SULTHAN SAID IBRAHIMversusPRAKASAN & ORS.

                 [2025] 5 S.C.R. 2185 : 2025 INSC 764

                           Sulthan Said Ibrahim
                                    v.
                             Prakasan & Ors.
                       (Civil Appeal No. 7108 of 2025)
                                 23 May 2025
              [J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Issue arose whether the High Court committed any error in rejecting
       the original petition filed by the appellant on the ground that the
       I.A. for deletion of name of the appellant from the array of parties
       was barred by res judicata; whether the appellant is entitled to the
       benefit of s.11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control)
       Act, 1965; and whether the transfer of possession of the suit
       property was implicit in the decree of specific performance in the
       facts of the case.

                                   Headnotes†
       Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Ord. 1 r.10, Ord. XXII Rule 4 –
       Suit for specific performance – Impleadment as a legal heir –
       Deletion of name from array of parties – Respondent filed
       suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale and
       for vacant possession of the suit property against the original
       defendant, which was decreed in favour of the respondent – On
       the demise of the original defendant during the pendency of
       the execution proceedings, appellant, along with other legal
       heirs of the original defendant came to be impleaded in the
       execution proceedings before the trial court – Appellant filed
       an application seeking the deletion of his name from the array
       of parties on the ground that he was wrongly impleaded as
       a legal heir, that his deceased father was a tenant in the suit
       property prior to his demise; and that he is a tenant in the suit
       property by virtue of having inherited the tenancy from his
       deceased father – Trial court rejecting the application – High
       Court affirmed the order passed by the trial court – Correctness:
       Held: Courts below committed no error in arriving at their respective
       decisions – Power to strike out or add a party to the proceedings
       u/Ord. I r.10 can be exercised by the court at any stage of the
* Author
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    proceeding – However, the same cannot be construed to mean
    that when a particular party has been impleaded as a legal heir
    u/Ord. XXII r.4 after due inquiry by the court and without any
    objections, the party can approach the court anytime later and
    seek his deletion from the array of parties by filing an application
    u/Ord. I r.10 – Trial court, while dismissing the application moved
    by the appellant u/Ord. I r.10, observed that the appellant had
    the opportunity of contesting his impleadment as the legal heir
    of the original defendant and the appellant was not only served
    with the notice of the impleadment application, but also entered
    appearance – However, the appellant, for reasons best known to
    him, chose to remain silent for more than four years and did not
    raise any objections as regards his status of not being a legal
    heir of the original defendant and over his objections as regards
    tenancy – If at all the appellant was aggrieved by his impleadment
    as a legal heir, the suitable course of action was to first object to
    his impleadment u/Ord. XXII r.4 – Even then if the trial court would
    have decided against the appellant, it would have been open to
    him to approach the High Court by filing a revision application
    against the order of impleadment – He was also a respondent in the
    application preferred by some of the legal heirs seeking rescission
    of the contract before the courts below – However, he chose not to
    raise any objection in either of these proceedings as well – Timing
    of the application preferred by the appellant also raises serious
    doubts as regards his bona fides – Thus, application for deletion
    from array of parties is merely one more attempt to further thwart
    and prolong what has already been an unduly protracted litigation
    for the original plaintiff – High Court rightly held the application of
    the appellant u/Ord. I r.10 to be barred by res judicata and thus,
    not maintainable on that ground – Principles of res judicata apply
    not only to two different proceedings but also to different stages of
    the same proceeding as well – Neither any objection was raised by
    the appellant before the trial court nor any revision was preferred
    subsequently against the said order – Expression “at any stage of
    the proceedings” used in Ord. I r.10 allows the court to exercise
    its power at any stage, however the same cannot be construed to
    mean that the defendant can keep reagitating the same objection
    at different stages of the same proceeding, when the issue has
    been determined conclusively at a previous stage – Allowing the
    same would run contrary to the considerations of fair play and
    justice and would amount to keeping the parties in a state of limbo
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                              2187

                 Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan & Ors.


     as regards the adjudication of the disputes – Appropriate remedy
     for the appellant lay in raising an objection u/Ord. XXII r4(2) at the
     time of the impleadment and not under Ord. I r.10 four years after
     the impleadment came to be allowed – Furthermore, the courts
     below rightly rejected the appellant’s plea that he is a tenant in
     the suit property by virtue of having inherited the tenancy from his
     deceased father, thus, he enjoys the protection of s.11 of the Kerala
     Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 which provides that
     a tenant cannot be evicted, even in execution of a decree, except
     in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the said Act –
     Deceased father of the appellant was a tenant in the suit property
     at the time the same was purchased by the original defendant
     and that he continued as a tenant till his demise, however the
     appellant failed to establish his tenancy or possession over the
     suit property – Documents relied upon by the appellant merely
     one more weapon to protract the execution proceedings – Also
     the courts below rightly held that the exclusive possession of
     the suit property could be said to be with the original defendant
     when the suit was decreed, the relief of transfer of possession is
     implicit in the decree for specific performance directing the original
     defendant to execute a sale deed in the favour of the respondent.
     [Paras 50-54, 58-68]

                              Case Law Cited
     Birma Devi & Ors v. Subhash & Anr. [2024] 12 SCR 484 : 2024
     SCC Online SC 3676; P.C. Varghese v. Devaki Amma Balambika
     Devi [2005] Supp. 4 SCR 267 : (2005) 8 SCC 486; B. Bal Reddy v.
     Teegala Narayana Reddy [2016] 4 SCR 62 : (2016) 15 SCC 102;
     Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre
     & Hotels (P) Ltd. [2010] 7 SCR 790 : (2010) 7 SCC 417; Ramankutty
     Guptan v. Avara [1994] 1 SCR 542 : (1994) 2 SCC 642; Ramesh
     Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay
     [1992] 2 SCR 1 : (1992) 2 SCC 524; Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana
     Kumar [2004] Supp. 6 SCR 1104 : (2005) 1 SCC 787; Satyadhyan
     Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi [1960] 3 SCR 590; S. Ramachandra
     Rao v. S. Nagabhushana Rao [2022] 17 SCR 451 : 2022 SCC
     OnLine SC 1460; Pankajbhai Rameshbhai Zalavadiya v. Jethabhai
     Kalabhai Zalavadiya [2017] 12 SCR 1028 : (2017) 9 SCC 700;
     Rohit Kochhar v. Vipul Infrastructure Developers Ltd. [2024] 11
     SCR 1289 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3584; Babu Lal v. Hazari Lal
     Kishori Lal [1982] 3 SCR 94 – referred to.
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     Tarini Charan Bhattacharya v. Kedar Nath Haldar, 1928 SCC OnLine
     Cal 172; Moolla Cassim bin Moolla Ahmed v. Moolla Abdul Rahim,
     1905 SCC OnLine PC 17 – referred to.

                                 List of Acts
     Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent
     Control) Act, 1965; Specific Relief Act, 1963.

                             List of Keywords
     Deletion of name from the array of parties; Barred by res judicata;
     Transfer of possession; Decree of specific performance; Suit for
     specific performance; Impleadment as a legal heir; Execution
     proceedings; Power to strike out or add a party to the proceedings;
     Rescission of the contract; Expression “at any stage of the
     proceedings”.

                            Case Arising From
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7108 of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 29.11.2021 of the High Court
     of Kerala at Ernakulam in OPC No. 2290 of 2013

                         Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Appellant:
     V. Chitambaresh, Sr. Adv., Harshad V. Hameed, Dileep Poolakkot,
     C. Govind Venugopal, Mrs. Ashly Harshad.
     Adv. for the Respondents:
     Mukund P. Unny.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                 Judgment

     J.B. Pardiwala, J.

1.   Leave granted.
2.   The path to justice is often winding, shaped by the weight of hierarchy
     and the labyrinth of procedure. The seeker, weary yet resolute, climbs
     each rung of the judicial ladder, only to stand at the summit with
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                        2189

                Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan & Ors.


     hope overshadowed by the fear of denied relief. The respondent
     no. 1 before us embodies this relentless pursuit—a traveller in the
     quest for justice, yearning for its elusive embrace.
3.   The present appeal arises from the judgment and order dated
     29.11.2021 passed by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in
     OP(C) No. 2290 of 2013 whereby the High Court dismissed the
     original petition filed by the appellant and thereby affirmed the order
     passed by the Principal Sub Judge, Palakkad in I.A. No. 2348/2012
     in O.S. No. 617/1996 rejecting the application filed by the appellant
     seeking the deletion of his name from the array of parties.

     A.    FACTUAL MATRIX
4.   The appellant is the grandson of one Late Jameela Beevi. Late
     Jameela Beevi was the original defendant in O.S. No. 617 of 1996,
     instituted by the respondent no. 1 herein (original plaintiff) before the
     Principal Sub Court, Palakkad seeking specific performance of the
     agreement to sell dated 14.06.1996 executed between the original
     plaintiff and the original defendant, whereby the original defendant
     undertook to transfer the suit property to the original plaintiff for a
     total consideration of Rs. 6,00,000/-, upon payment of the balance
     sale consideration of Rs. 1,50,000/- within three months from the
     execution of the agreement. Pertinently, the appellant herein was
     one of the witnesses to the sale agreement.
5.   The suit property, measuring 1 cent, situated in Keezhumuri Desom,
     Ward No. 3, Block 42, Survey No. 1895, Palakkad Town, Kerala,
     comprises of a tiled-roofed shop with walls on three sides and two
     shutters on the front side along with the land on which the shop
     stands. The same was purchased by the original defendant vide
     assignment deed dated 10.09.1976. It is noteworthy that clause
     8 of the said deed if read with the property description indicates
     the factum of tenancy, inter alia, of one of the sons of the original
     defendant and the father of the appellant, Late Shahul Hameed. It
     is the case of the appellant that his father was a tenant of the suit
     property from 1969 till his death on 01.11.1992.
6.   The case before us has a convoluted history and there have been
     delays at multiple stages of the proceedings. Despite having obtained
     an ex-parte decree way long back in 1998, and a final decree after
     contested hearing in 2003, the original plaintiff is yet to obtain the
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     possession of the suit property. For the sake of clarity, we must look
     into and discuss the different stages wherein delay was caused under
     different headings so as to demonstrate how well the process of law
     can be abused by dubious litigants in this country.

     Phase - I
7.   The case of the original plaintiff before the Trial Court was that although
     he was always ready and willing to pay the balance consideration,
     yet the original defendant was not inclined towards executing the
     sale deed for the suit property. As the original defendant failed to
     execute the sale deed within a period of three months from the date
     of entering into the agreement, despite issuing a legal notice, he
     instituted a suit for specific performance.
8.   The O.S. No. 617/1996 instituted by the original plaintiff was decreed
     ex parte on 30.06.1998 and the original defendant was directed to
     execute the sale deed in favor of the original plaintiff upon payment
     of the balance consideration.
9.   The original defendant filed I.A. No. 2204 of 1998 seeking to set
     aside the ex parte decree, which was dismissed by the Trial Court
     on 30.06.1999. The original defendant challenged the order of the
     Trial Court before the High Court in CMA No. 125 of 1999, which
     came to be allowed, thereby restoring the suit for trial.

     Phase - II
10. Upon restoration, the original defendant filed written statement before
    the Trial Court contesting that there was no agreement to sell existing
    between the parties and he had no interest in selling the property.
    The suit property was being utilised by her son for selling sugar and
    other grocery items, and she had to obtain a loan of Rs 4,50,000/-
    for the purpose of the wedding of her granddaughter. In lieu of the
    loan, the original plaintiff had obtained some signed papers from her
    and had misused them to forge the agreement to sell.
11. The suit came to be decreed by the Trial Court on 17.03.2003,
    which held that the execution of the agreement to sell was proved
    by the original plaintiff and the defence put forth by the original
    defendant was not credible. The Trial Court directed the original
    defendant to execute the sale deed upon payment of the remaining
    sale consideration.
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                       2191

                Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan & Ors.


     Phase - III
12. The order of the Trial Court decreeing the suit was challenged by the
    original defendant by way of filing RFA No. 281 of 2003 before the
    High Court. However, the High Court dismissed the same and affirmed
    the order of the Trial Court vide its judgment dated 02.08.2008.
13. The original defendant further challenged the order of the High Court
    before this Court by way of SLP (C) No. 18880 of 2008. However,
    the same also came to be dismissed vide order dated 13.08.2008,
    thereby conclusively affirming the decree for specific performance
    granted by the Trial Court.

     Phase - IV
14. Upon failure of the original defendant to execute the sale deed after
    accepting the balance consideration, the original plaintiff moved the
    I.A. No. 2548/2003 in O.S. No. 617/1996 under Section 28(5) read
    with Order XXI Rule 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short,
    “the CPC”) on 30.07.2003 seeking the execution of the sale deed
    in its favour by the intervention of the court.
15. During the pendency of the execution proceedings, the original
    defendant passed away on 19.10.2008, necessitating impleadment
    of her legal heirs. The original plaintiff filed I.A. No. 3823 of 2008 in
    I.A. No. 2548/2003 in O.S. No. 617/1996 on 20.11.2008 to bring her
    legal heirs on record which came to be allowed by the Trial Court.
16. Objections were raised by some of the legal heirs of the original
    plaintiff, inter alia, on the ground that the relief of possession was
    not granted by the Trial Court despite having been pleaded and thus
    there was no liability to hand over the possession to the original
    plaintiff even if a sale deed had to be executed. Further, the original
    plaintiff had failed to deposit the entire balance sale consideration
    in time and had deposited only the balance amount after deducting
    the costs awarded by the Trial Court while decreeing the suit. For
    the aforesaid reasons, the execution was objected on the ground
    that the contract stood rescinded. It is pertinent to note that the
    appellant herein, being one of the impleaded parties, initially raised
    no objection to his impleadment.
17. I.A. No. 669/2009 in O.S. No. 617/1996 under Section 28 of the
    Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short, “the SRA, 1963”) was also
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     filed by some of the legal heirs of the original defendant seeking a
     declaration that the contract stood rescinded.
18. The Principal Sub Court, Palakkad, dismissed the I.A. No. 669 of 2009
    on 11.04.2012, observing that the deposit of Rs. 97,116/- made on
    30.07.2003 by the original plaintiff was valid and in compliance with
    I.A. No. 931 of 2004, wherein the High Court, during the pendency of
    the first appeal against the decree, had permitted the respondent to
    deposit the balance amount after deducting costs. The court further
    ruled that possession of the property was implicit in the decree for
    specific performance of the agreement to sell.

     Phase - V
19. Aggrieved by the aforesaid, the legal heirs of the original defendant
    filed CRP No. 233 of 2012 before the High Court of Kerala, which
    came to be dismissed on 14.06.2012, affirming that rescission of
    contract was unwarranted.

     Phase - VI
20. Shortly thereafter, the appellant filed I.A. No. 2348 of 2012 in I.A.
    No. 2548/2003 in OS No. 617 of 1996 on 19.07.2012 under Order I
    Rule 10(2) of the CPC seeking deletion of his name from the array
    of parties, on the ground that he was wrongly impleaded as a legal
    heir under the Mohammedan Law and further asserting that he was a
    tenant in the suit property, having inherited the tenancy from his late
    father. He submitted that he was carrying on business from the suit
    property and his tenancy rights could not have been adjudicated in
    the execution proceedings. The original plaintiff objected to the said
    I.A., inter alia, on the ground that the appellant had failed to raise
    any of the said objections on any prior occasion and was doing the
    same only to obstruct and delay the execution proceedings.
21. The Trial Court dismissed the said I.A. on 19.06.2013 and held
    that the appellant was attempting to delay the execution by raising
    frivolous issues and that too after having failed to raise during the
    prior proceedings. The court noted that the appellant was a witness
    to the sale agreement dated 14.06.1996, had previously participated
    in litigation without objecting, and was now employing a strategy of
    filing repetitive interlocutory applications to obstruct the execution of
    the decree. The relevant observations made by the Trial Court are
    reproduced hereinbelow:
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                            2193

                 Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan & Ors.


           “[…] The records would show that supplemental
           respondents 2 to 14 in I.A. 2548/2003 were sought to be
           impleaded as per I.A. 3823/2008. On filing that petition
           notice thereof was issued on 26.11.2008 to the proposed
           supplemental respondents 2 to 14. Those respondents
           tendered appearance. That was the first opportunity for
           the petitioner herein to contend that he is not a legal heir
           of Jameela Beevi and he ought not to be impleaded. That
           was not done by him. It is to be noted that the court would
           implead under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC after due enquiry.
           During that enquiry the petitioner ought and might have
           contended that he is not a legal heir of Jameela Beevi.
           After his impleadment several petitions were preferred.
           I.A. 669/2009 is a petition under section 28 of the specific
           Relief Act to rescind the contract. The petitioner herein
           was a respondent in that petition. After detailed enquiry
           that petition was dismissed on 11.04.2012. Against that
           order CRP 233/12 was preferred before the Hon. High
           Court. The petitioner herein was the 5th respondent in
           that CRP. That CRP was dismissed on 14.06.2012. In
           these proceedings also petitioner herein had no case
           that he is an unnecessary party. On the other hand, he
           participated in those proceedings. On 24.07.2012 this
           petition is filed. It is to be noted that the decree directing
           execution of sale deed was passed on 17.03.2003, a
           decade ago, RFA 281/2003 was dismissed on 02.04
           2008. The decree attained finality. I.A.2548/2003 was
           pending while dismissing RFA 281/2003. Since then the
           supplemental respondents, one after other, is filing petitions
           in their cunning strategy to delay the execution of a sale
           deed pursuant to the decree, I.A. 669/2009 was one such
           petition, CRP 233/2012 against the order of dismissal of
           that petition was dismissed on 14.06.2012, Next month,
           on 24.07.2012, the petitioner has come forward with this
           petition, on experimental basis to open a new battle field,
           on the frantic attempt to delay the implementation of the
           decree, claiming tenancy right over the subject property
           alleged to be inherited from his father. So long as he
           is in the party array as legal heir of deceased original
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          defendant the new plea cannot be put forward. It is to
          circumvent that situation now he has come forward with
          this plea to remove him from the party array as he being
          not a legal heir of Jameela Beevi despite the fact that
          such a plea was not taken over these years either at the
          time of his impleadment or while participating in a series
          of interlocutory applications. This petition, is yet another
          ruse adopted by the respondents to delay the execution
          of a sale deed pursuant to the decree. The petition is
          barred by constructive resjudicata besides being devoid
          of bonafides. Therefore, it is dismissed with cost to the
          1st respondent/plaintiff.”
22. The appellant challenged the order of the Trial Court before the High
    Court in O.P. (C) No. 2290 of 2013, however the same came to be
    dismissed vide the impugned order dated 29.11.2021. The High
    Court observed that the impleadment of the appellant was valid
    and his I.A. seeking deletion from the array of parties was barred
    by res judicata. The High Court also observed that the claim of the
    appellant for independent possession was also rightly rejected by
    the Trial Court. The relevant observations made by the High Court
    are reproduced hereinbelow:
          “5. The undisputed facts reveals that the petitioner, along
          with other legal heirs of Jameela Beevi, were impleaded
          after due enquiry under Order I Rule 10 (2) of CPC. No
          objection was raised by the petitioner at that stage and
          the order by which he was impleaded as the additional
          8th respondent has become final. Hence, the interlocutory
          application filed thereafter, seeking deletion of petitioner’s
          name from the party array, is barred by res judicata.
          6. The contention of the petitioner that he is having
          independent possession over the property was rightly
          rejected by the trial court, petitioner having failed to raise
          such contention earlier or even in I.A.No.669 of 2009, filed
          by his own siblings. Circumstances being as above, I am
          constrained to hold that the attempt of the petitioner is to
          delay the consideration in I.A.No.2548 of 2003 filed by
          the first respondent, seeking execution of the sale deed
          through court.”
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                Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan & Ors.


23. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant-original
    defendant has come up before us with the present appeal.

     B.    SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
24. Mr. V. Chitambaresh, the learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the
    appellant, vehemently submitted that the High Court committed a
    grave error in taking the view that as the impleadment of legal heirs
    under Order I Rule 10(2) of the CPC was not objected to by the
    appellant at the appropriate stage, the subsequent application filed
    by the appellant for deletion of his name would be barred by virtue
    of the doctrine of res judicata.
25. The learned counsel submitted that in the instant case, since the
    relief of possession was not granted in O.S No. 617 of 1996 while
    decreeing the suit for specific performance, the decree got fully
    satisfied upon execution of the sale deed. The counsel placed
    reliance on the judgment of this Court in Birma Devi & Ors v.
    Subhash & Anr., reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 3676, wherein it
    was held that relief of possession must be specifically sought when
    the suit property is in possession of a third party. He also referred
    to the decision in P.C. Varghese v. Devaki Amma Balambika Devi
    reported in (2005) 8 SCC 486 wherein this Court held that Section
    22 of the SRA, 1963 enacts a rule of pleading to avoid multiplicity
    of proceedings.
26. The learned counsel further argued that Section 11 of the Kerala
    Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, contains a non obstante
    clause restricting eviction except in accordance with the provisions of
    the said Act. Therefore, before ordering delivery of possession, the
    status of the appellant as a tenant must necessarily be adjudicated.
27. Relying on the decision of this Court in B. Bal Reddy v. Teegala
    Narayana Reddy reported in (2016) 15 SCC 102, the counsel
    submitted that the interest of a protected tenant continues to be
    operative and subsisting so long as the protected tenancy is not
    validly terminated.
28. The learned counsel pointed out that the father of the appellant,
    Late Shahul Hameed, was a tenant in the suit property since the
    year 1969, and the assignment deed No. 2805/1976 acknowledges
    his tenancy, which continued with the appellant as his legal heir.
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     Further, in 1992, Municipality License No. 215/92-93 was also issued
     in the name of the father of the appellant. He contended that the
     Municipality License No. PH2-27607/11 was thereafter issued in the
     name of the appellant on 16.04.2011 thereby showing the exclusive
     possession of the appellant on the suit property owing to the tenancy.
29. It was also contended that under the Mohammedan Law, the
    legal heirs of a pre-deceased son are not the legal heirs of their
    grandmother, who in the instant case was the original defendant
    and the judgment debtor. The doctrine of representation does not
    apply under the Mohammedan Law. The sale deed also indicates
    that the property was individually owned by Jameela Beevi, and the
    descendant of her pre-deceased son would have no legal claim. As
    a sequitur, the tenancy rights of the appellant cannot be adjudicated
    and decided upon by impleading him as a legal heir.
30. The learned counsel stressed that an order allowing impleadment
    under Order I Rule 10(2) of the CPC is merely a summary procedure
    and cannot operate as res judicata. Placing reliance on the decision
    in Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention
    Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd. reported in (2010) 7 SCC 417, he submitted
    that this Court in the said decision held that the courts retain the
    power to strike out parties at any stage of the proceeding under
    Order I Rule 10(2) of the CPC.
31. The learned counsel also referred to the decision in Ramankutty
    Guptan v. Avara reported in (1994) 2 SCC 642, wherein this Court
    held that jurisdiction of the court does not cease after passing a
    decree for specific performance, and the court retains control over
    the decree. He also submitted that the appellant has no role in the
    application filed for the recission of contract.
32. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prayed
    that there being merit in his appeal, the same may be allowed.

     C.   SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
33. Mr. Mukund P. Unny, the learned counsel appearing for respondent
    no.1, vehemently submitted that the present appeal has been filed
    solely with a view to delay the execution of the decree, despite
    the fact that the judgment and decree dated 17.03.2003 in favor of
    respondent no.1 attained finality after dismissal of the SLP(C) No.
    18880 of 2008 arising therefrom on 13.08.2008. He emphasised
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                      2197

                Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan & Ors.


     that the respondent no.1 has not been able to obtain possession
     of the suit property and thereby reap the fruits of the decree in his
     favour due to persistent attempts by the appellant to stall execution
     proceedings.
34. The learned counsel referred to the findings of the High Court in
    the impugned order wherein the challenge by the appellant to the
    dismissal of IA No. 2348 of 2012 seeking deletion of the appellant
    from the party array was rejected. He argued that the key finding of
    the High Court is that the impleadment under Order I Rule 10(2) of
    the CPC had already attained finality and that the belated attempt
    by the appellant to question the same was barred by res judicata.
35. The learned counsel also brought to our attention the observations
    made by the Trial Court while dismissing the IA No. 2348 of 2012
    in OS No. 617 of 1996. He submitted that the Trial Court took note
    of the following:
     a.    The appellant had ample opportunity in prior proceedings to
           object to his impleadment but failed to do so.
     b.    The appellant, rather than raising an objection to his
           impleadment, participated in the proceedings, including the
           application to rescind the contract.
     c.    The appellant through various frivolous petitions was seeking
           to delay the execution of the decree dated 17.03.2003.
36. On the aspect of tenancy rights of the appellant in the suit property,
    the learned counsel submitted that the claim of tenancy in the suit
    property inherited from the father of the appellant is devoid of merit.
    He argued that the tenancy arrangement mentioned in the 1976 sale
    deed by which Jameela Beevi purchased the suit property, was not
    carried forward in the sale agreement of 1996, to which the appellant
    himself was a witness. The learned counsel emphasized that there is
    no documentary evidence, much less any other evidence, to support
    the claim of tenancy raised by the appellant.
37. On the aspect of tenancy, he submitted that unlike the assignment
    deed of 1976, the agreement to sell of 1996 did not contain any
    clause conferring or transferring the right to deal with tenants to the
    proposed buyer. He argued that such omission indicates that the
    tenancy rights did not carry forward after the death of the father of
    the appellant.
2198                                                        [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


38. The learned counsel pointed out that the suit for specific performance
    was decreed in OS No. 617 of 1996, and the execution proceedings
    were initiated thereafter. Despite the decree being affirmed right
    upto this Court, the appellant and his family have been repeatedly
    filing interlocutory applications to delay the execution. He pointed
    out that IA No. 669 of 2009, seeking rescission of the contract, was
    dismissed by the Trial Court, and the dismissal was affirmed by the
    High Court in CRP No. 233 of 2012.
39. The learned counsel pointed out that the High Court, in the impugned
    judgment, upheld the findings of the Trial Court, rejected the claims
    of the appellant and reaffirmed the impleadment under Order I
    Rule 10(2). The High Court also observed that the contention of
    the appellant regarding tenancy was baseless and did not warrant
    interference.
40. The learned counsel submitted that the sale deed has already been
    executed on 22.11.2022 at the instance of the Trial Court. However,
    the appellant has locked the premises, preventing the original plaintiff
    from obtaining actual possession. In view of this, he argued that
    the present appeal is infructuous as it seeks relief that is no longer
    relevant.
41. In such circumstances, the learned counsel prayed that there being
    no merit in this appeal, the same deserved to be dismissed with costs.

     D.   ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
42. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
    having gone through the materials on record, the following questions
    fall for our consideration:
     a.   Whether the High Court committed any error in rejecting the
          original petition filed by the appellant on the ground that the I.A.
          for deletion of name of the appellant from the array of parties
          was barred by res judicata?
     b.   Whether the appellant is entitled to the benefit of Section 11
          of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965?
     c.   Whether in the facts of this case the transfer of possession of the
          suit property was implicit in the decree of specific performance
          in the facts of the case?
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                          2199

                Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan & Ors.


     E.    ANALYSIS
43. Order I Rule 10 inter alia empowers the court to allow addition,
    substitution or deletion of a party to a suit at any stage of the
    proceedings. It reads as follows:
           “10. Suit in name of wrong plaintiff.—
           (1) Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the
           wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether
           it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff,
           the Court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that
           the suit has been instituted through a bona fide mistake,
           and that it is necessary for the determination of the real
           matter in dispute so to do, order any other person to be
           substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the
           Court thinks just.
           (2) Court may strike out or add parties.—
           The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either
           upon or without the application of either party, and on
           such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order
           that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as
           plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name
           of any person who ought to have been joined, whether
           as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the
           Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court
           effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle
           all the questions involved in the suit, be added.
           (3) No person shall be added as a plaintiff suing without
           a next friend or as the next friend of a plaintiff under any
           disability without his consent.
           (4) Where defendant added, plaint to be amended.—
           Where a defendant is added, the plaint shall, unless the
           Court otherwise directs, be amended in such manner as
           may be necessary, and amended copies of the summons
           and of the plaint shall be served on the new defendant
           and, if the Court thinks fit, on the original defendant
           (5) Subject to the provisions of the 1 [Indian Limitation
           Act, 1877 (XV of 1877)], section 22, the proceedings as
2200                                                          [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


          against any person added as defendant shall be deemed
          to have begun only on the service of the summons.”
44. For the purpose of answering the pivotal question at hand, we only
    need to refer to Sub-rules (2) of Order I Rule 10. A bare reading
    of the provision extracted above indicates that Sub-rule (2) vests
    a very broad and substantial power in the court to delete or add a
    party, at any stage of the suit proceedings, either suo motu or upon
    an application of either of the parties before it. It provides that the
    court may delete the name of a party on such terms as may appear
    to the court to be just and proper. It may add any party whose
    presence before the court is necessary for the effective and complete
    adjudication and settlement of all the questions involved in the suit.
45. The power to strike out or add parties under Sub-rule (2) can be
    exercised by the court on an application made by the parties before
    it, or upon an application by a third party who desires to be added
    as a party, or even suo motu. Explaining the object underlying
    Order I Rule 10, this Court in Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v.
    Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay reported in (1992) 2 SCC
    524 observed thus:
          “6. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 gives a wide discretion to the
          Court to meet every case of defect of parties and is not
          affected by the inaction of the plaintiff to bring the necessary
          parties on record. The question of impleadment of a party
          has to be decided on the touchstone of Order 1 Rule 10
          which provides that only a necessary or a proper party
          may be added. A necessary party is one without whom
          no order can be made effectively. A proper party is one in
          whose absence an effective order can be made but whose
          presence is necessary for a complete and final decision
          on the question involved in the proceeding. The addition
          of parties is generally not a question of initial jurisdiction
          of the Court but of a judicial discretion which has to be
          exercised in view of all the facts and circumstances of a
          particular case.
                                   xxx xxx xxx
          8. The case really turns on the true construction of the rule
          in particular the meaning of the words “whose presence
          before the Court may be necessary in order to enable
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                              2201

                 Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan & Ors.


           the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon
           and settle all the questions involved in the suit”. The
           Court is empowered to join a person whose presence is
           necessary for the prescribed purpose and cannot under
           the rule direct the addition of a person whose presence
           is not necessary for that purpose. If the intervener has a
           cause of action against the plaintiff relating to the subject
           matter of the existing action, the Court has power to join
           the intervener so as to give effect to the primary object of
           the order which is to avoid multiplicity of actions.
                                    xxx xxx xxx
           10. The power of the Court to add parties under Order 1
           Rule 10, CPC, came up for consideration before this Court
           in Razia Begum [1959 SCR 1111 : AIR 1958 SC 886]. In
           that case it was pointed out that the courts in India have
           not treated the matter of addition of parties as raising any
           question of the initial jurisdiction of the Court and that it is
           firmly established as a result of judicial decisions that in
           order that a person may be added as a party to a suit, he
           should have a direct interest in the subject matter of the
           litigation whether it be the questions relating to movable
           or immovable property.
                                    xxx xxx xxx
           14. It cannot be said that the main object of the rule is to
           prevent multiplicity of actions though it may incidentally
           have that effect. But that appears to be a desirable
           consequence of the rule rather than its main objective.
           The person to be joined must be one whose presence is
           necessary as a party. What makes a person a necessary
           party is not merely that he has relevant evidence to give
           on some of the questions involved; that would only make
           him a necessary witness. It is not merely that he has an
           interest in the correct solution of some question involved
           and has thought of relevant arguments to advance. The
           only reason which makes it necessary to make a person
           a party to an action is so that he should be bound by
           the result of the action and the question to be settled,
           therefore, must be a question in the action which cannot
2202                                                          [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


          be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party.
          The line has been drawn on a wider construction of the
          rule between the direct interest or the legal interest and
          commercial interest. It is, therefore, necessary that the
          person must be directly or legally interested in the action in
          the answer, i.e., he can say that the litigation may lead to
          a result which will affect him legally that is by curtailing his
          legal rights. It is difficult to say that the rule contemplates
          joining as a defendant a person whose only object is to
          prosecute his own cause of action. Similar provision was
          considered in Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd. [(1956)
          1 All ER 273 : (1956) 1 QB 357], wherein after quoting
          the observations of Wynn-Parry, J. in Dollfus Mieg et
          Compagnie S.A. v. Bank of England [(1950) 2 All ER 605,
          611], that their true test lies not so much in an analysis
          of what are the constituents of the applicants’ rights, but
          rather in what would be the result on the subject matter of
          the action if those rights could be established, Devlin, J.
          has stated:
          “The test is ‘May the order for which the plaintiff is asking
          directly affect the intervener in the enjoyment of his legal
          rights’.””
                                                  (Emphasis supplied)

46. In the present case, the appellant, along with other legal heirs of the
    original defendant came to be impleaded in the execution proceedings
    before the Trial Court as the original defendant passed away during
    the pendency of the execution proceedings. Impleadment of the
    legal heirs of a defendant who passes away during the pendency
    of suit proceedings is governed by Order XXII Rule 4. The same
    reads as under:
          “4. Procedure in case of death of one of several
          defentlants or of sole defendant.—
          (1) Where one of two or more defendants dies and the right
          to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant
          or defendants alone or a sole defendant or sole surviving
          defendant dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on
          an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                            2203

                 Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan & Ors.


           representative of the deceased defendants to be made a
           party and shall proceed with the suit.
           (2) Any person so made a party may make any defence
           appropriate to his character as legal representative of the
           deceased defendant.
           (3) Where within the time limited by law no application is
           made under sub-rule (1), the suit shall abate as against
           the deceased defendant.
           (4) The Court whenever it thinks fit, may exempt the plaintiff
           from the necessity of substituting the legal representatives
           of any such defendant who has failed to file a written
           statement or who, having filed it, has failed to appear
           and contest the suit at the hearing; and judgment may,
           in such case, be pronounced against the said defendant
           notwithstanding the death of such defendant and shall have
           the same force and effect as if it has been pronounced
           before death took place.
           (5) Where—
                (a) the plaintiff was ignorant of the death of a
                defendant, and could not, for that reason, make
                an application for the substitution of the legal
                representative of the defendant under this rule
                within the period specified in the Limitation
                Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), and the suit has, in
                consequence, abated, and
                (b) the plaintiff applies after the expiry of the
                period specified therefore in the Limitation
                Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), for setting aside the
                abatement and also for the admission of that
                application under section 5 of that Act on the
                ground that he had, by reason of such ignorance,
                sufficient cause for not making the application
                with the period specified in the said Act,
           the Court shall, in considering the application under the said
           section 5, have due regard to the fact of such ignorance,
           if proved.”
2204                                                        [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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47. It is important to note the Sub-rule (2) of the Rule (4) as extracted
    above. The said Sub-rule provides that any party which is sought
    to be impleaded as a legal heir of a deceased defendant is at
    liberty to take up any defence as regards his character as the legal
    representative of the deceased defendant.
48. Rule 5 of Order XXII is of importance in the facts of this litigation.
    It reads thus:
          “5. Determination of question as to legal representative.—
          Where a question arises as to whether any person is or
          is not the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or a
          deceased defendant, such question shall be determined
          by the Court:
          Provided that where such question arises before an
          Appellate Court, that Court may, before determining the
          question, direct any subordinate Court to try the question
          and to return the records together with evidence, if any,
          recorded at such trial, its findings and reasons therefor, and
          the Appellate Court may take the same into consideration
          in determining the question.”
49. A perusal of the extracted provision indicates that if a question arises
    as regards whether any person is or is not the legal representative
    of a deceased defendant then such a question shall be determined
    by the court.
50. As we have discussed in the preceding parts of this judgment, the
    Trial Court, while dismissing the application moved by the appellant
    under Order I Rule 10, observed in clear terms that the appellant
    had the opportunity of contesting his impleadment as the legal heir
    of the original defendant when the application for impleadment
    and amendment of plaint was moved by the original plaintiff. The
    Trial Court has also noted that the appellant was not only served
    with the notice of the impleadment application, but he also entered
    appearance. However, the appellant, for reasons best known to him,
    chose to remain silent for more than four years and did not raise
    any objections as regards his status of not being a legal heir of the
    original defendant.
51. The position of law is well settled that the power to strike out or add
    a party to the proceedings under Order I Rule 10 can be exercised
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                       2205

                Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan & Ors.


     by the court at any stage of the proceeding. However, the same
     cannot be construed to mean that when a particular party has been
     impleaded as a legal heir under Order XXII Rule 4 after due inquiry
     by the court and without any objections, the party can approach the
     court anytime later and seek his deletion from the array of parties
     by filing an application under Order I Rule 10. If at all the appellant
     was aggrieved by his impleadment as a legal heir, the suitable
     course of action was to first object to his impleadment under Sub-
     rule (2) of Order XXII Rule 4. Even then if the Trial Court would
     have decided against the appellant, it would have been open to him
     to approach the High Court by filing a revision application against
     the order of impleadment. However, the appellant chose to sit tight
     in the impleadment proceedings despite entering appearance. He
     was also a respondent in the application preferred by some of the
     legal heirs under Section 28 of the SRA seeking rescission of the
     contract, both before the Trial Court and later before the High Court
     in the revision preferred against the rejection of the said application.
     However, he chose not to raise any objection in either of these
     proceedings as well.
52. The timing of the application preferred by the appellant also raises
    serious doubts as regards his bona fides. While the appellant remained
    silent over his objections as regards tenancy and impleadment as
    legal heir from 2008 till the rejection of the revision preferred by
    some of the legal heirs against the rejection of the application for
    rescission of the contract, he filed the application under Order I Rule
    10 for the deletion of his name from the array of parties within a
    month of the said revision petition. This, when seen in the context
    of the delays caused by multiple applications preferred by the
    appellant and the other legal heirs of the original defendant, only
    goes on to lend credence to the allegation of the original plaintiff
    that the application for deletion from array of parties is merely one
    more attempt to further thwart and prolong what has already been
    an unduly protracted litigation for the original plaintiff. Furthermore,
    while the appellant raised no objection to the application for rescinding
    the contract either before the Trial Court or the High Court despite
    being a respondent in both the proceedings, it has been submitted
    by the counsel appearing on his behalf that the said proceedings
    were not being undertaken with the approval of the appellant. It is
    not possible for us to accept such a contention at this stage of the
    proceedings having regard to the conduct exhibited by the appellant.
2206                                                       [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                        Supreme Court Reports


53. The High Court, in its impugned order, held the application of the
    appellant under Order I Rule 10 to be barred by res judicata and
    thus not maintainable on that ground. We find no infirmity in the said
    observation mad by the High Court. This Court in Bhanu Kumar
    Jain v. Archana Kumar reported in (2005) 1 SCC 787 observed
    that the principles of res judicata apply not only to two different
    proceedings but also to different stages of the same proceeding as
    well. The relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow:
          “18. It is now well settled that principles of res judicata
          apply in different stages of the same proceedings. (See
          Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi [AIR 1960 SC 941 :
          (1960) 3 SCR 590] and Prahlad Singh v. Col. Sukhdev
          Singh [(1987) 1 SCC 727] .)
          19. In Y.B. Patil [(1976) 4 SCC 66] it was held: (SCC p.
          68, para 4)
               “4. … It is well settled that principles of res judicata
               can be invoked not only in separate subsequent
               proceedings, they also get attracted in subsequent
               stage of the same proceedings. Once an order
               made in the course of a proceeding becomes final,
               it would be binding at the subsequent stage of that
               proceeding.”
                                    xxx xxx xxx
          21. Yet again in Hope Plantations Ltd. [(1999) 5 SCC 590]
          this Court laid down the law in the following terms: (SCC
          p. 604, para 17)
               “17. … One important consideration of public policy is
               that the decisions pronounced by courts of competent
               jurisdiction should be final, unless they are modified
               or reversed by appellate authorities; and the other
               principle is that no one should be made to face the
               same kind of litigation twice over, because such a
               process would be contrary to considerations of fair
               play and justice.””
                                                (Emphasis supplied)
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                            2207

                 Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan & Ors.


54. Thus, as the dictum of the law as extracted aforesaid indicates, the
    only manner in which a decision arrived at by a court of competent
    jurisdiction can be interfered with is by modification or reversal by the
    appellate authorities. In the present case, the order for impleadment
    of the appellant as a legal heir was made by the Trial Court after
    due inquiry under Order XXII, as also observed by the Trial Court in
    its order rejecting the application under Order I Rule 10. Evidently,
    neither any objection was raised by the appellant before the Trial Court
    nor any revision was preferred subsequently against the said order.
    Thus, it could be said that the issue as regards the impleadment of
    the appellant as a legal heir of the original defendant had attained
    finality between the parties and thus the subsequent application under
    Order I Rule 10 seeking to get his name deleted from the array of
    parties could be said to be barred by res judicata. Undoubtedly, the
    expression “at any stage of the proceedings” used in Order I Rule 10
    allows the court to exercise its power at any stage, however the same
    cannot be construed to mean that the defendant can keep reagitating
    the same objection at different stages of the same proceeding, when
    the issue has been determined conclusively at a previous stage.
    Allowing the same would run contrary to the considerations of fair
    play and justice and would amount to keeping the parties in a state
    of limbo as regards the adjudication of the disputes.
55. This Court in the case of Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi
    reported in [1960] 3 SCR 590, has noted that the principle of res
    judicata is essential in giving a finality to judicial decisions. The
    relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow:
           “The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving
           a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a
           res is judicata, it shall not be adjudged again. Primarily it
           applies as between past litigation and future litigation. When
           a matter — whether on a question of fact or a question of
           law — has been decided between two parties in one suit
           or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no
           appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal
           was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be
           allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same
           parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res
           judicata is embodied in relation to suits in Section 11 of
           the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where Section 11
2208                                                           [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


          does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been
          applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in
          litigation. The result of this is that the original court as well
          as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed
          on the basis that the previous decision was correct. The
          principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages
          in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether
          the trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage
          decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to
          re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the
          same proceedings. …”
                                                   (Emphasis supplied)

56. This Court in S. Ramachandra Rao v. S. Nagabhushana Rao
    reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1460 observed that although a
    decision may be erroneous, yet it would bind the parties to the same
    litigation and concerning the same issue, if it is rendered by a court
    of competent jurisdiction. The observations read thus:
          “31. For what has been noticed and discussed in the
          preceding paragraphs, it remains hardly a matter of doubt
          that the doctrine of res judicata is fundamental to every
          well regulated system of jurisprudence, for being founded
          on the consideration of public policy that a judicial decision
          must be accepted as correct and that no person should be
          vexed twice with the same kind of litigation. This doctrine
          of res judicata is attracted not only in separate subsequent
          proceedings but also at the subsequent stage of the same
          proceedings. Moreover, a binding decision cannot lightly be
          ignored and even an erroneous decision remains binding
          on the parties to the same litigation and concerning the
          same issue, if rendered by a Court of competent jurisdiction.
          Such a binding decision cannot be ignored even on the
          principle of per incuriam because that principle applies to
          the precedents and not to the doctrine of res judicata.”
57. A five-Judge Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Tarini Charan
    Bhattacharya v. Kedar Nath Haldar reported in 1928 SCC OnLine
    Cal 172 considered the question as regards whether an erroneous
    decision on a point of law would operate as res judicata between
    the parties or not. The court inter alia observed that it is not always
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                            2209

                 Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan & Ors.


     open to the party to raise a point of law. It further held that Section
     11 of the CPC makes the decision of the court conclusive between
     the parties notwithstanding the reasoning employed by the court in
     arriving at the said decision. The relevant observations are as under:
           “(1) The question whether a decision is correct or erroneous
           has no bearing upon the question Whether it operates or
           does not operate as res judicata. The doctrine is that in
           certain circumstances the Court shall not try a suit or issue
           but shall deal with the matter on the footing that it is a
           matter no longer open to contest by reason of a previous
           decision. In these circumstances it must necessarily be
           wrong for a Court to try the suit or issue, come to its
           own conclusion thereon, consider whether the previous
           decision is right and give effect to it or not according as
           it conceives the previous decision to be right or wrong.
           To say, as a result of such disorderly procedure, that the
           previous decision was wrong and that it was wrong on a
           point of law/or on a pure point of law, and that therefore it
           may be disregarded, is an indefensible form of reasoning.
           For this purpose, it is not true that a point of law is always
           open to a party.
           (2) In India, at all events, a party who takes a plea of
           res judicata has to show that the matter directly and
           substantially in issue has been directly and substantially
           in issue in the former suit and also that it has been heard
           and finally decided. This phrase “matter directly and
           substantially in issue” has to be given a sensible and
           businesslike meaning, particularly in view of Expl. 4 to
           sec. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure which contains the
           expression “grounds of defence or attack.” Sec. 11 of the
           Code says nothing about causes of action, a phrase which
           always requires careful handling. Nor does the section
           say anything about point or points of law, or pure points
           of law. As a rule parties do not join issue upon academic
           or abstract questions but upon matters of importance to
           themselves. The section requires that the doctrine be
           restricted to matters in issue and of these to matters which
           are directly as well as substantially in issue.
2210                                                           [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


          (3) Questions of law are of all kinds and cannot be dealt with
          as though they were all the same. Questions of procedure,
          questions affecting jurisdiction, questions of limitation,
          may all be questions of law. In such questions the rights,
          of parties are not the only matter for consideration. The
          Court and the public have an interest. When a plea of res
          judicata is raised with reference to such matters, it is at least
          a question whether special considerations do not apply.
          (4) In any case in which it is found that the matter
          directly and substantially in issue has been directly and
          substantially in issue in the former suit and has been
          heard and finally decided by such Court, the principle of
          res judicata is not to be ignored merely on the ground
          that the reasoning, whether in law or otherwise, of the
          previous decision can be attacked on a particular point.
          On the other hand it is plain from the terms of sec. 11 of
          the Code that what is made conclusive between the parties
          is the decision of the Court and that the reasoning of the
          Court is not necessarily the same thing as its decision.
          The object of the doctrine of res judicata is not to fasten
          upon parties special principles of law as applicable to them
          inter se, but to ascertain their rights and the facts upon
          which these rights directly and substantially depend; and
          to prevent this ascertainment from becoming nugatory by
          precluding the parties from re-opening or recontesting that
          which has been finally decided.”
                                                   (Emphasis supplied)

58. We are aware of the decision of this Court in Pankajbhai Rameshbhai
    Zalavadiya v. Jethabhai Kalabhai Zalavadiya reported in (2017)
    9 SCC 700 wherein it was held that an application under Order I
    Rule 10 would not be liable to be rejected solely on the ground
    that an application under Order XXII Rule 4 had been found to not
    be maintainable. However, the facts before us are quite different
    from the facts before the Court in Jethabhai (supra). Therein, the
    subsequent application under Order I Rule 10 was allowed on the
    ground that the initial application under Order XXII Rule 4 was filed
    under a mistake of law and fact as the defendant had passed away
    prior to the institution of the suit, whereas order XXII Rule 4 only
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                        2211

                Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan & Ors.


     contemplates a situation wherein the defendant passes away during
     the pendency of the proceedings. Thus, in such a scenario, it was
     observed that the appropriate application would be under Order I
     Rule 10. However, in the present case, the appropriate remedy for
     the appellant lay in raising an objection under Sub-rule (2) of Rule (4)
     of Order XXII at the time of the impleadment and not under Order I
     Rule 10 four years after the impleadment came to be allowed.
59. In lieu of the aforesaid discussion, although it is immaterial for us
    to examine the contention of the appellant that Mohammedan law
    does not accord the son of a predeceased son the status of a legal
    heir of the grandfather by virtue of inapplicability of the doctrine of
    representation, yet we may refer to the observations of the Privy
    Council in the case of Moolla Cassim bin Moolla Ahmed v. Moolla
    Abdul Rahim reported in 1905 SCC OnLine PC 17 wherein it was
    observed thus:
           “It is a well-known principle of Mahomedan law that if any
           of the children of a man die before the opening of the
           succession to his estate, leaving children behind, these
           grandchildren are entirely excluded from the inheritance
           by their uncles and aunts. […]”
60. Thus, had the appellant taken up the objection at the right stage of
    the proceedings, it would have been open to the court to look into the
    said objection under Order XXII Rule 5 and disallow his impleadment
    as a legal heir of the original defendant. However, having failed to
    act at the appropriate stage, it was not open to the appellant to
    subsequently approach the court with an application under Order I
    Rule 10. Further, as we shall shortly discuss, the appellant having
    failed to raise the plea of his tenancy and possession over the suit
    property, the rejection of his application under Order I Rule 10 has
    no material effect on the ultimate outcome of the lis.
61. The appellant also contended before the Trial Court as well as the
    High Court that he is a tenant in the suit property by virtue of having
    inherited the tenancy from his deceased father in 1992. Thus, he
    enjoys the protection of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease
    and Rent Control) Act, 1965 which provides that a tenant cannot be
    evicted, even in execution of a decree, except in accordance with
    the procedure prescribed under the said Act. However, the said
    contention of the appellant was rejected by both the courts and in
    our opinion, rightly so.
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                        Supreme Court Reports


62. The appellant has relied on the assignment deed of the year 1976
    and the License No. 215/92-93 issued by the Palakkad Municipality
    under Section 204 of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1960 to contend
    that his deceased father was a tenant in the suit property prior to his
    demise in 1992. He has also relied upon the Municipality License
    No. PH2-27607/11 issued in his name on 16.04.2011 to contend
    that he enjoys the exclusive possession of the suit property owing
    to the tenancy. However, we are of the view that the same is merely
    one more weapon from the arsenal of dubious tactics employed by
    the appellant in collusion with the other legal heirs of the original
    defendant to protract the execution proceedings.
63. While it may be true that the deceased father of the appellant was
    a tenant in the suit property at the time the same was purchased by
    the original defendant in the year 1976 and that he continued as a
    tenant till his demise in 1992, however we are of the view that the
    appellant has failed to establish his tenancy or possession over the
    suit property for the following reasons:
     a.   The appellant is one of the witnesses to the agreement to
          sell entered into between the original plaintiff and the original
          defendant in the year 1996.
     b.   There is no clause or recital as regards the tenancy of the
          appellant in the agreement to sell unlike the assignment deed
          of the year 1976.
     c.   The appellant did not raise any objection in any of the
          proceedings on the ground of tenancy until the application
          filed by him in 2012 from which the present proceedings arise.
     d.   The appellant has failed to produce any documents indicating
          his tenancy or exclusive possession over the suit property from
          the time of the execution of the agreement to sell upto the filing
          of the execution application by the original plaintiff.
     e.   The Municipality license of 2011 has been issued long after the
          suit was decreed in the favor of the original plaintiff and during
          the pendency of the execution proceedings.
     f.   Both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings
          rejecting the claim of tenancy and exclusive possession over
          the suit property by the appellant.
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                          2213

                Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan & Ors.


64. Before we part with the matter, we deem it appropriate to briefly
    address the contention of the appellant that in the absence of decree
    granting possession to the original plaintiff, the decree gets satisfied
    with the execution of the sale deed and the original plaintiff is not
    entitled to seek possession over the suit property. The position of law
    is settled on this aspect and has been reiterated by us in our recent
    decision in Rohit Kochhar v. Vipul Infrastructure Developers Ltd.
    reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3584. In the said decision, relying
    on the decision of this Court in Babu Lal v. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal
    reported in (1982) 3 SCR 94, it was observed thus:
           “23. This Court in Babu Lal (supra), upon a combined
           reading of Sections 22 and 28(3) of the Specific Relief Act
           respectively and Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act,
           observed that the it was only “in an appropriate case” that
           the plaintiff was required to separately seek the relief of
           possession, partition, or separate possession, as the case
           may be, along with the relief of specific performance. The
           Court observed that in other cases, say for example a case
           where the exclusive possession of the suit property is with
           the contracting party, a decree for specific performance
           of the contract of sale simpliciter, without specifically
           providing for delivery of possession, may give complete
           relief to the decree-holder. This, the Court observed, was
           the mandate flowing from Section 55 of the Transfer of
           Property Act. […]”
                                                 (Emphasis supplied)

65. Thus, as in the present case, both the courts below have arrived
    at the conclusion that the exclusive possession of the suit property
    could be said to be with the original defendant when the suit was
    decreed, the relief of transfer of possession is implicit in the decree
    for specific performance directing the original defendant to execute a
    sale deed in the favour of the original plaintiff. For the same reason,
    the decision of this Court in Birma Devi (supra) is of no avail to
    the appellant.
66. It has been brought to our knowledge that during the pendency of the
    present petition, a sale deed has already been executed in the favour
    of the original plaintiff by the legal heirs of the original defendant,
    however the possession has not yet been granted.
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     F.      CONCLUSION
67. In light of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the High
    Court, as well as the Trial Court, committed no error, much less any
    error of law, in arriving at their respective decisions. As a result, the
    appeal fails and is, hereby, dismissed with costs of Rs 25,000/- to
    be paid by the appellant and deposited with the Legal Services
    Authority within a period of two weeks from today.
68. The sale deed having already been executed in favour of the
    respondent no. 1, the Executing Court shall now proceed to ensure
    that vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property is handed
    over to the respondent no.1 in his capacity as the decree holder as
    well as the title holder of the suit property and, if necessary, with
    the aid of police. This exercise shall be completed within a period
    of two months from today without fail.
69. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

     Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain