Holding

The suit was filed within the statutory limitation period, Section 14 excluded the interim jurisdictional delay, and the Karta’s alienation for family necessity was valid, rendering the plaintiffs’ claim untenable.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined a suit filed by three brothers challenging a 1959 sale deed by their father, the Karta of a Mitakshara joint Hindu family, which conveyed an ancestral house to the defendants. The plaintiffs argued the father lacked authority to alienate their undivided 3/4 share and that the suit was barred by the 12‑year limitation period under Article 109 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Court held that the suit was filed within the limitation period, that the period of limitation is not reset by re‑filing after a jurisdictional defect, and that Section 14 of the Limitation Act excludes the time spent prosecuting the suit in the wrong court. It further held that a Karta may alienate ancestral property for family necessity unless the transaction is shown to be tainted by immoral or illegal purpose, which the plaintiffs failed to prove. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the trial court decree was set aside and the plaintiffs’ suit dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the suit is barred by the 12‑year limitation period under Article 109 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Whether the period of limitation is excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act for the time the suit was pending in a court lacking pecuniary jurisdiction.
Whether the father, as Karta of a Mitakshara joint Hindu family, had the authority to alienate the ancestral house for family necessity.
Whether the sale deed is voidable on the ground of immoral or illegal purpose.
Whether the suit was a collusive proceeding.

Legislation cited

Limitation Act, 1963s. Article 109, s. Section 14

Subjects

LimitationArticle 109Section 14Mitakshara lawKartaAlienation of ancestral propertyFamily necessityCollusive suitHindu lawCivil appeal

Judgment

A SUNDER DAS AND ORS.
v.
GAJANANRAO AND ORS.

DECEMBER 13, 1996

B [N.P. SINGH AND S.B. MATMUDAR, JJ.]

Hindu Law:

Limitation Act, 1963: Article 109 and Section 14.
c Suit by Hindu governed by Mitakashara law to set aside his father's
alienation of ancestral property--Period spent in good faith in prosecutinf!
suit-Exclusion of-Limitation period of 12 years from date of taking posses-
sion of property by alianee-Alienees took possession of suit property on
30.5.1959 when sale deed was registered in their favour-Limitation period
D expired on 29.5.1971-Suit filed on 20.8.1970 before expiry of limitation period
in a Court lacking pecuniary jurisdiction-High Court on 22.11.1975 ordered
return of plaint for presentation to proper court-Accordingly suit filed in
proper courl on 26.11.1975-Held: Contention that limitation period for filing
suit should be counted from date of filing second suit in proper court and so
E counted suit was filed beyond period of 12 years and hence barred could not
be accepted-Suit not ban-ed by limitation-Hence, plea of bar of limitation
c
stood rejected.

Alienation-By father as 'Karta' of joint Hindu family-Sale of an-
cestral house-Sale deed contained recitals that sale of ancestral house was
F for family necessity-Father-karta was Upper Division Clerk in Civil Court at
relevant time-House was in dilapidated and rninous condition· and found to
be a burden to family and seller was in debt-Father-karta not tainted by
immoral conduct-Purchaser made substantial construction at huge
cost-Eleven and a half years after sale sons of seller filed suit by joining their
father as defendant on ground that sale deed was not binding on them since
G house was ancestral property in which they had equal interest and hence their
father had no right to sell it-Held: father-karta legally entitled to alienate
property of joint family and interest of minor member offamity for his own
requirement-Unless it was shown that the transaction was tainted by any
immoral or illegal purpose-No evidence led to rebut clear recitals in sale
H deed-Father must be presumed to be well-acclimatised in court proceedings
66
SUNDERDAS v. GAJANANRAO 67

... and he stood by the transaction and recitals in the sale deeHience, suit got A
filed by father only with a view to knock out more money from purchasers
and was a collusive suit-Plaintiffs made out no case for getting relief from
;.; Cowt in present proceedings and their suit was, there[ore, liable to be dis-
missed.

.The father of the plaintiffs-respondents had executed a registered
B
sale deed dated 30.5.1959 conveying his ancestral house to the defendants-
appellants and delivered possession of the said house to the appellants.
There were clear recitals ill the sale deed that the sale of the ancestral
house was for family necessity. The said ancestral house was in a
dilapidated and ruinous condition, was a burden to the family and that c
the father was in debt. The appellants-defendants made substantial re-con-
struction of the said ancestral house at a huge cost. The father was an
Upper Division. Clerk in the Civil Court at the relevant time.

The plaintiffs-respondents filed a suit on 20.8.1970 in court lacking D
pecuniary jurisdiction on the grounds that the said house was their
ancestral property in which they had undivided 3/4th interest, that their
father had no right to transfer the said ancestral house and that the sale
deed was not binding on them. The father was joined as defendant No. 6
, in the suit. However, the High Court on 22.11.1975 ordered return of the
plaint for presentation to the proper court. The plaintiffs-respondents E
accordingly filed the suit in proper court on 26.11.1975. The Trial Court
decreed the suit. The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the First
Appeal and confirmed with modification the decree passed by the Trial
Court. Hence this appeal.
F
On behalf of the appellants-defendants it was contended that the suit
was barred by limitation under Article 109 of the Limitation Act, 1963; that
the suit property belonged exclusively to the father of the plaintiffs-respon-
dents and, therefore, the plaintiffs-respondents had no right to challenge
the sale deed; that even assuming that the suit property was ancestral
house as the plaintiffs-respondents' father was the 'karta' of the Joint G
-·. Hindu family the sale deed executed by him was perfectly legal and valid
and binding on the plaintiffs-respondents unless it was shown that the sale
deed was executed for paying off a debt incurred by their father for an
illegal or immoral purpose; that the said transaction was for legal neces-
sity and for family requirement as mentioned in the recitals in the sale H
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[1996] SUPP.10 S.C.R.

A deed; that there was no cogent evidence led by the plaintiffs-respondents
to rebut these recitals· in the sale deed; that the plaintiffs- respondents
stood by the transaction and allowed the appellants-defendants to spend
huge sums of money for re-construction and renovation of the house; that
the suit was a collusive suit got filed by the father through his sons after
B ell~ven and a half years merely to knock out more money from the appel-
lants- defendants and to harass them; and that the suit was liable to be
dismissed.

Allowing the appeal, this Court

C HELD :Ll. Article 109 in the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963
provides for a period of limitation of twelve years for a Hindu governed
by Mitakashara law who files a suit to set aside his father's alienation of
ancestral property and twelve years' period begins from the date when
alienee takes possession of the property. Iii. the present case the alienees
took .possession of the suit property on 30.5.1959 when they got registered
D sale deed in their favour. Counting 12 years from 30.5.1959 limitation for
filing the suit or challenging the said alienation would expire by 29.5.1971.
The present suit was filed on 20.8.1970. Therefore, it was clearly within
limitation. [73-G; 74-A]

1.2. Originally the suit was filed within limitation, but it was .filed
E '
before a court which was found to be lacking in pecuniary jurisdiction and
when it was re-filed before a competent court the plaintiffs were entitled
to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act enabling them to get
exclusion of the time from 20.8.1970 to 22.11.1975 when the High Court
took the view that the suit should be returned for presentation to the
F proper court. The plaintiffs were prosecuting in good faith their suit before
a court which, from defect of pecuniary jurisdiction, was unable to enter·
tain it and if this period gets excluded the re-filed suit on 26·11·75 would
remain within limitation of 12 years from· the date of the impugned sale
deed. The contention of the appellant-defendants that the limitation period
G for filing the suit should be counted from the date of filing the suit in
proper court and so counted the suit was filed beyond the period of 12
years and hence barred cannot be accepted. Therefore, the plea of bar of
limitation stands rejected. [74-E-G]

2.1. The recital in the impugned sale deed to the effect that the sale
H deed was executed on account of family necessity indicated that the suit
SUNDER DAS v. GAJANANRAO 69
house was treated as joint family property wherein the plaintiffs would A
have interest. [75-B]

2.2. The plaintitl's father was the 'karta' of the Joint Hindu family.
,. He has clearly recited in the impugned sale deed in favour of the defen·
·'
dants that he was selling the suit house of account of family necessity. No
attempt was made in his evidence to get out of the clear recitals in the sale
B
'
deed that he had entered into the transaction for family necessity. Defen-
dant no. 6 being the father of the plaintiffs and 'karta'.for the Joint Hindu
Family was legally entitled to alienate the suit house and also the interest
of the .minor plaintiffs in the said house even for· his own requirements
unless it was shown that the transaction was tainted by any immoral or c
· illegal purpose. [75-E; 76-B-C; 75-G]

2.3. As a Hindu father and 'karta' of the joint family defendant No.
6 had every right to .dispose of the ancestral property and in the process
could have legally disposed of the interest of his minor sons in the said
D
property also for the benefit of the family and necessity of the family. The
plaintiffs have not been able to lead any cogent evidence to rebut the clear
recitals found in the sale deed to that effect. [76-G; 76-H]

Mu/la's Hindu Law 16th. Edn. para 256 by S.T. Desai, referred to.
E
3. The suit house which was in a dilapidated and ruinous .condition
was found to be a dead burden to the family and, therefore, for family
necessity it was disposed of by defendant no. 6, father of plaintiffs. The
said transaction was a transaction for the benefit of the family. The very
fact that defendant no. 6 who was presumed to be well acclimatised with F
the court proceedings as he was an Upper Division Clerk in the Civil Court
at the relevant time stood by the transaction and the recitals in the Sale
Deed for relevant and a half years and the further fact that he saw to it

- that his sons challenged the transaction after such a long period of time
when defendants· in the meantime went on spending huge amounts on the
property and ultimately came forward in the suit to support the plaintiffs, G
leave no room for doubt that the suit was got filed by defendant no. 6 only
..... ' with a view to knock out more money from the contesting defendants and
was clearly a collusive suit. The plaintiffs had made out no case for getting
any relief from the Court in the present proceedings and their suit was,
therefore, liable to be dismissed. [78-H; 79-B; 79-C-E; 79-F] H
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[1996] SUPP. 10 S.C.R.

A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3550 of
1984.

From the Judgment and Order dated 3.4.84 of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court in F.A. No. 2 of 1979.

B Sudhir Chandra and Jayant Bhusan for the Appellants.

S.S. Khanduja for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

C S.B. MAJMUDAR, J. This appeal on the grant of special leave to
appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is directed against
the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh m First Appeal No. 2 of 1979 whereby the Division Bench dis-
missed the First appeal .and confirmed with modification the decree passed
by the Trial Court against the appellants in Civil suit No. 13A of 1978 in
D the Court of learned Dist:l:ict Judge, Datia·. The facts leading to this appeal
shortly stated are as under.

The appellants are the original defendants against whom respondent
nos. 1 to 3, original plaintiffs, filed the aforesaid suit for a declaration that
E the registered sale deed date 30th May 1959 executed by their father,
respondent no. 4 in this appeal who was original defendant no. 6 in the
suit, in favour of the present appellants is void and inoperative at law and
for restoration of the posses~ion of the suit house bearing Municipal No.
1153/1 situated in Rajgarh locality of Datia town in the State of Madhya
Pradesh. For the sake of convenience we will refer to the appellants as
F original contesting defendants and respondents 1 to 3 as plaintiffs in the
latter part of this judgment. Respondent no. 4, father of the plaintiffs, was
joined a defendant no. 6 in the suit. The case of the plaintiffs is that their
father original defendant no. 6 had executed registered sale deed dated
30th May 1959 conveying the suit house to the contesting defendants for a
G sum of Rs. 1800 and delivered possession of the said house to them.
According to the plaintiffs the suit house was their ancestral property in
which they had got undivided 3/4th interest. That their father, defendant
no. 6, had no right to transfer the suit house in favour of the contesting
defendants and consequently the said sale deed was not binding on them.

H The said suit was contested by the contesting defendants on the
SUNDERDAS v. GAJANANRAO(S.B.MAJMUDAR,J.] 71

ground that the house belonged exclusively to their vendor defendant no. A
6 and plaintiffs had no interest therein. It was alternatively contended that .
... even assuming that the suit house was an ancestral house wherein the
plaintiffs had un?ivided interest defendant no. 6, their vendor, had
alienated the said house for family necessity and his transaction was
binding on the plaintiffs. Defendant no. 6 father of the plaintiffs, on the
B
other hand supported the plaintiffs.

Learned trial judge after recording the evidence came to the con-
clusion that the suit house was an ancestral property of the parties wherein
the plaintiffs had 3/4th undivided interest while their father defendant no.
6 had 1/4th interest and consequently the sale deed dated 30th May 1959 c
was voidable to the extent of 3/4th share of the plaintiffs. Accordingly the
learned trial judge directed the plaintiffs to be placed in joint possession
of the suit house along with the contesting defendants 1 to 5. Being
aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree of the trial judge the
contesting defendants carried the matter in First Appeal before the High
Court. As stated earlier Division Bench of the High Court was pleased to D
dismiss the same. However the cross objections filed by the plaintiffs were ·
allowed and accordingly trial court's decree .was modified as under :

"The suit of the plaintiffs for possession is decreed; the contesting
defendants to deliver possession of the suit house to the plaintiffs; E
but the execution of the decree in so far as it directs the contesting
defendants to deliver possession of the suit house to the plaintiffs
sliall remain stayed for a period of six months from today and, if
before the expiry of that period, the contesting defendants bring a
suit for general partition, then the stay should continue till the
disposal of the suit; but if no such suit is brought within the period, F
the stay of execution of the decree shall stand cancelled on the
expiry of the period of six months and the plaintiffs shall be entitled
to obtained the possession of the suit house."

It is the aforesaid decree in favour of the plaintiffs as confirmed with
G
modification by the Division Bench.of the High Court that is brought on
the anvil of scrutiny of this Court in the present proceedings by the
'
~
t dissatisfied contesting defendants.
<

At the outset it may be stated that at the suggestion of the Court the
contesting parties were given time to explore any possibility of settlement. H
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l996] SUPP. 10 S.C.R.

A But we were informed that settlement was not possible. However in view
of the fact that two of the plaintiffs were ininors at the time when their
father executed the impugned sale deed and as the prices of the properties
have naturally got escalated. over years the Court suggested to learned
counsel for the. appellants, contesting defendants, that in case they succeed
B in this appeal they may ex gratia make payment of suitable amount to the
respondent-plaintiffs to avoid any possible heart burning to them. We are
happy to note that the suggestion of'- the Court was accepted by the
appellants, contesting defendants. Appellant no. 1 Sunder Das who was
present in the Court has filed a written undertaking on affidavit to the
effect tliat having consulted Laxman, son of Tehalram, appellant no. 2 in
C this appeal he was giving undertaking to this Court that if the appeal filed
on their behalf is allowed and the judgment and decree are set aside they
shall pay ex gratia an amount Rs.2,00,000 to the plaintiff-respondents
Gajanan Rao, Ravindra Kumar and Govind Rao within three months from
the date of the delivery of the judgment. We were also informed by the
D learned counsel for the appellants that similar affidavits will be filed by the
remaining appellants within one week of the delivery of the judgment- in
case the appeal is ultimately allowed and the suit of the plaintiffs is
dismissed. They undertake to make payment of Rs. 2,00,000 to the plaintiffs
a
aforesaid ex gratia with view to alleviate likely heart burning of the
plaintiffs in such an eventuality. We appreciate the good gesture made by
. E the appellants. It is now time for us to deal with the merits of the appeal.
We have heard the learned counsel for the contesting defendants as
well as for the respondent-plaintiffs in support of their respective cases.

p Learned counsel for the contesting defendants submitted that both
the courts below had patently erred in law as well as on facts in taking the
view that the suit for challenging the impugned sale deed was within
limitation. According to the learned counsel the suit was bared by Article
109 of the Limitation Act. On merits it was contended that the suit house
belonged exclusively to the contesting defendants' vendor original defen-
G dant no. 6, father of the plaintiffs and, therefore, the plaintiffs had no right
challenge the said sale deed. It was alternatively contended that even
assuming that the suit property was ancestral property as plaintiffs father
defendant no. 6 was the 'karta' of the Joint Hindu family the sale deed
executed by him was perfectly legal and valid and binding on the plaintiffs
H unless it was shown that the sale deed was vitiated on the ground of it being
SUNDERDAS v. GAJANANRAO[S.B.MAJMUDAR,J.] 73

executed for paying off a debt incurred by their father for an illegal or A
immoral purpose. That there was no such case pleaded by the plaintiffs. It
was next contended that the said transaction was for legal necessity and
for family requirement as mentioned in the sale deed and these recital were
binding on defendant no. 6. That there was no cogent evidence led by the
plaintiffs to rebut these recitals in the sale deed. That both the courts below B
were patently in error when they took the view that the transaction was not
binding on the plaintiffs. That the suit was purely a collusive suit got filed
by defendant no. 6 through his sons after eleven and a half years of the
transaction. That they stood by the transaction for all these years, allowed
the contesting defendants to spend huge sums of money for re-construction
and rennovation of the house and that this suit was filed merely to knock C
out more money from the contesting defendants and to harass them. Hence
it was liable to be dismissed even on merits.

On the other hand learned counsel Shri Khanduja for the respon-
dent-plaintiffs submitted that both the courts on appreciation of evidence D
had come to a concurrent finding of fact that there was no legal necessity
for defendant no. 6 to execute the sale deed. That defendant no. 6 was not
shown to have incurred any debts or was in a such a stringent economic
condition that he was required to sell off the suit house to the contesting
defendants and, therefore, on the evidence on record the conclusion
reached by both the courts below that defendant no. 6, father of the E
plaintiffs, could nqt legally alienate the undivided 3/4th interest of the
plaintiffs in the suit house, remained will justified and called for no
interference in this appeal.

Having carefully considered the aforesaid rival contentions we find F
that the judgment and decree as passed by Trial Court and as confirmed
with modification by the Division Bench of the High Curt cannot be •
sustained. However before we proceed to consider the merits of the case
we may in the fist instance deal with the question of limitation for filling
the present suit. Article 109 in the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 G
provides for a period of limitation of twelve years for a Hindu governed by
Mitakashara law who files a suit to aside his father's alienation of ancestral
property and twelve years' period bagins from the date when alienee takes
possession of the property. In the present case the contesting alienees took
possession of the suit property on 30th May 1959 when they got registered
Sale Deed in their favour. Counting 12 years from 30th May 1959 limitation H
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[1996] SUPP.10 S.C.R.
A for filing the suit or challenging the said alienation would expire by 29th
May 1971. The present suit was filed on 20th August 1970. Therefore, it
was clearly within limitation. However the said suit underwent rough
whether. It was originally filed in the court of Civil Judge Class II. Datia
on the basis that the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction of the court
B would be Rs. 1800 the consideration amount mentioned in the sale deed.
In the first instance the said court took the view that the suit was within its
pecuniary jurisdiction. However the High Court took a contrary view and
held that the valuation of the suit should be equal to the market value of
the property on the date of the suit and hence ordered return of the plaint
for presentation to the proper court and that is how the suit was filed in
· C the District Court on 26th November 1975 after valuing the suit at Rs.
42,700. The contention of learned counsel for the contesting defendants is
that the limitation for filing the suit will hav.e to be seen from the date of
filing of the second suit before the competent court and if 26th November
1975 being the date of filing of that suit is taken to be the date in the light
D of which limitation question is to be decided then the period of limitation
of 12 years from the date of the sale deed dated 30th May 1959 must be
treated to have expired and the suit was, therefore, beyond time. This
contention was rightly not accepted by both the courts below for the simple
reason that originally the suit was filed within limitation, but it was filed
before a court which was found to be lacking in pecuniary jurisdiction and
E when it was re-filed before a competent court the plaintiffs were entitled
to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act enabling them to get
exclusion of the time from 20th August 1970 to 22nd November 1975 when
the High Court took the view that the suit should be returned for presen-
tation to the proper court. It is obvious that the plaintiffs were prosecuting
F in good faith their suit before a courts which, from defect of pecuniary
jurisdiction, was unable to entertain it and if this period gets exclused the
• re-filed suit on 26th November 1975 would remain within limitation of 12
years from the date of the impugned sale deed. The plea of bar of
limitation as raised by the learned counsel for the contesting defendants,
therefore, stands rejected.
G
So far as the merits of the case are concerned certain salient facts
which are well established on record deserve to be noted. There is ample
evidence on record to show that the suit house was the ancestral house of
the plaintiffs and defendant no. 6. Evidence shows that originally the suit
H house was occupied by plaintiffs' grand-father Mukundrao who had died
SUNDERDAS v. GAJANANRAO[S.B.MATMUDAR,J.] 75

60 years prior to the filing of the suit. It is also revealed from the evidence A
that suit house was occupied by plaintiffs' father defendant no. 6 and also
by latter's uncle. They were staying together till defendant no. 6's uncle
died. Even the recital in the impugned sale deed to the effect that the sale
deed was executed on account of family necessity indicated that the suit
house was treated as joint family property wherein obviously the plaintiffs B
would have interest. Both the courts below have held that the suit house
was an ancestral property in the hands of plaintiffs' father, defendant no.
6. This fmding is well sustained on the record of the case and calls for no
interference in this appeal. We, therefore,. reject the contention canvassed
by learned counsel for the appellants that the suit house was self-acquired
property of defendant no. 6. C

Once it is held that the suit house was an ancestral prop6rty in the
hands of plaintiffs' father defendant no. 6, the plaintiffs could naturally
have right by birth in the suit house. However the moot question is whether
the alienation of the suit house by the impugned sale deed by the plaintiffs' D
father, defendant no. 6, to the contesting defendants was binding on the
plaintiffs. So far as this question is concerned it must be kept in view that
plaintiffs' father was the 'karta' of th'e Joint Hindu family. The evidence
shows that at the relevant time he was working' as Upper Division Clerk in
the Civil Court at Chhatarpur. His monthly income was Rs. 150 in 1958-59
when the sale deed was ~xecuted as seen from his deposition as D.W.1. He E
has clearly recited in the impugned sale deed in favour of the co!ltesting
defendants that he wascselling the suit house for Rs. 1800 on account of
family necessity. He revealed in his deposition before the court that he had
a family of seven persons to be maintained out of his income of Rs. 150
per month as he had got his wife, three sons, namely, the present plaintiffs F
and two young daughters. It is also revealed from his evidence that he was
staying at Chhatarpur as he was serving as Upper Div!sion Clerk in the
Chhatarpur court. The suit house was situated at Village Datia. According
to defendant no. 6 he occasionally came to Datia to look after the house.
No attempt was made in his evidence to get out of the clear recital in the
sale deed that he had entered into the transaction for family necessity. It G.
is also pertinent to note that out of the three plaintiffs, plaintiff no. 1 was
major at the time of the sale deed. He has conspicuously remained absent
from the witness box and avoided inconvenient cross examination which he
might have faced. In support of the plaintiffs only plaintiff no. 3 P.W. ·1
Govind Rao who was admittedly aged 8 years at the time of the sale deed H
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS(1996] SUPP.10 S.C.R.

A J:ias been examined. He naturally could not have any personal knowledge
'bout what transpired in 1959 when his father who was serving in a Civil
Court as Upper Division Clerk thought it fit to sell the ancestral house in
Village Datia to the defendants and whether the recital made by him in
the sale deed that the transaction was being executed for family necessity
B was right ofli.ot. Nor defendant no. 6, vendor father of the plaintiffs, had
even whispered about the necessity ior inserting the recital in the sale deed
that he was executing the same for family necessity. It has to be kept in
view that defendant no. 6 being the father of the plaintiffs and 'karta' of j
the Joint H,fndu family was legally entitled to alienate the suit house and ~
also the intilrest of the minor plaintiffs in the said house even for his own
C requirements unless it was shown that the transaction was tainted by any
immoral or illegal purpose. That is not the case of the plaintiffs. Nor have
they suggested that their father was addicted to any immoral conduct. Their
only case is that their father had no right to alienate their undivided interest
in the suit house. We must keep in view the fact that defendant no. 6, father
D of the plaintiffs, was a worldly person who was presumed to know the ways
of the world as he was attached to the Civil Court as Upper Division Clerk
at the relevant time. His evidence shows that upto 1954 he had worked in
the Civil Court as a Lower Division Clerk. Then he was promoted by the
High Court to th~ post of Upper Division Clerk in the year 1954 and he
was transferred to Panna and from Panna he was transferred to Chhatar-
E pur. He also deposed that he used to visit Datia in connection with
supervision of the suit house. Therefore, defendant no. 6, father of the
plaintiffs apart from being the 'karta' of the joint Hindu family was well
versed in the ways of the world and was not a novice or a layman. With his
open eyes he disposed of the suit house which appeared to be almost a
F ruin for Rs. 1800. It is easy to visualized that when defendant no. 6, the
vendor, was staying with his family at Chhatarpur and when the ancestral
house at Datia Village was in a ruinous condition and which would almost
be a burden to them he thought it fit in his wisdom to dispose it of for Rs.
1800 in favour of the defendants and made an express recital in the sale
deed that it was for family necessity that he was disposing it of. As a Hindu
G father and 'karta' of the family he had every right to do so and in the
process could have legally disposed of the interest of his minor sons in the
said property also for the benefit of the family and necessity of the family.
The plaintiffs have not been able to lead any cogent evidence to rebut the
clear recitals found in the sale deed to that effect. We may usefully remind
H
SUNDER DAS v. GAJANANRAO [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 77

ourselves of what Mulla's Hindu Law 16th Edition by S.T. Desai has to A
state in connection with 'alienation by father' at paragraph 256 of the said
volume. It reads as under :

"256. Alienation by father. - A Hindu father as such has special
powers of alienating coparcenary property which no other copar-
cener has. In the exercise of these powers. - B
(1) he may make a gift of ancestral movable property to the extent
mentioned in paragraph 225, and even of ancestral immovable
property to the extent mentioned in paragraph 226;

(2) he may sell or mortgage ancestral property, whether movable C
or immovable, including the interest of his sons, grandsons
and grandsons therein, for the payment of his own debt,
provided the debt was an antecedent debt and was not in-
curred for immoral or illegal purposes
D
[paragraph 295]

Except as aforesaid, a father has no greater power over copar-
cenary property than any other manager, that is to say, he cannot
alienate coparcenary property except for legal necessity or for the
benefit of the family [paragraph 242]. This section must be read E
with what is stated under paragraph 213-215 ante."

Shri Khanduja, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-plain-
tiffs in this connection submitted that the defendants as alienees should
have properly enquired as to why the transaction was being entered into F
by the father of the minor plaintiffs in their favour. It is difficult to
I
appreciate this submission. The evidence on re.cord clearly shows that
contesting defendants before entering into the suit transaction had taken
all permissible precautions and made enquiries in this connection. Contest-
ing defendants witness no. 1 Tehalram stated in his evidence that he was
informed by defendant no. 6, that his uncle had expired. His debt has to G
be paid off. Money-lender has also to be paid. That he tried to verify these
facts. That he went to the shop of Chetandas in the area. His also enquired
from grocer Meghamal and found out that defendant no 6 was in debts
and, therefore, he came to the conclusion that defendant no. 6 was in need
of money and accordingly he had sold his house to him. Shri Khanduja, H
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS(1996] SUPP. 10 S.C.R.
A learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs submitted that defendant no.
1 in his cross examination has stated that defendant no. 6 Hanumantrao
had no title to the property and in order to help him he had purchased the
house from him. It is difficult to appreciate this contention. The evidence
of defendant no. 1 when read in its correct perspective showed that he was
B informed by one Ganpati that the property belonged to King and the King
of Datia had given it to the ancestor of the plaintiffs Mukundrao to stay
therein and accordingly he thought that defendant no. 6 would not be
having title to the property. It must be kept in view that plaintiffs' ancestor
Mukundrao had died 60 years prior to the suit. Therefore, even if originally
C the property might have belonged to the king it was being occupied by
plaintiffs' ancestor Mukundrao and his descendants since generations as
owners thereof and even by doctrine of adverse possession they would have
perfected their title. It may also be kept in view that there was nothing on
the record to suggest that the King of Datia had ever attempted to put
forward any claim of ownership over the suit property. Even that part apart
D it was not the case of the plaintiffs themselves that the suit property did
not belong to their father or their ancestors. On the contrary their case is
that the suit house did belong to their father jointly with them. Therefore,
it is too late in the day for the learned counsel for the plaintiffs to submit
that suit house did not belong to the plaintiffs and, their fathet or that at
E the time of the sale plaintiffs' father had no right, title or interest in the
suit house. In our view the evidence on record clearly establishes that the
defendants made all permissible efforts to find out the legal necessity which
prompted defendant no. 6 to enter into the said transaction in their favour.
It is of course true, as contended by Shri Khanduja for the plaintiffs, that
F the efforts made by the contesting defendants by relying upon the evidence
of Maghamal D.W.2 who is said to have sold grocery on credit to defendant
no. 6 at the relevant time remained unsuccessful as there would have been
no occasion for defendant no. 6 who was staying with his family at Chhatar-
pur to purchase at Datia grocery items on a continuous basis on credit from
G witness Meghamal. But even leaving aside the evidem:e of witness
Meghamal which was not accepted by courts below we find that the
evidence of the plaintiffs and defendant no. 6 clearly establishes that the
suit.house which was in a dilapidated and ruinous condition at Datia was
found to be a dead burden to the family and, therefore, for family necessity
it was disposed of by defendant no. 6, father of the plaintiffs in 1959. The
H
SUNDER DAS v. GAJANANRAO [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.) 79

said transaction, therefore, as the recitals in the sale deed themselves A
rightly showed, in the light of surrounding circumstances was a transaction
for the benefit of the family. The said conclusion of ours gets further
fortified from the well established facts on record that after purchasing the .
suit house the contesting defendants re-constructed it to a substantial
extent by spending an amount of Rs. 33,000 as held by a Division Bench B
of the High Court especially when the suit house was purchased for an
amount of Rs. 1800. That shows that it must be in a totally dilapidated
condition and the defendants appear to have purchased only the site on
which they put a substantially new construction at a huge cost of Rs. 33,000
as compared to the original purchase price of Rs. 1800. The very fact that C
defendant no. 6 who was presumed to be well acclimatised with the court
proceedings as he was an Upper Division Clerk in the Civil Court at
Chhatarpur at the relevant time stood by the transaction and the recitals
in the sale deed for eleven and a half years and the further fact that he saw
to it that his sons challenged the transaction after such a long period of D
time when defendants in the meantime went on spending huge amounts on
the property and ultimately came forward in the suit to support the
plaintiffs, leave no room for doubt that the suit was got filed by defendant
no. 6 only with a view to knock out more money from the contesting
defendants and was clearly a collusive suit. On an overall consideration of E
evidence on record, therefore, we find ourselves unable to endorse the
conclusions reached by both the courts below that tht: suit transaction was
not binding on the plaintiffs. The said finding is against the weight of
evidence and cannot be sustained. We, therefore, hold that the plaintiffs
had made out no case for getting any relief from the Court in the present
proceedings and their suit was, therefore, liable to be dismissed. Accord- F
ingly this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree passed
by the Trial Court and as confirmed with modification by the High Court
are quashed and set aside. Plaintiffs' suit will stand dismissed. However in
the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs
all throughout. G
•

- Before. parting with the present proceedings, however, we may men-
tion that, as noted earlier, appellant no. 1 on his own behalf and on behalf
of appellant no. 2 has given a written undertaking to this Court to pay ex
gratia Rs. 2,00,000 to the plaintiff-respondents. We also permit the remain- · H
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[1996] SUPP.10 S.C.R.
A ing contesting defendants to file similar written undertakings within one
week from today. These undertakings will stand accepted an~ accordingly
while allowing the appeal of the contesting defendants, we direct the
appellant-defendants to ex gratia pay sum of Rs. 2,00,000 to the respon-
dent-plaintiffs within three months from today. The said amount be
B deposited by the appellants in the Trial Court within that time. The
deposited amount of Rs. 2,00,000 will be permitted to be withdrawn by the
plaintiffs from the Trial Court on due identification. Orders accordingly.

v.s.s. Appeal allowed.