Holding

The 2003 Government Resolution on consequential seniority remains effective, but seniority cannot override the eligibility requirement, and the appellant was ineligible for the DTP vacancy, so his challenge fails.

Summary

The appellant, an open‑category officer, claimed that after his promotion to Joint Director of Town Planning (JDTP) he should gain seniority over the first respondent, a Scheduled Caste officer, under the "catch‑up" rule. The first respondent had been promoted to JDTP earlier and later to Director of Town Planning (DTP) in 2016. The appellant argued that the Government Resolution of 20 March 2003, which provided for consequential seniority, should give him seniority, and that the first respondent's promotion was ad‑hoc and therefore ineligible for seniority. The Court examined the validity of the 2003 resolution in light of the 2004 Reservation Act, the distinction between seniority and eligibility, and the requirement that a candidate must satisfy the three‑year JDTP service rule to be eligible for DTP. It held that the 2003 resolution remains valid, the Reservation Act does not override it, and the appellant was not eligible for the DTP vacancy on the relevant date. Consequently, the appellant could not challenge the first respondent's appointment. The appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

The applicability of the "catch‑up" rule and consequential seniority under the Government Resolution dated 20 March 2003.
Whether the Maharashtra State Public Services Reservation Act, 2004 supersedes the 2003 Government Resolution on seniority.
Whether seniority alone can override the eligibility criteria (three years as JDTP) for promotion to Director of Town Planning.
Whether the appellant’s failure to challenge the first respondent’s JDTP appointment precludes a later challenge on seniority.

Legislation cited

Maharashtra State Public Services Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Denotified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Special Backward Category and Other Backward Classes Act, 2001 (Act VIII of 2004)s. 11, s. 3, s. 4, s. 5, s. 6

Subjects

service lawpromotioncatch‑up ruleconsequential seniorityeligibilityreservationseniority vs eligibilityArticle 16Maharashtra

Judgment

[2019] 4 S.C.R. 945 945

SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE A
v.
NORESHWAR RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 2468-2470 of 2019)
MARCH 05, 2019 B
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND
HEMANT GUPTA, JJ.]
Service Law – Promotion – ‘Catch-up’ Rule – Appellant,
belonging to open category, joined service as Planning Assistant
C
in the Government of Maharashtra – Appellant and the first
respondent, Scheduled Caste, selected for the post of Town Planner
on 1st July, 1992 – Appellant promoted as Deputy Director of Town
Planning (DDTP) on 1st November, 2003– First respondent promoted
as DDTP on 3rd August, 2006 – In the promotional cadre of Joint
Director of Town Planning (JDTP), the first respondent was promoted D
on 11th August, 2011 while the appellant was promoted as JDTP on
2 nd July, 2013 – Appellant filed OA before the Maharashtra
Administrative Tribunal – In the meanwhile, the first respondent
was promoted as Director of Town Planning (DTP) on 30th April,
2016 – OA allowed – High Court set aside the said decision –
E
Appellant filed Special Leave Petition – Withdrawn – Appellant filed
review before the High Court – Dismissed – Appellant’s case that
once he was promoted as JDTP, the ‘catch-up’ rule must govern
and consequently, he must gain seniority over the first respondent
and that the first respondent was not entitled to claim consequential
seniority on the basis of his earlier promotion in the cadre of JDTP F
– Held: Preliminary objection to the present appeal that recourse
to Supreme Court was barred after the High Court decided the
review petitions, not accepted – Government Resolution dated 20th
October, 1997 was issued stipulating that an officer belonging to
Backward Class will retain seniority in the promotional cadre and
G
that it was not necessary to revise the seniority – GR dated 20th
March, 2003 was issued referring to the said GR clarifying that
the seniority between backward class and non-backward class
candidates in government service in the promotional cadre would
be governed by the regular date of promotion – Incorporating the
H
945
946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A principle of consequential seniority, GR dated 20th March, 2003
adverted to r.4, 1982 Rules which stipulated that seniority in a post
is determined by the length of continuous service – Further, GR
dated 20th March 2003 has not been abrogated upon the enactment
of the 2004 Act – Said GR was not challenged before the Tribunal
– Such a challenge cannot be entertained at this stage – Further,
B
eligibility has to be considered on the date of the occurrence of the
vacancy – On 30 th April, 2016, the appellant did not fulfill the
eligibility of three years’ experience as JDTP, required for the post
of DTP – Seniority by itself cannot prevail where a senior lacks
eligibility for promotion – Even if accepted, the applicability of the
C catch-up rule will also not obviate the requirement of the appellant
fulfilling the condition of eligibility for promotion, on the date when
the vacancy occurred – Appellant has also not challenged the
appointment of the first respondent as JDTP – Judgment of the High
Court does not call for interference – Maharashtra Civil Services
(Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1982 – r.4 – Maharashtra State
D
Public Services Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes,
Denotified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Special Backward
Category and Other Backward Classes Act, 2001 [Act VIII of 2004]
– ss. 3-6, 11 - Directorate of Town Planning and Valuation
(Recruitment) Rules, 2011 - r-3 - Consitution of India - Art. 16.
E Service Law – Promotion – Seniority and Eligibility – Held:
Seniority and eligibility are distinct concepts in service jurisprudence
– Seniority by itself cannot prevail where a senior lacks eligibility
for promotion to a higher post.
The appellant, belonging to open category, joined the service
F as Planning Assistant in the Government of Maharashtra. The
appellant and the first respondent, Scheduled Caste, were
selected for the post of Town Planner on 1st July, 1992. Appellant
was promoted as Deputy Director of Town Planning (DDTP) on
1st November, 2003 and the first respondent was promoted as
G DDTP on 3 Aug. 2006. In the promotional cadre of Joint Director
of Town Planning (JDTP), the first respondent was promoted on
11th August 2011 while the appellant was promoted as JDTP on
2nd July, 2013. The appellant filed OA before the Maharashtra
Administrative Tribunal. In the meanwhile, the first respondent

H
SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE v. NORESHWAR 947
RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE

was promoted as Director of Town Planning (DTP) on 30th April, A
2016. OA was allowed. The High Court set aside the said decision.
Appellant filed Special Leave Petition, which was withdrawn with
the liberty to file review petition before the High Court. Appellant
filed review petition before the High Court, which was dismissed.
Hence, the present appeals.
B
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: Civil Appeal Nos 2468-2470 of 2019 @ Special Leave
Petition (Civil) Nos. 8769-8771 of 2018:
1.1 On 20 October 1997, a Government Resolution was
issued stipulating that an officer belonging to a Backward Class C
will retain seniority in the promotional cadre and that it is not
necessary to revise the seniority. On 20 March 2003, another
GR was issued inter alia with reference to the earlier GR noted
above. The GR states that following the amendment to Article
16 by the insertion of Clause (4A), it has been decided that the D
instructions for regulating seniority of officers belonging to the
Backward Classes and the general category in the promoted cadre
would be governed by the earlier Government Resolutions dated
21 June 1982 and 20 October 1997. The GR clarified that the
seniority between backward class and non-backward class
candidates in government service in the promotional cadre would E
be governed by the regular date of promotion. [Paras 49, 50]
[978-E; 979-A-B]
1.2 The GR dated 20 March 2003 was issued after the
constitutional amendment to Article 16 (4A) by which
consequential seniority was incorporated into that provision. F
Maharashtra State Public Services Reservation for Scheduled
Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Denotified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis),
Nomadic Tribes, Special Backward Category and Other Backward
Classes Act, 2001 [Act VIII of 2004] (Reservation Act 2004) was
enacted by the State legislature in 2001. The assent of the G
Governor was received on 20 January 2004 and it was published
in the Official Gazette on 22 January 2004. The enactment has
come into force after the 85th constitutional amendment. Prior
to the enforcement of the Act, reservations were confined upto
the entry level in Group I posts. As a result of the enactment of
H
948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A the law, reservations are applicable to all appointments in public
services and posts [except categories covered by clauses (a) to
(d) of sub-section (1) of Section 3]. Section 3 deals with the
applicability of the Act and Section 4 deals with reservation and
percentages. [Paras 52-54] [980-A, F-G; 981-A]
B 1.3 Sub-section (1) of Section 5 stipulates that reservation
in promotion shall be at all stages of promotions. Consequently,
promotions within Class I posts are also governed by the rule of
reservation. A provision for reservation can be incorporated in
an executive order. The Reservation Act has not dealt with issue
of consequential seniority. Sub-section (2) of Section 5 saves
C government orders providing for reservation of any posts to be
filled in promotion which were in force on the date of the enactment
of the Act. Similarly, the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 6
saves government orders regarding the filling up of unfilled posts
reserved for Backward Class candidates in force on the date of
D the commencement of the Act. The GR dated 20 March 2003
deals with the determination of seniority while sub-section (2) of
Section 5 deals with orders providing for reservation. The GR
dated 20 March 2003 is not a government order which falls within
the purview of either sub-section (2) of Section 5 or the proviso
to sub-section (1) of Section 6. However, the enactment of the
E Act by the state legislature cannot be construed as a legislative
intent to override or abrogate the principle of consequential
seniority incorporated in government resolutions. A provision
for consequential seniority can certainly be incorporated in an
executive order issued in pursuance of the provisions of Article
F 162 of the Constitution. The Government Resolution dated 20
March 2003 has not been abrogated upon the enactment of the
Reservation Act 2004. The Reservation Act 2004 does not deal
with the principle of consequential seniority. It would be
impermissible to read the Act as having superseded the applicable
government orders on consequential seniority, in the absence of
G clear words providing for such an effect. [Paras 56, 59 and 60]
[982-H; 983-E-H; 984-A-C]
1.4 The GR dated 20 March 2003, while incorporating the
principle of consequential seniority, reiterated the GR dated 20
October 1997. It also adverts to the Seniority Rules 1982 of which
H
SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE v. NORESHWAR 949
RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE

Rule 4 specifically stipulates that the length of continuous service A
will be determinative of seniority in respect of posts and cadres
in the service. A challenge to the GR dated 20 March 2003 is
conspicuous by its absence in the reliefs which were sought before
the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal. Entertaining a challenge
to the validity of a Government Resolution incorporating the
B
principle of consequential seniority without a specific challenge
being addressed before the Tribunal would simply be
impermissible. Entertaining such a challenge at this stage will
have serious consequences in the entire State of Maharashtra by
upsetting a significant number of promotions which may have
already been granted to candidates belonging to the reserved C
category. The State government, in the pleadings before the
Tribunal and the High Court was not called upon to justify the
basis of its decision to adopt consequential seniority in the
absence of a challenge being squarely set up in the forum of first
instance. A challenge to the resolution providing for consequential
D
seniority is indeed a serious matter. Such a challenge calls upon
the court to upset a policy circular which has been issued with
the avowed objective of safeguarding consequential seniority
which was, as the constitutional history indicates, a clear purpose
underlying the 85th Amendment to the Constitution. Such
constitutional challenges cannot be bandied about without specific E
pleadings. Such an exercise would be impermissible in the
absence of a frontal challenge. [Paras 62, 64 and 65] [984-E-F;
985-C-F]
1.5 In the present case, there is a specific provision for
consequential seniority in the GR dated 20 March 2003. Absent F
a challenge to the GR in the proceedings which were initiated
before the Tribunal, such a challenge cannot be entertained at
this stage. [Paras 70] [987-B]
1.6 Eligibility has to be considered on the date of the
occurrence of the vacancy. On 30 April 2016, the appellant did G
not fulfill the eligibility required for the post of DTP. In assailing
the decision of the first respondent, the appellant has submitted
that the promotion of the first respondent as JDTP on 11 August
2011 was under a circular dated 27 October 2008 which has been
struck down by the Bombay High Court. The High Court in
H
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A dealing with this submission has held that the order of promotion,
when it was issued on 11 August 2011 had an imprint of legality.
Moreover, even the appellant adopted the position that since
promotion was given to the first respondent in terms of the
Government Circular dated 27 October 2008, he believed that
he had no reason to object to the seniority list of JDTP published
B
on 28 August 2014. That apart, the High Court has noted that
after the promotion of the first respondent on 11 August 2011,
the appellant was promoted on 2 July 2013 and it was only when
the second seniority list was finalized on 15 January 2016 that
the appellant filed an OA in February 2016. In the meantime, the
C appellant had worked as JDTP for a period of nearly five years.
The delay has, justifiably weighed with the High Court. Coupled
with this is an equally relevant consideration which must weigh
with the court: the appellant has not challenged the appointment
of the first respondent as JDTP. Having failed to challenge the
appointment, it is now not open to the appellant to assert that the
D
appointment must be treated as void on the ground that the
circular on the basis of which the first respondent was promoted
has subsequently been set aside in a judgment of the Bombay
High Court.[Paras 78, 79] [990-D-G; 991-A-B]
1.7 The appointment of the first respondent as JDTP has
E not been assailed in the OA filed before the Tribunal.
Consequently, it is not open to the appellant to lay a challenge on
the ground that the appointment was based on a circular which
was held to be invalid after the appointment was made. The
submission that the appointment is fortuitous within the meaning
F of Rule 3(f) is but another modality of seeking to deprive the first
respondent of the consequence of his appointment and to his
consequential seniority. The fact that the vacancy occurred on
30 April 2016, on the retirement of the then DTP has not been
disputed in the course of the submissions of the appellant. On
the date when the vacancy occurred, the appellant clearly did not
G fulfill the eligibility criterion of three years’ experience as JDTP.
The appellant who was promoted on 2 July 2013 did not fulfill the
criterion prescribed by Rule 3, Directorate of Town Planning and
Valuation (Recruitment) Rules 2011. Seniority and eligibility are

H
SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE v. NORESHWAR 951
RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE

distinct concepts in service jurisprudence. Seniority by itself A
cannot prevail where a senior lacks eligibility for promotion to a
higher post. Even if the contention of the appellant on the
applicability of the catch-up rule were to be accepted, that will
not obviate the requirement of his fulfilling the condition of
eligibility for promotion to the next higher post, on the date when
B
the vacancy occurred. [Paras 80-82] [991-C-D, F-G, 992-E-F]
1.8 The appellant failed to challenge the appointment of
the first respondent as JDTP on 11 August 2011. The appellant
failed to challenge the circular dated 20 March 2003 providing
for consequential seniority. The substratum of the challenge which
has been developed before Supreme Court is without basis in C
the pleadings. The ingenuity and industry of the learned counsel
who appeared on behalf of the appellant cannot, in the ultimate
analysis, be a substitute for a deficient pleading. The appellant
did not at any stage challenge the appointment of the respondent
to the post of JDTP nor did he challenge the GR dated 20 March D
2003 providing for consequential seniority. The appellant was
not eligible for the post of DTP on 30 April 2016, when the vacancy
occurred. He cannot, hence, challenge the appointment of the
first respondent. The judgment of the High Court does not call
for any interference. [Paras 83, 85 and 86] [992-F-G; 993-D-E]
E
Civil Appeal Nos 2471-2473 of 2019 @ Special Leave Petition
(Civil) Nos. 14041- 14043 of 2018:
1.9 In view of the judgment in Civil Appeals @ Special
Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 8769-8771 of 2018, these appeals
are also dismissed. [993-G] F
MA Nos 2983-2985 of 2019 in Special Leave Petition (Civil)
Nos. 33086-33088 of 2017
1.10 In view of the judgment in Civil Appeals @ Special
Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 8769-8771 of 2018, these MAs are
disposed of, in terms of the judgment and order in the lead G
appeals. [994-B]
Suseel Finance & Leasing Co. v. M Lata (2004) 13 SCC
675; Abhishek Malviya v. Additional Welfare

H
952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A Commissioner (2008) 3 SCC 108 ; Vinod Kapoor v State
of Goa (2012) 12 SCC 378 : [2012] 8 SCR 1089;
Sandhya Educational Society v. Union of India
(2014) 7 SCC 701; Bussa Overseas and Properties
Private Limited v. Union of India (2016) 4 SCC 696:
[2016] 1 SCR 266 – distinguished.
B
Indra Sawhney v Union of India (1992) 3 Suppl. SCC
217 : [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454 – followed.
Maharashtra Chamber of Housing Industry v Municipal
Corporation of Greater Mumbai Decision dated
C 16th August 2016 in SLP (C) No.024660 & 024661
of 2016; R Prabha Devi v Union of India (1988) 2
SCC 233:[1988] 3 SCR 147 – relied on.
M Nagaraj v Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 212; Magas
Varga Karmachari Adhikari Suraksha Mahasangh v
D State of Maharshtra Decision of Bombay High Court
in Writ Petition No. 3077 of 2011; Union of India v
Virpal Singh Chauhan (1995) 6 SCC 684 : [1995] 4
Suppl. SCR 158; Ajit Singh Januja v State of Punjab
(1996) 2 SCC 715 : [1996] 3 SCR 125 ; Jagdish Lal v
State of Haryana (1997) 6 SCC 538 ; Ajit Singh (II) v.
E State of Punjab (1999) 7 SCC 209 : [1999] 2 Suppl.
SCR 521; Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta
(2018) 10 SCC 396; Suraj Bhan Meena v State of
Rajasthan (2011) 1 SCC 467 : [2010] 14 SCR 532;
Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited v. Rajesh
F Kumar (2012) 7 SCC 1: [2012] 4 SCR 118; S Panneer
Selvam v. State of Tamil Nadu (2015) 10 SCC 292;
B K Pavitra v. Union of India (2017) 4 SCC 620 : [2017]
1 SCR 631; Gaurav Pradhan v State of Rajasthan
(2018) 11 SCC 352 : [2017] 8 SCR 951; Roshan Lal
v .International Airport Authority of India (1980) Suppl.
G SCC 449; P Chitharanja Menon v. A Balakrishnan
(1977) 3 SCC 255 : [1977] 3 SCR 687; Amarjeet
Singh v. Devi Ratan (2010) 1 SCC 417 : [2009] 15
SCR 1010; Palure Bhaskar Rao v. P Ramaseshaiah
(2017) 5 SCC 783 : [2017] 3 SCR 226; Sanjay K
H Sinha-II v. State of Bihar (2004) 10 SCC 734 : [2004]
SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE v. NORESHWAR 953
RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE

2 Suppl. SCR 834 ; Bhupendra Nath Hazarika v. State A
of Assam (2013) 2 SCC 516 : [2012] 12 SCR 587; PV
George v. State of Kerala (2007) 3 SCC 557 : [2007] 1
SCR 1198 ; BA Linga Reddy v. Karnataka State
Transport Authority (2015) 4 SCC 515 – referred to.
Case Law Reference B
(2006) 8 SCC 212 referred to Para 9
(2004) 13 SCC 675 distinguished Para 23
(2008) 3 SCC 108 distinguished Para 25
[2012] 8 SCR 1089 distinguished Para 26 C
(2014) 7 SCC 701 distinguished Para 26
[2016] 1 SCR 266 distinguished Para 26
[1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454 followed Para 31
[1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 158 referred to Para 36 D

[1996] 3 SCR 125 referred to Para 38
(1997) 6 SCC 538 referred to Para 39
[1999] 2 Suppl. SCR 521 referred to Para 39
E
(2018) 10 SCC 396 referred to Para 42
[2010] 14 SCR 532 referred to Para 43
[2012] 4 SCR 118 referred to Para 43
(2015) 10 SCC 292 referred to Para 43
F
[2017] 1 SCR 631 referred to Para 43
[2017] 8 SCR 951 referred to Para 52
(1980) Suppl. SCC 449 referred to Para 78
[1977] 3 SCR 687 referred to Para 78
G
[2009] 15 SCR 1010 referred to Para 78
[1988] 3 SCR 147 relied on Para 82
[2017] 3 SCR 226 referred to Para 82

H
954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A [2004] 2 Suppl. SCR 834 referred to Para 84
[2012] 12 SCR 587 referred to Para 84
[2007] 1 SCR 1198 referred to Para 84
(2015) 4 SCC 515 referred to Para 84
B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2468-
2470 of 2019.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.03.2018 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in Review Petition No. 17 of 2018 in Writ
C
Petition No. 9291 of 2016, Review Petition No. 18 of 2018 in Writ Petition
No. 8859 of 2016 and Review Petition No. 19 of 2018 in Writ Petition
No. 8860 of 2016.
With
D Civil Appeal Nos. 2471-2473 of 2019 And M.A. Nos. 2983-2985
of 2018 in S.L.P.(Civil) Nos. 33086-33088 of 2017.
Chander Uday Singh, Paramjit Singh Patwalia, V. Giri, R.P. Bhatt,
Sanjay R. Hegde, Sr. Advs., Sagar N. Pahune Patil, Gopal Balwant
Sathe, Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure, Siddheshwar N. Biradar, Ms.
E Natasha Dalmia, Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, Makarand D.
Adkar, Braj K. Mishra, Vijay Kumar, Mustafa A. Khan, Sagar Mane,
Amit Bhardwaj, Krishna Dev J., Ms. Aparna Jha, Sudhanshu S.
Choudhary, Ms. Surabhi Guleria, Satyajit A. Desai, Ms. Anagha A. Desai,
Advs. for the appearing parties.
F The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.2468-2470 OF 2019:
@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) Nos. 8769-8771 OF
2018
G
1. Leave granted.
2. The High Court of Judicature at Bombay, speaking through a
Division Bench, dismissed three review petitions seeking a review of its

H
SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE v. NORESHWAR 955
RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

judgment dated 16 November 2017. The review petitions were instituted A
before the High Court following an order of a two judge Bench of this
Court dated 12 December 2017. Finding that there was no reason to
review the earlier judgment, consistent with the settled parameters
governing the exercise of that jurisdiction, the High Court dismissed the
review petitions on 21 March 2018.
B
3. The original petitioner before the High Court is in appeal.
4. The appellant as well as the first respondent are officers in the
service of the Government of Maharashtra. The appellant belongs to
the open category while the first respondent belongs to a Scheduled
Caste. The chart with relevant details regarding their appointments and C
promotions in the service of the state is provided thus:

P OSTIG SUDHAKAR AGURE ORESHWAR SHEDE
(O PE CATEGORY) (SC)
Planning Assistant 6.5.1983 --
Assistant Town 6.5.1988 -- D
Planner
Town Planner 1.7.1992 1.7.1992
Dy. Director of 1.11.2003 3.8.2006
Town Planning
(DDTP)
E
Joint Director of 2.7.2013 11.8.2011
Town Planning
(JDTP )
Director of Town Eligible to be promoted Promoted on
Planning (DTP, on 3.7.2016 30.4.2016 subject to
MS) outcome of O.A.
F
No.269/2016.

5. The appellant joined service as a Planning Assistant in the
Government of Maharashtra on 6 May 1983. Both the appellant and the
first respondent were selected for the post of Town Planner on 1 July
1992, in the course of a process initiated by the Maharashtra Public G
Service Commission1. The appellant was promoted as Deputy Director
of Town Planning2 on 1 November 2003, by a nomination through the
MPSC. The first respondent was promoted as DDTP on 3 August 2006.
1
MPSC
2
DDTP H
956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A
6. In the promotional cadre of Joint Director of Town Planning3,
there were two posts, one for open category candidates and the second
for reservation on roster points. On 7 January 2011, the post of JDTP
was vacant for a Scheduled Tribe candidate under the roster. However,
relying upon a circular dated 27 October 2008 of the General
B
Administration Department4, the name of the first respondent was
recommended on 7 January 2011. Though the first respondent belongs
to a Scheduled Caste, he was promoted on an ad-hoc basis to the post of
JDTP on 11 August 2011. On 2 July 2013, by virtue of a Government
Resolution5 dated 29 December 2012, the cadre strength of JDTP was
C enhanced to eight posts, of which five posts were meant for the open
category while three posts were reserved. On 2 July 2013, the appellant
was promoted to the post of JDTP.
7. Essentially, the case of the appellant is that in the seniority list
of DDTPs, he ranked senior to the first respondent. The first respondent
was promoted as JDTP on 11 August 2011 while the appellant was
D
promoted later on 2 July 2013. The appellant claims that once he was
promoted as JDTP, the ‘catch-up’ rule must govern and in consequence,
he must gain seniority over the first respondent. In order to appreciate
this aspect of the appellant’s grievance, material facts pertaining to the
seniority list are provided thus:
E SENIORITY LIST
(i) 14 February 2011
A circular for seniority list of DDTPs as on 1 January 2009 was
issued. The appellant stood at serial no 3 and the first respondent
stood at serial no 9;
F
(ii) 1 June 2014
A letter was issued for the provisional seniority list of JDTPs as
on 1 January 2014 on the basis of “date of appointment on present
post”;
(iii) 28 August 2014
G
A circular was issued for the final seniority list of JDTPs as on
1 January 2014 on the basis of “date of appointment on present
post”;
3
JDTP
4
GAD
H 5
GR
SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE v. NORESHWAR 957
RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(iv) 15 January 2016 A
A circular was issued for final seniority list of JDTPs as on
1 January 2015 on the basis of “date of regular appointment/
regularized date of promotion”;
(v) 8 March 2016
B
In response to a query under the Right to Information Act 2005,
the appellant was informed that the promotion of the first
respondent would be regularized with the concurrence of GAD
and with the approval of the MPSC in future; and
(vi) 30 April 2016 C
6
The incumbent in the post of Director of Town Planning was due
to retire upon which the post would fall vacant.
8. After lodging an objection to the seniority list dated 15 January
2016, the appellant filed an Original Application7 before the Maharashtra
Administrative Tribunal8. Simply put, the case of the appellant before D
the Tribunal was that even assuming that the promotion of the first
respondent as JDTP on 11 August 2011 (prior to the promotion of the
appellant) against a reserved vacancy was regular in nature, he was not
entitled to claim consequential seniority on the basis of his earlier
promotion in the cadre of JDTP as against the appellant (a candidate
E
from the general category) who was senior to him in the feeder cadre of
DDTP.
9. In the submission of the appellant, the grant of consequential
seniority to persons belonging to the reserved categories promoted earlier
than their seniors in the feeder cadre had not been expressly provided
F
for by the State government in the Maharashtra Civil Services Seniority
Rules or elsewhere. The appellant also submitted that the State of
Maharashtra had not undertaken any exercise to quantify and demonstrate
the inadequacy of representation to the Scheduled Castes in the matter
of promotion to the senior cadre in the Town Planning and Valuation
Department (Recruitment) Rules 1984. Absent such an exercise, it was G
urged that the mandate of a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in

6
DTP
7
O.A. 269 of 2016
8
The Tribunal
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958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A M Nagaraj v Union of India9(“Nagaraj”)had not been fulfilled. With
this grievance, the appellant asserted that:
(i) As regards his promotion on 11 August 2011 as JDTP from the
cadre of DDTP, the first respondent as a Scheduled Caste
candidate was not entitled to a vacancy which was reserved
B for a Scheduled Tribe candidate. However, he was promoted
as JDTP on the basis of a GAD circular dated 27 October
2008. This circular was held to be ultra vires by a judgment of
a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Magas Varga
Karmachari-Adhikari Suraksha Mahasangh v State of
Maharashtra (“Mahasangh”) rendered on 9 May 2013 at its
C
Aurangabad Bench10. According to the decision, the circular
was contrary to the provisions of the Maharashtra State Public
Services Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Schedules Tribes,
Denotified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Special
Backward Category and Other Backward Classes Act 200111;
D
(ii) The promotion of the first respondent as JDTP on 11 August
2011 was fortuitous and not a regular appointment. Hence, he
is not entitled to claim the benefits of his promotion as JDTP
and has been wrongly shown as senior to the appellant in the
final seniority list of the cadre; and
E
(iii) The final seniority list published by the State on 15 January
2016 is in breach of the settled position of law governing
consequential seniority for reserved category promotees as
settled by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Nagaraj
(supra).
F
10. Principally, on the above grounds, the appellant sought the
following reliefs before the Tribunal:

(i) Setting aside of the final seniority list as on 1 January 2015,
published by the State on 15 January 2016 for the cadre of
G
JDTP;

9
(2006) 8 SCC 212
10
Writ Petition No. 3077 of 2011
11
Act VIII of 2004. “Reservation Act 2004"
H
SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE v. NORESHWAR 959
RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(ii) A direction to review and revise the seniority list in the cadre of A
JDTP as on 1 January 2015, by fixing the seniority of the
appellant above the first respondent in conformity with his
position in seniority in the feeder cadre of DDTP; and

(iii) An order restraining the State from undertaking the exercise of
selection for promotion to the post of DDTP on the basis of the B
final seniority list published on 15 January 2016 until it is
reviewed and revised.
11. By an interim order dated 1 April 2016, the Tribunal directed
that the decision of the government would be subject to the outcome of
the OA pending before it. Soon thereafter, on 2 April 2016, the GAD C
Establishment Board – I conducted a meeting where the first respondent
was recommended for promotion to the post of DTP. In a writ petition
challenging the interim order of the Tribunal, the High Court directed the
Tribunal to decide the pending OA by 30 April 2016 (the post of DDTP
was due to fall vacant on the retirement of the incumbent on 30 April D
2016). On 18 April 2016, the Tribunal concluded the hearing and, while
reserving the judgment, directed the case to be posted for pronouncement
of judgment on 2 May 2016. Shortly before that date, the State
government promoted the first respondent to the post of DTP on 30
April 2016. The Tribunal by its judgment dated 2 May 2016 allowed the
OA. It quashed the seniority list dated 15 January 2016 of JDTPs and E
issued directions for the preparation of a fresh seniority list by deciding
the date of regular promotion of the first respondent, whereupon a fresh
promotion order was directed to be issued to the post of DTP.
12. The first respondent instituted proceedings12 under Article 226
of the Constitution before the High Court to challenge the decisions of F
the Tribunal. The State government challenged the decision of the
Tribunal13. By its judgment dated 16 November 2017, the High Court
allowed the writ petitions and set aside the decision of the Tribunal. The
appellant moved this Court in proceedings under Article 136 of the
Constitution to assail the decision of the High Court. G

12
Writ Petition No. 8859 of 2016 was instituted to challenge the order of the Tribunal
condoning delay; Writ Petition No. 8860 of 2016 was instituted against the judgment of
the Tribunal in OA No. 269 of 201.
13
Writ Petition No. 9291 of 2016
H
960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A 13. On 12 December 2017, when the Special Leave Petition was
heard, this Court passed the following order:
“Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioner, points out that though the issue of catch up was raised
before the High Court, the same has not been considered.
B If that be so, it is for the petitioner to pursue his remedies available
to him under law on that issue.
Without prejudice to such liberty, these special leave petitions are
permitted to be withdrawn.

C We make it clear that we have not considered the matter on merits.
However, it will be open to the parties on both the sides to take all
available contentions before the High Court on the point of catch
up.”
In terms of the liberty granted by this Court, the appellant moved
D the High Court in review. The review petitions, as stated earlier, were
dismissed on 21 March 2018. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High
Court in review and the original judgment in the writ petitions, the appellant
moved this Court afresh under Article 136 of the Constitution14.
14. During the pendency of these proceedings, the appellant has
E instituted Miscellaneous Applications15 along with an interlocutory
application16. By the Miscellaneous Applications, the appellant has sought
a clarification of the order dated 12 December 2017 so as to seek specific
permission from this Court to move afresh if the review were to fail
before the High Court. On 28 November 2018, notice was issued on the
Miscellaneous Applications.
F
15. A preliminary objection has been taken to the maintainability
of the Special Leave Petition by Mr R P Bhatt, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the first respondent. Mr Bhatt urged that as a
result of the order of this Court dated 12 December 2017, all issues
other than the application of the catch-up rule were given up when liberty
G was granted to the appellant to move the High Court by way of review.
Once the review was rejected by the High Court, the following
consequences must according to the submission ensue:
14
SLP (C) Nos. 8769-71 of 2018 was filed against the judgment in review; SLP (C) Nos.
14041-43 of 2018 were filed against the judgment in the writ petitions.
15
H MA Nos. 2983-85 of 2018
16
IA No. 167323 of 2018
SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE v. NORESHWAR 961
RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(i) A challenge to the original order of the High Court allowing the A
writ petitions is barred, in the absence of liberty being granted
to the appellant to move afresh after the review was dismissed
against the original order assailed in the Special Leave Petition;
(ii) A challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution solely against
an order on a review petition is not maintainable. B
In support of the submission, certain decisions of this Court have
been relied upon which would be adverted to hereafter.
16. The first task of this Court is to construe the order dated 12
December 2017. As the order indicates, the grievance of the appellant
was that though the issue of the catch-up rule was raised before the C
High Court, it had not been considered. A two judge Bench of this Court
consisting of Hon’ble Mr Justice Kurian Joseph and Hon’ble Mr Justice
Amitava Roy, which heard the Special Leave Petitions, observed in
response to the submission that “if that be so, it is for the petitioner to
pursue his remedies available to him under law on that issue”. This Court D
permitted the Special Leave Petitions to be withdrawn “without prejudice
to such liberty”. Leaving it open to the contesting parities to take up all
available contentions before the High Court on the issue of catch-up, the
Bench observed that :
“We make it clear that we have not considered the matter on E
merits.”
17. What emerges from the order dated 12 December 2017 is
that:
(i) Liberty was granted to the appellant specifically to pursue the
remedies available in law on the grievance that the issue of F
catch-up, though raised, had not been considered by the High
Court; and
(ii) This Court had not considered the matter on merits.
The reservation of liberty to the appellant to adopt a suitable remedy
in law, to pursue the grievance that a submission which was urged before G
the High Court had not been considered would evidently be a reference
to the remedy by way of a review.
18. It is well settled that if a submission which has been urged
before the High Court has not been noticed or considered, it is to the
H
962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A High Court that the aggrieved litigant must turn for the rectification of
the record. But, apart from this, the observation in the order dated 12
December 2017 that this Court had not considered the matter on merits
is of crucial significance. The purpose of that clarification was to ensure
that the issues which were raised (in any event with regard to the catch-
up rule) were entirely open, to be urged before the High Court in the
B
first instance and thereafter, if the appellant were to be aggrieved, in
further proceedings before this Court. The above observation of this
Court was not merely intended to keep the issue of the non-consideration
of the catch-up rule open to be urged before the High Court. That this
issue was kept open, is evident from the last part of the order dated 12
C December 2017 which specifically keeps open the contentions of the
parties to be urged before the High Court. In addition, the order of this
Court carefully enunciates that “we have not considered the matter on
merits”.
19. In view of this clear clarification, it is impossible to accept the
D preliminary objection that a recourse to this Court is barred after the
High Court decided the review petitions. To take any other view would
effectively deny access to justice to the appellant. Evidently, the grievance
of the appellant was not considered by this Court on merits on 12
December 2017. To adopt a construction which would deprive the
appellant of the remedy of moving this Court after the decision of the
E High Court in review would lead to an egregious failure of justice. Such
a construction must be eschewed.
20. We would like to note an important aspect of the matter here
which reflects on the bona fides of the appellant. The appellant moved
a Miscellaneous Application on 22 November 2018 by way of abundant
F caution, for seeking a clarification of the order dated 12 December 2017.
The appellant sought a clarification to the effect that upon the disposal
of the review petitions by the High Court, it would be open to challenge
the order in review as well as the original order before this Court.
21. One of the members of the earlier Bench, Hon’ble Mr Justice
G Kurian Joseph, was due to demit office on 29 November 2018. The
Miscellaneous Application was instituted on 22 November 2018. On 28
November 2018, a Bench consisting of Hon’ble Mr Justice Kurian Joseph

H
SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE v. NORESHWAR 963
RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

and one of us (Hon’ble Mr Justice Hemant Gupta) issued notice on the A
Miscellaneous Application.
22. We accordingly clarify the earlier order dated 12 December
2017 by directing that it would be open to the appellant, if aggrieved by
the order that may be passed by the High Court in review to challenge
both the order in review and original orders in the writ petitions. However, B
this liberty is confined to the issue of the catch-up rule. In issuing this
clarification, we have also been guided by an earlier precedent of a two
judge Bench of this Court in the Maharashtra Chamber of Housing
Industry v Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai17. A Bench
of this Court consisting of Hon’ble Mr Justice S A Bobde and Hon’ble
Mr Justice Ashok Bhushan passed an order on 16 August 201618 in the C
following terms:
“In the circumstances, we permit the petitioner to approach the
High Court with a review petition along with appropriate application
for impleadment. The High Court shall decide the issues raised
by the petitioner afresh, as expeditiously as possible.” D

The Special Leave Petitions were accordingly disposed of.
23. Subsequently, on 5 December 2017, while considering an
application for modification/recall of the earlier order, a two judge Bench
consisting of Hon’ble Mr Justice S A Bobde and Hon’ble Mr Justice L E
Nageswara Rao observed thus:
“Having regard to the circumstances of the case and the
importance of the matter which affects the construction activities
in the entire city of Mumbai, we consider it appropriate to modify
our earlier order dated 16.08.2016 passed in SLP(C) Nos.24660- F
24661 of 2016, by expressly granting liberty to the petitioner to
challenge the impugned PIL order as well as the impugned Review
order before this Court.
We order accordingly.
Hence, the aforesaid applications for modification/recall are G
disposed of in the above terms.”

17
SLP (C)…2016.CC No. 14855 of 2016, dated 16 August 2016.
18
SLP (CC) NO 14855 of 2016

H
964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the first
respondent relied on a judgment of this Court in Suseel Finance &
Leasing Co. v M Lata19 where it was held thus:
“1. These special leave petitions are against an order dated
12-12-2003 passed in review petitions. It must be mentioned that
B against the main judgment, special leave petitions had earlier been
filed. However, when those special leave petitions reached hearing
on 1-9-2003, the following order came to be passed:
“After arguing for some time, the learned counsel for the petition-
ers seeks permission to withdraw the special leave petitions to
C seek review of the order of the National Commission. Permission
is granted. Accordingly, the special leave petitions are dismissed
as withdrawn.”
It is clear from the order that the matter was argued for some
time. It is clear that the Court was against the petitioners. Thus,
D as has become common nowadays, counsel applied for withdrawal
on the ground that a review will be applied for.
2. Thereafter the review applications were filed before the High
Court which have now been dismissed. By these special leave
petitions the order dismissing the review petitions has been
E challenged.
3. In the case of Shanker Motiram Nale v. Shiolalsing Gannusing
Rajput [(1994) 2 SCC 753] it has been held by this Court that
against an order rejecting an application for review, a special leave
petition is not maintainable. This authority is directly on the point
F in issue.”
24. In the above case, it is evident that the petitioners had sought
permission to withdraw the Special Leave Petition, after arguing the
matter for some time, to seek a review of the order which was impugned.
Granting permission, the Special Leave Petition was dismissed as
withdrawn. It is clear therefore that there was nothing to indicate that
G
the court had granted permission to move this Court afresh against the
original order after the review was decided.
19
(2004) 13 SCC 675

H
SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE v. NORESHWAR 965
RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

25. In Abhishek Malviya v Additional Welfare A
Commissioner20, a Special Leave Petition was filed before this Court
against an order of the Additional Welfare Commissioner in a matter
involving a claim for compensation arising out of the Bhopal Gas Leak
Disaster. One of the grounds of challenge was that the Additional Welfare
Commissioner had referred to the appellant as deceased. This Court
B
dismissed the Special Leave Petition as withdrawn, recording the
submission of the appellant that he wishes to move the Additional Welfare
Commissioner for correction of the order. After the Additional Welfare
Commissioner passed a fresh order, writ proceedings were initiated
before the High Court. The High Court held that by the earlier order of
this Court, liberty was reserved only to move the Additional Welfare C
Commissioner to correct a typographical error in appeal. This Court
affirmed the order of the High Court, holding that its earlier order had
merely reserved liberty to move the Additional Welfare Commissioner
for correction of a typographical error.
26. In Vinod Kapoor v State of Goa21, a Special Leave Petition D
before this Court was dismissed as withdrawn, recording that the
petitioner had filed a review petition in the High Court. No liberty was
taken to file a fresh Special Leave Petition against the original order of
the High Court. In that context, this Court held thus:
“As the appellant has withdrawn the special leave to appeal against E
the order dated 29-1-2000 [Vinod Kapoor v. State of Goa, WP
(C) No. 253 of 1999, order dated 29-1-2000 (Bom)] of the High
Court with permission to pursue his remedy by way of review
instead and had not taken the liberty from this Court to challenge
the order dated 29-1-2000 afresh by way of special leave in case
he did not get relief in the review application, he is precluded from F
challenging the order dated 29-1-2000 of the High Court by way
of special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.”
The same view was reiterated by another Bench of two judges of
this Court in Sandhya Educational Society v Union of India 22
(“Sandhya Education Society”), where this Court had permitted the G
withdrawal of a Special Leave Petition with liberty to institute a review
petition before the High Court. No liberty was granted to file a fresh
20
(2008) 3 SCC 108
21
(2012) 12 SCC 378
22
(2014) 7 SCC 701 H
966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A Special Leave Petition thereafter. This Court held that once a Special
Leave Petition is dismissed as withdrawn without obtaining appropriate
permission to file a fresh Special Leave Petition after exhausting the
remedy of a review petition before the High Court, it would not be
maintainable. The Court held thus:
B “16. This Court in Vinod Kapoor v. State of Goa [(2012) 12
SCC 378 : AIR 2012 SC 3722], has categorically observed that
once the special leave petition is dismissed as withdrawn without
obtaining appropriate permission to file a special leave petition
once over again after exhausting the remedy of review petition
before the High Court, the same is not maintainable.
C
17. The issue raised in this appeal is identical with the issue raised
and considered by this Court in Vinod Kapoorv. State of Goa
[(2012) 12 SCC 378 : AIR 2012 SC 3722] . Therefore, while
accepting the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondent,
we hold that the petition filed by the appellant is not maintainable.”
D
The view in Sandhya Educational Society (supra)was reiterated
in Bussa Overseas and Properties Private Limited v Union of
India23, where this Court held thus:
“30. The decisions pertaining to maintainability of special leave
E petition or for that matter appeal have to be seemly understood.
Though in the decision in Shanker Motiram Nale [Shanker Motiram
Nale v. Shiolalsing Gannusing Rajput, (1994) 2 SCC 753] the two-
Judge Bench referred to Order 47 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil
Procedure that bars an appeal against the order of the court
rejecting the review, it is not to be understood that the Court has
F curtailed the plenary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
Constitution by taking recourse to the provisions in the Code of
Civil Procedure. It has to be understood that the Court has evolved
and formulated a principle that if the basic judgment is not assailed
and the challenge is only to the order passed in review, this Court
G is obliged not to entertain such special leave petition. The said
principle has gained the authoritative status and has been treated
as a precedential principle for more than two decades and we are
disposed to think that there is hardly any necessity not to be guided
by the said precedent.”
23
H (2016) 4 SCC 696
SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE v. NORESHWAR 967
RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

27. In the present case, we find, for the reasons which we have A
indicated above, a clear distinction on facts. While disposing of the earlier
Special Leave Petition to enable the appellant to pursue his remedies on
the contention that the issue of catch-up though raised was not considered
by the High Court, this Court expressly clarified that it had not considered
the matter on merits. In the absence of such a clarification, the withdrawal
B
of the Special Leave Petition would have led to the inference that the
appellant had not been granted liberty to move this Court afresh. On the
other hand, the clear purpose and intent of the observation that this Court
had not considered the matter on merits was to keep open all the remedies
of the appellant before the High Court in the first instance and thereafter
before this Court on the issue of the catch-up rule. C
28. By the clarification that we have issued on the Miscellaneous
Applications, we have set the matter at rest. For the above reasons, we
do not find any merit in the preliminary objection.
29. Mr P S Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellant urged the following submissions: D

(i) The appellant was senior to the first respondent in the feeder
cadre of DDTP;
(ii) Even assuming that the promotion of the first respondent as
JDTP was on a regular basis, the appellant would “catch-up” E
on his promotion and regain his seniority over the first
respondent in the promotional post;
(iii) The circular of the Government of Maharashtra dated 20 March
2003 cannot be construed as granting consequential seniority
to a reserved candidate on the promotion to a higher post, in F
the absence of the collection of quantifiable date, as required
by the decision of this Court in Nagaraj (supra);
(iii) When the circular dated 20 March 2003 was issued,
reservation in the state services was only until the entry level
of class-I posts, in this case DDTP;
G
(iv) Reservation within the Class-I posts was brought about for the
first time by Reservation Act 2004;

H
968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A (v) Sections 5 and 6 of the Reservation Act 2004 specifically save
certain existing circulars and it occupies the field. No other
circular, including the circular on consequential seniority is saved.
Under Section 11, anything done in violation of the Act is void;
(vi) The circular dated 27 October 2008 on which basis promotion
B was granted to the first respondent on 2 August 2011 against a
post reserved for a Scheduled Tribe candidate, was quashed
by the Bombay High Court24 on the ground that it was ultra
vires the Reservation Act 2004. Since the promotion of the
first respondent was on the basis of the circular which was
quashed, his appointment contrary to the rules would not entitle
C him to seniority; and
(vii) The circular dated 20 March 2003 provides for the grant of
consequential seniority where a reserved candidate has been
promoted on a regular basis. The promotion of the first
respondent being ad-hoc, would not entitle him to
D consequential seniority.
30. On the other hand, Mr V Giri, learned Senior Counsel appearing
on behalf of the first respondent urged the following submissions:
(i) The scope of adjudication before this Court must be restricted
E only to the applicability of the principle of catch-up;
(ii) The promotion of the first respondent dated 11 August 2011 to
the post of JDTP was not challenged by the appellant in the
OA before the Tribunal and cannot be permitted to be
challenged, directly or indirectly, in these proceedings;
F (iii) The necessary concomitant for the application of the principle
of catch-up is that the promotion of the first respondent dated
11 August 2011 must be taken to be valid and regular; and
(iv) Consequently, the submission of the appellant that the promotion
of the first respondent as JDTP was ad-hoc, fortuitous or
G irregular cannot be agitated before this Court.
31. On the applicability of the principle of catch-up, Mr V Giri
urged the following submissions:

24
2013 (5) Maharashtra Law Journal 640
H
SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE v. NORESHWAR 969
RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(i) Rule 4 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Regulation of Seniority) A
Rules 198225, stipulates that the seniority of a government
servant in a post is ordinarily determined by the length of their
continuous service;
(ii) Section 5(1) of the Reservation Act 2004 stipulates that
reservation shall be at all stages of promotion, thereby giving B
effect to the constitutional right under Article 16 (4A);
(iii) Section 5(2) saves all government orders which provide for
reservation of posts by promotion;
(iv) In the judgment of this Court in Indra Sawhney v Union of
India26 (“Indra Sawhney”), it was held that the principle of C
consequential seniority can be enunciated in a rule or executive
order. Consequently, the State government was competent to
provide for consequential seniority in its GR dated 20 March
2003;
(v) By a GR dated 20 October 1997, it was stipulated that a D
Backward Class officer will retain seniority in a promotional
cadre by the date of regular appointment, according to the
seniority rules; and
(vi) The GR dated 20 March 2003 was issued after the amendment
of Article 16 (4A) by the 85th Amendment, expressly recognizing E
that seniority among Backward Classes/non-Backward Class
candidates in government service in the promoted cadre shall
be fixed on the basis of the regular dates of their promotion.
32. On the above grounds, it was urged that the principle of
catch-up would not be applicable. Finally, it was urged that even presuming F
that the seniority of the appellant is protected in the cadre of JDTP, he
did not have the requisite eligibility to be considered for promotion to the
post of DTP for the following reasons:
(i) Rule 3 of the Directorate of Town Planning and Valuation
(Recruitment) Rules 2011 prescribes that an officer holding G
the post of JDTP must serve in the post for a minimum of three
years to be considered eligible for promotion to the post of
DTP;
25
Seniority Rules 1982
26
1992 Supp. (3) SCC 217
H
970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A (ii) Upon the superannuation of the incumbent in the post of DTP, a
vacancy arose in the post on 30 April 2016;
(iii) On the date on which a vacancy occurred in the post of DTP,
the appellant did not fulfill the eligibility criterion of three years’
experience as JDTP and the first respondent being the senior
B most eligible officer was entitled to and eligible for the post;
and
(iv) Seniority and eligibility are distinct concepts and if a senior is
not otherwise eligible for consideration under the rules of
promotion, seniority will have to give way to an eligible junior.
C The catch-up rule, it was submitted, will not provide actual
service to the appellant to fulfill the eligibility requirement for
the post of DTP. On 30 April 2016, the appellant did not complete
three years of actual service in the post of JDTP for being
eligible for the post of DTP.

D 33. The rival submissions now fall for consideration.
34. Clause (1) of Article 16 of the Constitution stipulates that
there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to
employment or appointment to any office under the State. The expression
‘appointment’ was interpreted by a Bench of nine Judges of this Court
E in Indra Sawhney (supra)to exclude reservations in promotional posts.
The expression ‘appointment’ was construed to refer to initial
appointments and hence not to promotional avenues. After this decision,
the Parliament in its constituent capacity amended Article 16 by the
Constitution (Seventy-seventh) Amendment Act 1995 with effect from
17 June 1995. Clause (4A) of Article 16 as introduced by the Seventy-
F Seventh Amendment read thus:
“16.(4A) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making
any provision for reservation in matters of promotion to any class
or classes of posts in the services under the State in favour of the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes which, in the opinion
G of the State, are not adequately represented in the services under
the State.”
By virtue of Clause (4A), an enabling provision was introduced
as a result of which nothing contained in the Article would prevent the

H
SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE v. NORESHWAR 971
RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

State from making reservations in promotion in the services under the A
State for Scheduled Castes and Tribes which, in its opinion, are not
adequately represented in its service.
35. A line of cases before this Court considered the effect of an
accelerated promotion granted to a member of a Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe in terms of consequential seniority in a higher post. B
More specifically, the vexed issue was whether a member of such a
caste and tribe who obtains promotion earlier than a senior belonging to
the general or open category in the feeder cadre would retain that seniority
on the latter being promoted to a higher post.
36. In Union of India v Virpal Singh Chauhan27(“Virpal Singh C
Chauhan”),a two judge Bench of this Courtheld that the State could
provide that a candidate who had been promoted earlier on the basis of
reservation and on the application of the roster would not be entitled to
seniority over a senior belonging to the general category in the feeder
category. A senior belonging to the general category who is promoted to
a higher post subsequently would regain seniority over the reserved D
candidate.
37. The decision in Virpal Singh Chauhan (supra) led to the
Constitution (Eighty-fifth Amendment) Act 2001 with effect from 17
June 1995. Clause (4A), as amended, expanded the ambit of the earlier
provision by enabling the State to also provide for consequential seniority, E
while making the provision for reservation in matters of promotion. Clause
(4A) of Article 16, in its present form, reads thus:
“(4A) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making
any provision for reservation in matters of promotion, with
consequential seniority, to any class or classes of posts in the F
services under the State in favour of the Scheduled Castes and
the Scheduled Tribes which, in the opinion of the State, are not
adequately represented in the services under the State.”
38. The principle which has been enunciated in Virpal Singh
Chauhan (supra) has come to be known as the ‘catch-up’ rule. In Ajit G
Singh Januja v State of Punjab28(“Ajit Singh I”), a three judge Bench
of this Court adopted the catch-up rule propounded in Virpal Singh
Chauhan (supra).This Court held that a balance has to be maintained
27
(1995) 6 SCC 684
28
(1996) 2 SCC 715 H
972 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A so as to avoid reverse discrimination and a rule or circular which gives
seniority to a candidate belonging to the reserved category promoted on
the basis of the roster point would violate Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution.
39. A contrary view was taken by another three Judge Bench in
B Jagdish Lal v State of Haryana29 (“Jagdish Lal”) to the effect that by
virtue of the principle of continuous officiation, a candidate belonging to
the reserved category who is promoted earlier than a general candidate
due to an accelerated promotion would not lose seniority in the higher
cadre. This conflict of decisions was resolved by a Constitution Bench
in Ajit Singh (II) v State of Punjab30 (“Ajit Singh II”).The Constitution
C Bench upheld the principle laid down in Virpal Singh Chauhan
(supra)and Ajit SinghI (supra) and disapproved of the decision in
Jagdish Lal (supra). This Court held thus:
“77. We, therefore, hold that the roster-point promotees (reserved
category) cannot count their seniority in the promoted category
D from the date of their continuous officiation in the promoted post,
— vis-à-vis the general candidates who were senior to them in
the lower category and who were later promoted. On the other
hand, the senior general candidate at the lower level, if he reaches
the promotional level later but before the further promotion of the
E reserved candidate — he will have to be treated as senior, at the
promotional level, to the reserved candidate even if the reserved
candidate was earlier promoted to that level. We shall explain this
further under Point 3. We also hold that Virpal [(1995) 6 SCC 684
: 1996 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1995) 31 ATC 813] and Ajit Singh [(1996)
2 SCC 715 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 540 : (1996) 33 ATC 239] have
F been correctly decided and that Jagdish Lal [(1997) 6 SCC 538 :
1997 SCC (L&S) 1550] is not correctly decided. Points 1 and 2
are decided accordingly.”
40. The constitutional validity of clauses (4A) and (4B) of Article
16 of the Constitution was dealt with in a decision of a Constitution
G Bench of this Court in Nagaraj (supra). Nagaraj (supra) laid down that
the catch-up rule and the concept of the consequential seniority are
essentially precepts of service jurisprudence. They cannot, in the view
of the Constitution Bench, be elevated to the status of a component of
29
(1997) 6 SCC 538
H 30
(1999) 7 SCC 209
SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE v. NORESHWAR 973
RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

the basic structure. These precepts have been held to be practices as A
distinct from constitutional principles. The consequence is that they do
not lie beyond the amending power of Parliament: neither the catch-up
rule nor consequential seniority are elements of clauses (1) or (4) of
Article 16. These have been held to be the principles evolved to control
the extent of reservation.
B
41. The validity of clause (4A) and (4B) of Article 16 has been
upheld by the Constitution Bench in Nagaraj on the rationale that “they
retain the controlling factors or the compelling reasons, namely,
backwardness and inadequacy of representation which enables the States
to provide for reservation keeping in mind the overall efficiency of the
State administration under Article 335”31. Nagaraj (supra) held that the C
State must demonstrate in each case the existence of compelling reasons,
namely (i) backwardness; (ii) inadequacy of representation; and (iii)
overall administrative efficiency before providing for reservation.
Construing clauses (4A) and (4B) of Article 16 to be enabling, Nagaraj
(supra) holds that if the State wishes to exercise its discretion under the D
enabling provisions, it must collect quantifiable data showing
backwardness of the class as well as inadequacy of representation of
that class in public employment in addition to complying with the norm of
efficiency embodied in Article 335. The Court held thus:
“123. However, in this case, as stated above, the main issue E
concerns the “extent of reservation”. In this regard the State
concerned will have to show in each case the existence of the
compelling reasons, namely, backwardness, inadequacy of
representation and overall administrative efficiency before making
provision for reservation. As stated above, the impugned provision
is an enabling provision. The State is not bound to make reservation F
for SCs/STs in matters of promotions. However, if they wish to
exercise their discretion and make such provision, the State has
to collect quantifiable data showing backwardness of the class
and inadequacy of representation of that class in public
employment in addition to compliance with Article 335. It is made G
clear that even if the State has compelling reasons, as stated above,
the State will have to see that its reservation provision does not
lead to excessiveness so as to breach the ceiling limit of 50% or
obliterate the creamy layer or extend the reservation indefinitely.”
31
Nagaraj at page 278 H
974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A 42. In the recent decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in
Jarnail Singh v Lachhmi Narain Gupta32(“Jarnail Singh”), Nagaraj
(supra) has been followed save and except for the dictum requiring the
State to the demonstrate backwardness as a condition for the exercise
of the enabling power in making reservations in promotion for Scheduled
Castes and Tribes. This part of the judgment in Nagaraj (supra)has
B
been held to be inconsistent with the nine Judge Bench decision in Indra
Sawhney (supra). The Court in Jarnail Singh (supra) held thus:
“..It is clear, therefore, that Nagaraj (supra) has, in unmistakable
terms, stated that the State has to collect quantifiable data showing
backwardness of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.
C We are afraid that this portion of the judgment is directly contrary
to the nine-Judge Bench in Indra Sawhney (1) (supra). Jeevan
Reddy, J., speaking for himself and three other learned Judges,
had clearly held, “[t]he test or requirement of social and educational
backwardness cannot be applied to Scheduled Castes and
D Scheduled Tribes, who indubitably fall within the expression
“backward class of citizens”.”
Justice RF Nariman, speaking for the Constitution Bench held
thus:
“..Thus, it is clear that when Nagaraj (supra) required the States
E to collect quantifiable data on backwardness, insofar as Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes are concerned, this would clearly
be contrary to the Indra Sawhney (1) (supra) and would have to
be declared to be bad on this ground.”
43. The decision in Nagaraj (supra) has been followed in several
F subsequent decisions of this Court: (i) Suraj Bhan Meena v State of
Rajasthan 33 (“Suraj Bhan Meena”);(ii) Uttar Pradesh Power
CorporationLimited v Rajesh Kumar34(“UP Power Corporation”);
(iii) S Panneer Selvam v State of Tamil Nadu35(“Paneer Selvam”);
and (iv) B K Pavitra v Union of India36(“B K Pavitra”).
G
32
(2018) 10 SCC 396
33
(2011) 1 SCC 467
34
(2012) 7 SCC 1
35
(2015) 10 SCC 292
36
(2017) 4 SCC 620

H
SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE v. NORESHWAR 975
RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

44. In Suraj Bhan Meena (supra) the question which arose for A
consideration before a two judge Bench of this Court was formulated
thus:
“49. The primary question which we are called upon to answer in
these five special leave petitions is whether the amended provisions
of Article 16(4-A) of the Constitution intended that those belonging B
to the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe communities, who
had been promoted against reserved quota, would also be entitled
to consequential seniority on account of such promotions, or would
the “catch-up” rule prevail.”
Answering this question, this Court held thus: C
“66. The position after the decision in M. Nagaraj case [(2006) 8
SCC 212 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 1013] is that reservation of posts
in promotion is dependent on the inadequacy of representation of
members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and
Backward Classes and subject to the condition of ascertaining as D
to whether such reservation was at all required.”
The Court held that since no exercise was carried out by the
State of Rajasthan to acquire quantifiable data regarding the inadequacy
of representation of Scheduled Castes and Tribes in public services in
the state, the High Court was justified in quashing the notifications E
providing for consequential seniority and promotion.
45. In Panneer Selvam (supra) the issue before a two Judge
Bench of this Court was thus:
“1.1. (i) In the absence of policy decision taken by the State/rules
framed pursuant to the enabling provision of Article 16(4-A) of F
the Constitution of India, whether a reserved category candidate
promoted on the basis of reservation earlier than his senior general
category candidate in the feeder category can claim consequential
seniority in the promotional post?”
Rule 12 of the sub-rules to the Tamil Nadu Highways and G
Engineering Service provided as follows:
“12. Reservation of appointment.- The rule of reservation of
appointments (General Rule 22) shall apply to the appointment of

H
976 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A Assistant Divisional Engineers by direct recruitment and
recruitment by transfer separately and the appointment of Assistant
Engineers by direct recruitment.”
Under Rule 12, reserved category Assistant and Junior Engineers
had secured promotion as Assistant Divisional Engineers earlier than
B their counterparts belonging to the general category as a result of
accelerated promotion following the rule of reservation.
46. Justice R Banumathi, speaking for the two Judge Bench held
that Rule 12 did not provide for consequential seniority to candidates
drawn from the reserved category who are granted accelerated promotion
C and, in the absence of a specific provision or policy, consequential seniority
could not be granted:
“26. The true legislative intent under Article 16(4-A) of the
Constitution is to enable the State to make provision or frame
rules giving consequential seniority for the accelerated promotion
D gained based on the rule of reservation. Rule 12 evidently does
not provide for the consequential seniority for reserved category
promotees at any point of time. The consequential seniority for
such reserved category promotees can be fixed only if there is
express provision for such reserved category promotees in the
State rules. In the absence of any specific provision or policy
E decision taken by the State Government for consequential seniority
for reserved category accelerated promotees, there is no question
of automatic application of Article 16(4-A) of the Constitution.”
The Court noted that the appellants who belonged to the general
category were not questioning the accelerated promotion granted to their
F counterparts from the reserved category by following the rule of
reservation but were only seeking the application of the catch-up rule in
the fixation of seniority in the promotional cadre. The Court held that in
the absence of any provision of consequential seniority in the rules, the
catch-up rule will prevail:
G “36. In the absence of any provision for consequential seniority in
the rules, the “catch-up rule” will be applicable and the roster-
point reserved category promotees cannot count their seniority in
the promoted category from the date of their promotion and the
senior general candidates if later reach the promotional level,
H
SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE v. NORESHWAR 977
RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

general candidates will regain their seniority. The Division Bench A
appears to have proceeded on an erroneous footing that Article
16(4-A) of the Constitution of India automatically gives the
consequential seniority in addition to accelerated promotion to the
roster-point promotees and the judgment of the Division Bench
cannot be sustained.”
B
47. The decision in Panneer Selvam (supra) has since been
followed by a two judge Bench of this Court in B K Pavitra (supra).
Justice AK Goel, speaking for the Bench held thus:
“29. It is clear from the above discussion in S. Panneer Selvam
case [S. Panneer Selvam v. State of T.N., (2015) 10 SCC 292 : C
(2016) 1 SCC (L&S) 76] that exercise for determining
“inadequacy of representation”, “backwardness” and “overall
efficiency”, is a must for exercise of power under Article 16(4-
A). Mere fact that there is no proportionate representation in
promotional posts for the population of SCs and STs is not by
itself enough to grant consequential seniority to promotees who D
are otherwise junior and thereby denying seniority to those who
are given promotion later on account of reservation policy. It is
for the State to place material on record that there was compelling
necessity for exercise of such power and decision of the State
was based on material including the study that overall efficiency E
is not compromised. In the present case, no such exercise has
been undertaken. The High Court erroneously observed that it
was for the petitioners to plead and prove that the overall efficiency
was adversely affected by giving consequential seniority to junior
persons who got promotion on account of reservation. Plea that
persons promoted at the same time were allowed to retain their F
seniority in the lower cadre is untenable and ignores the fact that
a senior person may be promoted later and not at the same time
on account of roster point reservation. Depriving him of his seniority
affects his further chances of promotion. Further plea that seniority
was not a fundamental right is equally without any merit in the G
present context. In absence of exercise under Article 16(4-A), it
is the “catch-up” rule which fully applies. It is not necessary to go
into the question whether the Corporation concerned had adopted
the rule of consequential seniority.”

H
978 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A 48. Rule 4 of the Maharashtra Civil Service (Regulation of Seniority)
Rules 1982 lays down the general principles of seniority. The substantive
part of Rule 4(1) reads thus:
“4. General principles of seniority:-
(1) Subject to the other provisions of these rules, the seniority of a
B Government servant in any post, cadre or service shall ordinarily
be determined on the length of his continuous service therein.”
The second proviso to Rule 4(1) is as follows:
“Provided further that, the service, if any, rendered by him as a
C result of fortuitous appointment (except in a case whether the
competent authority certifies that, it was not expedient / possible
or practicable to make a regular appointment strictly in accordance
with the ratio of recruitment as prescribed in relevant recruitment
rules, with the brief reasons recorded therefor), shall be excluded
in computing the length of service and for the purpose of seniority
D he shall be deemed to have been appointed to the post or in the
cadre or service on the date on which his regular appointment is
made in accordance with the provisions of the relevant recruitment
rules.”
49. On 20 October 1997, a Government Resolution was issued
E stipulating that an officer belonging to a Backward Class will retain
seniority in the promotional cadre and that it is not necessary to revise
the seniority. The GR adverts to the decision of this Court in Virpal
Singh Chauhan (supra) and to the orders which were issued on 19
April 1997 for regulating the seniority of employees in government
F services, following a circular dated 30 January 1997 of the Union
government. The GR is founded on the judgment in Jagdish Lal (supra)
and provides thus:
“2[A] If any Backward Class employee / Officer is already
promoted in promotional cadre, then it is not necessary to revise
his seniority in said cadre. Similarly, it is not necessary to revise
G
the seniority lists which were in existence on 30.1.1997.”
50. On 20 March 2003, another GR was issued inter alia with
reference to the earlier GR noted above. The GR states that following
the amendment to Article 16 by the insertion of Clause (4A), it has been
decided that the instructions for regulating seniority of officers belonging
H
SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE v. NORESHWAR 979
RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

to the Backward Classes and the general category in the promoted cadre A
would be governed by the earlier Government Resolutions dated 21 June
1982 and 20 October 1997. The GR clarified that the seniority between
backward class and non-backward class candidates in government
service in the promotional cadre would be governed by the regular date
of promotion:
B
“3. Considering the said amendment made by the Union
Government to Constitution of India and accordingly the orders
issued on 21.1.2002, the State Government has now decided that
the instructions issued for regulating the seniority amongst the
employees/ officers of Backward Classes / Non-Backward
Classes in Government Service in the promoted cadre vide the C
circular of 21st June 1982 and the instructions stipulated in the
orders dated 20.10.1997 shall continue to remain in force. Hence,
seniority amongst the Backward Classes / Non Backward Class
candidates in government service in the promoted cadre shall be
fixed on the basis of their respective regular date of promotion D
given to them as per their sequence in the select list of Backward
Class and non-Backward candidates.”
51. The submission which has been urged on behalf of the first
respondent is that:
(i) The GR dated 20 March 2003 has been issued in pursuance of E
the 85th constitutional amendment by which the words “with
consequential seniority” were inserted in Clause (4A) of Ar-
ticle 16;
(ii) The decision of this Court in Indra Sawnhey (supra) contem-
plates that a reservation in favour of the backward classes can F
also be provided by means of an executive order;
(iii) Section 5(1) of the Reservation Act 2004 stipulates that reser-
vation in promotion shall be at all stages of promotion and in
doing so, gives effect to Article 16(4A); and
G
(iv) Section 5(2) of the Reservation Act 2004 saves all government
orders which provide for reservation for any posts to be filled
by way of promotion. Consequently it is urged that all prior
government orders have been explicitly saved after the enact-
ment of the Reservation Act 2004.
H
980 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A 52. The GR dated 20 March 2003 was issued after the
constitutional amendment to Article 16 (4A) by which consequential
seniority was incorporated into that provision. The decision of this Court
in Indra Sawhney (supra) indeed contemplated that a provision for
reservation can be made by a legislative enactment or rules and also by
an executive order. The judgment of Justice Jeevan Reddy formulated
B
the following among other issues for decision:
“1. (a) Whether the ‘provision’ contemplated by Article 16(4)
must necessarily be made by the legislative wing of the State?
(b) If the answer to clause (a) is in the negative, whether an
C executive order making such a provision is enforceable without
incorporating it into a rule made under the proviso to Article 309?”
Answering this issue the decision holds:
“(1) (a) It is not necessary that the ‘provision’ under Article 16(4)
should necessarily be made by the Parliament/Legislature. Such
D a provision can be made by the Executive also. Local bodies,
Statutory Corporations and other instrumentalities of the State
falling under Article 12 of the Constitution are themselves
competent to make such a provision, if so advised. (Paras 735-
737)
E (b) An executive order making a provision under Article 16(4) is
enforceable the moment it is made and issued. (Paras 738-740)”
[See also in this context Gaurav Pradhan v State of
Rajasthan37.]
53. The Reservation Act 2004 was enacted by the State legislature
F
in 2001. The assent of the Governor was received on 20 January 2004
and it was published in the Official Gazette on 22 January 2004. The
enactment has come into force after the 85th constitutional amendment.
Prior to the enforcement of the Act, reservations were confined upto
the entry level in Group I posts, this being common ground during the
G course of the hearing. As a result of the enactment of the law, reservations
are applicable to all appointments in public services and posts [except
categories covered by clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 3].

37
(2018) 11 SCC 352
H
SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE v. NORESHWAR 981
RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

54. Section 3 deals with the applicability of the Act and Section 4 A
deals with reservation and percentages:
“Section 3 - Applicability
(1) This Act shall apply to all appointments made in public services
and posts except,-
(a) the super specialised posts in Medical, Technical and B
Educational field;
(b) the posts to be filled by transfer or deputation;
(c) the temporary appointments of less than forty-five days
duration; and
(d) the posts which is single (isolated) in any cadre or grade.” C

Sub Sections (1) and (2) of Section 4 read thus:
“Section 4 - Reservation and percentage
(1) Unless otherwise provided by or under this Act, the posts
reserved for the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified D
Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Special Backward
Category and Other Backward Classes shall not be filled in by
the candidates not belonging to that, caste, tribe, category or class
for which the posts are reserved.
(2) Subject to other provisions of this Act, there shall be posts E
reserved for the persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes, De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic
Tribes, Special Backward Category and Other Backward Classes,
at the stage of direct recruitment in public services and posts
specified under clause (j) of section 2, as provided below :-
F
Description of Percentage of vacancies or
Caste/Tribe/Category/Class seats to be reserved
(1) Scheduled Castes 13 per cent
(2) Scheduled Tribes 7 per cent
(3) De-notified Tribes (A) 3 per cent
(4) Nomadic Tribes (B) 2.5 per cent G
(5) Nomadic Tribes (C) 3.5 per cent
(6) Nomadic Tribes (D) 2 per cent
(7) Special Backward Category 2 per cent
(8) Other Backward Classes 19 per cent
Total 52 per cent
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982 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A Sub-section (3) of Section 4 provides thus:
“(3) The reservation specified for the categories mentioned at
serial numbers (3) to (6) (both inclusive) in the table under sub-
section (2) shall be inter transferable. If suitable candidates for
the posts reserved for any of the said categories are not available
B in the same recruitment year, the posts shall be filled by appointing
suitable candidates from any of the other said categories.”
55. Sections 5 and 6 provide thus:
“Section 5 - Reservation in promotion

C (1) The reservation in promotion shall be at all stages of promotions.
(2) On the date of coming into force of this Act, if any Government
orders providing for reservation for any posts to be filled by
promotion, are in force, the same shall continue to be in force
unless modified or revoked, by Government.
D Section 6 - Carrying forward of reserved vacancies
(1) If in respect of any recruitment year, any vacancy reserved
for any category of persons under sub-section (2) of section 4
remains unfilled, such vacancy shall be carried forward upto five
years in case of direct recruitment and three years in case of
E promotion:
Provided that, on the date of commencement of this Act, if any
Government orders regarding filling up the posts, in case of non
availability of Backward Class candidates are in force, such
Government orders shall continue to be in force unless modified
F or revoked, by Government.”
Section 11 provides thus:
“Section 11 - Irregular appointments void protection of
action taken in good faith

G Any appointments made, in contravention of the provisions of this
Act shall be void.”
56. Sub-section (1) of Section 5 stipulates that reservation in
promotion shall be at all stages of promotions. Consequently, promotions
within Class I posts are also governed by the rule of reservation.
H
SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE v. NORESHWAR 983
RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

57. According to the appellant, the Reservation Act 2004 clearly A
provides in sub-section (2) of Section 5 and the proviso to sub-section
(1) of Section 6, which category of government orders predating the Act
stand saved. Mr Patwalia submits that the long title to the Reservation
Act 2004 indicates that the law was enacted to provide for reservation
and “for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto”. The
B
submission is that while making a law for the purpose of reservation, the
state government did not incorporate a provision for consequential
seniority. Moreover, the proviso to Section 6 saves government orders
dealing with the filling up of unfilled posts reserved for backward class
candidates. Hence, it was urged that the GR dated 20 March 2003 does
not survive the enactment of the Reservation Act 2004 and in any event, C
it has not been saved by Section 5 or Section 6. Moreover, Section 11
stipulates that any appointment made in contravention of the provisions
of the Act shall be void.
58. On the other hand, Mr Giri has met this submission by urging
that the Reservation Act 2004 does not deal with the issue of consequential D
seniority. Hence the GR dated 20 March 2003 will continue to apply. It
was urged that though the GR dated 20 March 2003 is an executive
order, this is a valid or competent mode of giving effect to the principle
of consequential seniority as recognized by the decision of this Court in
Indra Sawhney (supra).
E
59. We have already noticed the decision in Indra Sawhney (supra)
as having laid down that a provision for reservation can be incorporated
in an executive order. We are not inclined to accede to the submission
of the appellant that the GR dated 20 March 2003 will cease to remain in
force after the enactment of the Reservation Act 2004. The Reservation
Act has not dealt with issue of consequential seniority. Sub-section (2) F
of Section 5 saves government orders providing for reservation of any
posts to be filled in promotion which were in force on the date of the
enactment of the Act. Similarly, the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section
6 saves government orders regarding the filling up of unfilled posts
reserved for Backward Class candidates in force on the date of the G
commencement of the Act. The GR dated 20 March 2003 deals with
the determination of seniority while sub-section (2) of Section 5 deals
with orders providing for reservation. The GR dated 20 March 2003 is
undoubtedly not a government order which falls within the purview of
either sub-section (2) of Section 5 or the proviso to sub-section (1) of
H
984 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A Section 6. However, the enactment of the Act by the state legislature
cannot be construed as a legislative intent to override or abrogate the
principle of consequential seniority incorporated in government
resolutions. A provision for consequential seniority can certainly be
incorporated in an executive order issued in pursuance of the provisions
of Article 162 of the Constitution.38
B
60. The Government Resolution dated 20 March 2003 has not
been abrogated upon the enactment of the Reservation Act 2004. The
Reservation Act 2004 does not deal with the principle of consequential
seniority. It would be impermissible to read the Act as having superseded
the applicable government orders on consequential seniority, in the
C absence of clear words providing for such an effect.
61. A further submission which was urged on behalf of the appellant
is that until the Reservation Act 2004 was enacted, reservations in
promotions were not available within Class I posts. Mr Patwalia urged
that when the GR dated 20 March 2003 was issued, there was no
D reservation within Class 1 posts and that in consequence, consequential
seniority needs to be restricted in its application to posts other than Class
1 posts.
62. This again, is an attempt to urge the Court to read the GR
dated 20 March 2003 in a restrictive manner on the basis of the
E Reservation Act 2004. The GR dated 20 March 2003, while incorporating
the principle of consequential seniority, reiterates the GR dated 20 October
1997. It also adverts to the Seniority Rules 1982 of which Rule 4 specifically
stipulates that the length of continuous service will be determinative of
seniority in respect of posts and cadres in the service. Accepting the
F submission of the appellant would lead to an anomalous situation where
consequential seniority will be made applicable to posts below Class 1,
and the catch-up rule will apply to Class 1 posts. An interpretation
which results in this anomaly must be eschewed, particularly in the
absence of a challenge to the GR dated 20 March 2003 and the Seniority
Rules of 1982.
G
38
“162. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive power of a State
shall extend to the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power
to make laws:
Provided that in any matter with respect to which the Legislature of a State and
Parliament have power to make laws, the executive power of the State shall be subject
to, and limited by, the executive power expressly conferred by this Constitution or by
H any law made by Parliament upon the Union or authorities thereof.”
SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE v. NORESHWAR 985
RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

63. The appellant has, in the course of the submissions of Mr A
Patwalia, sought to urge that the GR dated 20 March 2003 is contrary to
the ratio of the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Nagaraj
(supra). It was urged that before a provision for consequential seniority
can be incorporated, the state is under a mandate to collect quantifiable
data with reference to (i) inadequacy of representation; and (ii) the effect
B
on the efficiency of administration. Mr Patwalia urged that in the absence
of quantifiable data, the GR dated 20 March 2003 is ultra vires. In this
context, it was urged that in the absence of an exercise by the state to
collect quantifiable data, the principle enunciated by this Court in Nagaraj
(supra) and as applied by the subsequent decisions of this Court in Suraj
BhanMeena (supra), UP Power Corporation (supra), Panneer C
Selvam (supra)and B KPavitra (supra) would be attracted.
64. A challenge to the GR dated 20 March 2003 is conspicuous by
its absence in the reliefs which were sought before the Maharashtra
Administrative Tribunal. We have adverted to the reliefs claimed in an
earlier part of this judgment and they are indicative only of a challenge D
to seniority. Entertaining a challenge to the validity of a Government
Resolution incorporating the principle of consequential seniority without
a specific challenge being addressed before the Tribunal would simply
be impermissible. Entertaining such a challenge at this stage will have
serious consequences in the entire State of Maharashtra by upsetting a
significant number of promotions which may have already been granted E
to candidates belonging to the reserved category. The State government,
in the pleadings before the Tribunal and the High Court was not called
upon to justify the basis of its decision to adopt consequential seniority in
the absence of a challenge being squarely set up in the forum of first
instance. F
65. A challenge to the resolution providing for consequential
seniority is indeed a serious matter. Such a challenge calls upon the
court to upset a policy circular which has been issued with the avowed
objective of safeguarding consequential seniority which was, as our
constitutional history indicates, a clear purpose underlying the 85th G
Amendment to the Constitution. Such constitutional challenges cannot
be bandied about without specific pleadings. We are clearly of the view
that such an exercise would be impermissible in the absence of a frontal
challenge.

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986 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A 66. In Suraj Bhan Meena (supra), the petitioners had challenged
a notification dated 25 April 2008 issued by the State of Rajasthan under
the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, amending the Rajasthan
“Various Service Rules” with effect from 28 December 2012. This was
challenged on the ground that the deletion amounted to giving
consequential seniority to candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes
B
and Tribes without carrying out the exercise of collecting quantifiable
data.
67. In UP Power Corporation (supra),there was a specific
challenge before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad to the validity
of Rule 8-A of the UP Government Servants Seniority Rules 2007.
C Section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Reservation for
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes) Act
1994 and Rule 8-A of the 1991 Rules brought into force in 2007 were
challenged as being ultra vires and unconstitutional. As a consequence,
the consequential orders relating to seniority were impugned. Once
D again, the challenge was on the ground that the exercise which was
required in pursuance of the decision of this Court in Nagaraj (supra)
had not been carried out.
68. In Panneer Selvam (supra), Rule 12 of the Special Rules to
Tamil Nadu Highways Engineering Service provided that the rule of
E reservation of appointments (General Rule 22) shall apply to the
appointment of Assistant Divisional Engineers by direct recruitment and
by transfer of the appointment of Assistant Engineers. This Court held
that Rule 12 did not provide for consequential seniority and, in the absence
of a provision for consequential seniority catch-up rule will be applicable.
The litigation in Panneer Selvam (supra) did not engage a situation
F such as the present where the GR dated 20 March 2003 specifically
provides for consequential seniority.
69. The decision in BK Pavitra (supra) involved a specific
challenge to the validity of the Karnataka Determination of Seniority of
the Government Servants promoted on the basis of Reservation (to the
G posts in the Civil Services of the State) Act 2002. The Act was struck
down by a two judge Bench of this Court on the ground that the State
had not undertaken an exercise to establish a “compelling necessity”
since no material had been placed by the State on record.

H
SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE v. NORESHWAR 987
RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

70. All these decisions (except the decision in Panneer Selvam) A
involved a specific challenge to the validity of administrative notifications
or, as the case may be, an Act of the legislature. Panneer Selvam
(supra) was a case where in the absence of a provision for consequential
seniority, it was held that the catch-up rule will prevail. In the present
case, there is a specific provision for consequential seniority in the GR
B
dated 20 March 2003. Absent a challenge to the GR in the proceedings
which were initiated before the Tribunal, such a challenge cannot be
entertained at this stage.
71. On behalf of the appellant, it has been urged that the promotion
which was granted to the first respondent on 11 August 2011 as JDTP is
purely ad-hoc and has not been regularized. This submission has been C
buttressed by relying upon three documents:
(i) The promotion order dated 11 August 2011 which states that an
ad-hoc promotion has been granted to the first respondent on
the post of JDTP, subject to the outcome of the decision of the
Bombay High Court in Writ Petition 8452 of 2004; D

(ii) The counter affidavit filed by the State before the MAT which
states that:
“Shri N R Shende (Scheduled Caste) was promoted as Joint
Director of Town Planning on 11/08/2011 after following due E
procedure and provisions of prevailing rules for promotion, with
the approval of General Administration Department, Establishment
Board as well as Government. Though his promotion is on adhoc
basis, and on regular post, it will be regularized with the approval
of Maharashtra Public Service Commission. Even the applicant
is also promoted on upgraded post of Joint Director of Town F
Planning on ad-hoc basis vide Government Resolution dated
02/07/2013 and it also will be regularized with the approval of
Maharashtra Public Service Commission.”
(iii) A reply to a query addressed by the appellant under the Right
to Information Act 2005 on 8 March 2016 stating that: G
“Mr N R Shende, Joint Director, Town Planning has been granted
adhoc promotion to the post of Joint Director of Town Planning
vide Government Resolution No. TPV-1110/624/CR.170/2010/

H
988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A UD-27 dt. 11.08.2011. Provision is made that said promotion will
be regularized with concurrence of General Administration
Department and approval of Maharashtra Public Service
Commission.”
72. Another limb of the submission is that the promotion which
B was granted to the first respondent was in terms of the GAD Circular
dated 27 October 2008 which contemplated the inter-changeability of
reserved posts between reserved categories. The circular was struck
down by the Bombay High Court on the ground that after the enactment
of the Reservation Act 2004, interchangeability of posts was specifically
prohibited. Moreover, it was submitted that a regular post of JDTP became
C available to the first respondent only when the cadre strength increased
from two to eight on 29 December 2012, resulting in a simultaneous
increase in the posts for reserved categories from one to three. The
submissions of the appellant have been countered by urging that the
reason why the promotion of the first respondent has been treated as
D ad-hoc is because there was a challenge pending to the Reservation Act
2004 at the material time before the Tribunal / High Court in Writ Petition
8452 of 2004.
73. The submission of the appellant is based on the hypothesis
that the promotion of the first respondent is ad-hoc and hence, he is not
E entitled to consequential seniority in terms of the GR dated 20 March
2003, which speaks of the “regular date of promotion”. In assessing this
submission, it is necessary to note that the order of promotion dated 11
August 2011 indicates the reason as to why the promotion was treated
as ad-hoc. The reason was the pendency of Writ Petition 8452 of 2004
before the Bombay High Court where there was a challenge to the
F Reservation Act 2004. Indeed, the order of promotion dated 2 July 2013
by which the appellant was promoted to the post of JDTP also states
that the promotion is ad-hoc. Significantly, in the case of the appellant as
well, the reason why the promotion is treated as ad-hoc is also the
pendency of Writ Petition 8452 of 2004.
G 74. A policy circular was issued by the State of Maharashtra on 1
April 2008 to all departments directing that promotions will be subject to
the outcome of the decision in the above Writ Petition. Special Leave
Petitions against the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the

H
SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE v. NORESHWAR 989
RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Writ Petition39 are pending adjudication before this Court. The Tribunal, A
by its order dated 28 November 2014 struck down the Reservation Act,
2004 and the GR dated 25 May 2004. The judgment of the Tribunal was
stayed by the Bombay High Court on 20 March 2015.On 4 August 2017,
the High Court set aside the decision of the Tribunal to the extent that it
struck down the Reservation Act 2004. The High Court kept the issue
B
of constitutional validity open. The State of Maharashtra has filed a
Special Leave Petition which is pending before this Court.
75. Mr Giri, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
first respondent submitted that though the word ad-hoc has been used in
the order of promotion, the due process of promotion was followed before
the first respondent was promoted to the post of JDTP. In urging this C
submission, Mr Giri has relied on the communication dated 7 January
2011 of the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra to the
Principal Secretary, Services, GAD. He submits that (i) only two posts
were available in the cadre of JDTP, one of which is set apart for the
reserved categories; (ii) no other eligible officer was available to fill up D
the said post from amongst the reserved categories and hence the first
respondent was recommended for promotion; and (iii) in any event, the
appellant who is an open category candidate cannot have a right of
appointment to a post for the reserved categories on which the first
respondent was appointed.
E
76. Alternately, it has been urged on behalf of the first respondent
that even presuming that the seniority of the appellant is protected in the
cadre of JDTP, the fact remains that he did not have the requisite eligibility
to be considered for promotion to the post of Director, Town Planning.
The appellant was promoted to the post of JDTP on 2 July 2013. Mr Giri
has urged that even if the catch-up rule were to prevail on the ground F
that the promotion of the first respondent is only ad-hoc: (i) Rule 3 of the
Directorate of Town Planning and Valuation (Recruitment) Rules 2011
prescribes that an officer holding the post of JDTP must necessarily
serve in the post for a minimum of three years to be considered eligible
for promotion to the post of DTP; (ii) upon superannuation of Mr Rajan G
Kop from the post of DTP, a vacancy in the post arose on 30 April 2016;
(iii) as on the date when the vacancy occurred in the post of DTP, the
appellant did not fulfill the eligibility criterion of three years’ experience

39
SLP (C) No 28306 of 2017 and others
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990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A as JDTP and the first respondent as the senior-most eligible officer, was
entitled to be appointed to the post. The state has issued a GR dated 5
October 2015 under which the condition prescribing the minimum required
experience for promotion cannot be relaxed; and (iv) seniority and
eligibility are different concepts and merely because a person is senior
does not make an individual eligible for consideration.
B
77. On the above foundation, it has been urged that even if the
catch-up rule is made applicable to the appellant in the post of JDTP, he
was not eligible to be considered for promotion as DTP in terms of Rule
3 which requires a minimum of three years’ experience as JDTP. The
catch-up rule, in this submission, provides for a notional state of affairs
C vis-à-vis a person who was earlier promoted under a reserved category.
In other words, the catch-up rule will not provide actual service required
to fulfill the requirement of eligibility.
78. Eligibility has to be considered on the date of the occurrence
of the vacancy. On 30 April 2016, the appellant did not fulfill the eligibility
D required for the post of DTP. In assailing the decision of the first
respondent, as we have noted, the appellant has submitted that the
promotion of the first respondent as JDTP on 11 August 2011 was under
a circular dated 27 October 2008 which has been struck down by the
Bombay High Court. The High Court in dealing with this submission
E has held that the order of promotion, when it was issued on 11 August
2011 had an imprint of legality. Moreover, even the appellant adopted
the position that since promotion was given to the first respondent in
terms of the Government Circular dated 27 October 2008, he believed
that he had no reason to object to the seniority list of JDTP published on
28 August 2014. That apart, the High Court has noted that after the
F promotion of the first respondent on 11 August 2011, the appellant was
promoted on 2 July 2013 and it was only when the second seniority list
was finalized on 15 January 2016 that the appellant filed an OA in
February 2016. In the meantime, the appellant had worked as JDTP for
a period of nearly five years. In declining to allow the issue of seniority
G to be challenged at this belated stage, the High Court relied upon the
decisions of this Court in Roshan Lal v International Airport
Authority of India40, P Chitharanja Menon v A Balakrishnan41and
Amarjeet Singh v Devi Ratan42.
40
(1980) Suppl.SCC 449
41
(1977) 3 SCC 255
H 42
(2010) 1 SCC 417
SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE v. NORESHWAR 991
RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

79. The delay has, in our view,justifiably weighed with the High A
Court. Coupled with this is an equally relevant consideration which must
weigh with the court: the appellant has not challenged the appointment
of the first respondent as JDTP. Having failed to challenge the
appointment, it is now not open to the appellant to assert that the
appointment must be treated as void on the ground that the circular on
B
the basis of which the first respondent was promoted has subsequently
been set aside in a judgment of the Bombay High Court43.
80. The first respondent has urged that his appointment as JDTP
was not challenged by the appellant for the reason that any challenge
would have attracted the bar of limitation. Whatever be the reason, the
fact remains that the appointment of the first respondent as JDTP has C
not been assailed in the OA filed before the Tribunal. Consequently, it is
not open to the appellant to lay a challenge on the ground that the
appointment was based on a circular which was held to be invalid after
the appointment was made. The submission that the appointment is
fortuitous within the meaning of Rule 3(f) is but another modality of D
seeking to deprive the first respondent of the consequence of his
appointment and to his consequential seniority.
81. Rule 3 of the Directorate of Town Planning and Valuation
(Recruitment) Rules 2011 provides as follows:
“3. Appointment to the post of the Director of Town Planning, E
Group-A shall be made by promotion of a suitable person on the
basis of strict selection with due regard to seniority, from amongst
the persons holding the post of Joint Director of Town Planning in
the Directorate, having not less than three years regular service
in that post.” F
The fact that the vacancy occurred on 30 April 2016, on the
retirement of the then DTP has not been disputed in the course of the
submissions of the appellant. On the date when the vacancy occurred,
the appellant clearly did not fulfill the eligibility criterion of three years’
experience as JDTP. The appellant who was promoted on 2 July 2013 G
did not fulfill the criterion prescribed by Rule 3. The contention urged by
Mr Patwalia that the tenure served by the appellant in the posts of DDTP
and JDTP must be coupled together for the purpose of determining

43
Mahasangh, (2013) 5 Mh LJ 640
H
992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A eligibility cannot be accepted as Rule 3 clearly stipulates that an eligible
JDTP must have three years of regular service in that post.
82. In R Prabha Devi v Union of India44, a two Judge Bench
of this Court formulated the principle in the following terms:
“The rule-making authority is competent to frame rules laying
B down eligibility condition for promotion to a higher post. When
such an eligibility condition has been laid down by service rules, it
cannot be said that a direct recruit who is senior to the promotees
is not required to comply with the eligibility condition and he is
entitled to be considered for promotion to the higher post merely
C on the basis of his seniority.
…
Seniority in a particular cadre does not entitle a public servant for
promotion to a higher post unless he fulfils the eligibility condition
prescribed by the relevant rules. A person must be eligible for
promotion having regard to the qualifications prescribed for the
D post before he can be considered for promotion. Seniority will be
relevant only amongst persons eligible. Seniority cannot be
substituted for eligibility nor can override it in the matter of
promotion to the next higher post.”
Seniority and eligibility are distinct concepts in service
E jurisprudence. Seniority by itself cannot prevail where a senior lacks
eligibility for promotion to a higher post [See in this context Palure
Bhaskar Rao v P Ramaseshaiah45]. Even if the contention of the
appellant on the applicability of the catch-up rule were to be accepted,
that will not obviate the requirement of his fulfilling the condition of
eligibility for promotion to the next higher post, on the date when the
F
vacancy occurred.
83. The appellant failed to challenge the appointment of the first
respondent as JDTP on 11 August 2011. The appellant failed to challenge
the circular dated 20 March 2003 providing for consequential seniority.
The substratum of the challenge which has been developed before this
G
Court is without basis in the pleadings. The ingenuity and industry of the
learned counsel who appeared on behalf of the appellant cannot, in the
ultimate analysis, be a substitute for a deficient pleading.
44
(1988) 2 SCC 233
45
(2017) 5 SCC 783
H
SUDHAKAR BABURAO NANGNURE v. NORESHWAR 993
RAGHUNATHRAO SHENDE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

84. A submission was sought to be advanced on the basis of the A
principle that an appointment made contrary to the rules is merely
fortuitous and does not confer the benefit of seniority on the appointee
over and above the regular/substantive appointees to the service (Sanjay
K Sinha-II v State of Bihar)46. The same principle was emphasized in
Bhupendra Nath Hazarika v State of Assam47:
B
“..when the infrastructure is founded on total illegal edifice, the
endeavor to put forth a claim for counting the previous service to
build a pyramid is bound to founder.”
[See also PV George v State of Kerala48 and BA Linga Reddy
v Karnataka State Transport Authority49(relied upon to buttress the C
submission that the power of the High Court to strike down cannot be
exercised prospectively)].
85. The answer to the submissions is simple: the appellant did not
at any stage challenge the appointment of the respondent to the post of
JDTP nor did he challenge the GR dated 20 March 2003 providing for D
consequential seniority. The appellant was not eligible for the post of
DTP on 30 April 2016, when the vacancy occurred. He cannot, hence,
challenge the appointment of the first respondent.
86. For the above reasons, we have come to the conclusion that
E
there is no substance in the appeals. The judgment of the High Court
does not call for any interference, though for the reasons which we
have indicated. The Civil Appeals shall stand dismissed. There shall be
no order as to costs.
CIVIL APPEAL Nos 2471-2473 OF 2019 F
@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) Nos. 14041-14043 OF
2018
87. In view of the judgment in Civil Appeals @ Special Leave
Petition(C) Nos 8769-8771 of 2018 rendered today, these appeals are
G
also dismissed with no order as to costs.

46
(2004) 10 SCC 734 at 742
47
(2013) 2 SCC 516
48
(2007) 3 SCC 557
49
(2015) 4 SCC 515 H
994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A MA Nos 2983-2985 OF 2019
@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) Nos.33086-33088 OF
2017
88. In view of the judgment in Civil Appeals @ Special Leave
Petition (C) Nos 8769-8771 of 2018 rendered today, these MAs are
B disposed of, in terms of the judgment and order in the lead appeals.

Divya Pandey Appeals dismissed.

C

D

E

F

G

H