Holding

Section 221 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 gives the Board of Revenue general powers of superintendence and control, both administrative and judicial, enabling it to set aside subordinate court orders when the interest of justice so requires.

Summary

The case concerned the determination of ceiling area for Raghubir Singh under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, where the Sub‑Divisional Officer (SDO) treated the father and his minor son Surendrapal Singh as separate units and allotted each 62 bighas 8 biswas. Raghubir Singh appealed the SDO's order, which was upheld by the Revenue Appellate Authority, and then filed a revision before the Board of Revenue. The Board, invoking Section 221 of the 1955 Act, held that the old law applied, found the SDO's interpretation of the 1973 Ceiling Act erroneous, and set aside the SDO's order, remanding the matter for fresh determination. The State argued that, having not appealed the SDO order, the Board lacked jurisdiction to interfere. The Supreme Court held that Section 221 confers both administrative and judicial superintendence on the Board, allowing it to set aside subordinate court orders when justice requires, and that no restriction exists on this power. Consequently, the Board's action was upheld and the appeal dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether Section 221 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 empowers the Board of Revenue to set aside orders of subordinate revenue courts in a revision proceeding even when the State has not appealed the order.
Whether the powers under Section 221 are limited to administrative superintendence or also include judicial authority.
Whether the SDO erred in treating father and son as separate units under the 1973 Ceiling Act contrary to the provisions of the 1955 Act.

Legislation cited

Government of India Act, 1955s. 107
Land Revenue Acts. 9
Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973
Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955s. 221, s. 225, s. 230

Subjects

Section 221Board of Revenuesuperintendencerevision jurisdictionceiling area determinationagricultural holdingsadministrative and judicial powersRajasthan Tenancy Act

Judgment

SURENDRA PAL SINGH
A
v.

THE BOARD OF REVENUE FOR RAJASTHAN AND ORS.

[KULDIP SINGH AND YOGESHWAR DAYAL, JJ.]

B MAY 13,1993

Rajastlzan Tenancy Act 1955-S. 221-General powers ofsuperin-tendency
and control of Board of Revenue over all revenue courts, held includes both
administrative and judicial powers-Ch. III-B, Ss 225,. 2JO-Rajastlzan Imposi-
tion of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973.
c
Proceedings were commenced under Chapter lll·B of the Rajasthan
Tenancy Act 1955 for determining the ceiling area for Raghubir Singh, the
father of the appellant. In a revision application in the first round of litigation.
The Board of Revenue directed that the ceiling area for Raghubir Singh may
be determined according to the old law, i.e.Actof1955, and not according to
D the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973.

Thereafter, by his order dt. 5.5.76, the SDO held, inter alia, that the
father and the son, appellant, constituted two separate units and each of them
was entitled to get 62 bighas and 8 biswas.
E
Aggrieved by the SDO's order, Raghubir Singh fded an appeal before
Revenue Appellate Authority, which was dismissed. He then fded a revision
application under S.230 of the Act of 1955 before the Board of Revenue for
Rajasthan.

F
He urged that he was in possession of 112 bighas only and sought
permission to adduce additional evidence, which was disallowed. However,
the Member of the Board held inter alia that the provisions of the old law
applied to the case, but the SDO had committed an error oflaw in determining
the ceiling area under the new Act of1973. The Board further held that there
G is no provision for separate units in Chapter 111-B of the Act of 1955, and
remanded the case to the SDO, Hanumangarh, for fresh determination of the
Ceiling area for Raghubir Singh.

Before the High Court, it was urged that the State having not appealed
against the order of the SDO dated 5.5.76, it became final, and the Board of
H
7?2
SURENDRA PAL"· RAJASTHAN REVENUE BOARD 723
Revenue had no jurisdiction to set aside that part of the SDO's order which
had gone against the Sta~e and in his favour. It was submitted that the power A
of general superintendence and control over all revenue courts which vested
in the Board could not be exercised to the detriment of the writ petitioners
much less by way of suo motu exercise of powers.

The High Court dismissed the petitions. B

Before this court it was submitted that the State not having fded an
appeal, or a revision, the Board of Revenue could not, while hearing the
revision petition of Raghubir Singh, set aside the orders of the SDO and
Revenue Appellate Authority. under S.221 of the Act of 1955.
c
Dismissing the appeal, this court,

HELD: (I) S.221 is not subject to the other provisions of the Act. It is
clear from the language of Section 221 of the Act 1955 that the Board of
Revenue has general powers of superintendence and control over all revenue D
courts. It is both administrative as well as judicial powers. It is open to the
Board to exercise its powers of superintendence on all its subordinate courts
in order to regulate the functioning of the subordinate courts so as to keep
th~m within their respective spheres of jurisdiction. If the subordinate court
disregards any specific provision oflaw and does something illegal it is open E
to the' Board of Revenue to interfere and set the matter right. (727-E)

Karan Singh,.. Board ofRevenue, Rajasthan 1962 Raj LW 178 and Pennessar
Singh v. Kailaspati AIR 1916 Pat. 292 (FB), distinguished.
F
Kana ,.. Board of Revenue ILR (1955) 5 Raj. 55, approved.

(2) There is no restriction on the powers of the Board to set aside the
order of the SDO provided it comes to the conclusion that interest of justice
requires exercise of such powers. (728-D) G

(3) In not determining the ceiling area according to the Act of 1955, the
SDO committed a grave illegality in not merely ignoring the law but also
ignoring the directions of the Board of Revenue itself. (728_-F)
H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] 3 S.C.R.

A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1367 of 1980.
-
From the Judgment and Order dated 19. 7 .1979 of the Rajasthan High Court
in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 769 of 1979.

B Subhash Mallick and S.K. Jain for the Appellant.

B.D. Sharma for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c
YOGESHW AR DAY ALJ. This is an appeal against the judgment of the
Rajasthan High Court dated 19th July, 1979 pa~sed in D .B. Civil Writ Petition No.
681 of 1978 (Raghubir Singh v. The Board of Revenue for Rajasthan and others)
and D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 769of1979 (Surendrapal Singh v. The Board of
Revenue for Rajasthan and others). These writ petitions were decided by the
D aforesaid common judgment. The first writ petition was filed by the father
Raghubir Singh whereas the second writ petition was filed by his minor son
Surendrapal Singh through his next friend Shri Jagjit Singh, maternal grand-father
of the minor. The relief claimed in both the petitions before the High Court was the
same, namely- for setting aside of the order dated 6th August, 1977 passed by the
Board of Revenue for Rajasthan, Ajmer.
E

The facts of the case briefly are-that proceedings under Chapter III-B of the
Rajasthan Tenancy Act (Act No. 3 of l ?55) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of
1955') were commenced for determining the ceiling area for Raghubir Singh. The
Sub-Divisional Officer, Hanumangarh, by his order dated 10th August, 1972,
F determined the ceiling area, but an appeal by Raghubir .Singh, the Revenue
Api}e!late Authority, set aside the order of the sub-Divisional Officer on March 6,
1973 and remanded the case. The matter was taken to the Board of Revenue for
Rajasthan by a revision application and the Board by its order dated 14th April,
1975 directed that the ceiling area for Raghubir Singh may be determined
according to the old law i.e. Act of 1955 and not according to the l)ew Jaw i.e.
G
Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, 1973 (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Act of 1973').

H
In pursuance of the direction of the Board, the Sub~Divisional Officer,
Hanumangarh, by his order dated 5th May, 1976 held that Surendrapal Singh,
(appellant herein) aged 12 years, was a minor son ofRaghubir Singh and used to
-
SURENDRA PAL"· RAJASTIIAN REVENUE BOARD [DAY AL. J] 725

study in Punjab and further held that the land in possession of Raghubir Singh was A
ancestral. The Sub-Divisional Officer, then came to the conclusion that the father
and "the son constitute two separate units and each one of them was entitled to get
62 Bighas and 8 Biswas. It was thus held that Raghubir Singh and his son
Surendrapal Singh are entitled to retain 124 Bighas and 16 Biswas only and the
surplus land measuring 4 Bighas and 6 Biswas may be resumed.
B
Aggrieved by the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Raghubir Singh filed
appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Bikaner, who by his order dated
6th September, 1976 dismissed the same and upheld the order of the Sub-
Divisional Officer. Dis~satisfiedwith the order of the Revenue Appellate Author-
ity, Raghubir Singh filed a revision application under Section 230 of the Act of C
1955 before the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan.

On behalf of raghubir Singh it was urged before the Board that the petitioner
was in possession of 112 Bighas only and not 129 Bighas and 3 Biswas as held by
the lower courts. He sought permission to adduce additional evidence in support D
of his contention. The application for adducing additional evidence was disal-
lowed. However, the Memberofthe Board came to the conclusion thatSurendrapal
Singh (appellant herein) was born to Raghu bir Singh on 14th March, 1963 and was
only 13 years of age when the ceiling proceedings were finalized by the Sub-
Divisional Officeron 5th May, 1976. He further held that the provisions of the old
ceiling law applied to the case but the Sub-Divisional Officer had committed an E
error of law in determining the ceiling area under the new law i.e. the Act of 1973.
The Board went on to hold that there is no provision for separate units in Chapter
IIJ-B of the Act of 1955. In the ultimate analysis the Member of the Board found
that there was a gross and patent illegality in the order of the Sub-Divisional
Officer and, consequently, set aside the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated
5th May, 1976 as well as the orderofthe Appellate Authority dated 6th September, F
1976 and remand~d the case to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Hanumangarh, for
fresh determination of the calling area for Raghubir Singh.

Before the Division Bench of the High Court in the writ petitions it was urged
on behalf ofRaghubir Singh that no appeal having been filed by the State from the G
order ~he Sub-Divisional Officer dated 5th May, 1976, the said order became final
and the Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction to set aside that part of the Sub-
Divisional Officer's order which had gone against the State and in his favour. It
,was submitted that the power of general superintenctence and control ove1 ail
revenue courts vested in the Board could not be exercised to the detriment of the
H
A
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

writ petitioners much less by way of suo 1110111 exercise of powers.
(1993) 3 S.C.R.
-
The High Court by the impugned judgment dated 19th July, 1979 upheld the
order of the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan and dismissed the writ petitions.

B Surendrapal Singh, the erstwhile minor son of Raghubir Singh has come up
to this Court by way of special· leave which was granted and hence the present
appeal.

Mr. Subhagh Mal Jain learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant submitted that the State having not filed an appeal under section 225 of
c the Act of 1955 and or revision under Section 230 of the Act of 1955, the Board
of the Revenue could not, while hearing the revision petition filed by Raghubir
· Singh, set aside the orders of Sub-Divisional Officer and the revenue appellate
authority under Section 221 of the Act of 1955. Section 221 of the Act of 1955
provides as under:-
D
"221. Subordination ofrevenue courts. -The general superintendence
an&~_ontrol over all revenue courts shall be vested in, and all such
Courts .shall be s.µbordinate to ·the Board; and subject to such
superintendend, torttrol and subordination-

E (a) x x x (omitted)
'l'-
(b) all Additional Collectors, Sub,-Divisional Officer, Assistant
Collectors and Tehsildars in a district shall be subordinate to the
Collector thereof,

F (c) all Assistant Collectors, Tehsildars and Naib-Tehsildars in a
sub-division shall be subordinate to the Sub-Divisional Officer
thereof, and

(d) All Additional Tehsildars and Naib-Tehsildars in a tehsil shall
be subordinate to the Tehsildar tht>reof.''
G

The contentivn of!earned counsel for the appellant is that the section confers
executive powers of superintendence and control on the Board and it does not vest
9 .1y power <",.superintendence on the Board 01) judicial side. For this purpose he

relied or '1e decision of the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court reported
H as 19r RLW 178: Kara11 Si11glt v. Board of Revenue, Rajastltan. The.Division
SURENDRA PAL'" RAJASTilAN REVENUE BOARD [DAYAL, J] 727

Bench in that case was concerned with the interpretation of Sec ti or 9 of the Land A
Revenue Act. Section 9 whereof provides as under :-

"9 Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the general
superintendence and control over all revenue courts and over all
revenue officers shall be vested in, and all such Courts and Officers B
shall be subordinate to, the Board.''

In that case also the High Court took the view that it is not correct to say that
Section 9 is limited to the executive control and superintendence of the Board over
subordinate revenue courts and it does not apply to judicial proceedings. The
contention 0n behalf of the appellant to that effect was negatived but on merits the c
High Court held that it was not appropriate for the Board to exercise the powers
conferred by Section 9 of the Land Revenue Act in view of the fact that the Board
had appellate jurisdiction and it could not, therefore, make use of its powers of
superintendence and control and the order of the Board could not be held proper
with reference to Section 9 of the Land Revenue Act. This case has no application · D
forinterpretation of the present Section 221 of the Act of 1955. Section 221 of the
Act of 1955 is not subject to the other provisions of the Act. It is clear from the
language ot Section 221 of the Act of 1955 that the Board of Revenue has general
powers of superintendence and control over all revenue courts. It is both admin-
istrative as well as judicial powers. It is open to the Board to exercise its powers
0f superintendence on all its subordinate courts in order to regulate the functioning E
of the subordinate courts so as to keep them within their respective spheres of
jurisdiction. If the subordinate· ourt disregards any specific provision of law and
does something illegal it is open to the Board of Revenue to interfere and set the
matter right. A similar question arose before the Rajasthan High Court in Kana and
others v. Board ofRevenue. Rajastlzan: ILR (1955)5 Raj. 55 where the High Court F
had to construe the power of the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, conferred on it by
the Rajas than Board of Revenue Ordinance (No.XXII of 1949). There also there
was similar provision like Section 9 of the Land Revenue Act and it was held that
Section 12 ofth.e said Ordinance must be held to give powers to the Board to revise
judicial orders also passed by courts in appropriate cases. It was observed at page
63 of the report-"'of course, such powers would generally not be exercised where G
a party had remedy by way of appeal and revision, and did not avail of it. At the
same time, the power is there. and it may be exercised sparingly in extraordinary
cases where interest of justice requires that the Board should exercise the power".

Under Section 107 of the Government oflndiaAct. 1955 there was provision H
of superint~ndence by High Court in these terms :-
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) 3 S.C.R.

A "Eacti of the High Courts has superintendence overall the court<; for
the tii'ne being subject to its appellate jurisdiction:'
i .
These words have been consistently interpreted to mean that the High Court had
power in• appropriate.< ca<;es to interfere with the judicial orders of the courts.
~

B
Reference may ln this connection be made to Parmessar Singlz v. Kailaspati
: AIR 1916 Pat. 292 (F.B.). In the Government of India Act of 1935, there was
provision under Sectfon 224 for superintendence by the High Courts; but sub-
section (2) made it clear that this superintendence would not be construed as giving
to the High Court any jurisdiction to question any judgment of any inferior court
c which was not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. Section 221 of the Act of
1955 is similar to Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 and there is
no section like sub-section (2) of Section 224 of the Government of India Act of
1935 in the Act of 195~. Thus there is no restriction on the powers of the Board to
set aside the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer provided it comes to the
D conclusion that interest of justice requires exercise of such powers. The Board
noticed that there was no provision for separate unit in Chapter III-B of the Act of
1955 and the applicant:Raghubir Singh and his son Surendrapal Singh constituted
one unit and not two units and the case was remanded to Sub-Divisional Officer,
Hanumangarh, for de novo determination of the ceiling area for the appellant in
law. The High Court also did not go into the merits of the controversy nor we have
E thought it advisable to go into it and it would be for the Sub-Divisional Officer,
Hanumangarh to decide it in the light of the observations of the Board. It is clear
from the judgment under appeal that the Board had by its order dated 14th April,
1975 directed that the ceiling area may be determined according to old law i.e. Act
of 1955 and it spite of it the Sub-Divisional Officer committed the grave illegality
on not merely ignoring the law but also ignoring the directions of the Board of
F
Revenue itself.

The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed with costs:

U.R. Appeal dismissed.