Holding

The amendment to Section 115 CPC does not curtail the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227; the Court may still entertain writs of certiorari and exercise supervisory jurisdiction over subordinate court orders, including interlocutory orders, to correct gross jurisdictional errors.

Summary

The appellant sought a permanent and ad interim injunction on title and possession of agricultural land, but both the trial court and the appellate court rejected his claim. He then filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, which the High Court dismissed on the ground that the relief sought was against private respondents. The appeal before the Supreme Court raised the question of whether the amendment to Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (by Act 46 of 1999) curtailed the High Court's jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to issue writs of certiorari or exercise supervisory jurisdiction over orders of subordinate courts, especially interlocutory orders. The Court held that the amendment does not affect the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court; interlocutory orders excluded from revision remain open to certiorari and supervisory review to correct gross jurisdictional errors. Consequently, the High Court's order dismissing the petition was set aside and the petition restored. The appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

The amendment to Section 115 of the CPC by Act 46 of 1999, does it limit the High Court's jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227?
Can interlocutory orders of subordinate courts, for which revision is barred by the amendment, be challenged via certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction?
Is a petition under Article 226 maintainable when the relief sought is an interim injunction against private parties?

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 115
Constitution of Indias. 226, s. 227

Subjects

Article 226Article 227Section 115 CPCcertiorarisupervisory jurisdictioninterlocutory ordersinjunctionrevisionconstitutional jurisdictionhigh court

Judgment

A SURYA DEV RAI
v.
RAM CHANDER RAI AND ORS.

AUGUST 7, 2003

B [R.C. LAHOTI AND ASHOK BHAN, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950:

Articles 226 and 227--Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Section 115(1)
C proviso (as amended)-Amendment of section 115(1) proviso curtailing·
revisional jurisdiction ofHigh Court-Effect of-On the power and jurisdiction
of High Court under Articles 226 and 227-Held: Amendment does not affect
the jurisdiction of High Court under Articles 226 and 227-0rders and
proceedings and also interlocutory orders passed by courts subordinate to
D High Court against which remedy of revision is excluded by amendment are
subject to certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of High Court which is to be
exercised where there is gross failure ofjustice or grave injustice and not to
correct mere errors offact or of law .

Article 226-Writ of certiorari-General principles governing the
E issuance thereof-Discussed

Article 227-Supervisory jurisdiction-Issuance and exercise a/-
Discussed

Articles 226 and 227--Certiorarifurisdiction and supervisory jurisdiction
F -Difference between-Discussed

Appellant filed a suit for issuance of permanent preventive injunction
based on title and possession over the suit property-agricultural land and
also for ad interim injunction. Both trial court and appellate court rejected
the prayer. Appellant then filed a petition under Article 226 of the
G Constitution. High Court summarily dismissed the petition holding it not
maintainable as appellant was seeking interim injunction against·private
respondents. Hence the present appeal. The question which arose for
consideration in this appeal was regarding the effect of amendment made
in Section 115 of C.P.C by Act 46 of 1999 on the power and jurisdiction

H 290
S.D. RA! V. R.C. RAI 291
of High Court under Article 226 and Article 227 as against similar orders, A
acts or proceedings of courts subordinate to High Courts, against which
earlier the remedy of filing civil revision under Section 115 of C.P.C. was
available to the person aggrieved. Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. Amendment made in Section 115 of C.P.C. by Act No.46
of 1999 cannot and does not affect the jurisdiction of High Court under B
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in any manner. The curtailment
j of revisional jurisdiction of High Court does not take away and could not
~J have taken away the constitutional jurisdiction of High Court to issue a
writ of certiorari to a civil court nor the power of superintendence
conferred on High Court is taken away or whittled down. The power exists, C
untrammeled by the amendment in Section l15 ofC.P.C. and is available
to be exercised subject to rules of self discipline and practice which are
well settled. Furthermore, the interlocutory orders passed by the courts
subdrdinate to the High Court against which remedy of revision has been
excluded by CPC amendment Act are nevertheless open to challenge in
and continue to be subject to certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of D
High Court. (311-A, B, C; 309-E, F)

Ganga Saran v. Civil Judge, Hapur, Ghaziabad & Ors.[1991) All LJ
159; Baby v. Travancore Devaswom Board & Ors. (1998) 8 SCC 310;
Manmatha Nath Biswas v. Emperor (1932-33) 37 C.W.N. 201; L. Chandra
Kuma; v. Union of India [1997) 3 SCC 261; Balkrishna Hari Phansalkar v. E
Emperor AIR (1933) Born. 1; State, through Special Cell, New Delhi v. Navjot
Sandhu @ Afshan Guru and Ors. JT (2003) 4 SC 605 and Shiv Shakti Coop.
Housing Society, Nagpur v. Mis. Swaraj Developers & Ors. [2003) 4 Scale
241 - referred to.

Govind v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [2003) 6 ILD 468, approved.
F

2.1. Certiorari under Article 226 is issued for correcting gross errors
of jurisdiction, i.e., when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i)
without jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none,
or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction - by overstepping or crossing the limits G
of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of
procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there
is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice.
(311-D)

2.2. Any authority or body of persons constituted by law or having H
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A legal authority to adjudicate upon questions affecting the rights of a
subject and enjoined with a duty to act judicially or quasi-judicially is
amenable to the certiorari jurisdiction of the High Court. It can also be
issued if the lis is between two private parties. r310-G)

2.3. It is a well-settled principle that the technicalities associated with
B the prerogative writs in English law have no role to play under our
constitutional scheme; that a writ of certiorari to call for records and \
\

examine the same for passing appropriate orders, is issued by superior \
court to an inferior court which certifies its records to the High Court \
for its inspection so as to enable the High Court to determine whether on
the face of the record the inferior court has committed any of the preceding
C errors occasioning failure of justice; and that a High Court cannot issue
a writ to another High Court, nor can one Bench of a High Court issue a
writ to a different Bench of the High Court; much less can writ jurisdiction
of a High Court be invoked to seek issuance of a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court. High Courts are not constituted as inferior courts in our
D constitutional scheme. Thus, the orders and proceedings of a judicial court
subordinate to High Court are amenable to writ juri.sdiction of High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution. (302-F-H; 303-A)
)
Ryots ofGarabandho and other villages v. Zamindar ofParlakimedi AIR
(1943) PC 164; Hari Vishnu Karnath v. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors. (1955) 1
E SCR 1104; The Custodian of Evacuee Property Bangalore v. Khan Saheb
Abdul Shukoor etc. [1961) 3 SCR 855; Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner
of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam and Ors. [1958) SCR 1240; T.C.
Basappa v. T. Nagappa & Anr. (1955) 1 SCR 250; Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar
& Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (1966) 3 SCR 744; Rupa Ashok
F Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and Anr. r2002) 4 SCC 388; Satyanarayan
Laxminarayan Hegde and Ors. v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale (1960)
1 SCR 890; Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani (Dead) by Lrs.
[1950] SCR 62 and Dwarka Nath v. Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, D
Ward, Kanpur and Anr. (1965) 3 SCR 536, referred to.

G Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 14, p. I 2 I; Administrative Law by H. W.R.
Wade & C.E. Forsyth Eighth Edition p 591, referred to

3. Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 oft.he Constitution is
exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their
jurisdiction. The paramount consideration behind vesting such wide power
H of superintendence i'n the High Court is paving the path of .iustice and
S.D. RAI v. R.C. RAI 293
removing any obstacles therein. The power may be exercised in cases A
occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the court
or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed
to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a
failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being
exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of B
jurisdiction. (311-E, Fl

Waryam Singh and Anr. v. Amarnath & Anr., (1954] SCR 565 and
Chandrasekhar Singh and Ors. v. Siva Ram Singh & Ors., [1979) 3 SCC 118,
referred to.

4. The broad general difference between writ of certiorari under C
Article 226 and supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, is that the writ
of certiorari is an exercise of its original jurisdiction by the High Court
whereas exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is akin to appellate revisional
or corrective jurisdiction; that in a writ of certiorari, the record of the
proceedings having been certified and sent up by the inferior court or D
tribunal to the High Court, the High Court if inclined to exercise its
jurisdiction, may simply annul or quash the proceedings of the subordinate
courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof whereas in
exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only quash
or set aside the impugned proceedings, judgmentor order but it may also
make such directions as the facts and circumstances of the case may E
warrant, may be by way of guiding the inferior court or tribunal as to
the manner in which it would now proceed further or afresh as
commended to or guided by the High Court, and it may substitute such a
decision of its own in place of the impugned decision, as the inferior court
or tribunal should have made; and that the jurisdiction under Article 226 F
is capable of being exercised on a prayer made by or on behalf of the party
aggrieved whereas the supervisory jurisdiction is capable of being
exercised suo motu as well. [305-C-FI

Umaji Keshao Meshram and Ors. v. Smt. Radhikabal and Anr. P9861
Supp. sec 401, referred to. G
5.1. Writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is
not available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the error is
manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is
based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and
H
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. Further
the patent error is an error which is self-evident, i.e., which can be
perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or
complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two
inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen
B to take one view the error cannot be called gross or patent.
(311-G, H; 312-Al

5.2. The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory
jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases
where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a
C gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution
and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two
jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or
proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for
correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the
proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and
D entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of
High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the
suit or proceedings. High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the
error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become
incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would
E result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in
prolonging of the lis. (312-B-DI

5.3. High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction
will not convert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation
or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inference or correct
p errors of mere formal or technical character. (312-El

5.4. In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a
writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction
are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High
Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction
G between the two jurisdictions. The parameters for exercise of jurisdiction
under Article 226 or 227 cannot be tied down in a straitjacket formula or
rigid rules. Not less than often the High Court would be faced with
dilemma. If it intervenes in pending proceedings there is bound to be delay
in termination of proceedings. If it does not intervene, the error of the
H moment may earn immunity from correction. The facts and circumstances
S.D. RA! v. R.C. RAJ [R.C. LAHOT!, J.] 295
of a given case may make it more appropriate for the High Court to A
exercise self-restraint and not to intervene because the error of jurisdiction
though committed is yet capable of being taken care of and corrected at
a later stage and the wrong done, if any, would be set right and rights
I and equities adjusted in appeal or revision preferred at the conclusion of
the proceedings. But there may be cases where 'a stitch in time would save
nine'. Therefore, the power is there but the exercise is discretionary which B
will be governed solely by the dictates of judicial conscience enriched by
judicial experience and practical wisdom of the Judge. (313-B-DI

6. In the instant case, the order of the High Court refusing to
entertain the petition filed by the appellant, holding it not maintainable, C
is set aside. The petition is restored on the file of the High Court, to be
dealt with by an appropriate Bench consistently with the rules of the High
Court, depending on whether the petitioner before the High Court is
seeking a writ of certiorari or invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of the
High Court. [313-EI
D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6110 of2003.

From the Judgment and Order dated 15.5.2002 of the Allahabad High
Court in C.M.W.P. No. 20038 of 2002.

Shrinath Singh and A.S. Pundir for the Appellant. E
Dr. Krishan Singh Chauhan (NP) and Rameshwar Prasad Goyal (NP)
for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

R.C. LAHOTI, J. Leave granted.
F
The appellant filed a suit, for issuance of permanent preventive injunction
" based on his title and possession over the suit property which is a piece of
agricultural land, in the Court of Civil Judge. He also sought for relief by
way of ad interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules I and 2 of the C.P.C. G
The prayer was rejected by the trial court as also by the appellate court.
Feeling aggrieved thereby the appellant filed a petition (C.M.W.P.No.20038
of 2002) in the High Court labeling it as one under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The High Court has summarily dismissed the petition forming
an opinion that the petition was not maintainable as the appellant was seeking
interim injunction against private respondents. Reference is made in the H
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A impugned order to a Full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court in Ganga
Saran v. Civil Judge, Hapur, Ghaziabad and Ors., (1991) Allahabad Law
Journal 159. Earlier the remedy of final civil revision under Section 115 of
the C.P.C. could have been availed of by the appellant herein but that remedy

B
is not available to the appellant because of the amendment made in Section
115 of the C.P.C. by Amendment Act 46 of 1999 w.e.f. 01.07.2002.
\
This appeal raises a question of frequent occurrence before the High
Courts as to what is the impact of the amendment in Section 115 of the
C.P.C. brought in by Act 46 of 1999 w.e.f. 01.07.2002, on the power and
jurisdiction of the High Court to en~ertain petitions seeking a writ of certiorari
-
C under Article 226 of the Constitution or invoking the power of superintendence
under Article 227 of the Constitution as against similar orders, acts or
proceedings of the courts subordinate to the High Courts, against which
earlier the remedy of filing civil revision under Section·l 15 of the C.P.C. was
available to the person aggrieved. Is an aggrieved person completely deprived
of the remedy of judicial review, if he has lost at the hands of the original
D court and the appellate court though a case of gross failure of justice having
been occasioned, can be made out?

Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended does not now
pennit a revision petition being filed against an order disposing of an appeal
against the order of the trial court whether confinning, reversing or modifying
E the order of injunction granted by the trial court. The reason is that the order
of the High Court passed either way would not have the effect of finally
disposing of the suit or other proceedings. The exercise of revisio11al
jurisdiction in such a case is taken away by the proviso inserted under sub-
section (l) of Section 115 of the CPC. The amendment is based on the
p Malimath Committee's recommendations. The Committee was of the opinion
that the expression employed in Section 115 CPC, which enables interference
in revision on the ground that the order if allowed to stand would occasion
a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it ..
was made, left open wide scope for the exercise of the revisional power with
all types of interlocutory orders and this was substantially contributing towards
G delay in the disposal of cases. The Committee did not favour denuding the
High Court of the power of revision but strongly felt that the power should
be suitably curtailed. The effect of the erstwhile clause (b) of the proviso,
being deleted and a new proviso having been inserted, is that the revisional
jurisdiction, in respect of an interlocutory order passed in a trial or other
H proceedings, is substantially curtailed. A revisional jurisdiction cannot be.
S.D. RAI v. R.C. RAI [R.C. LAHOTI, J.) 297
exercised unless the requirement of the proviso is satisfied. A
As a preclude to search for answer to the question posed it becomes
necessary to recollect and restate a few well-established principles relating to
the Constitutional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution in the backdrop of the amended Section 115
of the C.P.C. B
Writ of Certiorari

According to Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol.14, page 121) certiorari is
a writ issued from a superior court to an inferior court or tribunal commanding
the latter to send up the record of a particular case. C
H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth define certiorari in these ;Words :-

"Certiorari is used to bring up into the High Court the decision
of some inferior tribunal or authority in order that it may be
investigated. If the decision does not pass the test, it is quashed - that D
is to say, it is declared completely invalid, so that no one need respect
it.

The underlying policy is that all inferior courts and authorities
have only limited jurisdiction or powers and must be kept within
their legal bounds. This is the concern of the Crown, for the sake of E
orderly administration of justice, but it is a private complaint which
sets the Crown in motion." (Administrative Law, Eighth Edition, page
591).

The learned authors go on to add that problem arose on exercising
control over justices of the peace, both in their judicial and their administrative F
functions as also the problem of controlling the special statutory body which
was addressed to by the Court of King's Bench. "The most useful instruments
which the Court found ready to hand were the prerogative writs. But not
unnaturally the control exercised was strictly legal, and no longer political.
Certiorari would issue to call up the records of justices of the peace and G
commissioners f?r examination in the King's Bench and for quashing if any
legal defect was found. At first there was much quashing for defects of form
on the record, i.e. for error on the face. Later, as the doctrine of ultra vires
developed, that became the dominant principle of control" {page 592).
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A The nature and scope of the writ of certiorari and when can it issue
was beautifully set out in a concise passage, quoted hereafter, by Lord
Chancellor Viscount Simon in Ryots of Garabandho and other villages v.
Zamindar of Parlakimedi and Anr., AIR (l 943) PC I 64. "The ancient writ of
certiorari in England is an original writ which may issue out of a superior
B Court requiring that the record of the proceedings in some cause or matter
pending before an inferior Court should be transmitted into the superior
Court to be there dealt with. The writ is so named because, in its original
Latin form, it required that the King should "be certified" of the proceedings
to be investigated, and the object is to secure by the exercise of the authority
of a. superior Court, that the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal should be
C properly exercised. This writ does not issue to correct purely executive acts,
but, on the other hand, its application is not narrowly limited to inferior
"Courts" in the strictest sense. Broadly speaking, it may be said that if the act
done by the inferior body is a judicial act, as distinguished from being a
ministerial act, certiorari will lie. The rer.:.ec!y, in point of principle, is derived
from the superintending authority which the Sovereign's Superior Courts,
D and in particular the Court of King's Bench, possess and exercise over inferior
jurisdictions. This principle has been transplanted to other parts of the King's
dominions, and operates, within certain limits, in British India."

Article 226 of the Constitution of India preserves to the High Court
E power to issue writ of certiorari amongst others. The principles on which the
writ of certiorari is issued are well-settled. It would suffice for our purpose
to qu~te 'from the 7-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Hari Vishnu
Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., (1955] 1 SCR 1104. The four proposition:;
laid down therein were summarized by the Constitution Bench in The
Custodian of Evacuee Property Bangalore v. Khan Saheb Abdul Shukoor
F etc .. (1961) 3 SCR 855 as under:-

" ....... the High Court was not justified in looking into the order of
December 2, I 952, as an appellate court, though it would be justified
in scrutinizing,1hat order as if it was brought before it under Article
226 of the Constitution for issue of a writ of certiorari. The limit of
G the jurisdiction of the High Court in issuing writs of certiorari was
considered by this Court in Hari Vishnu Karnath v. Ahmad lshaque,
1955-1 S 1104 : ((s) AIR 1955 SC 233) and the following four
propositions were laid down :-

"( l) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction;
H
S.D. RAlv. R.C. RAT (R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 299
(2) Certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts A
illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides
without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates
the principles of natural justice;

(3) The court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a
supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is B
that the court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior
court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous.

(4) An error in the decision or determination itself may also be
amenable to a writ of certiorari if it is a manifest error apparent on
the face of the proceedings, e.g., when it is based on clear ignorance C
or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent
error which can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong
decision."

In the initial years the Supreme Court was not inclined to depart from
the traditional role of certiorari jurisdiction and consistent with the historical D
background felt itself bound by such procedural technicalities as were well-
known to the English judges. In later years the Supreme Court has relaxed
the procedural and technical rigours, yet the broad and fundamental principles
governing the exercise of jurisdiction have not been given a go-by.

In the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction the High Court proceeds on an E
assumption that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has the
jurisdiction to decide wrongly as well as rightly. The High Court would not,
therefore, for the purpose of certiorari assign to itself the role of an Appellate
Court and step into re-appreciating or evaluating the evidence and substitute
its own findings in place of those arrived at by the inferior court. F
In Nagendra Nath Bora and Anr. v. Commissioner of Hills Division
and Appeals, Assam and Ors., [1958] SCR 1240, the parameters for the
exercise of jurisdiction, calling upon the issuance of writ of certiorari where
so set out by the Constitution Bench :-
G
"The Common law writ, now called the order of certiorari, which has
also been adopted by our Constitution, is not meant to take the place
of an appeal where the Statute does not confer a right of appeal. Its
purpose is only to determine, on an examination of the record, whether
the inferior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or has not proceeded
in acc9rdance with the essential requirements of the law which it was H
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A meant to administer. Mere formal or technical errors, even though of
law, will not be sufficient to attract this extra-ordinary jurisdiction.
Where the errors cannot be said to be errors of law apparent on the
face of the record, but they are merely errors in appreciation of
documentary evidence or affidavits, errors in drawing inferences or
omission to draw inference or in other words errors which a court
B sitting as a court of appeal only, could have examined and, if necessary,
corrected and the appellate authority under a statute in question has
unlimited jurisdiction to examine and appreciate the evidence in the
exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction and it has not been
shown that in exercising its powers the appellate authority disregarded
c any mandatory provisions of the law but what can be said at the most .
was that it had disregarded certain executive instructions not having
the force of law, there is no case for the exercise of the jurisdiction
under Article 226."

The Constitution Bench in TC. Basappa v. T Nagappa & Anr., [1955]
D I SCR 250, held that certiorari may be and is generally granted when a court
has acted (i) without jurisdiction, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction. The want
of jurisdicticn may arise from the nature of the subject-matter of the
proceedings or from the absence of some preliminary proceedings or the
court itself may not have been legally constituted or suffering from certain
E disability by reason of extraneous circumstances. Certiorari may also issue if
the court or tribunal though competent has acted in flagrant disregard of the
rules or procedure or in violation of the principles of natural justice where
no particular procedure is prescribed. An error in the decision or determination
itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari subject to the following
factors being available ifthe error is manifest and apparent on the face of the
F proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the
provisions of law but a mere wrong decision is not amenable to a writ of
certiorari.

Any authority or body of persons constitu.ted by law or having legel
authority to adjudicate upon questions affecting the rights of a subject and
G enjoined with a duty to act judicially or quasi~judicially is amenable to the
certiorari jurisdiction of the High Court. The proceedings of judicial courts
subordinate to High Court can be subjected to certiorari.

While dealing with the question whether the orders and the proceedings
of subordinate Court are amenable to certiorari writ jurisdiction of the High
H
S.O. RAJ v. R.C. RAJ [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 301
Court, we would be failing in our duty if we do not make a reference to a A
larger Bench and a Constitution Bench decisions of this Court and clear a
confusion lest it should arise at some point of time. Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar
and Ors. v. State of Maharashra and Anr., [1966] 3 SCR 744, is a nine-
Judges Bench decision of this Court. A learned judge of Bombay High Court
sitting on the Original Side passed an oral order restraining the Press from
publishing certain court proceedings. This order was sought to be impugned B
by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before a Division
Bench of the High Court which dismissed the writ petition on the ground that
the impugned order was a judicial order of the High Court and hence not
amenable to a writ under Article 226. The petitioner then moved this Court
under Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of his fundamental C
rights under Article 19(1)(a) and (g) of the Constitution. During the course
of majority judgment Chief Justice Gajendragadkar quoted the following
passage from Halsbury Laws Of England (Vol.I I pages 129, 130) from the
foot-note :

"( ..... .in the case of judgments of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction) D
it has been suggested that certiorari might be granted to quash them
for want of jurisdiction [Kemp v. Baine (1844), I Dow. & L. 885, at
p.887), inasmuch as an error did not lie upon that ground. But there
appears to be no reported case in which the judgment of an inferior
Court of civil jurisdiction has been quashed on certiorari, either for E
want of jurisdiction or on any other ground".

His Lordship then said :

"The ultimate proposition is set out in terms: "Certiorari does not lie
to quash the judgments of inferior Courts of civil jurisdiction".* These
observations would indicate that in England the judicial orders passed F
by civil Courts of plenary jurisdiction in or in relation to matters
brought before them are not held to be amenable to the jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari."

[*Para 239, page 130 from Halsbury, ibid]
G
A perusal of the judgment shows that the above passage has been
quoted "incidentally" and that too for the purpose of finding authority for the
proposition that a judge sitting on the Original Side of the High Court cannot
be called a court 'inferior or subordinate to High Court' so as to make his
orders amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Secondly, the abovesaid H
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A passage has been quoted but nowhere the Court has laid down as law by way
its own holding that a writ of certiorari by High Court cannot be directed to
Court subordinate to it. And lastly, the passage from Halsbury quoted in
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar 's case (supra) is from third edition of Halsbury
Laws of England (Simond's Edition, 1955). The law has undergone a change
in England itself and this changed legal position has been noted in a
B Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok
Hurra and Anr., [2002] 4 SCC 388. Justice SSM Quadri speaking for thP.
Constitution Bench has quoted the following passage from Halsbury's Laws
of England, 4th Edn.(Reissue) Vol.I (I) :

c "103. Historically, prohibition was a writ whereby the royal courts of
common law prohibited other courts from entertaining matters falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the common law courts; certiorari
was issued to bring the record of an inferior court in the King's
Bench for review or to remove indictments and to public officers and
bodies, to order the performance of a public duty. All three were
D called prerogative writs."

"109. Certiorari lies to bring decisions of an inferior court, tribunal,
public authority or any other body of persons before the High Court
for review so that the court may determine whether they should be
quashed, or to quash such decisions. The order of prohibition is an
E order issuing out of the High Court and directed to an inferior court
or tribunal or public authority which forbids that court or tribunal or
authority to act in excess of its jurisdiction or contrary to law, Both
certiorari and prohibition are employed for the control of inferior
courts, tribunals and public authorities."
F. Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar 's case was Cited before the Constitution Bench
in Rupa Ashok Hurra 's case and considered. It has been clearly held : (i) that
it is a well-settled principle that the technicalities associated with the
prerogative writs in English law have no role to play under our constitutional
scheme; (ii) that a writ of certiorari to call for records and examine the same
G for passing appropriate orders, is issued by superior court to an inferior court
which certifies its records for examinatior.; and (iii) that a High Court cannot
issue a writ to another High Court, nor can one Bench of a High Court issue
a writ to a different Bench of the High Court; much less can writ jurisdiction
of a High Court be invoked to seek issuance of a writ of certiorari to the
H Supreme Court. The High Courts are not constituted as inferior courts in our
1
S.D. RA! v. R.C. RA! [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 303

constitutional scheme. A
Thus, there is no manner of doubt that the orders and proceedings of
a judicial court subordinate to High Court are amenable to writ jurisdiction
of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Authority in abundance is avaiiable for the proposition that an error B
apparent on face of record can be corrected by certiorari. The broad working
rule for determining what is a patent error or an error apparent on the face
of the record was well set out in Satyanarayan Luxminarayan Hegde and
Ors. v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, [l 960] I SCR 890. It was held
that the alleged error should be self-evident. An error which needs to be C
established by lengthy and complicated arguments or an error in a long-
drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two
opinions cannot be called a patent error. In a writ of certiorari the High Court
may quash the proceedings of the tribunal, authority or court but may not
substitute its own findings or directions in lieu of one given in the proceedings
forming the subject-matter of certiorari. D
Certiorari jurisdiction though available is not to be exercised as a matter
of course. The High Court would be justified in refusing the writ of certiorari
if no failure of justice has been occasioned. In exercising the certiorari
jurisdiction the procedure ordinarily followed by the High Court is to command
the inferior court or tribunal to certify its record or proceedings to the High E
Court for its inspection so as to enable the High Court to determine whether
on the face of the record the inferior court has committed any of the preceding
errors occasioning failure of justice.

Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227
F
Article 227 of the Constitution confers on every High Court the power
of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in
relation to which it exercises jurisdiction excepting any court or tribunal
constituted by or under any law relating to the armed forces. Without prejudice
to the generality of such power the High Court has been conferred wi~h G.
certain specific powers by sub-Articles (2) and (3) of Article 227 with which
we are not concerned hereat. It is well-settled that the power of superintendence
so conferred on the High Court is administrative as well as judicial, and is
capable of being invoked at the instance of any person aggrieved or may
even be exercised suo motu. The paramount consideration behind vesting
such wide power of superintendence in the High Court is paving the path of H
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A justice and removing any obstacles therein. The power under. Article 227 is
wider than the one conferred on the High Court by Article 226 in the sense
that the power of superintendence is not subject to those technicalities of ,,
;"--
procedure or traditional fetters which are to be found in certiorari jurisdiction.
Else the parameters invoking the exercise of power are almost similar.

B The history of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court,
and how the jurisdiction has culminated into its present shape under Article
227 of the Constitution, was traced in Waryam Singh and Anr. v. Amarnath ·
and Anr., [1954] SCR 565. The jurisdiction can be traced back to Section 15
of High Courts Act 1861 which gave a power of judicial superintendence to
c the High Court apart from and independently of the provisions of other Jaws
conferring revisionsal jurisdiction on the High Court. Section 107 of the
Government of India Act 1915 and then Section 224 of the Government of
India Act 1935, were similarly worded and reproduced the predecessor
provision. However, sub-section (2) was added in Section 224 which confined I"
the jurisdiction of the High Court to such judgments of the inferior courts
D which were not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. That restriction has
not been carried forward in Article 227 of the Constitution. In that sense
Article 227 of,the Constitution has width and vigour unprecedented. ?

Difference between a writ of certiorari under Article 226 and '
~
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227.
E
The difference between Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was
well brought out in Umaji Keshao Meshram and Ors. v. Smt. Radhikabai and
Anr., [ 1986] Supp. SCC 40 I. Proceedings under Article 226 are hi exercise
of the original jurisdiction of the High Court while proceedings under Article
227 of the Constitution are not original but only supervisory. Article 227 ~
F
substantially reproduces the provisions of Section I 07 of the Government of
India Act, 1915 excepting that the power of superintendence has been extended
by this Article to tribunals as well. Though the power is akin to that of an
ordinary court of appeal, yet the power under Article 227 is intended to be p
used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the
G subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not ,
for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning
grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the court or tribunal has
assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a
jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice,
and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner
H F=
S.D. RA! v. R.C. RA! [R.C. LAHOTI, J.) 305
which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction. A
Upon a review of decided cases and a survey of the occasions wherein
the High Courts have exercised jurisdiction to command a writ of certiorari
or to exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in the given facts
and circumstances in a variety of cases, it seems that the distinction between
the two jurisdictions stands almost obliterated in practice. Probably, this is B
the reason why it has become customary with the lawyers labeling their
petitions as one common under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution,
though .such practice has been deprecated in some judicial pronouncement.
Without entering into niceties and technicality of the subject, we venture to
state the broad general difference between the two jurisdictions. Firstly, the C
writ of certiorari is an exercise of its original jurisdiction by the High Court;
exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is not an original jurisdiction and in this
sense it is akin to appellate revisional or corrective jurisdiction. Secondly, in
a writ of certiorari, the record of the proceedings having been certified and
sent up by the inferior court or tribunal to the High Court, the High Court if
inclined to exercise its jurisdiction, may simply annul or quash the proceedings D
and then do no more. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court
may not only quash or set aside the impugned proceedings, judgment or
order but it may also make such directions as the facts and circumstances of
the case may warrant, may be by way of guiding the inferior court or tribunal
as to the manner in which it would now proceed further or afresh as E
commended to or guided by the High Court. In appropriate cases the High
Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, may substitute such a decision
of its own in place of the impugned decision, as the inferior court or tribunal
should have made. Lastly, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
is capable of being· exercised on a prayer made by or on behalf of the party
aggrieved; the supervisory jurisdiction is capable of being exercised suo motu F
as well.

In order to safeguard against a mere appellate or revisional jurisdiction
being exercised in the garb of exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution, the courts have devised self-imposed rules of G
discipline on their power. Supervisory jurisdiction may be refused to be
exercised when an alternative efficacious remedy by way of appeal or revision
is available to the person aggrieved. The High Court may have regard to
legislative policy formulated on experience and expressed by enactments
where the Legislature in exercise of its wisdom has deliberately chosen certain
orders and proceedings to be kept away from exercise of appellate and H
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A revisional jurisdiction in the hope of accelerating the conclusion of the
proceedings and avoiding delay and procrastination which is ~ccasioned by
subjecting every order at every stage of proceedings fo judicial review by
way of a;Jpeal or reyision. So long as an error is capable of being·corrected
by a superior court in exercise of appellate or r~visional jurisdiction though
B available to be exercised only at the conch,1sion of the proceedings, it would
be sound P-xercise of discretion on the part of the High Court to re.fuse to
exercise power of superintendence during the· pendency of the proceedings.
Howeve~. there may be cases where but for invoking the supervisory
jurisdiction, the jurisdictional error· committed by the inferior court or tribunal
would be incapable of being remedied once the proceedings have concluded.
c
In Chandrasekhar Singh and Ors. v. Siva Ra,m Singh and Ors:; (1979]
3 SCC ll8, the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution
came tip for the consideration of this Court ln the context -0f ~ections 435 and
439 of the Criminal Procedure Code which prohibits a second revision to the
D High Court against decision in first revision rendered .by the Sei;sions Judge.
On a review of earlier decisions, the three-Judges Bench summed up the
position of law as under :~ .
. . .
(i) ti1at the powers conferred on· the High Court under Ai:ticle 227
of the Constitution cannot, in any way, be curtailed by the
provisions of the Code of Criminal procedure;
E
(ii) the scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 is
restricted. The power of superintendence conferred by Article
227 is to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases in
orde•
. to keep the ~u.bordinate Courts within
.. the bounds of their
authority and not for .. correcting mere en-ors;
F
(iii) that tlte power of judicial interference under Article 227 of the
Constitution is not greater than the power under Article 226 of
the Constitution;

(iv) that the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the
G Constitution cannot be invoked to correct an error of fact which
only a superior Court can do in exercise of its statutory power
as the Court of Appeal; the High Court cannot, in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 227, convert itself into a Court of
Appeal.

H Later, a two-judge Bench of this Court in Baby v. Travancore Devaswom
S.D. RAI v. R.C. RAI [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 307
Board and Ors., [ 1998] 8 sec 310, clarified that in spite of the revisional A
jurisdiction being not available to the High Court, it still had powers under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India to quash the orders passed by the
Tribunals if the findings of fact had been arrived at by non-consideration of.
the relevant and material documents, the consideration of which could have
led to an opposite- conclusion. This power of tl~e High Court under the
Constitution of India is always in addition to thf" revision~! jurisdiction B
conferred on it.

Does the amendment in Section 115 of C.P.C have any impact on
jurisdiction undet Artides 226 and 227?

The Constitution Bench in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and
c
Ors., [1997] 3 SCC 261, dealt with the nature of power of judicial review
conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution and the power of superintendence
conferred by Article 227. It was held that the jurisdiction conferred on the
Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution and on the High Courts
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is part of the basic str11cture D
of the Constitution, forming its integral and essential feature, which cannot
be tampered with much less taken away even by constitutional amendment,
not to speak of a parliamentary legislation. A recent Division Bench decis.ion
by Delhi High Court (Dalveer Bhandari and H.R. Malhctra, JJ) in Crim:nal
Writ Petition Nos. 758, 917 and 1295 of 2002 - 'Govind v. State (Govt. of E
!/CT of Delhi) decid~d oil April 7, 2003 (reported as [2003] 6 ILD 468.l
makes an indepth surv~y of decided cases including almoc;t all the lea'.iing
de~isions by this Court and holds - "1 he power of the High Court i;.1der
Article 226 cannot be whittled down, r.ullified, curtailed, abrogated, diluted
or taken either by judicial pron_ouncement or by the legislative enactment or
ev~n by the amendment of the Constitution. The power of judicial review is F
an inherent part of the basic structure and it cannot be abrogated without
affecting the basic structure of the Constitution." The essence of constitutional
and legal principles, relevant to the issue at hand, ha~ been correctly summed
up by the Division Bench of the High Court and we record our approval of
the same.
G
It is interesting to recall two landmark decisions delivered by High
Courts and adorning the judicial archives. !n Balkrishna Hari Phansalkar v.
Emperor, AIR (1933) Bombay I, the question arose before a Special Bench:
whether the power of superintendence conferred on the High Court by Section
!07 of Government of India Act 1915 can be controlled by the Governor- H
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A General exercising his power to legislate. The occasion arose because of the
resistance offered by the State Government to .the High Court exercising its
power of superintendence over the Courts of Magistrates established under
Emergency Powers Ordinance, 1932. CJ$f Justice Beaumont held that even
if power of revision is taken away, thi"power of superintendence over the
B courts constituted by the ordinance was still available. The Governor-General
cannot control the powers conferred on the High Court by an Act 9f Imperial
Parliament. However, speaking of the care and caution to be observed while
exercising the power of superintendence though possessed by the High Court,
the learned Chief Justice held that the power of superintendence is not the
same thing as the hearing of an appeal. An illegal conviction may be set aside
C under power of superintendence but - "we must exercise our discretion on
judicial grounds, and only interfere if considerations of justice require us to
do so."

In Manmatha Nath Biswas v. Emperor, (1932-33) 37 C.W.N. 201, a
conviction based on no legal reason and unsustainable in law came up for the
D scrutiny of the High Court under the power of superintendence in spite of
right of appeal having been allowed to lapse. Speaking of the nature of power
of superintendence, the Division Bench, speaking through Chief Justice Rankin,
held that the power of superintendence vesting in the High Court under
Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, is not a limitless power
E available to be exercised for removing hardship of particular decisions. The
power of superintendence is a power of known and well-recognised character
and should be exercised on those judicial principles which give it its character.
The mere misconception on a point of law or a wrong decision on facts or
a failure to mention by the Courts in its judgment every element of the
offence, would not allow the order of the Magistrate being interfered with in
F exercise of the power of superintendence but the High Court can and should
see that no man is convicted without a legal reason. A defect of jurisdiction
or fraud on the part of the prosecutor or error on the "face of the proceedings"
as ~nderstood in Indian practice, provides a ground for the exercise of the
power of superintendence. The line between the two classes of case must be,
G however, kept clear and straight. In general words, the High Court's power
of superintendence is a power to keep subordinate Courts within the bounds
of their authority, to see that they do what their duty requires and that they
do it in a legal manner.

The principles deducible, well-settled as they are, have been well
H summed up and stated by a two-judges Bench of this Court recently in State,
S.D. RAT v. R.C. RAT [R.C. LAHOTI, J.) 309
through Special Cell, New Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu @Afthan Guru and Ors., A
JT 2003 (4) SC 605, para 28. This Court held :

(i) the jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be limited or fettered
by any Act of the state Legislature;
(ii) the supervisory jurisdiction is wide and can be used to meet the B
ends of justice, also to interf::re even with interlocutory order;
(iii) the power must be exercised sparingly, only to move subordinate
courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority to see
that they obey the law. The power is not available to be exercised
to correct mere errors (whether on the facts or laws) and also
cannot be exercised "as the cloak of an appeal in disguise". C
In Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur v. Mis. Swaraj Developers
and Ors., (2003) 4 Scale 241, another two-Judges bench of this Court dealt
with Section 115 of the C.P.C. The Court at the end of its judgment noted
the submission of the learned counsel for a party that even if the revisional D
applications are held to be not maintainable, there should not be a bar on a
challenge being made under Article 227 of the Constitution for which an
opportunity was prayed to be allowed. The Court observed - "If any remedy
is available to a party, no liberty is necessary to be granted for availing the
same."
E
We are of the opinion that the curtailment of revisional jurisdiction of
the High Court does not take away - and could not have taken away - the
constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of cen:orari to a
civil court nor the power of superintendence conferred on the High Court
under Article 227 of the Constitution is taken away or whittled down. The
power exists, untrammelled by the amendment in Section 115 of the CPC, F
and is available to be exercised subject to rules of self discipline and practice
. which are well settled.

We have carefully perused the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad
High Court in Ganga Saran's case relied on by the learned counsel for
respondent and referred to in the impugned order of the High Court. We do G
not think that the decision of the Full Bench has been correctly read. Rather,
vide para 11, the Full Bench has itself held that where the order of the Civil
Court suffers from patent error of law and further causes manifest injustice
to the party aggrieved .then the same can be subjected to writ of certiorari.
The Full Bench added that every interlocutory order passed in a civil suit is H
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A not subject to review under Article 226 of the Constitution but if it is found
from the order impugned that fundamental principle of law has been violated
and further such an order causes substantial injustice to the party aggrieved
the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari is not precluded.
However, the following sentence occurs in the judgment of the Full Bench:-

B "where an aggrieved party approaches th<: High Court under Art.
226 of the Constitution against an order passed in civil suit refusing
to issue injunction to a private individual who is not under statutory
duty to perform public duty or vacating an order of injunction, the
main relief is for issue of a writ of mandamus to a private individual
and such a writ petition under Art.226 of the Constitution would not
c be maintainable."

lt seems that the High Court in its decision impugned herein formed an
impression from the above-quoted passage that a prayer for issuance of
injunction having been refused cy trial court as well ~s the appellate court,
D both being subordinate to High Court and the dispute being between two
private parties, issuance of injunction by High Court amounts to issuance of
a mandamus against a private party which is not permissible in law.

The above quoted sentence from Ganga Saran's case cannot be read
torn out of the context. All that the Full Bench has said is that while exercising
E certiorari jurisdiction over a decision of the court below refusing to issue an
order of injunction, the High Court would not, while issuing a writ of certiorari,
also issue a mandamus against a private party. Article 227 of the Constitution
has not been referred to by the Full Bench. Earlier in this judgment we have
already pointed out the distinction betweer. Article 226 and Article 227 of the
Constitution and we need not reiterate the same. In this context, we' may
F quote the Constitution Bench decision in TC. Basappa v. T Nagappa and
Anr., (1955] I SCR 250 and Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani
(dead) by Lrs., [ 1950] SCR 621, as also a three-Judge Bench decision in
Dwarka Nath v. Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, D Ward, Kanpur and
Anr., (1965] 3 SCR 536, which have held in no uncertain terms, as the law
G has always been, that a writ of certiorari is issued against the acts or
proceedings of a judicial or quasi-judicial body conferred with power to
detennine questions affecting the rights of subjects and obliged to act judicially.
We are therefore of the opinion that the writ of certiorari is directed against
the act, order of proceedings of the subordinate Court, it can issue even if the
lis is between two private parties.
H
S.D. RAI v. R.C. RAI [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 311
Such like matters frequently arise before the High Courts. We sum up A
our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same
as hereunder:-

(l) Amendment by Act No.46 of 1999 with effect from 01.07.2002
in Section l l 5 of Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not
affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under B
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

~" (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subcrdinate to the High
Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by
the CPC Amendment Act No. 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open
to challenge in, and continue to be subject .to, certiorari and c
supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.
(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for
correcting gross errors o.f jurisdiction, i.e., when a subordinate
court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction - by assuming
• jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its
jurisdiction - by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction,
D
or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure
or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there
is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of
justice.
E
(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is
exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds
of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assume<! a
jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a
jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available
is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law F
and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby,
the High Court may step in to exercise its :;upervisory jurisdiction.
(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction,
none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless
the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest G
., and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is
based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of
law, and (iii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has
occasioned thereby.
(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident, i.e., which can H
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy
or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning.
Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate
court has chosen to take one view the error cannot be called
gross or patent.

B (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory
jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate
cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it ,.v
to act lest a gross failure of justice or ·grave injustice should
occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised,
when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be
c invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a
subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is ·
yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings
in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining
a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of High
D Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of
the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to
intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very
moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and
refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where
such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the !is.
E
(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction
will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-
appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing
inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character.
(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a
F
writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory
jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction
exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has
almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions.
While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the
G High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings
of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision
in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High
Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the
subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or
proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate
H
S.D. RAI v. R:C. RAI [R.C. LAHOTI, J.) 313
cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the A
order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in
the facts and circumstances of the case.

Though we have tried to lay down broad principles and working rules,
the fact remains that the param~ters for exercise of jurisdiction under Articles
226 or 227 of the Constitution cannot be tied down in a straitjacket formula B
or rigid rules. Not less than often the High Court wouid be faced with dilemma.
If it intervenes in pending proceedings there is bound to be delay in termination
of proceedings. If it does not intervene, the error of the moment may earn
immunity from correction. The facts and circumstances of a given case may
make it more appropriate for the High Court to exercise self-restraint and not
to intervene because the error of jurisdiction though committed is yet capable C
of being taken care of and corrected at a later stage and the wrong done, if
any, would be set right and rights and equities adjusted in appeal or revision
preferred at the conclusion of the proceedings. But there may be cases where
'a stitch in time would save nine'. At the end, we may sum up by saying that
the power is there but the exercise is discretionary which will be governed D
solely by the dictates of judicial conscience enriched by judicial experience
and practical wisdom of the Judge.

- The appeal is allowed. The order of the High Court refusing to entertain
. the petition filed by the appellant, holding it not maintainable, is set aside.
The petition shall stand restored on the file of the High Court, to be dealt E
with by an appropriate Bench consistently with the rules of the High Court,
depending on whether the petitioner before the High Court is seeking a writ
of certiorari or invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.

Costs made easy.

N.J. Appeal allowed.