SUKHBIR SINGH AND ORS.versusSTATE OF HARYANA
- Citation
- 1997 INSC 683
- Decided
- 1 October 1997
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- G N RAYG B PATTANAIK
Holding
The order transferring the case to a regular criminal court was justified, and the subsequent re‑transfer and trial by the designated TADA court were invalid and set aside.
Summary
The appellants Sukhbir Singh and others were initially charged under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) and tried by a designated TADA court. The designated judge held that no offence under TADA was made out and, relying on a Punjab and Haryana High Court decision, ordered the case transferred to a regular criminal court on 19‑December‑1987. While an appeal against that High Court decision was pending before the Supreme Court, an interim stay was granted and the case was re‑referred to the designated court, which then proceeded to convict the appellants under Sections 302, 307 and 149 of the IPC and the Arms Act. The appellants contended that the designated court lacked jurisdiction after the transfer order and that the re‑transfer was invalid. The Supreme Court held that the original transfer order was justified, that there was no authority to re‑transfer the case, and consequently set aside the designated court’s judgment, leaving the trial to continue before the regular criminal court. The appeal was allowed, but the criminal trial was not quashed; bail was continued for six weeks.
Issues considered
- Whether the designated TADA court retained jurisdiction to try the case after it had ordered transfer to a regular criminal court on finding no TADA offence.
- Whether the re‑transfer of the case to the designated court, following an interim stay, was valid in the absence of a setting‑aside order.
- Whether the convictions under the IPC and Arms Act passed by the designated court are void.
- Whether the delay caused by the designated court warrants quashing the criminal trial.
Legislation cited
- Arms Act
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 149, s. 302, s. 307
- Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987s. 18
Subjects
Judgment
SUKHBIR SINGH AND ORS. A
V.
STATE OF HARYANA
OCTOBER 1, 1997
[G.N. RAY ANDG.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.] B
Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 : Section
18. .
Designated Court-TADA Trial-Transfer of case to regular criminal C
Court-Retransfer to designated Court-Validity of-Appellants accused tried
by designated Court-Designated Court came to the finding that no case for
offence under TADA had been made out-Consequently case transferred to
appropriate Criminal Court for trial-Order passed relying upon a full
Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court-Appeal filed in D
Supreme Court against the said decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court
wherein interim stay was granted by Supreme Court-Jn view of said stay
order case retransferred to Designate Court-Appeal by appellants accused
before Supreme Court-Held the order of the designated judge releasing the
case for being tried by regular criminal Bench was fully justified-There was
no occasion to retransfer the said criminal case before the designated court E
when that order was not set aside by any competent authority-Subsequent·
retransfer of the case before the designated court and decision rendered by
the designated court therefore held not sustainable and therefore are set
aside.
F
*Bimal Kaur Khalsa v. Union ofIndia, AIR (1988) Punjab and Haryana
page 95; Kartar Singh v. State ofPunjab. [1994) 3 SCC 569; Hitendra Vishnu
Thakur and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602 and Rambhai
Nathubai Gadhvi and Ors. v. State of Gujarat, (1977) 5 Scale 388, referred
to.
G
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 169
of 1988.
From the Judgment and Order dated 6.2.88 of the Designated Court,
Bhiwani at Hisar in T.S.C. No. 9/86 S.T. No. 49of1987.
H
401
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A K.T.S. Tulsi, Som Raj Dutta, Uma Dutta and M.S. Dahiya for the .
Appellants.
Ajay Siwach for Prem Malhotra for the Respondent.
The following Order of the Court was delivered :
B
In this appeal the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant
by the learned Designated Court Bhiwani at Hissar on 6.2.88 in Sessions Trial
No. 49/87 are under challenge.
Mr. KTS Tulsi, learned senior counsel has appeared for appellant No.
C I Sukhbir Singh and Mr. Som Raj Dutta, learned senior counsel has appeared
for the remaining appellants. The appellant Sukhbir Singh has been convicted
by the learned Designated Court under Section 302 read and Section 307 read
with Section 149 India Penal Code. The other appellants have also been
convicted under Section 302 and Section 307 read with Section 149 iPC.
D Although the said appellants have been convicted under the Arms Act, but
no separate sentence has been passed for such offence.
Mr. Tulsi has submitted that initially the appellants were also charged
for the offence under Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act,
1985 (hereinafter referred to as TADA). The learned Designated Court thereafter
E assumed jurisdiction and proceeded with the trial. Considering the materials
on record, the learned Designated Judge inter alia came to the finding that
no case for an offence under TADA had been made out. Therefore, an order
was passed by the learned Designated Judge on 19.12.87 that the case should
be transferred to the appropriate criminal court for the trial of the said criminal
case. Jn basing the said order of 19th December, 1987, the learned Judge,
F Designated Court had relied on a full Bench decision of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in Bimal Kaur Kha/sa's case AIR (1988) Punjab and
Haryana page 9 5. It appears that an appeal was taken to this Court against
the said full Bench Decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bimal
Khalsa's case and it appears that an interim order of stay was granted by this
G Court. In view of the said order of stay, the case was again referred back
before the learned Designated Judge for trial on merits:
Mr. Tulsi has submitted that the principles indicated by the Full Bench
of the Punjab and Haryana High Court as to what constitutes offence under
TADA in Bimal Khalsa 's case has been considered by the Constitution
H Bench of this Court in Kartar Singh's case, [1994] 3 SCC page 569. Mr. Tulsi
SUKHBIR SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA 403
has submitted that in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Ors., [1994] 4 SCC 602 this A
Court also considered ~hat are the terrorist and disruptive activities under
TADA. The decision of this Court in the said Constitution Bench decision
approves the principle indicated in Bimal Khalsa's case. Therefore, the order
passed by the learned Designated Judge that no case under TADA had been
made out must be held to be fully justified. Therefore, on merits also, there B
was no occasion for the Designated Court to proceed with the trial of the said
case when no offence under TADA was made out. Mr. Tulsi has further
submitted that only beca·1se an appeal was pending before this Court against
the judgment in Bimal Khalsa's case and an interim order of stay was passed
in the said appeal, there was no reason to retransfer the case before the
learned Designated Court in the absence of any order passed by any ·competent C
court setting aside the order dated 19th December, 1987 passed by the learned
Designated Judge by which it was decided that no case under TADA was
made out and therefore, the case should be transfered before the regular
criminal court.
Mr. Tulsi has, therefore, submitted that the learned Designated Judge, D
• had no jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of the criminal case and pass the
impugned order or conviction and sentence against the appellant for offence
under Indian Penal Code and Arms Act. Mr. Tutsi has also submitted that in
Rambhai Nathubai Gadhvi and Ors., v. State of Gujarat, (1977) 5 Scale page
388 this Court has held that where for want of appropriate sanction, the E
Designated Court did not have jurisdiction to try the case, the entire trial was
vitiated. It was submitted before this court that in view of detention in prison
for a long time during the pendency of the trial before the Designated Court,
no further trial of the said criminal case by the regular criminal court should
be allowed. It has been observed by this Court that the question of proceeding
further of the said criminal case before the regular criminal court will be taken F
into consideration by the State on being alive to the said fact of suffering
long detention by the accused during the pendency of the trial before the
Designated Court. Mr. Tutsi has submitted that in the instant case long time
--·
has elapsed since the institution of the case before the Designated Court the
case can only be tried by the regular court and such trial is likely to consume G
long time. The delay in proceeding with the trial before the designated court
is not attributable to the accused. Therefore, the said criminal trial deemed to
be pending before the regular criminal bench should be quashed by this Court
because of the Jong delay involved in completing the trial thereby creating
serious prejudice against the appellants. In the facts of the case, Mr. Tulsi
has rightly contended that the order of the designate judge dated 19.12.1987 H
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A releasing the case for being tried by regular criminal Bench was fully justified.
There was no occasion to retransfer the said criminal case before the designated
court when the order date 19.12.1987 was not set aside by any competent
authority. Such s.ubsequent retransfer of the case before the designated court
and decision rendered by the designated court therefore cannot be sustained
and the same therefore are set aside by allowing this appeal. We are however
B not inclined to quash the criminal case which must be deemed to be pending
before regular criminal Bench. It will be open to the accused to make appropriate
application for quashing the criminal trial before the appropriate court if they
so desi.re. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion in this
regard. The interim order of bail granted by this Court will continue for a
c period of six weeks from today so that arpropriate application for interim bail
may be made before the Court where the trial will commence. The appeal is
disposed of accordingly.
T.N.A. Appeal disposed of.
•
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.