Holding

The Court upheld the conviction, finding the appellant guilty of murder and rejecting the pleas of self‑defence and grave and sudden provocation.

Summary

The appellant, a police guard, was convicted of murder and attempted murder for shooting a man inside a Delhi police station, motivated by the victim's alleged affair with the appellant's wife. The prosecution presented multiple eye‑witnesses, forensic evidence of close‑range gunshots, and a post‑mortem report showing numerous bullet injuries, establishing the appellant's intent to kill. The appellant claimed self‑defence and, alternatively, grave and sudden provocation under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC, arguing the victim had rushed the station to attack him. The Supreme Court held that the evidence disproved any claim of self‑defence or provocation, noting that the burden of proving an exception lies on the accused under Section 105 of the Evidence Act. It also cautioned against undue deferral of cross‑examination, reaffirming the standards of Section 231 CrPC. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction and ordering the appellant to surrender.

Issues considered

Whether the appellant's act constitutes murder under Sections 302 and 307 IPC or can be reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC.
Whether the defence of self‑defence or grave and sudden provocation is sustainable on the facts.
Whether the deferment of cross‑examination of a key witness violated procedural requirements under Section 231 CrPC.
The allocation of the burden of proof for the defence of private defence under Section 105 of the Evidence Act.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 231
Evidence Act, 1872s. 105
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 300, s. 302, s. 307

Subjects

MurderCulpable homicide not amounting to murderPlea of self defencePower of self-controlGrave and sudden provocationMotiveTestimony of the eye witnessesPrivate defenceBurden of proofException 1 to s.300 IPCDeferring of cross-examination of witnessLong adjournment after examination-in-chiefFairness of the trial

Judgment

[2024] 7 S.C.R. 163 : 2024 INSC 462

Surender Singh
v.
State (NCT of Delhi)
(Criminal Appeal No. 597 of 2012)
03 July 2024
[Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Correctness of the order of the High Court upholding the conviction
and sentence of the appellant for offences under ss. 302 and 307
IPC .

Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 302 and 307, s. 300 exception 1 –
Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder, when –
Plea of self-defence – Prosecution case that the appellant-
police guard committed murder of the deceased inside the
police station while he was on duty – Deceased was having
illicit relationship with the appellant’s wife – Deceased and the
appellant last seen together in conversation with each other
inside the police station by more than one witnesses even
minutes before these witnesses saw the appellant killing the
deceased with his official 9 m.m. carbine – Plea of self defence
by the appellant that the death of the deceased was caused by
the appellant when the appellant was deprived of his power
of self-control due to grave and sudden provocation caused
by the deceased which resulted in his death by accident –
Conviction and sentence of the appellant for offences ss. 302
and 307 by the courts below – Justification:
Held: All the evidences are unassailable – Prosecution case stands
secured on these evidences – It is a clear case of murder – Motive
for the appellant that the deceased was having an affair with his
wife, and the execution of the crime at the Police Station, all
point towards the murder committed inside the police station by
the appellant – One fire arm injury with blackening at the entry
point also explains that the deceased was first shot from a close
range – Remaining injuries also correlate with the testimony of the
eye witnesses – Plea of self-defence and in the alternative the

* Author
164 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

plea of grave and sudden provocation taken by the appellant that
it was the deceased who came to the police station in full speed
in his car thereby first hitting the gate of the police station and
then making an attempt to snatch the weapon from the appellant
in order to kill him, do not hold any ground – Defence not been
able to establish a case of private defence by any evidence – Eye
witness accounts of police personnels who were all present at the
Police Station at that point of time, establish a case of murder
beyond any reasonable doubt – Thus, the nature of weapon used;
number of gun shots fired at the deceased; part of the body where
gun shots are fired, all point towards the fact that the appellant
was determined to kill the deceased and ultimately, he achieved
his task – Not a case of any lesser magnitude, and definitely not
culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Facts do not even
remotely make out any case under exception 1 to s. 300, or under
any other exceptions to s. 300 IPC – Interferance with the findings
of the courts below not called for – Evidence Act, 1872 – s. 105.
[Paras 19-26]
Penal Code, 1860 – s. 300 exception 1 – Culpable homicide
when not amounting to murder – Provocation when grave and
sudden to bring the case under exception 1 to s. 300:
Held: In order to convert a case of murder to a case of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder, provocation must be such that
would temporarily deprive the power of self-control of a “reasonable
person” – Provocation itself is not enough to reduce the crime from
murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Time gap
between this alleged provocation and the act of homicide; the kind
of weapon used; the number of blows, etc, is also to be seen –
These are again all questions of facts – There is no standard or
test as to what reasonableness should be in these circumstances
as this would again be a question of fact to be determined by a
Court. [Para 25]
Criminal trial – Cross-examination of witness deferred by two
months – Effect:
Held: Such long adjournment after examination-in-chief, should
never be given – This may affect the fairness of the trial and may
even endanger, in a given case, the safety of the witness – As
far as possible, the defence should be asked to cross examine
the witness the same day or the following day – Only in very
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 165

Surender Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi)

exceptional cases, and for reasons to be recorded, the cross
examination should be deferred and a short adjournment can be
given after taking precautions and care, for the witness, if it is
required – Courts should be slow in deferring these matters – This
practice is not a healthy practice – Mandate of s. 231 Cr.PC and
the law laid down on the subject to be followed in its letter and
spirit – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 231.[Paras11,13]

Case Law Cited
State of U.P v. Shambhu Nath Singh [2001] 2 SCR 854 : (2001) 4
SCC 667; Ambika Prasad v. State (Delhi Admn.) [2000] 1 SCR 342 :
(2000) 2 SCC 646; Mohd. Khalid v. State of W.B. [2002] Suppl. 2
SCR 31 : (2002) 7 SCC 334; State of Kerala v. Rasheed [2018]
13 SCR 587 : (2019) 13 SCC 297; State of M.P. v. Ramesh [2004]
Suppl. 6 SCR 152 : (2005) 9 SCC 705; Salim Zia v. State of U.P.
[1979] 2 SCR 394 : (1979) 2 SCC 648; K.M. Nanavati v. State of
Maharashtra [1961] 1 SCR 497 : AIR 1962 SC 605 –referred to.

List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872; Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973.

List of Keywords
Murder; Culpable homicide not amounting to murder; Plea of self
defence; Power of self-control; Grave and sudden provocation;
Motive; Testimony of the eye witnesses; Private defence; Burden
of proof; Case under exception 1 to s. 300 IPC; Deferring of cross-
examination of witness; Long adjournment after examination-in-
chief; Fairness of the trial.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.597
of 2012
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.05.2011 of the High Court of
Delhi at New Delhi in CRLA No.202 of 2008
Appearances for Parties
S K Agarwal, Sr. Adv., Arun K. Sinha, Rakesh Singh, Ms. Anjali
Rajput, Sumit Sinha, Rohan Goel, Abhinav Mutyalwar, Vijay Raj
Singh Chouhan, Advs. for the Appellant.
166 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Satyajit A. Desai, Adv. (Amicus Curiae)
Mrs. Aishwarya Bhati, A.S.G., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Ms. Ameya
Vikrama Thanvi, Mrs. Chitrangda Rastaravara, Santosh Kumar,
Ms. Sweksha, Ms. Poornina Singh, Chinmay Mehta, Advs. for the
Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment
Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.
1. The appellant before this Court has challenged the order of the
High Court (dated 18.05.2011) which has dismissed his appeal
while upholding his conviction and sentence by the Trial Court for
offences under Sections 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code, for
which he has been sentenced for life imprisonment and 7 years of
rigorous imprisonment respectively.
2. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as for
the State at length.
3. As the facts of the case would reveal the present case is of a brazen
murder, committed inside a Police Station in Delhi. The prosecution
case is that the appellant, who was posted as a police guard at
Mayur Vihar Police Station, Delhi, executed this murder inside the
police station, while he was on duty!
4. The deceased was married to the appellant’s first cousin and was
also his neighbour. The prosecution case is that the deceased
had an illicit relationship with the wife of the appellant. There are
more than one witnesses to the fact that the deceased and the
appellant were last seen together in conversation with each other
inside the police station even minutes before these witnesses saw
the appellant killing the deceased with his official 9 m.m. carbine.
5. An FIR was lodged at Police Station Mayur Vihar, New Delhi
on 30.06.2002 at 2:30 pm, under Sections 302/307 IPC on the
narration of PW-2 who was posted at the Police Station, Mayur
Vihar, New Delhi as Head Constable at the relevant point of time.
PW-2 states that on the date of the incident she reached the
Police Station at around 11.30 am and saw the appellant talking
to the deceased. She further states that at around 11.40 am, she
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 167

Surender Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi)

heard sounds of fire and then saw the deceased running towards
the Duty Officer’s room; he was bleeding with his hands held up
in the air. The appellant was seen firing at the deceased from
his Carbine. When the firing stopped, the deceased was seen lying
outside the duty officer’s room, bleeding profusely. The appellant was
apprehended along with his carbine by the police staff, and PW-2 who
was also injured in the firing was taken to the LBS Hospital where
she received medical aid, and later lodged the FIR.
6. The police after its investigation filed chargesheet and the case was
committed to Sessions, where charges were framed under Sections
302/307 of IPC against the present appellant. The prosecution
examined as many as 27 witnesses. The accused, after giving his
statement under Section 313 CrPC, had also examined a witness
as DW-1. The Trial Court ultimately convicted and sentenced the
appellant under Sections 302 and 307 IPC as already stated above.
7. Strangely, and for reasons best known to the prosecution, it examined
PW-6 who is the brother of the appellant and PW-25 who is wife of
the appellant, as prosecution witnesses. Although these two witnesses
have supported the case of the prosecution to the extent that they
establish that the deceased was having an extra marital affair with
the appellant’s wife, yet both of them added in their testimony that it
was the deceased who was determined to kill the appellant!
8. PW-25, who is the wife of the appellant, says that, minutes prior to
the incident, the deceased had come to her place and had warned
her that he was going to the Police Station to kill her husband! PW-6
is also a witness to this expression on the part of the deceased.
9. The accused/appellant who as we shall see, has neither denied the
incident nor the fact that he killed the deceased. His argument is that
he did it as a matter of self-defence, and in the alternative if self-
defence is not accepted by the Court, then it was a case of grave and
sudden provocation at best, which led to the death of the deceased
at the hands of the appellant. In other words, if at all, the appellant
can be punished only for culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
It has been argued before us that on the fateful day (i.e. 30.06.2002),
it was the deceased who had come to the police station to kill the
appellant and the appellant used his weapon only in self defence,
but unfortunately the deceased was killed.
168 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

The evidence of PW-25 and PW-6 which we have just referred
apparently supports this theory, to the extent that the deceased was
determined to kill the appellant. The appellant states in his Section
313 Cr.P.C. statement as under :-
“…I was doing my duty as a santari. At about11.40 Satish
(deceased) who was my relative came there. I had half
closed the doors of PS as per directions of SHO. He
opened the doors by hitting car against these. He parked
his car inside the PS. He started shouting at me. I took
him towards near police quarters. He pounced at me. I
forbade him from doing so. I took him towards duty officer’s
room. I tried to snatch my carbine from his hand. In that
process firing took place. Magazine fell down. I tried to pick
it up and fit in the carbine. In that process it fired four-five
times in air. Satish tried to snatch said carbine from me
and in that process was hit by bullets. The carbine fired in
rapid action from gate of PS up to police quarters. When
we were near duty officer’s room the carbine was set at
automatic mode. It fired which hit deceased Satish as well
as walls, tube lights and windows of duty officer’s room.”
The entire case of the defence is built on the above statement of
the accused appellant, which is that it was the deceased who had
come rushing to the Police Station on that fateful day knowing very
well that the appellant was posted there as a guard. He then tried to
snatch the weapon from the appellant and in this scuffle, shots were
fired from the weapon, which was an accident, which ultimately led to
the death of the deceased. This, in short is the case of the defence.
All the same, this trumped up story did not find favour with the
trial court and the appellate court and understandably so as the
prosecution has an overwhelming evidence to the contrary, which
only points towards a dastardly murder at the hands of the present
appellant.
The prosecution case is primarily based on the statement of the eye
witnesses present in the Police Station itself and mainly PW-2 who
is a lady head constable and also the complainant. This witness
has remained steadfast to her version of the incident, which was
given in the first information report lodged by her; and later in her
examination-in-chief and cross-examination, during the trial. She is
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 169

Surender Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi)

an extremely credible and trustworthy witness and the veracity of her
statement and deposition establishes the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, and has its corroboration with other evidences,
including ocular evidences of PW-1, PW-14 and PW-17, who were
also constables or head Constables posted at Police Station Mayur
Vihar, New Delhi, and were present at the Police Station at the
relevant time. Additionally, this is also confirmed by the forensic
evidence which was gathered by the Police during investigation from
the site itself, to which we shall refer in a while.
PW-2 was put to a lengthy cross-examination by the defence. In the
cross-examination the defence made every possible attempt to cast
doubt on the presence of this witness at the Police Station, but this
was all in vain since there are more than one witnesses in this case
which clearly establish the presence of PW-2 at the Police Station.
Her presence is established by the other witnesses such as PW-1,
PW-14 and PW-17, who were also Police constables posted at the
same Police Station. Most importantly her presence is established
by the fact that this witness (PW-2) is also an injured witness as
she had sustained bullet injuries on her left shoulder. Her medical
examination was done on the same day and the following injuries
were found :
1. Lacerated wound 2x2 cm over left (L) shoulder near
lateral end of clavicle, penetrating anterior aspect,
fresh, oozing of blood.
2. Lacerated wound left (L) shoulder, posterior aspect
near lateral end of clavicle, 3x3 cm, fresh, oozing
of blood.
PW-11, Head Constable Jai Prakash, is the one who took PW-2 to
the LBS hospital and also testified before the court in this regard.
PW-27, the SHO of the police station who investigated the case, also
testified that he reached the police station right after the incident and
then rushed to the hospital where he recorded the statement of PW-2.
10. In her examination-in-chief PW-2 says that on 30.06.2002, she was
posted at Police Station, Mayur Vihar where she was to work as duty
officer from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., but as she had some personal work in
the morning that day, she had taken prior permission from the SHO to
arrive late. She hence reached the P.S. at 11.35 a.m. and at the gate,
she saw the appellant-Surender (whom she identifies in the court),
170 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

and who was posted as guard in the same Police Station, talking to a
stranger near a corner of the premises. She then went straight to her
duty room and while she was talking to the Head Constable Om Pal
(PW-1) from whom she had to take the charge, and where constable
Vinod (PW-17) and DHG Jai Singh (PW-5) were also present along
with Munshi Gulzari Lal, she suddenly heard sounds of bullet shots
in the compound of the Police Station. Then she saw the person with
whom the appellant was having a conversation (i.e. the deceased)
rushing towards the duty officers’ room with his hands up in the air;
and he was bleeding. She also saw Constable Surender (i.e. the
appellant before this Court), chasing this person from behind, still
firing from his 9mm carbine, aiming at the deceased. She as well
as the head Constable Om Prakash, Constable Vinod and DHG Jai
Singh bent down and took shield in order to avoid stray bullets. She
then saw the deceased lying outside the room, bleeding profusely. By
this time, she had realized that she too had received bullet injuries
on her left shoulder. She was then taken to LBS Hospital by Head
Constable Jai Prakash. It was in the hospital that she was informed
that the deceased (Satish) was a relative of Surender and that he is
now dead, due to the bullet injuries sustained in the firing.
11. The defence did not cross-examine this witness immediately after
her examination-in-chief, but sought that the cross examination be
deferred, which was done and she was cross-examined only on
30.11.2004, which is more than two months after her examination-
in-chief. We may just stop here for a while only to sound a note
of caution. Such long adjournment as was given in this case after
examination-in-chief, should never have been given. Reasons for
this are many, but to our mind the main reason would be that this
may affect the fairness of the trial and may even endanger, in a
given case, the safety of the witness. As far as possible, the defence
should be asked to cross examine the witness the same day or the
following day. Only in very exceptional cases, and for reasons to
be recorded, the cross examination should be deferred and a short
adjournment can be given after taking precautions and care, for the
witness, if it is required. We are constrained to make this observation
as we have noticed in case after case that cross examinations are
being adjourned routinely which can seriously prejudice a fair trial.
12. This Court had, on more than one occasion, condemned this practice
of the trial court where examinations are deferred without sufficient
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 171

Surender Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi)

reasons. We may refer here to some cases, which are State of
U.P v. Shambhu Nath Singh (2001) 4 SCC 667; Ambika Prasad
v. State (Delhi Admn.) (2000) 2 SCC 646; Mohd. Khalid v. State
of W.B. (2002) 7 SCC 334.
13. As we have said cross examination can be deferred in exceptional
cases and for reasons to be recorded by the Court, such as under
sub-section 2 of Section 231 of CrPC1 but even here the adjournment
is not to be given as a matter of right and ultimately it is the discretion
of the Court. In State of Kerala v. Rasheed (2019) 13 SCC 297, this
Court has set certain guidelines under which such an adjournment
can be given. The emphasis again is on the fact that a request for
deferral must be premised on sufficient reasons, justifying the deferral
of cross-examination of the witness.
As we could see from the records in the present case the cross
examination of PW-2 was deferred precisely on grounds referred in
sub-section (2) of Section 231 of CrPC. The defence requested to
examine PW-2 with another prosecution witness (Vinod-PW-17). Yet
the records of the case also reveal that though the cross-examination
was deferred yet the other witness (PW-17) was examined much
later, nearly a year after the cross examination of PW-2. We only
wanted to record this cautionary note to make our point that this
practice is not a healthy practice and the Courts should be slow in
deferring these matters. The mandate of Section 231 of Cr.PC and
the law laid down on the subject referred above must be followed
in its letter and spirit.
Thankfully, in the case at hand, the deferred cross-examination
of PW-2 has not affected the course of the trial. This witness has
remained consistent.
14. PW-19 is Dr. S.B. Jangpangi, Casualty Medical Officer posted at
LBS Hospital Delhi, who had examined PW-2 as she had received
bullet injuries on that fateful day. PW-19 in his statement mentions
that two injuries were found on Panwati’s (PW-2) body. PW-19 had

1 231. Evidence for prosecution.—(1) On the date so fixed, the Judge shall proceed to take all such
evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution.
(2) The Judge may, in his discretion, permit the cross-examination of any witness to be deferred
until any other witness or witnesses have been examined or recall any witness for further cross-
examination.
172 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

also examined the deceased who was declared dead by him and
found his body riddled with bullet injuries.
15. PW-1, Ompal Singh, who was posted as head constable in P.S.
Mayur Vihar is another key prosecution witness. He says that he
was working as duty officer on 30.06.2002 in place of WHC Panwati
(PW2). After PW-2 reported for her duties Constable Vinod (PW-17),
DHG Jai Singh and PW-1 were also in the duty officers’ room. He
recounts that on the day of the incident he heard sounds of firing
at about 11.35 a.m. and saw a person with blood-stained clothes
(i.e. the deceased) trying to reach the duty officers’ room. He was
being chased by the appellant, who was identified by this witness
in court. He states that the police staff tried to save their own life
in the duty officer’s room and then saw the deceased lying on the
ground. Constable Panwati (PW-2) also sustained bullet injuries in
this firing. He then gave a wireless message of the incident to the
SHO. This witness was cross examined later but again nothing has
come in the cross to doubt the statement of this witness.
16. PW-11 and PW-17 were again, Head Constable and Constable
respectively, who were posted at this police station on that fateful
day of June 30, 2002. They were also witness to the crime and
their deposition states similar facts as narrated by PW-1 and PW-2.
17. The post-mortem was conducted on 01.07.2002 by Dr. Vinay Kumar
Singh (PW18) of LBS Hospital. He found 17 ante mortem injuries on
the body of the deceased. He confirms his post-mortem report, in
his deposition, where in his opinion the cause of death was shock
resulting from fire arm injuries. He states that the injuries on the chest
and on the back of the deceased were sufficient to cause his death.
He also mentions that bullets were also recovered from the chest
cavity of the deceased and one bullet was recovered from the right
side of the back. There were 6 fire-arm entry wounds corresponding
to 6 fire-arm exit wounds. At least one fire-arm entry wound has a
blackening at the entry point which shows that this was fired at a
point-blank range.
18. In all, the deceased had received 8 to 9 shots from the carbine of
the appellant which are spread all over his body. Entry wounds exist
on the front as well as on the back of the deceased’s body, which
makes it clear that the deceased was shot not only from the front
but also from the back, while he was trying to escape. The nature
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 173

Surender Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi)

of these injuries corroborates with the ocular testimony of PW-2. It
is PW-2 who had said that when she came to the Police Station,
she had seen the deceased talking to the appellant at the gate of
the police station and that the appellant was armed with a carbine.
PW-21, Constable Devender Kumar who had to take the charge
of ‘sentry’/guard at 12 noon, also states that he saw the appellant
talking to the deceased before the incident. PW-2 heard the sound
of firing few minutes later and then saw the deceased (who was
bleeding) rushing towards the duty room with his hands in the air,
and the appellant was seen firing at him from behind.
19. Taken together, all these evidences are unassailable. The case of the
prosecution stands secured on these evidences. It is a clear case of
murder. The motive for the appellant (admittedly the deceased was
having an affair with the appellant’s wife), and the execution of the
crime at the Police Station, all point towards the murder committed
inside the police station by the present appellant. The one fire
arm injury with blackening at the entry point also explains that the
deceased was first shot from a close range. The remaining injuries
also correlate with the testimony of the eye witnesses referred above.
20. The plea of self-defence and in the alternative the plea of grave and
sudden provocation taken by the appellant is based on the theory
that it was the deceased who came to the police station in full speed
in his car thereby first hitting the gate of the police station and then
making an attempt to snatch the weapon from the appellant in order
to kill him. But these arguments do not hold any ground and most
importantly there is not even an iota of evidence to sustain this
bizarre line of defence.
21. Under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act 2, the burden of proof
that the accused’s case falls within the general exception is upon
the accused himself. This Court in State of M.P. v. Ramesh, (2005)
9 SCC 705 observed that:
“Under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in
short “the Evidence Act”), the burden of proof is on the

2 105. Burden of proving that case of accused comes within exceptions.—When a person is accused
of any offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the
General Exceptions in the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860), or within any special exception or proviso
contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is upon him, and the
Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.
174 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

accused, who sets up the plea of self-defence, and, in
the absence of proof, it is not possible for the court to
presume the truth of the plea of self-defence. The court shall
presume the absence of such circumstances……Where
the right of private defence is pleaded, the defence must
be a reasonable and probable version satisfying the court
that the harm caused by the accused was necessary for
either warding off the attack or for forestalling the further
reasonable apprehension from the side of the accused.”
This burden of proof though is not as onerous as the burden of
proof beyond all reasonable doubts which is on the prosecution,
nevertheless some degree of reasonable satisfaction has to be
established by the defence, when this plea is taken. (See : Salim
Zia v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 648).
22. In the case at hand, the defence has not been able to establish a
case of private defence by any evidence. There is no evidence on
this aspect and therefore this plea was rightly rejected by the Trial
Court as well as the Appellate Court.
23. In fact, the plea of self-defence taken by the accused/appellant is
childish to say the least, in the light of the facts of the case, and
on the weight of the evidence of the prosecution. The case of the
defence that the deceased came to the Police Station “unarmed”
to kill the appellant knowing very well that the appellant was armed
with a weapon is an awkward attempt to present the deceased as
the aggressor. It does not make any sense. What is most important
here is the eye-witness accounts of PW-2, PW-1, PW-11 & PW-17,
which prove that the appellant did not stop at the initial firing of the
shot, which he had fired from a close range (the entry wound of
gun shot with blackening). Instead, he continued to spray bullets on
the deceased even when he was trying to escape. The eye witness
accounts of four police personnels who were all present at the Police
Station at that point of time, establish a case of murder beyond any
reasonable doubt.
24. The defence again has not even been able to discharge its burden
by showing that it is a case of grave and sudden provocation,
though an attempt has been made by the defence to bring the case
under Exception I to Section 300 IPC. There is however, nothing
on record to show that the deceased hit the car at the gate of the
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 175

Surender Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi)

Police Station, which was found parked inside that Police Station
with no scratch on its body, thus disproving that it had hit the gate
as was the case of the defence. Moreover, all the facts which have
been placed before the Court show that it was the appellant who
had a motive to kill the deceased as the deceased was having an
illicit relationship with his wife. In spite of best efforts by the family
members of the appellant and the deceased, the deceased continued
with this relationship with the wife of the appellant. This was hence
the motive for the appellant to kill the deceased.
25. The appellant would argue that the Act attributable to him would fall
under Exception 1 to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, which
reads as under:
“Exception 1.—When culpable homicide is not murder.—
Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst
deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden
provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the
provocation or causes the death of any other person by
mistake or accident.
The above exception is subject to the following provisos:—
First.—That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily
provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing
harm to any person.
Secondly.—That the provocation is not given by anything
done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in
the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.
Thirdly.—That the provocation is not given by anything
done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.
Explanation.—Whether the provocation was grave and
sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting
to murder is a question of fact.”
According to the defence, the death of the deceased was caused
by the appellant when the appellant was deprived of his power of
self-control due to grave and sudden provocation caused by the
deceased which resulted in his death by accident.
This court has reiterated in more than one cases right from K.M.
Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1962 SC 605 onwards that
176 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

provocation itself is not enough to reduce the crime from murder
to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. In order to convert
a case of murder to a case of culpable homicide not amounting to
murder, provocation must me such that would temporarily deprive
the power of self-control of a “reasonable person”. What has also
to be seen is the time gap between this alleged provocation and
the act of homicide; the kind of weapon used; the number of blows,
etc. These are again all questions of facts. There is no standard or
test as to what reasonableness should be in these circumstances as
this would again be a question of fact to be determined by a Court.
Nanavati (supra) answers this question as follows:
“84. Is there any standard of a reasonable man for
the application of the doctrine of “grave and sudden”
provocation? No abstract standard of reasonableness can
be laid down. What a reasonable man will do in certain
circumstances depends upon the customs, manners, way
of life, traditional values etc.; in short, the cultural, social and
emotional background of the society to which an accused
belongs. In our vast country there are social groups ranging
from the lowest to the highest state of civilization. It is
neither possible nor desirable to lay down any standard
with precision : it is for the court to decide in each case,
having regard to the relevant circumstances. It is not
necessary in this case to ascertain whether a reasonable
man placed in the position of the accused would have lost
his self-control momentarily or even temporarily when his
wife confessed to him of her illicit intimacy with another, for
we are satisfied on the evidence that the accused regained
his self-control and killed Ahuja deliberately.
85. The Indian law, relevant to the present enquiry, may be
stated thus : (1) The test of “grave and sudden” provocation
is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same
class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in
which the accused was placed would be so provoked as
to lose his self-control. (2) In India, words and gestures
may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and
sudden provocation to an accused so as to bring his act
within the First Exception to Section 300 of the Indian
Penal Code. (3) The mental background created by the
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 177

Surender Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi)

previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration
in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave
and sudden provocation for committing the offence. (4)
The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence
of passion arising from that provocation and not after the
passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise
giving room and scope for premeditation and calculation.”
In the present case on every possible count the case is nothing but
a case of murder. The nature of weapon used; the number of gun
shots fired at the deceased; the part of the body where gun shots
are fired, all point towards the fact that the appellant was determined
to kill the deceased. Ultimately, he achieved his task and made
sure that the deceased is dead. By no stretch of logic is it a case
of any lesser magnitude, and definitely not culpable homicide not
amounting to murder.
The facts of the present case do not even remotely make out any
case under Exception 1 to Section 300 of the IPC, or under any
other Exception(s) to Section 300 of IPC.
26. In view of the above, we are not inclined to interfere with the findings
of the Trial Court and the High Court. Accordingly, this appeal is
dismissed. The interim order dated 02.04.2012 granting bail to
the appellant, hereby, stands vacated and the appellant is hereby
directed to surrender before the trial court within four weeks from
today. A copy of this Judgment shall be sent to the Trial Court to
ensure that the appellant surrenders and undergoes the remaining
part of his sentence.

Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain