Holding

The State cannot rely on delay or laches to avoid its constitutional obligation to compensate for land taken without lawful acquisition; the subject land is deemed to have been acquired and compensation must be paid.

Summary

The appellants, Sukh Dutt Ratra and Bhagat Ram, claimed ownership of land that the Himachal Pradesh government had used to construct the Narag Fagla Road in 1972-73 without initiating any land acquisition proceedings or paying compensation. While neighbouring landowners had later been awarded compensation after court‑ordered acquisition, the appellants' petition for similar relief was dismissed by the High Court on the ground of limitation and laches. The Supreme Court examined whether the State could evade its constitutional duty to compensate by invoking delay, emphasizing that the right to property (now under Article 300‑A) demands due process and that equity cannot be barred by mere lapse of time. Relying on precedents such as State of U.P. v. Manohar and Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh, the Court held that the State’s arbitrary refusal to acquire the land violated the appellants' rights and could not be shielded by laches. Using its extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 136 and 142, the Court declared the land a deemed acquisition and ordered compensation on the same terms as awarded to the neighbouring owners, together with solatium, interest, and legal costs. The appeal was allowed and the High Court’s order set aside.

Issues considered

The State’s reliance on delay and laches as a defence to compensation for land taken without due process.
Whether the appellants are entitled to compensation as a deemed acquisition despite the absence of formal acquisition proceedings.
The applicability of Article 300‑A (and the erstwhile Article 31) in cases of unauthorized state dispossession of property.
The appropriate forum and limitation period for adjudicating compensation claims arising from historic land dispossession.

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 18, s. 23(1-A), s. 28, s. 4

Subjects

land acquisitiondeemed acquisitioncompensationdelaylachesArticle 300-AArticle 31constitutional lawproperty rightsequity

Judgment

[2022] 2 S.C.R. 1041 1041

SUKH DUTT RATRA & ANR. A
v.
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 2773 of 2022)
APRIL 06, 2022 B
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND
PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950: Art. 300-A – Right against
depriviation of property – Respondent state utilised subject land C
and adjoining lands for the construction of road in 1972-73 –
Appellants claimed to be owners of subject land – Allegedly no
land acquisition proceedings were initiated nor compensation was
given to the appellants or the owners of the adjoining lands – Land
acquisition proceedings were initiated in respect of neighbouring
land owners and award was passed on 04.10.2005 – Appellants D
filed writ petition in 2011 before the High Court seeking
compensation for the subject land or initiation of acquisition
proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act – High Court held that
the matter involved disputed questions of law and fact for
determination on the starting point of limitation, which could not E
be adjudicated in writ proceedings – In the instant appeals, question
that arose was can the State, merely on the ground of delay and
laches, evade its legal responsibility towards those from whom
private property was expropriated – Held: The State cannot shield
itself behind the ground of delay and laches – There cannot be a
‘limitation’ to doing justice – The State has, in a clandestine and F
arbitrary manner, actively tried to limit disbursal of compensation
as was required by law – This arbitrary action was also violative of
the appellant’s prevailing Art. 31 right – The State was unable to
produce any evidence indicating that the land of the appellants
was taken over in the manner known to law or have ever paid any G
compensation – Appellants too were illegally dispossessed without
following due process of law – In the absence of written consent to
voluntarily give up their land, the appellants were entitled to
compensation in terms of law – Invoking extraordinary jurisdiction
under Arts.136 and 142 of the Constitution, the State is directed to
H
1041
1042 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 2 S.C.R.

A treat the subject land as a deemed acquisition and appropriately
disburse compensation to the appellants in the same terms as the
order of the reference court dated 04.10.2005 – State is also directed
to pay legal costs and expenses of Rs. 50,000 to the appellants –
Land acquisition – Limitation – Delay and laches.
B Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The facts of the present case reveal that the State
has, in a clandestine and arbitrary manner, actively tried to limit
disbursal of compensation as required by law, only to those for
which it was specifically prodded by the courts, rather than to all
C those who are entitled. This arbitrary action, which is also violative
of the appellants’ prevailing Article 31 right (at the time of cause
of action), undoubtedly warranted consideration, and intervention
by the High Court, under its Article 226 jurisdiction. [Para
19][1051-C-E]

D State of U.P. v. Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC 126 – referred
to.
2. The State has merely averred to the appellants’ alleged
verbal consent or the lack of objection, but has not placed any
material on record to substantiate this plea. Further, the State was
E unable to produce any evidence indicating that the land of the
appellants had been taken over or acquired in the manner known
to law, or that they had ever paid any compensation. This was the
State’s position and subsequent findings of the High Court in 2007
as well, in the other writ proceedings. [Para 21][1052-F-H]

F 3. The State’s contention that since the property is not
adjoining to that of the appellants, it disentitles them from claiming
benefit on the ground of parity cannot be accepted. Despite it not
being adjoining (which is admitted in the rejoinder affidavit filed
by the appellants), it is clear that the subject land was acquired
for the same reason – construction of the Narag Fagla Road, in
G 1972-73, and much like the claimants before the reference court,
these appellants too were illegally dispossessed without following
due process of law thus resulting in violation of Article 31 and
warranting the High Court’s intervention under Article 226
jurisdiction. In the absence of written consent to voluntarily give
H
SUKH DUTT RATRA & ANR. v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. 1043

up their land, the appellants were entitled to compensation in A
terms of law. The forcible dispossession of a person of their private
property without following due process of law, was violative of
both their human right, and constitutional right under Article 300-
A. [Paras 22 and 25][1052-H; 1053-A-C; 1054-D]
Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2020) 2 SCC B
569- relied on.
4. In view of this court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under
Article 136 and 142 of the Constitution, the State is hereby
directed to treat the subject lands as a deemed acquisition and
appropriately disburse compensation to the appellants in the same C
terms as the order of the reference court dated 04.10.2005. The
Respondent-State is directed, consequently to ensure that the
appropriate Land Acquisition Collector computes the
compensation, and disburses it to the appellants, within four
months. The appellants would also be entitled to consequential
benefits of solatium, and interest on all sums payable under law D
w.e.f 16.10.2001 (i.e. date of issuance of notification under Section
4 of the Act), till the date of the impugned judgment, i.e.
12.09.2013. Given the disregard for the appellants’ fundamental
rights which has caused them to approach this court and receive
remedy decades after the act of dispossession, the Respondent- E
State is directed to pay legal costs and expenses of Rs. 50,000 to
the appellants. [Paras 26 and 27][1054-E-G; 1055-A-B]
Bishandas v. State of Punjab [1962] 2 SCR 69;
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v.
Balwant Regular Motor Service [1969] 1 SCR 808 – F
followed.
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur
Chenai [2005] Supp (3) SCR 388; N. Padmamma v. S.
Ramakrishna Reddy (2008) 15 SCC 517; Delhi Airtech
Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & G
Ors. [2011] 12 SCR 191; Jilubhai Nanbhai Kahchar v.
State of Gujarat [1994] Supp 1 SCR 807 – relied on.

H
1044 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 2 S.C.R.

A Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. Maharashtra Industrial
Development Corporation (MIDC) [2012] 13 SCR; Air
India Ltd. vs. Vishal Capoor [2005] Supp 3 SCR 670;
State of Maharashtra vs. Digambar [1995] Supp 1 SCR
492; State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr vs. Bhailal Bhai
& Ors. [1964] 6 SCR 261; Brijesh Kumar & Ors. vs.
B
State of Haryana (2014) 11 SCC 351; Wazir Chand vs.
The State of Himachal Pradesh [1955] 1 SCR 408; State
of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. vs. Dharmander Prasad
Singh and Ors. [1989] 1 SCR 176 – referred to.
Entick vs. Carrington [1765] EWHC (KB) 198 –
C
referred to.
Case Law Reference
(2005) 2 SCC 126 referred to Para 6
[2012] 13 SCR referred to Para 6
D
[2005] Supp 3 SCR 670 referred to Para 8
(2020) 2 SCC 569 relied on. Para 9
[1995] Supp 1 SCR 492 referred to Para 10
E [1964] 6 SCR 261 referred to Para 10
(2014) 11 SCC 351 referred to Para 10
[ 1955] 1 SCR 408 referred to Para 14
[1962] 2 SCR 69 followed Para 15
F [1989] 1SCR 176 referred to Para 15
[1969] 1 SCR 808 followed Para 18
[2005] Supp 3 SCR 388 relied on Para 25
(2008) 15 SCC 517 relied on Para 25
G
[2011] 12 SCR 191 relied on Para 25
[1994] Supp 1 SCR 807 relied on Para 25

H
SUKH DUTT RATRA & ANR. v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. 1045

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2773 A
of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.09.2013 of the High Court
of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in CWP No.7873 of 2011.
Sharan Thakur, Mahesh Thakur, Siddhartha Thakur, Ms. Vipasha
Singh, Ms. Biswendra Singh, Advs. for the Appellants. B

Abhinav Mukerji, Ms. Bihu Sharma, Ms. Pratishtha Vij, Akshay
C. Shrivastava, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. C
1. Delay condoned and leave granted. With consent of counsel
for the parties, the appeal was heard finally. The appellants are aggrieved
by final judgment1 of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla,
disposing their writ petition, with liberty to institute a civil suit in accordance
with law. D
Facts
2. Sukh Dutt Ratra and Bhagat Ram (hereafter ‘appellants’) claim
to be owners of land2 situated at Mauzal Sarol Basach, Tehsil Pachhad,
District Sirmaour, Himachal Pradesh (hereafter ‘subject land’). The
Respondent-State utilised the subject land and adjoining lands for the E
construction of the ‘Narag Fagla Road’ in 1972-73, but allegedly no land
acquisition proceedings were initiated, nor compensation given to the
appellants or owners of the adjoining land.
3. Pursuant to a judgment by the Himachal Pradesh High Court 3
(hereafter ‘High Court’) directing the State to initiate land acquisition F
proceedings, a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (hereafter ‘Act’) was issued on 16.10.2001 (published on 30.10.2001)
and the award was passed on 20.12.2001 fixing compensation at 30,000
per bigha. Proceedings under Section 18 of the Act for enhancement of
compensation, were initiated by ten neighbouring land owners (Mata G

1
Dated 12.09.2013 in CWP No. 7873/2011.
2
Khasra Nos. 141, 232/142, 143, 144, 145, 281/267, 206/147, 158, 268/149, 282/267,
and Khasra Nos. 201/138, 242/146, 209/154, 158, 211/163, 16/172, further Khasra
Nos. 50, 51, 89, 278/92, 280/93, and 205/147, 281/267, 151, 152, 283/153, 285/20.
3
In Devender Singh &Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh CWP No. 816/1992. H
1046 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 2 S.C.R.

A Ram and others), whose lands were similarly utilised for the construction
of the same road and an award4 dated 04.10.2005 was passed by the
reference court in their favour. It was held that the reference petitioners
were entitled to enhanced compensation of 39,000 per bigha; solatium
of 30% per annum on the market value of the land; additional
compensation at the rate of 12% per annum under Section 23(1-A) of
B
the Act w.e.f. 16.10.2001 (date of issuance of notification under Section
4) till the date of making of the award by the Collector, i.e. 20.12.2001;
and under Section 28, interest of 9% per annum from 16.10.2001 for a
period of one year, and thereafter 15% per annum, till date of payment.
In 2009, the High Court dismissed5 the appeal against this order by
C thoseclaimants, who were seeking statutory interest from the date of
taking possession (rather than date of initiation of acquisition proceedings).
4. Similarly situated land owners, filed writ proceedings before
the High Court: a writ petition filed by one Anakh Singh, from the adjoining
village was allowed by the High Court6 with the direction to acquire
D lands of the writ petitioners under the Act, with consequential benefits;
subsequently other similarly situated owners also received7 the benefit
of these directions.
5. This led the appellants to file a writ petition before the High
Court in 2011, seeking compensation for the subject land or initiation of
E acquisition proceedings under the Act. Relying on a Full bench decision 8
of the High Court, it was held in the impugned judgment that the matter
involved disputed questions of law and fact for determination on the
starting point of limitation, which could not be adjudicated in writ
proceedings. The writ petition was disposed of, with liberty to file a civil
suit in accordance with law. Aggrieved, the appellants have approached
F
this court through these appeals.
Contentions of parties
6. Mr. Mahesh Thakur, learned counsel on behalf of the
appellants argued that the State had illegally usurped the appellants’
G
4
Award in Land Ref. Petition No. 10-LAC/4 of 2004 and consolidated matters.
5
Dated 25.08.2009 in RFA No. 1-9/2006.
6
Order dated 23.04.2007 in CWP No. 1192/2004.
7
Order dated 20.12.2013 in CWP No. 1356/2010.
8
Shankar Dass v. State of Himachal Pradesh CWP No. 1966/2010-C, judgment dated
H 02.03.2013 (hereafter “Shankar Dass”).
SUKH DUTT RATRA & ANR. v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. 1047
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

lands, without following due process of law and reliance was placed A
on this court’s decision in State of U.P. v. Manohar9 and Tukaram
Kana Joshi & Ors. v. Maharashtra Industrial Development
Corporation (MIDC)10.
7. It was further submitted that the appellants’ case is on the
same footing as that of adjoining land owners who were granted B
compensation and consequential benefits by land acquisition award dated
04.10.2005, and in subsequent writ proceedings. Counsel urged that the
state’s inaction is arbitrary, given that the lands adjoining the subject land
were acquired under directions of the High Court, despite it being used
for the same purpose.
C
8. Counsel highlighted that the Respondent-State had not disputed
that the appellants were owners of the subject land, that it had been
taken and used by the State for construction of Narag Fagla Road, and
that no compensation had been paid. So, given that these facts are
undisputed, it was urged that the High Court had erred in dismissing the
writ petition, in light of this court’s decision in Air India Ltd. v. Vishal D
Capoor 11 .
9. Counsel drew our attention to a judgment of this court in Vidya
Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh12, which he argued had similar
facts and prevailing circumstances: petitioners’ lands had been taken by
the State at the same time and for the same purpose as that of the E
appellants, and this court had after condoning delay of 1756 days, allowed
the appeal and directed the State to pay compensation along with all
statutory benefits, including solatium, interest, etc.
10. Mr. Abhinav Mukerji, learned counsel on behalf of the State
of Himachal Pradesh, urged that the petition was hit by immense delay F
and latches and liable to be dismissed on this ground alone: appellants
had approached the High Court after an inordinate delay of 38 years in
2011, against action taken by the State in 1972-73; and an inordinate
delay of about 6 years in approaching this court after passing of the
impugned judgment in 2013. Reliance was placed on this court’s decisions G

9
(2005) 2 SCC 126 (hereafter “Manohar”)
10
2012 (13) SCR29 (hereafter “Tukaram Kana Joshi”)
11
2005 Supp (3) SCR 670.
12
(2020) 2 SCC 569; Civil Appeal Nos. 60-61/2020, judgment dated 08.01.2020
(hereafter “Vidya Devi”).
H
1048 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 2 S.C.R.

A in State of Maharashtra v. Digambar13, State of Madhya Pradesh &
Anr v. Bhailal Bhai & Ors.14 and Brijesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of
Haryana15. Counsel also submitted that the decision in Tukaram Kana
Joshi (supra)which the appellants strongly rely on, is per incuriam in
light of the larger bench decision in Digambar (supra), which was not
considered in Tukaram Kana Joshi. The Respondent-State opposes
B
the application for condonation of delay filed by the appellants on the
same grounds, by way of reply.
11. On facts, counsel on behalf of State submitted that the Narag
Fagla road was in fact constructed at the request of the appellants, and
C other landowners who wanted the benefit of connectivity; counsel claims
that they volunteered their land for this purpose, and hence, it was
constructed with their verbal consent. Since 1972-73 when it was built,
there was no objection raised or compensation sought by the appellants
till 2011. Further, counsel contended that the lands dealt with in other
writ proceedings (CWP No. 1192/2004 and 1356/2010) are not adjoining
D to the subject land of the appellants’, as claimed by them. It was submitted
that the appellants’ land falls in Sirmour District while the lands in the
other writ proceedings, were acquired for the road between Jalari to
Sujanpur via Bara-Choru, which is a different road, falling in the Hamirpur
district. Therefore, on these facts, the counsel urges that the ground of
E parity is untenable.
12. Lastly, it was argued that in light of the disputed questions of
fact relating to limitation, construction of the road, and verbal consent
for the same – the appropriate forum would be the civil court, and thus
the impugned order required no intervention.
F Analysis and conclusion
13. While the right to property is no longer a fundamental right 16,
it is pertinent to note that at the time of dispossession of the subject land,
this right was still included in Part III of the Constitution. The right against
deprivation of property unless in accordance with procedure established
G
by law, continues to be a constitutional right under Article 300-A.

13
1995 Supp (1) SCR 492 (hereafter “Digambar”)
14
1964 (6) SCR 261
15
(2014) 11 SCC 351
16
Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.
H
SUKH DUTT RATRA & ANR. v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. 1049
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

14. It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law, that nobody can A
be deprived of liberty or property without due process, or authorization
of law. The recognition of this dates back to the 1700s to the decision of
the King’s Bench in Entick v. Carrington17 and by this court in Wazir
Chand v. The State of Himachal Pradesh 18. Further, in several
judgments, this court has repeatedly held that rather than enjoying a
B
wider bandwidth of lenience, the State often has a higher responsibility
in demonstrating that it has acted within the confines of legality, and
therefore, not tarnished the basic principle of the rule of law.
15. When it comes to the subject of private property, this court
has upheld the high threshold of legality that must be met, to dispossess C
an individual of their property, and even more so when done by the
State. In Bishandas v. State of Punjab 19 this court rejected the
contention that the petitioners in the case were trespassers and could
be removed by an executive order, and instead concluded that the
executive action taken by the State and its officers, was destructive of
the basic principle of the rule of law. This court, in another case - D
State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh and
Ors.20, held:
“A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume
possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even
after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture E
or otherwise. The use of the expression ‘re-entry’ in the lease-
deed does not authorise extra-judicial methods to resume
possession. Under law, the possession of a lessee, even after
the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession
and forcible dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be F
dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. In the
present case, the fact that the lessor is the State does not place
it in any higher or better position. On the contrary, it is under
an additional inhibition stemming from the requirement that
all actions of Government and Governmental authorities
should have a ‘legal pedigree’”. G

17
[1765] EWHC (KB) 198
18
1955 (1) SCR 408
19
1962 (2) SCR 69
20
1989 (1) SCR 176 H
1050 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 2 S.C.R.

A 16. Given the important protection extended to an individual vis-
a-vis their private property (embodied earlier in Article 31, and now as a
constitutional right in Article 300-A), and the high threshold the State
must meet while acquiring land, the question remains – can the State,
merely on the ground of delay and laches, evade its legal responsibility
towards those from whom private property has been expropriated? In
B
these facts and circumstances, we find this conclusion to be unacceptable,
and warranting intervention on the grounds of equity and fairness.
17. When seen holistically, it is apparent that the State’s actions,
or lack thereof, have in fact compounded the injustice meted out to the
appellants and compelled them to approach this court, albeit belatedly.
C The initiation of acquisition proceedings initially in the 1990s occurred
only at the behest of the High Court. Even after such judicial intervention,
the State continued to only extend the benefit of the court’s directions to
those who specifically approached the courts. The State’s lackadaisical
conduct is discernible from this action of initiating acquisition proceedings
D selectively, only in respect to the lands of those writ petitioners who had
approached the court in earlier proceedings, and not other land owners,
pursuant to the orders dated 23.04.2007 (in CWP No. 1192/2004) and
20.12.2013 (in CWP No. 1356/2010) respectively. In this manner, at
every stage, the State sought to shirk its responsibility of acquiring land
required for public use in the manner prescribed by law.
E
18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and laches which
conclude either way – as contended by both sides in the present dispute
– however, the specific factual matrix compels this court to weigh in
favour of the appellant-land owners. The State cannot shield itself behind
the ground of delay and laches in such a situation; there cannot be a
F ‘limitation’ to doing justice. This court in a much earlier case -
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular
Motor Service21, held:
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an
arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically
G unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his
conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as
equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and
neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet

21
H 1969 (1) SCR 808
SUKH DUTT RATRA & ANR. v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. 1051
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

put the other party in a situation in which it would not be A
reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are
most material.
But in every case, if an argument against relief, which
otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that B
delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of
limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon
principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always
important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the
nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking C
the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”
19. The facts of the present case reveal that the State has, in a
clandestine and arbitrary manner, actively tried to limit disbursal of
compensation as required by law, only to those for which it was
specifically prodded by the courts, rather than to all those who are entitled. D
This arbitrary action, which is also violative of the appellants’ prevailing
Article 31 right (at the time of cause of action), undoubtedly warranted
consideration, and intervention by the High Court, under its Article 226
jurisdiction. This court, in Manohar (supra) - a similar case where the
name of the aggrieved had been deleted from revenue records leading to E
his dispossession from the land without payment of compensation – held:
“Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants, we
are satisfied that the case projected before the court by the
appellants is utterly untenable and not worthy of emanating
from any State which professes the least regard to being a F
welfare State. When we pointed out to the learned counsel
that, at this stage at least, the State should be gracious enough
to accept its mistake and promptly pay the compensation to
the respondent, the State has taken an intractable attitude
and persisted in opposing what appears to be a just and
reasonable claim of the respondent. G
Ours is a constitutional democracy and the rights available
to the citizens are declared by the Constitution. Although
Article 19(1)(f) was deleted by the Forty-fourth Amendment
to the Constitution, Article 300-A has been placed in the
Constitution, which reads as follows: H
1052 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 2 S.C.R.

A “300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by
authority of law.—No person shall be deprived of his property
save by authority of law.”
This is a case where we find utter lack of legal authority for
deprivation of the respondent’s property by the appellants
B who are State authorities. In our view, this case was an
eminently fit one for exercising the writ jurisdiction of the
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution…”
20. Again, in Tukaram Kana Joshi(supra) while dealing with a
similar fact situation, this court held as follows:
C “There are authorities which state that delay and laches
extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these
authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of
compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery
of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other
categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there
D
are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches
debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental
right has been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the
Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario
altogether. The functionaries of the State took over possession
E of the land belonging to the appellants without any sanction
of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the
benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with
the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or
any other permissible statutory mode.”
F 21. Having considered the pleadings filed, this court finds that the
contentions raised by the State, do not inspire confidence and deserve to
be rejected. The State has merely averred to the appellants’ alleged
verbal consent or the lack of objection, but has not placed any material
on record to substantiate this plea. Further, the State was unable to
produce any evidence indicating that the land of the appellants had been
G taken over or acquired in the manner known to law, or that they had
ever paid any compensation. It is pertinent to note that this was the
State’s position, and subsequent findings of the High Court in 2007 as
well, in the other writ proceedings.
22. This court is also not moved by the State’s contention that
H since the property is not adjoining to that of the appellants, it disentitles
SUKH DUTT RATRA & ANR. v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. 1053
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

them from claiming benefit on the ground of parity. Despite it not being A
adjoining (which is admitted in the rejoinder affidavit filed by the
appellants), it is clear that the subject land was acquired for the same
reason – construction of the Narag Fagla Road, in 1972-73, and much
like the claimants before the reference court, these appellants too were
illegally dispossessed without following due process of law, thus resulting
B
in violation of Article 31 and warranting the High Court’s intervention
under Article 226 jurisdiction. In the absence of written consent to
voluntarily give up their land, the appellants were entitled to compensation
in terms of law. The need for written consent in matters of land acquisition
proceedings, has been noted in fact, by the full court decision of the
High Court in Shankar Dass (supra) itself, which is relied upon in the C
impugned judgment.
23. This court, in Vidya Devi (supra)facing an almost identical
set of facts and circumstances – rejected the contention of ‘oral’ consent
to be baseless and outlined the responsibility of the State:
“12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the D
State could not have deprived a citizen of their property
without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment
of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC [Tukaram Kana
Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491]
wherein it was held that the State must comply with the E
procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible
statutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed by
the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what
is provided by the Constitution.
12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar [State
of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 404 : (2012) 3 F
SCC (Civ) 769] held that the right to property is now
considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right,
but also a human right. Human rights have been considered
in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter,
livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained G
a multi-faceted dimension.”
24. And with regards to the contention of delay and laches, this
court went on to hold:
“2.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and
laches of the appellant in moving the Court is also liable to H
1054 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 2 S.C.R.

A be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a
continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the
judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a
matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised
judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of
a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights,
B
and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose.
There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to
exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial
justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling,
C a constitutional court would exercise its jurisdiction with a
view to promote justice, and not defeat it. [P.S. Sadasivaswamy
v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22]”
25. Concluding that the forcible dispossession of a person of their
private property without following due process of law, was violative22 of
D both their human right, and constitutional right under Article 300-A, this
court allowed the appeal. We find that the approach taken by this court
in Vidya Devi (supra) is squarely applicable to the nearly identical facts
before us in the present case.
26. In view of the above discussion, in view of this court’s
E extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 and 142 of the Constitution,
the State is hereby directed to treat the subject lands as a deemed
acquisition and appropriately disburse compensation to the appellants in
the same terms as the order of the reference court dated 04.10.2005 in
Land Ref. Petition No. 10-LAC/4 of 2004 (and consolidated matters).
F The Respondent-State is directed, consequently to ensure that the
appropriate Land Acquisition Collector computes the compensation, and
disburses it to the appellants, within four months from today. The
appellants would also be entitled to consequential benefits of solatium,
and interest on all sums payable under law w.e.f 16.10.2001 (i.e. date of
issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act), till the date of the
G impugned judgment, i.e. 12.09.2013.

22
Relying on Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius ShapurChenai 2005
Supp (3) SCR 388; N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy (2008) 15 SCC 517; Delhi
Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. &Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh &Ors. 2011 (12) SCR 191;
H and JilubhaiNanbhaiKahchar v. State of Gujarat1994 Supp (1)SCR807.
SUKH DUTT RATRA & ANR. v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. 1055
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

27. For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed and the impugned A
order of the High Court is hereby set aside. Given the disregard for the
appellants’ fundamental rights which has caused them to approach this
court and receive remedy decades after the act of dispossession, we
also deem it appropriate to direct the Respondent-State to pay legal
costs and expenses of 50,000 to the appellants. Pending applications, if B
any, are hereby disposed of.

Devika Gujral Appeal allowed.

C

D

E

F

G

H