did not deserve
    further investigation. Now, a comparison of the first complaint
    dated 11.11.2010 and the second complaint dated 20.07.2011 shows
    that they contain the same set of allegations against the same
    accused as has been observed by the learned CJM in the order
    dated 12.07.2012. The learned CJM, in the order dated 12.07.2012
    after referring to various decisions observed and held thus:-
           “After the original complaint has been duly investigated
           by the police and Final Report submitted therein has
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                          25

          Subrata Choudhury @ Santosh Choudhury & Ors. v.
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           been accepted by the Court in a Judicial Proceeding;
           therefore, in my considered view it cannot be re-opened
           by the means of filing of a second complaint in respect
           of the same facts and circumstances. In this connection,
           reliance can be placed n (Sic: in) a Judgment of the Hon’ble
           Patna High Court reported in 1981 CRL. LAW JOURNAL
           795 Bhuveneswar Prasad Singh and others Vs. State of
           Bihar and another.
           The Hon’ble Patna High Court relying upon a decision of
           the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in AIR 1968 Supreme
           Court 117 Abhinandan Jha Vs. Dinesh Mishra had held –
           Where the Final Report by police holding the case against
           the accused persons to be untrue; was accepted by the
           Magistrate earlier, than the complaint petition was filed
           against the accused, the Magistrate would not be justified
           in taking cognizance on the basis of the complaint petition
           in respect of the same facts constituting the offence which
           were mentioned in the final form where a Judicial order
           was passed by accepting final form.”
31. The circumstances expatiated above and a scanning of the decision
    in Samta Naidu’s case and the decisions referred to in the aforesaid
    paragraphs thereunder would constrain us to say, with respect, that
    the understanding of the settled position in regard to the maintainability
    of a second complaint or second protest petition of the High Court,
    as reflected mainly in paragraph 20 of the impugned judgment is not
    true to the position settled by this Court. Merely because this Court
    in some of such decisions held that when a Magistrate conducted
    an inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C., and dismissed a complaint
    on merits, a second complaint on the same facts would not be
    maintainable unless there are very exceptional circumstances, it
    could not be understood that in all cases where a complaint to a
    Magistrate was not proceeded under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C.,
    and dismissed not at the stage of Section 203, Cr.P.C., a second
    complaint or a second protest petition would be maintainable. The
    various decisions referred above in Samta Naidu’s case and recitals
    therefrom, extracted above would indubitably reveal the said position.
    The different situations where a second complaint or a second protest
    petition would be maintainable and would not be maintainable were
    specifically discussed and decided, in those decisions. In short, the
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       maintainability or otherwise of the second complaint would depend
       upon how the earlier complaint happened to be rejected/dismissed
       at the first instance.
32. In the context of the contentions, it is to be noted that the case at
    hand stands on a firmer footing than the case involved in Samta
    Naidu’s case (supra). Paragraph 16 of Samta Naidu’s case
    (supra), as extracted above,would reveal that the earlier complaint
    involved in that case was disposed of not on technical ground
    but on finding that no prima facie case was made out and in the
    second complaint the nature of the supporting materials were
    furnished and this Court observed that it could not be said that
    those materials furnished and relied upon in the second complaint
    could not have been procured earlier. Thereafter, finding that both
    the complaints were identical the finding of the High Court that the
    second complaint was maintainable was rejected and the subject
    complaint was dismissed as not being maintainable. In the case
    at hand, a perusal of protest petition dated 05.05.2011 and the
    second complaint dated 20.07.2011 would reveal that the second
    complaint filed after acceptance of final report filed pursuant to
    the investigation in the FIR registered based on the complaint
    dated 11.11.2010, that too after considering the narazi petition
    and hearing the complainant (the second respondent herein) the
    second complaint dated 20.07.2011 has been filed reproducing the
    first complaint dated 11.11.2010 and stating that the said complaint
    was not properly investigated and action should be taken on the
    second complaint dated 20.07.2011. In fact, the indubitable position
    is that the core of the original complaint dated 11.11.2010 and the
    second complaint dated 20.07.2011 is the same.
33. In the light of the decision in Ravinder Singh v. Sukhbir Singh,15
    referred to in Samta Naidu’s case (supra) repeated complaints by
    frustrated litigants cannot be maintained. A scanning of the second
    complaint dated 20.07.2011 would reveal that none of the situations
    permissible in terms of the decisions referred supra exist in the
    case at hand to maintain the said complaint. When that be the
    position, the learned Sessions Judge as also the High Court were
    not justified in interfering with the order passed by the learned CJM


15    [2013] 1 SCR 243 : (2013) 9 SCC 245
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                   27

             Subrata Choudhury @ Santosh Choudhury & Ors. v.
                        The State of Assam & Anr.

     dated 12.07.2012 holding the second complaint as not maintainable
     in law and issuing further direction.
34. In the aforesaid circumstances we allow the appeal and set aside
    the decision of the High Court dated 08.01.2021 and the decision of
    the learned Sessions Judge that got confirmance by the judgment
    of the High Court and consequently restore the order of the learned
    CJM dated 12.07.2012. In short, the complaint dated 20.07.2011
    stands rejected for not being maintainable.

     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



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         Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey