Holding

A bamboo mat, being a commercially distinct product fashioned by human labour, is not "forest‑produce" within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927.

Summary

Suresh Lohia's bamboo mat was confiscated by forest authorities as alleged forest‑produce. The Additional Sessions Judge ordered its release, but the Bombay High Court reversed, holding the mat to be forest‑produce under the Indian Forest Act, 1927. Lohia appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that a bamboo mat, being a product fashioned by human labour and commercially distinct, does not fall within the statutory definition of "forest‑produce". The Court examined Sections 2(4), 2(6) and 2(7) of the Act and held that the definition excludes articles that are not natural growths or products of trees but are created as separate commercial items. Relying on the Gujarat High Court decision in Fatesang Gimba Vasava, the Court concluded that bamboo as a whole is forest‑produce, but a bamboo mat is not. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the confiscation order set aside.

Issues considered

Whether a bamboo mat falls within the definition of "forest‑produce" under Section 2(4) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927
Whether the definitions of "timber" (Section 2(6)) and "tree" (Section 2(7)) extend to fashioned bamboo products such as bamboo mats
How statutory definitions should be interpreted when the legislature has provided a specific definition

Legislation cited

Indian Forest Act, 1927s. 2(4), s. 2(6), s. 2(7)

Subjects

forest‑produceIndian Forest Actstatutory interpretationbamboo mattimbertreeconfiscationcriminal appealforest wealthcommercial product

Judgment

A SURESH LOHIYA
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR.

AUGUST 23, 1996

B (G.N. RAY AND B.L. HANSARIA, JJ.)

Indian Forest Act, 1927: Sectio11s 2(4), (6) & (7).

'Forest-produce'-Bamboo mat-Held : did 11ot include bamboo
C mat-A forest produce changed into commercially new and disti11ct product
ceased to be forest produce--'Trees' in S. 2(4)(b )(i) refe1Ted to natural growth
or products of trees and did 11ot i11clude mticles produced with aid of huma11
labou~171e seco11d pmt of defi11itio11 of 'timber' i11 S. 2(6) did not refer to
'fashioned' bamboo.

D /11terpretatio11 of Statutes :

Judicial Legislatio11-Held: Not pennissible-Cowt could not read in
the defi11ition of a provi ~ion somethi11g which was 1101 there.

I11temal aids-Definition-Held : Whe11 a word was defined in Act
E Courl had to look to that defi11itio11 and not to ge11eral understanding of that
word.

Words & Phrases :

"Forest-produce''-Mea11i11g of-ln the context of Section 2(4) of the
F Indian Forest Act, 1927.

The r•espondents confiscated bamboo mat belonging to the appellant.
However, t.he Additional Sessions Judge directed release of the bamboo
mat. The revision petition filed by the respondents was allowed by the High
G Court on the ground that the product confiscated was "forest-produce"
within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. Being
aggrieved, the appellant preferred the present appeal.

On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the second part of
the definition "timber" in Section 2(6) of the Act did not include bamboo
H mat; and that only natural growth or product like flowers and fruits was
130 •
c
SURF.SH LOHIYAv. STATE 131

contemplated by the expression "produce of tree". A
On behalf of the respondents it was contended that if bamboo mat
was held to be not a "forest-produce" it would denude the country's forest
wealth.

Allowing the appeal, this Court B
HELD : Though bamboo as a whole is forest-produce, if a product,
commercially new and distinct, known to the business community as totally
different is brought into existence by human labour, such an article and
product would cease to be a forest-produce. The definition of "forest-
produce" leaves nothing to doubt that it would not take within its fold an C
article or thing which is totally different from forest-produce, having a
distinct character. Therefore, were a product from bamboo is commercial·
Iy different from it and in common parlance taken as a distinct product,
the same would not be encompassed within the expression "forest-produce"
as defined in Section 2(4) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 despite it being D
inclusive in nature. Bamboo mat is taken as a product distinct from
bamboo in the commercial world and, therefore, it is not a forest-produce
in the eyes of law. [135-B-D]

Fatesang Gimba Vasava v. State of Gujarat, AIR (1987) Guj 9, ap·
proved. :E:
Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, referred to.

2.1. Section 2(4)(b)(i) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 clearly indicates
that such produce of tree alone is contemplated which is a natural growth
or product like flowers and fruits. When the definition of "forest-produce" F
is read in its entirety it would show that wherever the legislature wanted
to include article produced with the aid of human labour, it has said so
specifically as would appear from Section 2(4)(b)(iv) of the Act, as it
speaks, apart from minerals etc. of "all products of mines or quarries".
The second part of the definition of timber in Section 2(6) of the Act does G
not take within its fold fashioned bamboo as that part is relatable to wood,
and not tree because the definition of tree includes even canes, and a cane
cannot be taken as a wood, even if a tree could be., [134-C-F]

2.2~ The legislature having defined "forest-produce", it is not permis·
sible to read in the definition something which is not there. While forest H
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A wealth is required to be prest~rved, it is not open to the Court to legislate,
as what a court can do in a matter like at hand is to iron out creases; it
cannot weave a new texture. If there be any lacuna in the definition it is
really for the legislature to tlllke care of the same. [134-F-HJ

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
B 430 of 1993.

From the Judgment and Order dated 4.12.92 of the Bombay High
Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 57 of 1990.

S.K. Dholakia and S.M. Jadhav for the Appellant.
c
Madan Bhatia, Ms. Rakhi Verma and Ms. Bina Gupta for the
Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D HANSARIA, J. Whether bamboo mat is a forest-produce as is this
expression known to the Indian Forest Act? requires our determination in
this appeal. This question would decide whether the order of confiscation
of bamboo mat belonging to the appellant was in accordance with law. The
Bombay High Court, having: been approached in revision by the State
E against the order of the Additional Sessions Judge directing release of the
bamboo mat, has reversed the order being of the view that the product
confiscated was "forest-produce". The owner of the bamboo mat has ap-
proached this Court by filing this appeal.

2. ''Forest-produce" has been defined in The Indian Forest Act, 1927
F (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") as below :

"2(4) "forest-produce" includes -

(a) the following whether found in, or brought from, a forest or
:not, that is to say - timber, charcoal, caoutchouc, catechu, wood-oil,
G :resin, natural varnish bark, lac, mahua flowers, mahua seeds, kuth
and myrabolams, and

(b) the following when found in, or brought from a forest, that is
to say -

H (i) trees and leaves, flowers and fruits, and all other parts or
SURF.SHLOHIYAv. STAIB[HANSARIA,J.] 133

produce not hereinbefore mentioned, of trees. A
(ii) plants not being trees (including grass, creepers, reeds and ·
moss), and all parts or produce of such planfs,

(iii) wild animals an skins, tusks, horns, bones, silk, cocoons, honey
and wax, and all other parts or produce of animals, and B
(iv) peat, surface soil, rock and minerals (including lime-stone,
laterite, mineral oils, and all products of mines or quarries)."

We must also note the definition of "timber" as given in sub-clause (6) and
of "tree" in sub-clause (7) - the same being as below : C
"(6) "timber" includes trees when they have fallen or have been
felled, and all wood whether cut up or fashioned or hollowed out
for any purpose or not; and

(7) "tree" includes palms, bamboos, stumps, brush-wood and D
canes."

3. The High Court's decision is principally based a conjoint reading
of definition of "timber" and "tree". It has stated that as definition of "tree"
includes bamboo, and as definition of "timber" includes tree, even a E
fashioned bamboo would be a tree. It was then stated that "forest-produce"
having been defined as any produce of tree in sub-clause (i) of clause (b)
of sub- section (4), bamboo mat is forest-produce. In taking this view the
- . High Court differed from what had been held by Gujarat High Court in
Fatesang Gimba Vasava v. State of Gujarat, AIR (1987) Gujarat 9.
F
4. Sh,_i Bhatia, appearing for the appellant, who was duly assisted by
Ms. Verma, submitted that the High Court erred in holding that a product
like bamboo mat would be forest-produce by relying on the definition of
"timber" because that definition is in two parts and the second part which
speaks of "all wood ......fashioned ........ or no" has no application so far trees G
are conci;;rned, which have been dealt in the first part of the definition. It
has also been urged that bamboo mat being a separate commercial product
what was stated by the Gujarat High Court in Fatesang's case merits our
acceptance.

5. Shri Dholakia, who was duly assisted by Shri Jadhav, however, H
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A contends that if bamboo mat is held to be not a forest-produce, .the object
of the Act would be frustrated inasmuch as it would debar the forest
authorities to inquire about the removal of such goods from the forests,
which would be used as a handle by unscrupulous dealers to denude the
country of its forest wealth. To buttress his submission, reference has been
made to the definition of "produce" in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary which
B reads : "The expression 'produce of mines or minerals' does not necessarily
mean produce in its native state; coke may be such produce, although by
combustion its chemical nature is changed."

6. We have given our considered thought to the rival contentions. It
c appears to us that the High Court erred in taking the abovesaid view by
referring to the definition of "timber" inasmuch as we agree with Shri
Bhatia that the second part of the definition does not take within its fold
fashioned bamboo as that part is relatable to wood, and not tree. We have
said so because the definition of tree includes even canes, and a cane
cannot be taken as a wood, even if a tree could be. But then, the High
D Court has also referred to sub-clause (i) (supra) which speaks of produce
of tree as well. As to this, submission of the appellant's counsel has been
that whc~n sub-clause (i) is read as a whole the same would clearly indicate
that such produce of tree alone is contemplated which is a natural growth
or product like flowers and fruits. This submission has force when the
E definition of forest-produce: is read in its entirety which would show that
the definition either include.s nature's gifts like charcoal, mahua flowers or
minerals. Wild animals of which sub-clause (iii) speaks of is also a God's
gift and not man-made. Wherever the legislature wanted to include article
produced with the aid of human labour, it has said so specifically as would
appear from sub-clause (iv), as it speaks, apart from minerals etc. of "all
F
products of mines or quarries".

7. The legislature having defined "forest-produce'', it is not pem1is-
sible to us to read in the definition something which is not there. We are
conscious of the fact that forest wealth is required to be preserved; but, it
G is not open to us to legislate, as what a court can do in a matter like at
hand is to iron out creases; it cannot weave a new texture. If there be any
lacuna in the definition it is really for the legislature to take care of the
same.

H 8. We may also state that according to us the view taken by the
SURESHLOHIYAv. STATE[HANSARIA,J.] 135

Gujarat High Court in Fatesang's case is correct, because though bamboo A
as a whole is forest-produce, if a product, commercially new and distinct,

- known to the business community as totally different is brought into
existence by human labour, such an article and product would cease to be
a forest-produce. The definition of this expression leaves nothing to doubt
that it would not take within its fold an article or thing which is totally B
different from forest produce having a distinct character. May it be stated
that where a word or an expression is defined by the legislature, courts
have to look to that definition; the general understanding of it can not be
determinative. So, what has been stated in Strouds' Judicial Dictionary
regarding a "produce" can not be decisive. Therefore, where a product
from bamboo is commercially different from it and in common parlance C
taken as a distinct product, the same would not be encompassed within the
expression "forest-produce" as defined in section 2(4) of the Act, despite
it being inclusive in nature. That bamboo mat is taken as a product distinct
from bamboo in the commercial world, has not been disputed before us,
and rightly. D
9. In view of all the above, we hold that bamboo mat is not a
forest-produce in the eye of the Act, and so, allow the appeal, set aside
the impugned judgment of the High Court and state that the order of
confiscation passed by the Conservator of Forest was not in accordance
with law. E
V.S.S. Appeal allowed.

'