Holding

The lease of the land together with the kaichalai is a composite lease of a building and land, and the kaichalai is a building under Section 2(2), so the Rent Control Act applies.

Summary

The appellant and respondent entered into a lease in 1936 for vacant land, a well and a structure called a "kaichalai" to operate a petrol pump. The lease was repeatedly extended, and the lessor later sought eviction under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, claiming demolition and denial of title. The central issue was whether the kaichalai, a modest shed, qualified as a "building" under Section 2(2) of the Act and whether the lease was a composite lease of both land and building, thereby bringing it within the Act's ambit. The Supreme Court held that the kaichalai fits the statutory definition of a building/hut and that the parties intended to lease both the land and the structure together, making it a composite lease covered by the Rent Control Act. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether a kaichalai (shed) constitutes a 'building' within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act.
Whether the lease in question is a composite lease of land and building, and if so, whether the Rent Control Act applies.
Whether the dominant intention test or the concept of inseparable letting should determine the applicability of the Act.

Legislation cited

Income Tax Act, 1922s. 12(4)
Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960s. 10(2)(vii), s. 14(1)(b), s. 2(2)
Tamil Nadu City Tenants' Protection Act, 1922

Subjects

leasebuilding definitionkaichalaicomposite leaserent controlTamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Actdominant intentioninseparable lettingevictionpetrol pump

Judgment

A SURYAKUMAR GOVINDJEE
v.
KRISHNAMMAL AJliD ORS.

APRIL 26, 1990
"-
B [S. RANGANATHAN AND A.M. AHMADI, JJ.]

Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act-Section
y
2 (2 )-'Building'-What is 'kaichalai'-Whether included.

On 9.6.1936 the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents execu-
ted a lease deed in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant,
c for a period of 15 years. The property leased out was vacant land, well
.T -~

and Kaichalai, and the lessee was permitted to construct on the vacant
land and instal petrol selling business. It was further stipulated that
after the expiry of the lease period the Jessee shall at his own expense 7
remove the structure put up by hint and deliver possession of the vacant
D land together with well and Kaichalai. The lease was extended from
time to time.

The lessor had itled petitions in 1962 and 1979 to evict the lessee
under the Madras Buildings (lease and Rent Control) Act, 1950 but
without success. Thereafter, in 1979 the present respondents instituted
E a petition for eviction of the lessee on the ground of demolition and .\c
reconstruction, and of wilful denial of title, within the meaning of Sec-
tions 14(1)(b) and 10(2)(vii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and
Rent Control) Act.

~
In the meantinte, the provisions of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants'
F Protection Act, 1922 were extended to the municipal limits of
Udomalpettai. Taking advantage of this, the lessee itled petition claint-
ing the benefit of compulsory purchase conferred on tenants of land ,;,.
under the said Act. The District Munsif-cum-Rent Controller allowed
the lessor's petition for eviction and dismissed the lessee's petition for
compulsory purchase. The Sub-Judge dismissed the appeals.
G
The lessee itled two revision petitions before the High Court which ,.
declined to interfere.
..A
Before this Court it was contened on behalf of the appellant that
the original lease comprised only of the vacant site, well and Kaichalai;
H the kaichalai was merely in the nature of a shed pnt up for the tethering

782
SURYAKUMAR v. KRISHNAMMAL 783

•
I of cattle and it was not a 'building' within the meaning of Section 2(2) of A
the Rent Control Act; though the small Kaichalai was situated in a
corner of the site, the lease intended by the parties was only that of the
site. It was further contended that where a lease was a composite one of
land and buildings, the court had to address itself to the primary or
dominant intention of the parties; if the intention was to lease a
B
building-the lease of land being adjunct or incidental, the Rent Cun-
.,..,,, trol Act would apply; on the other hand, if the dominant intention was
to lease a site-the presence of a building thereon not being considered
material by either party-the lease would not be one of a 'building'
covered by the Rent Control Act.

Larsen & Toubro case [1988] 4 SCC 260, relied upon. c
On behalf of the respondents it was contended that, in the case of
a composite lease, the existence of a building or hut on the land
(howsoever small, insignificant or useless it may be) was sufficient per
se to bring the lease within the scope of the Rent Control Act.
D
Irani v. Chidambaram Chettiar, AIR 1953 Madras 650 and Salay
Mohd. Saitv. J.M.S. Charity, [1969] 1MLJ--SC16, relied upon.

Dismissing the appeals, this Court,
/ E
HELD: (1) The Tamil_ word "kaichalai"' seems to denote a
structure or a roof put up by hand. Whatever may be the precise
meaning of the term, the definition in Section 2(2) of the Rent Act
clearly includes the 'kaicha/ai' in the present case. [789D]

L- (2) Since the Rent Act applies to residential and non-residential
buildings alike, the expression 'hut' cannot be restricted only to huts or
F
cottages intended to be lived in. It will also take in any shed, hut or
other crude or third class construction consisting of an enclosure made
of mid or by poles supporting a tin or asbestos roof that can be put to
use for any purpose, residential or non-residential, in the same manner
as any other fU"st class construction. [789E-F)
G
(3) In the case of composite lease of land and building, a question
may well arise whether the lease is one of land although there is a small
building or hut (whkh does not really fignre in the transaction) or of a
lease of the building (in which the lease of land is incidental) or a lease of
both regardless of their respective dimensions. [790G] H
784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

(4) It is not always necessary that there should he a dominant
A intention swaying the parties. There may he cases where all that is
intended is a joint lease of both the laud and the building without there
being any consideration sufficient to jnstify spelling out au intention to
-
give primacy to the land or the building. The test of dominant intention
or purpose may not he very helpful in such cases in the context of this
B legislation. [791F; 792B]

Sivarajan v. Official Receiver, AIR 1953 Trav. Co. 105; Naga-
mony v. 1iruchittambalam, AIR 1953 Trav. Co. 369; Official Trustee v.
United Commercial Syndicate, (1955] 1 MW 220; Raj Narain v. Shiv
Raj Saran, AIR 1969 RCJ 409; Venkayya v. Subba Rao, AIR 1957 AP
619; Uttam Chand v. Lalwani, AIR 1965 SC 716 and Dwarka Prasadv.
C Dwarkadas, [1976] 1SCR277.
,,.
(5) In the context of this case, we should he guided not by any
theory of dominant purpose hut by the consideration as to wbetber the
parties intended that the building and laud should go together or
D whether the lessor could have intended to let out the land without the
building. [794B]

Sultan Bros. P. Ltd. v. C./. T, (1964] 5 SCR 807, referred to.

(6) Having regard to all the facts and circumstances, the correct
E inference appears to he that what the lessor intended was a lease of both
the land and the building, this being a composite lease with a composite
purpose. In these circumstances, this letting would .come in within the
scope of Rent Control Act. [795C]

(7) Where a person teases a bnilding together "lfith land, lt seems
F impermissible in the absence of clear intention spelt out In the deed, to
dissect the lease as (a) of building and appurtenant land covered by the .~.
Rent Control Act and (b) of laud alone governed by other relevant
statutory provisions. What the parties have joined, the court cannot
tear as under. [796B]

G CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.
2044-45 of 1990.

From the Judgment and Order dated 18.8.1989 of the Madras
High Court in C.R.P. Nos. 4797 and 4798 of 1984.

H C.S. Vaidyanathau, K.V. Vishwanathan, K.V. Mohan, S.R.
Bhat and S.R. Setia for the Appellant.
SURYAKUMAR v. KRISHNAMMAL IRANGANATHAN, J.] 785

K. Parsaran and V. Balachandran for the Respondents.

--- I
The Judgment ot the Court was delivered by
A

RANGANATHAN, J. Special leave to appeal is granted and the
appeals are disposed of by a common order.
B
On 9.6.1936, Ramaswamy Gounder (the predecessor-in-interest
"' -·~ of the respondents) executed a lease deed in favour of Gopal Sait (the
predecessm-in-interest of the appellant). Certain passages from an
English translation of the lease deed (which was in vernacular) are

--~

~/
relevant for the purposes of the present case and they read thus:

"Whereas the property viz. vacant land well and Kaiehalai
etc. belongs to the party of the First part as his ancestral
c
property;

Whereas the said property was leased out to party of the
Second Part on a monthly rental of Rs.12-8-0 for 15 years D
and taken possession by the party of the second part from
party of the First part on 3.12.1935 ..... and the party of
the Second part for his convenience and at his own expenses
and costs (was) permitted to construct in the said vacant
/ land and instal petrol selling business ..........
E
(A)fter the expiry of lease period of 15 years i.e. on
12.2.1950 the lessee shall at his own expense remove the
structure put up by him and deliver possession of the

L_ vacant land together with well and kaichalai in the present
state ....
F
J' SCHEDULE

..... vacant land situated in this bounded on the North by
vacant land leased out for Burmah Oil Co. by the said
Ramaswamy Gounder Gopalji Ratnaswami ..... all these
vacant lands together with in the fourth plot measuring G
East to west 84 and North to South 16 together with half
).__ share in well therein together with tiled Kaichalai ...
together with door, doorways etc. There is no number fot
Kaichalai.

It is common ground that the total vacant area covered by the H
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I19901 2 S.C.R.

A lease was 3600'sq. ft. and that the kaichalai, referred to therein, was
thirty seven and a half by sixteen and a half feet i.e. of the extent of
about 600 sq. ft. It also appears that even though there was initially no
door number for the Kaicha/ai, it was eventually given door No. 82
and the suit premises we are concerned with bear door Nos. 80, 81 and
82.
B
The lease was extended for a period of two years from 1.1.51 by a
fresh deed dated 15 .1.5 lat an enhanced rent. This lease deed recited: --r'
"On the expiry of two years, i.e. on 31.12.52, the lessor has
no objection for the removal of the structure put up by .
c Burmah Sheil petrol pump etc except the extent of
structure of thirty seven and a half feet by sixteen and a half
-(
---
feet put up by the lessor ...... "

There was a fresh lease deed, again, executed on 2.1.53 for a further
period of three years at a higher rent. This deed also required the
D lessee, when delivering possession back to the lessor on the expiry of
the lease, to remove the structures put up by him or the Burrnah Shell
Co. Ltd. "except the structure measuring thirty seven and a half ft. by
sixteen and a half ft.".

The lessee appears to have continued to occupy the property
E even beyond 31.12.55 at a further enhanced rent. In 1962, we are told,
the lessor filed a petition to evict the lessee under s. 10(3)(a)(i) 1and
14(1)(b) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960,
alleging that he required the premises for personal occupation and for
bona fide immediate demolition. "The lessee defended the petition
saying that the premises do not require any immediate demolition,
F that the premises are used for non-residential purposes and kept in
good condition and that the petitioner's requirement for personal
occupation is not bona fide." The petition was dismissed by the Rent
Controller observing that the premises did not need demolition and
further that, as the premises had been leased out for non-residential
purposes and the landlord could not seek its conversion into residen-
G tial use without the controller's application, the petitioner's allegation
that he required it for personal use was neither tenable nor bona fide.

Ramaswamy Gounder filed a petition again in 1979 for the evic-
tion of the respondent but he died in February 1979 and the petition
filed by him was dismissed for default. Thereafter his legal representa-
H tives (the present respondents) instituted a petition for eviction
SURYAKUMAR v.)<RISHNAMMAL [RANGANATHAN, J.] 787

(R.C.O.P. 19/79 out of which the present proceedings have arisen) of

-----· I the respondents on the grounds of demolition and re-construction and
of wilful denial of title within the meaning of Ss. 14(l)(b) and·
10(2)(vii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act.
A

In the meantime, the provisions of the Madras City Tenants'
Protection Act, 1922 (Later renamed the Tamil Nadu City Tenants' B
Protection Act) were extended to the municipal limits of Udumalpet-
--7r'-· tai within which the premises in question were located. Talcing
advantage of this, the respondent filed 0 .P. 1/79 (in the same court of
District Munsif-cum-Rent Controller) claiming the benefit of com-
pulsory purchase conferred on tenants of land under the said Act. The
_-.,:. District Munsif-cum-Rent Controller allowed the lessor's petition for
eviction and dismissed the lessee's petition. The sub-judge, on appeal, c
dismissed the appeals with a slight modification. He was of the view
·.y· that, except for the kaichalai, the other buildings had been put up by
the respondents with the permission of the lessor and that, hence, he
was entitled to obtain compensation therefor by institution of seperate
appropriate proceedings. D

The respondent filed two rev1s10n petitions before the High
Court which declined to interfere. The learned Judge held:
~

? "I do not see any reason to interfere with the orders of the
courts below negativing the claim of the revision petitioner. E
In as much as admittedly the property situated in door No.
82 belonged to the landlord, this is a case to which section
14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent

L Control) Act 1960 will apply. However, the property bear-
ing door Nos. 80 and 81 belonged to the petitioner is the
finding. On that all that the tenant could ask for will be for F
+ removal of the superstructure. Beyond that his claim for
compensation also could not be ordered since there was no
prayer for the same. The decision in Mis. Larsen & Toubro
Ltd. v. The Trustees of Dharmamoorthy Rao Bahadur,
Calvala Cunnan Chetty's Charities by its Trustees, [1988] 2
LW 380 is distinguishable because this is a case of only one <ii
~
and a half grounds wherein there is a ,kaichalai of 600 sq. ft.
.......__ The removal shall take place within a period of three
.months from today. The Civil revision petitions are
dismissed."

Hence these two appeals. H
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

Though there have been claims made under the Rent Control
A
Act by the lessor and under the City Tenants' Protection Act by the
lessee, the claim under the latter has not been pressed before us by the
learned counsel for the appellant who has coiifined his arguments
before us to the only question whether the demised premises consti-
tute a "building" within the meaning of s. 2(2) of the Rent Control
B Act.

Sri C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned counsel for the appellants sub-
mitted that the first appellate court has found, modifying the trial
court's findings in this regard, that the original lease comprised only of
the vacant site, well and kaichalai and that all the other superstruc-
tures found in the demised premises had been put up by the appellant.
c He contended that the 'kaichalai' was merely in the nature of a shed
put up for the tethering of cattle and that it was not a 'building' within
the meaning of the Rent Control Act. Alternatively, he contended,
even if the Kaichalai could be considered to be a building this was not a
case of the lease of a building or hut with its appurtenant land: it was
D really a case of the lease of a vacant site to the petitioner on which was
situated a small hut in one comer. The lease deed itself recites that the
appellant had taken the premises for putting up a petrol pump. In fact
he did put in an underground storage tank, a petrol pump and other
structures and carried on a petrol and kerosene business thereon.
Though the small Kaichalai was situate in a comer of the site, the lease
E intended by the parties was only that of the site. The Kaichalai was no
doubt not demolished and, perhaps, the appellant also made use of it
for the purposes of his business but, says Sri Vaidyanathan, this made
no difference to the obvious and clear and dominant intention of both
parties that it was the site that was leased out for a petrol pump
business. Sri Vaidyanathan contended that the issue is directly gover-
F ned by the decision in the Larsen & Toubro case [1988] 4 SCC 260, to
which one of us was a party. He submitted that, where a lease is a
composite one of land and buildings, the court has to address itself to
the primary or dominant intention of the parties. If this is to lease a
building-the lease of land being adjunct or incidental-as in the
Larsen & Toubro, case (supra), the Rent Control Act would apply. On
G the other hand, if the dominant intention is to lease a site-the pre-
sence of a building thereon not being considered material by either
party-the lease would not be one of a 'building' covered by the Rent
Control Act, whether or not it can be considered as a lease only of a
vacant site governed by the City Tenant's Protection Act. Counsel
contended that it is possible that there may be a grey area of leases
H which might fall under neither Act and proceedings in respect of which
SURYAKUMAR v. KRISHNAMMAL (RANGANATHAN, J.) 789

may continue to be governed by the Transfer of Property Act, A
I unaffected by these special laws .
.-->---
The Rent Control Act contains a definition of the expression
'building' which reads as follows:

"2(2) 'building' means any building or hut or part of a B
building or a hut, let or to be let separatelv for residential

,~
-.,...., or non-residential purposes and includes-

(a) the gardens, grounds and out-houses, if any, appur-
tenant to such building, hut or part of such building or hut
'1· and let or to be let along with such building or hut,
L

(b) any furniture supplied by tile landlord for use in such
~
building or hut or part of a building or hut,

but does notinclude a room in a hotel or boarding house."
D
We have not been able to get at the exact meaning of the Tamil
word 'kaichalai'. It, however, seems to denote a structure or a roof put
up by hand. Whatever may be the precise meaning of the term, we
think that the definition in S. 2(2) clearly includes the kaichalai in the
"' ~ present case. Since the Act applies to residential and non-residential
' buildings alike, the expression 'hut' cannot be restricted only to huts or E
cottages intended to be lived in. It will also take in any shed, hut or
other crude or third class construction consisting of an enclosure made
of mud or by pole!l"supporting a tin or asbestos roof that can be put to
use for any purpose, residential or non-residential, in the same manner

L I
as any other first class construction. The kaichalai is a structure which
falls within the purview of the definition. Counsel for the appellant is
perhaps under-stating its utility by describing it as a mere cattle shed.
F
} The area of the shed is quite substantial and, as will be explained later,
the parties also appear to have attached some importance to its exis-
tence on the site. It is very difficult to hold, in view of the above
definition, that the kaichalai is not a 'building' within the meaning of
s. 2(2). G
~

On behalf of the respondents, it is contended that, in a compo-
.>-- site lease, the existence of a building or hut on the land (however
small, insignificant or useless it may be) is sufficient per se to bring the
lease within the scope of the Rent Control Act. It is suggested for the
respondent that it would be unarguable, once it is admitted or held H
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990) 2 S.C.R.

that the Kaichalai is a building and that the same has been let out, that
A
still there is no letting out of a building within the meaning of the Act.
In support of his contention, Sri Parasaran, for the respondent, placed
considerable reliance on Irani v. Chidambaram Chettiar, AIR 1953
Mad. 650. He pointed out that, in that case there was a vast vacant
land with only some stalls in one comer and a compound wall but it
B was nevertheless held to be a case of lease of a building. According to
him·, this case was not disapproved, but indeed indirectly approved, by
this Court in Salay Md. Sait v. J.M.S. Charity, [1969) 1 MLJ-SC 16
though certain other cases (where leases of vacant sites with only the
lessees' buildings thereon were i)eld to be leases of buildings) were
overruled in that decision. This case, according to him, decides that,
once there is a building on the land, however insignificant, and it is let
c out, the case will be governed by the Rent Control Act. We do not
think this case is an authority for such an extreme position. It rather
seems that the case was one decided on its own special facts. At the
time of the original lease by the landlord there was only a vacant site
and a few sm.all stalls. But, by the time the relevant lease deed (which
D came up for consideration) was executed, it had become the site of a
theatre. No doubt the theatre did not belong to the lessor; neverthe-
less for several years the leased property had .been sued as a theatre
and the purpose of the parties was clearly that the leased premises '
should continue be used as a cinema theatre. It was in this special i
situation that the Court came to the conclusion that it was plausible to
•
E hold the lease to be one of a building though if the structures not
belonging to the landlord were left out of account, there was only a
vacant site and a few stalls. We think it would not be correct to draw
support from this decision for the extreme proposition contended for
on behalf of the respondent. In our opinion, we have to travel beyond
this solitary fact, go further to look at th~ terms of the lease and the
F surrounding circumstances to find out what it is that the parties really
intended.

There is no difficulty in determining the scope of the lease where
a building and a piece of land are separately let out. But in the case of
composite lease of land and building, a question may well arise
G whether the lease is one of land although there is a small building or
hut on it (which does not really figure in the transaction) or one of a ~
lease of the building (in which the lease of land is incidental) or a lease
of both regardless of their respective dimensions. In determining ---"'
whether a particular lease is of the one kind of another, difficulties are
always bound to arise and it will be necessary to examine whether the
H parties intended to let out the building along with the lands or vice
SURYAKUMAR v. KRISHNAMMAL [RANGANATIIAN, J.] 791

versa. The decisions in Sivarajan v. Official Receiver, AIR 1953 Trav.
A
Co. 105; Nagamony v. Tiruchittambalam, AIR 1953 Trav. Co. 369;
Official Trusteev. United Commercial Syndicate, [1955) 1MLJ220 and
Raj Narain v. Shiv Raj Saran, AIR 1969 RCJ 409, relied upon by Sri
Vaidyanathan, were instances where what the parties had in mind was
only the lease of land, although there were certain petty structures
thereon which were not demolished or kept out of the lease but were B
also let out. They were clearly cases in which, we think, the applicabi-
• lity of the Rent Act was rightly ruled out. On the other hand, Larsen &
Toubro, [1988] 4 SCC 260 is a case where there was the lease of a
building although a vast extent of land was also included in the lease.
That was not a case which arose under the Rent Control Act but it
illustrates the converse situation. Sri Vaidyanathan wants to derive,
from the case referred to above and certain cases which deal with other c
aspects which become relevant while considering a composite letting, a
proposition that the dominant purpose of the letting should govern.
For instance, there are cases where factories, mills or cinema theatres
are leased out and cases have held that the dominant object is to lease
a factory, mill or theatre and that, even though in all these cases, the D
letting out of a building would be involved, the provisions of the Rent
Control Act would not apply vide Venkayya v. Subba Rao, AIR 1957
ti..P. 619; Uttam Chand v. Lalwani. AIR 1965 SC 716 and Dwarka
Prasad v. Dwarkadas, [1976) 1 SCR 277. But we think that this
approach also seeks to over simplify the problem. When we come
down to consider the terms of a particular lease and the intention of
the parties, there are bound to be a large variety of cases. If the
transaction clearly brings out a dominant intention and purpose as in
the cases cited above, there may be no difficulty in drawing a conclu-
sion one way or the other. But it is not always necessary that there
should be a dominant intention swaying the parties. There may be
cases where all that is intended is a joint lease of both the land and the F
building without there being any considerations ·sufficient to justify
spelling out an intention to give primacy to the land or the building.
For instance, where a person owns a building surrounded by a vast
extent of vacant lands (which may not all be capable of being described
appurtenant thereto, in the sense of being necessary for its use and
enjoyment) and a party comes to him and desires to take a lease G
thereof, he may do so because he is interested either in the building or
the land (as the case may be). But the ;,wner may very well say: "I am
not interested in your need or purpose. You may do what you like with
the land (or building). I have got a compact property consisting of both
and I want to let it out as such. You may take it or leave it." The fact in
such cases is that the owner has a building and land and he lets them H
792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

out together. He is not bothered about the purpose tor which the lease

'
A
is being taken by the other party. In such cases, it is very difficult to say
that there is no lease of building at all unless there is some contra
indication in the terms of the lease such as, for example, that the lessee
could demolish the structure. The test of dominant intention or
purpose may not be very helpful in such cases in the context of this
B legislation.

Sri Vaidyanathan sought to contend that the words of S. 2(2)
"any building ..... and gardens, grounds ..... let or to be let along
with it", import the concept that the dominant purpose should be a
letting of the building. We do not think that this is necessarily so. The
decision of this Court in Sultan Bros. P. Ltd. v. C.I. T., (1964] 5 SCR
, ,_
c 807 is of some relevance in this context. There the Supreme Court was
concerned with the interpretation of S. 12(4) of the Indian Income-tax
Act, 1922 which read:

"(4) Where an assessee lets on hire machinery plant or
D furniture belonging to him and also buildings, and the let-
ting of the buildings inseparable from the letting of the said
machinery, plant or furniture, he shall be entitled to allo-
wances in accordance with the provisions of the clauses
(iv), (v) and (vii) of sub-section (2) of section 10 in respect
of such buildings."

The High Court took the view that the plant and machinery and build-
ings should not only be inseparably let out but also that "the primary
letting must be of the machinery, plant or furniture and that together
with such letting or along with such letting there (should be) letting of
buildings." In that case, the High Court held, the primary letting was
F of the building and so S. 12(4) would not apply. The Supreme Court
did not approve of this reasoning. It said:

"Now the difficulty that we feel in accepting the view which
appealed to the High Court and the Tribunal is that we find
nothing in the language of sub-s. (4) of S. 12 to support it.
G No doubt the sub-section first mentions the letting of the
machinery, plant or furniture and then refers to the letting
of the building and further uses the word 'also' in connec-
tion with the letting of the building. We, however, think
that this is too slender a foundation for the conclusion that
the intention was that the primary letting must be of the
H rnachinery' plant or furnitures. In the absence of a much
SURYAKUMAR v. KR!SHNAMMAL IRANGANATHAN, JI 793

stronger indication in the language used, there is, no
A
warrant for saying_ that the sub-section contemplated that
the letting of the.building had to be incidental to the letting
of the plant, machinery or furniture. It is pertinent to ask
that if the intention was that the letting of the plant,
machinery· or furniture should be primary, why did not the
section say so? Furthermore, we find it practically impossi- B
ble to imagine how the letting of a building could be in
cidental to the letting of furniture, though we can see that
the letting of a factory building may be incideptal to the
letting of the machinery or plant in it for the object there
may be really to work the machinery. If we are right in our
view, as we think we are, that the letting of a building can
never be incidental to the letting of furniture contained in
c
it, then it must be held that no consideration of primary or
secondarv lettings arises inconstruing the section for what
must apply when furniture is let and also buildings must
equally apply when plant and machinery are let and also
buildings. We think all that sub-s. (4) of s. 12 contemplates D
is that the letting of machinery, plant or furniture should be
inseparable from the letting of the buildings."

The Court proceeded then to consider the concept of 'inseparable
letting' and observed:
E
"It seems to us that the inseparability referred to in sub-s.
(4) is an inseparability arising from the intention of the
parties. That intention may be ascertained by framing the
following questions: Was it the intention in making the
lease-and it mal!ers not whether there is one lease or two,
--~ that is, separate leases in respect of the furniture and the F
\
+ building-that the two should be enjoyed together? Was it
the intention to make the letting oi the two practically one
letting? Would one have been let alone or a lease of it
accepted without the other? If the answers to the first two
qustions are in the affirmative, and the last in the negative
then, in our view, it has to be held that it was intended that G
the lettings would be inseparable. This view also provides a
justification for taking the case of the income frcim the
lease of a building out of s. 9 and putting it under s. 12 as
a residuary head of income. It then becomes a new kind of
income, not covered by s. 9, that is, income not from the
ownership of the building alone but an income which H
794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990) 2 S.C.R.

• though arising from a building would not have arisen if the
A plant, machinery and furniture had not also been let along
with it."

Though the context was somewhat different, the observations in that
case are of great assistance. We think that, in the context here also, we
B should be guided not by any theory of dominant purpose but by the
consideration as to whether the parties intended that that the building
and land should go together or whether the lessor could have intended
to let out the land without the building. The latter inference can
perhaps be generally drawn in certain cases where only the lease of
land dominated the thoughts of the parties but the mere fact that the
building is small or that the land is vast or that the lessee had in mind a
c particular purpose cannot be conclusive.

Let us now tum, in the above background, to a consideration of
the lease deed in the present case. As already mentioned, counsel for
the appellant strongly relies on the purpose of the lease and seeks to
D make out that the building (kaichalai) was not really a significant part
of the lease. This contention is stoutly refuted on behalf of the respon-
dents. It is pointed out that the kaichalai was of substantial dimensions
and that counsel for the appellant is not right in characterising it as a
mere cattle shed. It is pointed out that the shed was also admittedly
used by the appellants for the purposes of its business and there is
E nothing to show that this was also not in contemplation at the time of
the lease. Again it is pointed out that, in some parts of the lease deeds,
the vernacular version gives first place to the kaicha/ai rather than to
the vacant site. Also, every one of the lease deeds attaches special
emphasis that the kaichalai should not be removed but should be
returned to the lessor without any damage. We may also advert to one
-
F more circumstance which shows beyond doubt that th~ kaichalai was
not an insignificant stmcture. We have earlier referred to the fact that +
Ramaswamy Gounder had filed an earlier eviction petition on the
ground that he needed the premises for personal occupation and
immediate demolition. The lessee's defence to this was not that the
kaichalai was a cattle-shed unfit for personal occupation. The defence
G was that it had been let out for a non-residential purpose and could not
be converted to residential use without permission. This certainly
demonstrates that the kaichalai was capable of use both for residential
and non-residential purposes. Counsel for the respondent, in fact,
wanted to go a little further and hold it against the appellant that he
had not taken in those proceedings the plea, now put forward, that the
rl Rent Control Act could not at all be invoked. We will not, however,
SURYAKUMAR v. KRISHNAMMAL IRANGANATHAN .I) 795
''\

~
hold this against the appellant as, at that tune, the benefits of the
A
Tenants' Protection Act had not been extended to Udumalpettai and
the tenant would not have gained anything by raising any such point.
But the pleadings in those proceedings as well° as the order of the Rent
Controller therein leave no doubt that the kaichalai was a material
structure let out as such to the lessee for non-residential purposes and
which, with necessary permission, could also have been used;for res1- B
dential purposes. Having regard to all these circumstances, the correct
~-·
inference appears to be that what the lessor intended was a lease of
both the land and the building; The land was to be put to use for a
petrol pump; so far as the building was concerned, the lessee was at
-,. liberty to use it as he liked but he had to maintain it in good condition
and return it at the end of the lease. This was a composite lease with a
composite purpose. It is difficult to break up the integrity of the lease c
/
as one of land alone or of· building alone. In these circumstances, we
-.:·
think this letting would come in within the scope of the Rent Control
Act, for the reasons already explained.

Before concluding, we may touch upon two more relevant D
aspects. The first is the use of the word "separately" ins. 2(2). This,
however, does not affect our above construction of the section. That
word is intended to emphasise that, for purposes of the Act, a building
means any unit comprising the whole or part of a building that is
/ separately let out. It does not mean-it cannot 'mean-that composite
leases of land and building would not be covered by it. That would be E
clearly contrary to the language of the whole clause which specifically
talks of joint letting of land and building. The second is the restriction
of the applicability of s. 2(2) to cases of letting of building and
appurtenant lands only. It may be suggested that the lands here are not
~ "appurtenant" except perhaps to the extent required for providing
\
access to the Kaichalai. This argument is not very helpful to the appel- F
+ !ants. At best, it can mean that the Kaichalai and only a part of land
needed for its enjoyment or use would be governed by the Rent Con-
trol Act. But this was not the contention of the appellant and no
attempt has been made to ascertain what the extent of such "appurten-
ant" land could be. That apart, we are inclined to think that the word
"appurtenant" has, in the context, a much wider meaning. It is not just G
restricted to land which, on a C?nsideration of the circumstances, a
_....___ court may consider necessary or imperative for its enjoyment. It
should be construed as comprehending the land which the parties con-
sidered appropriate to Jet along with the building. To hold to the
contrary may give rise to practical difficulties. Suppose there is, in the
middle of a metropolis, a bungalow with a vast extent of land sur- H
796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] 2 S.C.R.

A rounding it such as for e.g. in the Larsen & Toubro case and this is let
out to a tenant. If a very strict and narrow interpretation is given to the
word "appurtenant", it is arguable that a considerable part of the
surrounding land is surplus to the requirements of the lessee of the
building. But, we think, no argument is needed to say that such a lease
would be a lease of building for the purposes of the Rent Control Act.
B Where a person leases a building together with land, it seems impermis-
sible in the absence of clear intention spelt out in the deed, to dissect
the lease as. (a) of building and appurtenant land covered by the Rent
Control Act and (b) of land alone governed by other relevant statutory
provisions. What the parties have joined, one would think, the court
cannot tear as under. In fact, we may point out that a wider meaning
C for this word was convassed in Irani v. Chidambaram Chettiar, AIR
1953 Madras 650 which the court had no necessity to 'go into in the
view taken by it on the interpretation of the lease deed. In this case
also no contention has been raised in regard to this aspect and so we
shall also leave open the precise connotation of the word except to say
that it may warrant a wide meaning in the context.
D
For the reasons discussed above, we see no grounds to interfere
with the judgments of the courts below. The appeal is dismissed but we
make no order as to costs.

R.S.S. Appeal dismissed.

+