Holding

Vacating a building under a requisition order is not "vacated without sufficient cause" and therefore the second proviso of Section 14(3) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 does not bar the landlord's eviction application.

Summary

The appellant, Surinder Singh Sibia, owned a house in Himachal Pradesh where he occupied the first floor and let the second floor to a judge. The entire house was later requisitioned for the judge's use under the Himachal Pradesh Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1972, and the appellant did not file an objection. After vacating the premises, he sought eviction of the tenant under Section 14(3) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987. The lower courts rejected his claim, applying the second proviso of Section 14(3) which bars a landlord who has "vacated such building without sufficient cause" within five years. The Supreme Court held that vacating under a requisition order is not "without sufficient cause" and that the validity of the requisition order cannot be used to deny the landlord's right under the Rent Control Act. Consequently, the second proviso does not apply, and the appellant's eviction application was allowed.

Issues considered

Whether vacating a premises pursuant to a requisition order constitutes "vacated without sufficient cause" under the second proviso of Section 14(3) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987.
Whether the validity or invalidity of a requisition order can be taken into account to determine "sufficient cause" under the Rent Control Act.
Whether the landlord's failure to object under the Requisition Act bars his right to seek eviction under the Rent Control Act.

Legislation cited

Subjects

rent controlrequisitionevictionsufficient causelandlord rightsHimachal PradeshUrban Rent Control ActRequisition Actsecond provisopossession

Judgment

SURINDER SINGH SIBIA A
v.
VIJA Y KUMAR SOOD

OCTOBER 10, 1991

(T.K. THOMMEN AND R.M.SAHAI, JJ.] B

Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987:

Section 14(3)- Second Proviso-£.xpression "has 11ot vacated such
building without sufficient cause"-Scope of-'-Possession given in conse-
qztence of reqztisition order cannot be held vacation "not without sufficient
c
cause".

Hirnachal Pradesh Reqztisition and Acqztisition of Immovable Properly
Act, 1972:
D
~ Validity or i11validity of requisition order--Ca11not reflect 011 sufficiency
of cause under Rent Co11trol Act-Requisition Proceedings- Non-filing of
objection by La11dlord-Effect of

Words and Phrases: E
"Vacation"- "Sufficient Cause"-Meaning of.

Section 14(3) ofthe Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act-1987
....,,-- enables a landlord to obtain an order for eviction of the tenant if he
requires the building for his own occupation and he has no other building
-i_n the area concerned. This right however stands deferred tinder second . F
proviso for a period of five years if the landlord has vacated a building in
his use without sufficient cause.

The appellant, an owner of a house, was in occupation of first floor
of the house, while the second Ooorwas let out to a Judge. His entire house G
was requisitioned for occupation of a Judge. The appellant did not tile any
objection under section 3(2) of the Requisition Act. However, after
vacating the building he applied for eviction of respondent. The Courts
below rejected his application by applying the second proviso to section
14(3) of the Himachal Rent Control Act.
467 H
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991) SUPP. 1 S. C. R:

A Allowing the Landlord's appeal anci setting aside the order or Courts '<
below, this Court,

HELD: 1. 'Sufficient cause' is an expression which is round in
various statutes. It has been construed liberally In keeping with its
ordinary dictionary meaning as adequate or enough. That is any
B justifiable reason resulting in vacation has to be understood as sutncient
cause. For instance economic difficulty or financial stringency or family
reasons may compel a landlord· to let out a building in his occupation. So
long it is round to be :enuine and bona fide it would amount to vacating a ·
building for sufficient cause. And the bar of second proviso stands lifted. ·
C In other words if the vacation of the building was not a pretence or pretext
the proviso could not frustrate the right or landlord to approach the
controller for necessary direction to tenant to hand over possession to
him. [470 B-C]

1.1 Vacation of a building by landlord in pursuance or an order or
D requisition by the competent authority could not be characterised as 'not
without sufficient cause'. A landlord has no option. He is required to
/..._ --
vacate under constraint or law. Therefore the statutory restriction created
by second proviso would not apply'in such a case. [470-D]

E 2. Validity or invalidity or an order under Requisition Act could not
adversely reftect on sufficiency or cause under Rent Control Act. Reason
for either arises in different circumstances. Vacating a building, even,
under an incorrect order passed by a competent authority under
Requisition Act would be for sufficient reason. The Rent Control
authorities could not examine_ merit or the order under Requisition Act.
F Therefore it could not be a valid consideration for holding that the
building was vacated without sufficient cause. The courts below thus
committed an enor of law !n applying second .proviso to reject the
application filed on behalf of the appellant. [470-H,.471-A-B]

G CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2383 of
1988. .

From the Judgment and Order dated 1.4.1988 of the· Himachal
Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision No. 29 of 1988. ·

N.S. Hegde and Ms. Madhu Moolchandani for the Appellant.
H
S.S. SIBIA v. V. K. SOOD (SAHAI, J.) . 469

Ms. Asha Jain Madan for the Respondent. A
The Judgment of the <;ourt was delivered by

RM. SAHAI, J. The short but interesting question of law that arises
for consideration in this appeal, directed against judgment of the Himachal
Pradesh High Court, is if possession given to competent authority under B
Himachal Pradesh Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property ·
Act, 1972 (for brevity 'Requisition Act') is vacation of premises without
sufficient cause within second proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 14 of
Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 deemed to have come
·into force with effect from 17th November 1971 (hereinafter referred to as
•the Act'). C
Sub-section (3) of Section 14 is extracted below:

"(3) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the
tenant to put the landlord in possessiori -
(a) in the case of a residential building, if - D
(i) he requires it for his own o~upation:
- - ---',
Provided that he is not occupying another residential
building owned by him, in the urban area concerned:
Provided further that he has not vacated such a building E
without sufficient cause within five years of the filing of
the application, in the said urban area;"

>.f It enables a landlord to obtain an order for eviction of the tenant if
he requires the building for his own occupation and he has no other build- F
ing in the area concerned. This right however stands deferred under
second proviso for a period of five years if the landlord has vacated a
building in his use without suffident cause. The question is how the expres-
si_on, 'he has not vacated such building without sufficient cause' in the
second proviso should be construed. It has two aspects one whether the
proviso applies to voluntary vacation only or it extends to vacating under G
pressure of legal proceedings such as requisition order by competent
-~ ""( authority. Seoond even assuming that the expression 'vacate such building'
is given wide interpretation does giving up possession in consequence of a
requisition order amounts to vacation without sufficient cause? Vacate,
normally, means to go away, to leave. The setting or context in which the
. word has been used does not indicate any different meaning. Nor it is H
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991) SUPP. 1 S. C.R.

A necessary to decide if it applies to voluntary vacation only as it was urged
that even assuming that giving up possession in pursuance of requisition
order is included in the proviso can it be said to be without sufficient cause.
Sufficient cause is an expression which is found in various statutes. It has
been construed liberally in keeping with its ordinary dictionary meaning as
adequate or enough. That is any justifiable reason resulting in vacation has
B to be understood as ~ufficient. cause. For instance economic difficulty or
financial stringency or family reasons may compel a landlord to let out a
building in his occupation. So long it is found to be gen"uine and bona fide it
would amount to vacating a building for sufficient cause. And the bar of
second proviso stands lifted. In other words if the vacation of the building
was not a pretence or pretext the proviso could not frustrate the right of
C landlord fo approach the controller for necessary direction to- tenant to
haitd over possession to him. ·

Vacation of a building by landlord in pursuance of an order of requi-
sition by the competent authority could not be characterised as, 'not
without sufficient cause'. _A landlord has no option. He is required to va-
D cate under constraint of law. Therefore the statutory restriction created by
second proviso would not apply in such a case. Does it make any difference
in law or the action of the landlord is rendered without sufficient cause as ,i;.._ - -
he did not file any objection in requisition proc.eedings either under mis-
taken advice or ignorance of law? For this it is necessary to narrate facts in
brief: The appellant is owner of Kennilworth house/Simla and its annexe.
E He was in occupatioq of first floor of Kennilworth house. Second floor was
let out to the District Judge, who, later was elevated to the Bench. For-his
occupation the entire house was requisitioned. The appellant did not file
any objection. After vacating, the building he applied for eviction of
respondent from the annexe. His application was rejected as it would
found to be in teeth of the second proviso. It was held that the order of
F requisition was passed because the appellant did not show any cause by
filing any objection under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Requisition
Act even though proviso to the sub-section precluded any property or part
from being requisitioned if it was in bonafide use by the owner. The ex-
planation of the appellant that he was advised by his lawyer not to file any
objection as the building was required for a High Court judge, was not
G accepted.
Validity or invalidity of an order under Requisition Act could not
adversely reflect on sufficiency of cause under Rent Control Act. Reason
for either arises. in different circumstances. Vacating a building, even,
under an incorrect order passed by a competent authority under Requisi-
H
'S. S.SIBIA v. V. K. SOOD (SAHAI, J.] 471

tion Act would be for sufficient reason. The Rent Control authorities could A
not examine merit of the order under Requisition Act. Therefore it could
not be _a valid consideration for holding that the building \\'as vacated
Without sufficient cause. The courts below thus committed an error of law
in applying second proviso to reject the application filed on behalf of the
appellant.
B
Even the finding on requirement of the appellant to occupy the
building is not well founded. The inference drawn by the two courts below
that the appellant being a rich man would not occupy the annexe or that he
would use it occasionally is not well founded. It being undisputed that the
appellant has no other building in the urban area and it having been found
that he vacated the other building for sufficient reason there was no fetter C
on the right of appellant to seek eviction of the tenant.

In the result this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The orders of all
the courts below are set aside. The application of appellant shall stand
allowed. He shall approach the Rent Control authorities for appropriate
directions. Parties shall bear their own costs. D
T.N.A Appeal allowed.