Holding

Material discrepancies in the sole witness's testimony render the prosecution case unreliable, and the conviction cannot be sustained; the maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" is not a mandatory rule in India.

Summary

Syed Ibrahim was convicted under Section 302 IPC for the murder of his wife based solely on the testimony of the deceased's father, PW I. The High Court upheld the conviction despite noting inconsistencies in PW I's evidence. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether a conviction can rest on a solitary witness whose testimony contains material discrepancies, and whether the maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" applies in Indian law. The Court held that PW I's statements were riddled with material contradictions regarding the time, place, and manner of the incident, rendering the prosecution's case unreliable. It clarified that the maxim is not a mandatory rule and that material discrepancies can defeat the prosecution even if some evidence remains. Consequently, the conviction was set aside and the appellant was acquitted.

Issues considered

Can a conviction for murder be sustained on the sole testimony of a witness who exhibits material discrepancies?
Does the maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" mandate the rejection of all evidence if part of it is false?
Is the number of witnesses a factor under Section 134 of the Evidence Act for proving a fact?
Was the place of occurrence of the alleged murder established beyond reasonable doubt?

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 134
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302

Subjects

murderIPC 302solitary witnessmaterial discrepancyfalsus in uno falsus in omnibusEvidence Act Section 134burden of proofacquittal

Judgment

SYED IBRAHIM A
v.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

JULY 27, 2006

[ARIJIT PASAYAT AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, JJ.] B

Penal Code. 1860-Seclion 302-Murder-Solitary wilness-Appellant
convicted by Cour/s below for murdering his wife-Conviction based upon the
sole testimony of PW I, the deceased's father-Conviction challenged-Held: C
Evidence on record disproves veracity of PWJ s evidence to a large extent-
Place of occurrence itself not being established, prosecution version cannot
be accepted-High Court erred in lightly brushing aside the apparent
inconsistencies/ discrepancies in evidence by observing Iha/ PW I was
illiterale-Appellant accordingly acquitted.
D
Ma-rims-Principle of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus"-Explained.

Evidence-Discrepancies in-Normal discrepancies and material
discrepancies-Distinguished

Evidence Act, 1872-Seclion 134-Number of wilnesses-Nol re/evanl E
for proof of any fact, material evidence-Prosecution lo succeed even if !here
is a solitary cogent and credible wilness.

Appellant allegedly stabbed his wife with a knife causing multiple

-
injuries resulting in her death. Trial Court found the appellant guilty
under Section 302, IPC based on the testimony of PWt, the father of the F
deceased and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. PWl is the
solitary witness who claimed to have seen the occurrence. High Court
upheld the conviction. Hence the present appeal.

In appeal before this Court it was contended that the High Court G
its:M having noticed that the evidence of PWl was not fully credible, erred
in holding that the same was sufficient to hold the appellant guilty.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

105 H
106 Sl!PREME COURT REPORTS [2006] Sl'.PP. 4 S.C.R.

A HELD: I.I. Stress was laid by the accused-appellants on the non-
acceptance of evidence tenden!d by PWI to a large extent to contend about
desirability to throw out entire prosecution case. In essence prayer is to
apply the principle of "fals11s in 11no fi1/sus in omnibus" (false in one thing,
false in everything). This plea is clearly untenable. 1111-CI

B 1.2. Even if major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in
case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, his conviction can
be maintained. It is the duty of Court to separate grain from chaff. Where
chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open to the Court to convict
an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be
C deficient, or to be not wholly credible. Falsity of material particular would
not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim ''jidsus in uno fa/sus in
omnibus" has no application in India and the witness or witnesses cannot
be branded as liar(s). It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts
to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must
be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of
D evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it
is not what may be called a mandatory rule of evidence. [ 111-D-FI

1.3. An attempt has to be made in terms of felicitous metaphor,
separate grain irom the chaff, truth from falsehood. Where it is nut
frasible to separate truth from falsehood, because grain and chaff are
E inextricably mixed up, and in the process of separation an absolutely new
case !Jas to be reconstructed by divorcing essential details presented by
the prosecution completely from the context and the background against
which they are made, the only available course to be made is to discard
the evidence in toto. (112-B-CI

f 1.4. While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a
party's case, material discrepancies do so. Normal discrepancies in
evidence are those which are due to normal errors of observation, normal
errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as
shock and horror at the time of occurrence and those are always there
G however honest and truthful a witness may be. Material discrepancies are
those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person. Courts
have to label the category to which a discrepancy may be categorized.
[112-D-E[

Nisar Alli v. The State of Uuar Pradesh, AIR (1957) SC 366; Gurcharan
H Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab. AIR (1956) SC 460: Sohrab s/o Be/i Nayata
SYED IBRAHIM v. ST ATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH I 07

andAnr. v. TheStateofMadhyaPradesh, 1J97213SCC751; UgarAhirand A
Ors. v. The State of Bihar, AIR (1965) SC 277; Zwinglee Ariel v. State of
Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1954) SC 15; Ba/aka Singh and Ors. v. The State of
Puniab, (19751 4 SCC 511; State of Rajasthan v. Smt Kalki and Anr., ( 19811
2 SCC 752; Krishna Moc hi and Ors. v. State of Bihar etc., 120021 6 SCC 81;
Sucha Singh v, State of Punjab, 1200317 SCC 643; Zahira H. Sheikh v. State B
of Gujarat, 120041 4 SCC 158; Ram Udgar Singh v. State of Bihar, 120041
10 SCC 443; Gorle S. Naidu v. State of And[lra Pradesh. 12003112 SCC 449
and Gubba/a Venugopalswamy V, State of Andhra Pradesh, 120041 10 sec
120, relied on.

2. Merely because PWI was the solitary witness who claimed to have C
seen the occurrence, that cannot be a ground to discard his evidence, in
the background of what has been stated in Section 134 of the Evidence
Act, 1872. No particular number of witnesses are required for the proof
of any fact, material evidence and not number of witnesses has to be taken
note of by the courts to ascertain the truth of the allegations matle. D
Therefore, if the evidence of PW 1 is accepted as cogent and credible, then
the prosecution is to succeed. (112-G-H; 113-AI

3. The testimony of PWI was to the effect that after witnessing a
part of the occurrence he had run to the police station and had come back
within about five minutes. The evidence on record dis-proves veracity of E
this part of his evidence. The occurrence is alleged to have taken place at
about to P.M. and the FJR was lodged at the police station at about I 1.30
P.M. PWI and the investigating officer accepted that it will take nearly
one hour for somebody on foot to reach the police station considering the
distance of the alleged place of occurrence and the police station.
1113-A-CI F
4. Further, PWI accepted in the cross examination that the report
(Ex.Bl) was written in the police station in the presence of sub inspector
and a constable. But in his examination-in-chief, he had stated that he had
got written the report by somebody at a hotel and the person normally G
writes petitions. No particulars of this person who allegedly scribed the
report, not even his name, was stated by PWI. His evidence is further to
the effect that he alone had come to the police station where the report
was lodged and that is how he admitted that the report was written at the
police station. This may not appear to be that important a factor
considering the illiteracy of PWt. But there is another significant factor H
A
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (20061 SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

which completely destroys the prosecution version and the credibility of
PWI as a witness. He has indicated four different places to be the place
of occurrence. In his examination in chief he stated that the occurrence
.
took place in his house. In the cross-examination he stated that the incident
took place at the house of his wife-the deceased's mother. This is a very
important factor considering the undisputed position and in fact the
B admission of PWI that he and his wife were separated nearly two decades
ai~o, and that he was not in visiting terms with his wife. Then the question
would automatically arise as to how in spite of strained relationship he
could have seen the occurrence as alleged in the house of his wife. That is
not the end of the matter. In his cross examination PWI further stated
c that the incident happened in the small lane in front of the house of his
wife. This is at clear variance with the statement that the occurrence took
place inside the house where allegedly he, the deceased, his son-PW2 and
daughters PWs. 3 and 6 were present. That is not the final say of the
witness. He accepted that in the FIR (Ex. Bl) he had stated the place of
occurrence to be the house of the deceased. Though the FIR is not a
D
substantive evidence yet, the same can be used to test the veracity of the
witness. PWI accepted thdt what was stated in the FIR was correct. When
the place of occurrence itself has not been established it would be not
proper to accept the prosecution version. 1113-C-H)

E S. Above being the position the High Court was not right in lightly
brushing aside the apparent inconsistencies and discrepancies by making
a general observation that PWI is an illiterate person. 1114-AI

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 798 of
2006.
F
From the Judgment dated 23.8.2006 of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh ...
at Hyderbad in Criminal Appel No. 511fl997.

A. Subba Rao for the Appellant.

G D. Bharathi Reddy for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. Leave granted.
H Challenge m this Appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division .,.,.
-
SYED IBRAHIM v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH (PASAYAT. J.] I 09

Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court upholding the conviction of the A
appellant for an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (in short the '!PC'). The trial comt had found the appellant guilty
of murdering his wife on I 0.1. I 994. The accused was sentenced to undergo
imprisonment for life. Accused challenged the conviction and sentence by
filing an appeal before the High Court which was numbered as Criminal
Appeal No. 511 of 1997. Initially by order dated 30.4.1998 a Division Bench B
of the High Court allowed the Appeal. The respondent-State filed an appeal
before this Court. Since the order passed by the High Court was practically
unreasoned, without expressing any opinion on merits, the judgment was set
aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal. The
High Court by the impugned judgment dismissed the appeal confirming the C
order of the conviction and sentence passed by learned Session Judge, Guntur.

The background facts, as projected by prosecution during trial in a
nutshell are as follows:

Durbhakula Lakshmi (hereinafter referred to as the "deceased") was D
living with the appellant (hereinafter referred to as the "accused") since about
15 years and gave birth to two children. On I 0.1.1994, at about IO.A.M.
while the deceased, her father-Durbhakula Yenkateswarlu (PW!), her brother,
Durbhakula Ramu (PW2) and her sister, Durbhakula Kumari (PW3) were
talking in their house, the accused came there, abused the deceased in filthy E
language and questioned the deceased as to why she returned to her father's
house without informing him and why she gave information to the Railway
police about his movements. By that time Gopisetty Nagamani (PW6) had
reached there. He grew wild, caught hold of her hair and stabbed with a knife

-
causing multiple injuries. When PWs. I to 3 came to her rescue, the accused
fled away from the scene of offence pushing and threatening them with dire F
consequences. Makkalla Ankulu and Mekala Krishnavenamma (PW4) came
out their house and noticed the incident. Mothati Setharavamma and Mekala
Yenkaiah, who were the immediate neighbours of PW-1 noticed the accused
fleeing away from the scene of offence.

On the strength of Ex.P-1 report given by PW I, i.e. Cr!. No. I/94 for G
alleged commission of offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. was
registered by T. Murli Krishna, SI (PW! I) and K. Suba Rao (PWl2) took up
investigation, visited the scene of offence, prepared Ex.P-20 rough sketch of
the scene, prepared Ex P-7 observation report and conducted inquest over the
dead body of the deceased under Ex.P-8-panchanama, in the presence of H
A
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20061 SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

C.K. Reddy (PW7) and others. During inquest, Exs. P-13 to P-16 photographs
of the deceased were taken. Exs. P-9 to P-12 are the corresponding negatives.
-
PW-12 also seized blood stained earth and control earth (M.Os. 2 and 3) and
also a pair of hawai chappals (M.0.-1) from the scene of offence. Dr. K.P.
Rao (PWIO), Medical Officer conducted autopsy over the dead body and
B issued Ex.P-17-Post Mortem Certificate. The accused who was found lodged
in Adoni Sub Jail in another case was produced before the trial Court. The
trial court framed a charge against the accused for commission of offence
punishable under Section 302 l.P.C., to which the accused pleaded not guilty
and claimed to be tried.

C To prove its case, the prosecution in all, examined 12 witnesses, namely
PWs. I to 12 and marked Exs. P-1 and P-27 and M.Os I to 6. Exs.D-1 and
D-2 are the contradictions marked in Section 16 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code') statement of PW-6. After completion
of trial and after hearing both sides and on considering the material available
on record. the learned Sessions Judge found the accused guilty for the offence
D under Section 302 1.P.C., and accordingly convicted and sentenced him to
undergo imprisonment for life. The Trial Court found that evidence of all
other so-called eye witnes:;es did not help the prosecution as they departed
from the version given during investigation and the case hinged on the evidence
of PW I. His evidence was accepted.
E As noted above, an appeal was filed before the High Court questioning
correctness of the judgment of the trial court.

The High Court noticed that except PW!, the father of the deceased, no
other witnesses supported the prosecution version. However, the High Court
F found that the evidence of PW I i.e. the father of the deceased, was sufficient
enough to fasten the guiit on the accused. Accordingly the appeal was
dismissed.

In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that the High Court itself noticed that the evidence of PW I was not fully
G credible as he was speaking half truth and was giving an exaggerated version.
Though the evidence was found to be largely inconsistent. yet it was held
that the same was sufficient to hold the accused guilty. It was pointed out that
the approach of the High Court is clearly unsustainable. The evidence of
PW I is full of contradictions and after having held that he was not speaking
H the truth and/or was exaggerating, the High Court should not have placed
SYED IBRAHIM v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [PASAYAT, J.] I 11
.... reliance on his evidence to hold the appellant guilty. It was further submitted A
that only on the version of a single witness whose evidence was discarded to
a large extent, the trial court and the High Court should not have held the
accused-appellant guilty.

In response, learned counsel for the respondent-State submitted that
even if it is accepted, as was observed by the High Court, that PWI was not B
speaking the truth yet his evidence was sufficient to establish that the accused
was guilty.

Stress was laid by the accused-appellants on the non-acceptance of
evidence tendered by PWI to a large extent to contend abuut desirability to
throw out entire prosecution case. In essence prayer is to apply the principle
c
of "fa/sus in uno fa/sus in omnibus" (false in one thing, false in everything).
This plea is clearly untenable. Even if major portion of evidence is found to
be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, his
conviction cdn be maintained. It is the duty of Court to separate grain from
chaff. Where chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open to the D
Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been
found to be deficient, or to be note wholly credible. Falsity of material
particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim "falsus in
uno falsus in omnibus" has no application in India and the witness or witnesses
.
~
cannot be branded as liar(s). The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus"
has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the
E
status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is
that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be
disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence
which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what
may be called 'a mandatory rule of evidence. (See Nisar Alli v. The State of F
Uttar Pradesh, AIR (1957) SC 366. In a given case, it is always open to a
Court to diffuentiate accused who had been acquitted from those who were
convicted where there are a number of accused persons. (See Gurucharan
Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab, AIR (1956) SC 460.) The doctrine is a
dangerous one specially in India for if a whole body of the testimony were
to be rejected, because witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some G
aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come
to a dead-stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to a story,
however, true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as
to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in
' some respects the Court considers the same to be insufficient for placing H
-
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f2006J SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a
matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respect as well. The evidence
has to be sifted with care. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the
reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not
contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or
embellishment. (See Sohrab slo Beli Nayata and Anr. v. The State of Madhya
8 Pradesh, [ 1972] 3 SCC 751 and Ugar Ahir and Ors. v. The State of Bihar,
AIR (1965) SC 277). An attempt has to be made to. as noted above, in terms
of felicitous metaphor, separate grain from the chaff, truth from falsehood.

C
Where it is not feasible to separate truth from falsehood, because grain and
chaff are inextricably mixed up, and in the process of separation an absolutely
new case has to be reconstructed by divorcing essential details presented by
the prosecution completely from the context and the background against
which they are made, the only available course to be made is to discard the
-
evidence in toto. (See Zwinglee Ariel v. State of Madhya Pradesh. AIR
(1954) SC 15 and Ba/aka Singh and Ors. v. The State o.f Punjab, (1975] 4
SCC 511 ]. As observed by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Smt Kalki and
D Anr.. [ 1981] 2 sec 752, normal discrepancies in evidence are those which
an: due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to
lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time
of occurrence and those are always there however honest and truthful a
v. ;tness may be. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and
E not expected of a normal person. Courts have to label the category to which
a discrepancy may be categorized. While nonnal discrepancies do not corrode
the credibility of a party's case, material discrepancies do so. These aspects
were highlighted in Krishna Mochi and Ors. v. State of Bihar etc., [2002) 6
sec 81 and in Sucha Singh V. State of Punjab, [2003) 7 sec 643. It was
further illuminated in the Zahira H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, [2004) 4 SCC
F I 58, Rum Udgur Singh v. Stale of Bihar. [2004) I 0 SCC 443, Corle S. Naidu
v. Slate of Andhra Pradesh. [2003) 12 SCC 449 and in Gubbala
l"enugopu!swamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [2004] I 0 SCC 120.

In the background of principles set out above it is to be seen how far
G the evidence of PW I is cogent and credible. Merely because he was the
solitary witness who claimed to have seen the occurrence, that cannot be a
ground to discard his evidence, in the background of what has been stated in
Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the ' Evidence Act'). No
particular number of witnesses are required for the proof of any fact, material
evidence and not number of witnesses has to be taken note of by the courts
H to ascertain the truth of the allegations made. Therefore, if the evidence of
SYED IBRAHIM v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [PASAYAT, .I.] 113
•
PW I is accepted as cogent and credible, then the prosecution is to succeed. A
It is to be noted that PW I-father of the appellant, claimed to have set law into
motion. The testimony of PW I was to the effect that after witnessing a part
of the occurrence he had run to the police station and had come back within
about five minutes. The evidence on record dis-proves veracity of this part
of his evidence. The occurrence is alleged to have taken place and at about B
I 0 P.M. the FIR was lodged at the police station at about 11.30 P.M. PW!
and the investigating officer accepted that it will take nearly one hour for
somebody on foot to reach the police station considering the distance of the
alleged place of occurrence and the police station. There is another interesting
factor PW! accepted in the cross examination that the report (Ex.BI) was
written in the police station in the presence of sub inspector and a constable. C
But in his examination-in-chief, he had stated that he had got written the
report by somebody at a hotel and the person normally writes petitions. No
particulars of this person who allegedly scribed the report, not even his name,
was stated by PW I. His evidence is further to the effect that he alone had
come to the police station where the report was lodged and that is how he
admitted that the report was written at the police station. This may not appear D
to be that important a factor considering the illiteracy of PW I. But there is
another significant factor which completely destroys the prosecution version
and the credibility of PW I as a witness. He has indicated four different
places to be the place of occurrence. In his examination in chief he stated that
the occurrence took place in his house. In the cross-examination he stated E
that the incident took place at the house of his wife-the deceased's mother.
This is a very important factor considering the undisputed position and in
fact the admission of PW I that he and his wife were separated nearly two
decades ago, and that he was not in visiting terms with his wife. Then the
question would automatically arise as to how in spite of strained relationship
he could have seen the occurrence as alleged in the house of his wife. That F
is not the end of the matter. In his cross examination he further stated that
the incident happened in the small lane in front of the house of his wife. This
is at clear variance with the statement that the occurrence took place inside
the house where allegedly he, the deceased, his son··PW2 and daughters PWs.
3 and 6 w::re present. That is not the final say of the witness. He accepted G
that in the FIR (Ex. BI) he had stated the place of occurrence to be the house
of the deceased. Though the FIR is not a substantive evidence yet, the same
can be used to test the veracity of the witness. PWI accepted that what was
stated in the FIR was correct. When the place of occurrence itself has not
been established it would be not proper to accept the prosecution version.
H
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006J SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Above being the position the High Court was not right in lightly brushing
aside the apparent inconsistencies and discrepancies by making a general
observation that the PW 1 is an illiterate person. Above being the position the
impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. The accused be set at
liberty forthwith unless he is required to be in custody 111 connection with any
other case.
B
Appeal is allowed.

B.B.B. Appeal allowed.