Holding

The appellant’s allegations constitute criminal contempt; the High Court has jurisdiction to punish contempt while trying an election petition; and the limitation provision of Section 20 does not bar the continuation of the contempt proceedings.

Summary

T. Deen Dayal, a Rajya Sabha candidate, filed a transfer application in an election petition alleging bias and corruption against the presiding judge. The judge deemed the allegations baseless and scandalous, initiating suo moto contempt proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The High Court convicted Dayal of criminal contempt and sentenced him to three months' simple imprisonment. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the allegations were ex‑facie contumacious, that the High Court, while trying an election petition, is a court of record with jurisdiction to punish contempt, and that Section 20 of the Contempt Act only limits the *initiation* of proceedings, not their conclusion. Consequently, the contempt proceedings were not time‑barred and the conviction was upheld.

Issues considered

Whether the allegations in the transfer application amount to criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Whether the High Court, while adjudicating an election petition, has jurisdiction to initiate suo moto contempt proceedings despite Article 329(b).
Whether the contempt proceedings are barred by the limitation provision of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Whether procedural orders of the trial judge (e.g., the order of 25.4.85) discharged the appellant and affected continuation of contempt proceedings.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 215, s. Article 329(b)
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 13, s. 15, s. 19(1)(b), s. 20, s. 2(c)
General Clauses Act, 1897
Representation of the People Act, 1951s. 80A, s. 98

Subjects

criminal contempthigh court jurisdictionelection petitionlimitation periodcontempt of courts actArticle 215Article 329(b)scandalising the court

Judgment

T. DEEN DAY AL A
.v.
'.
THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA'PRADESH .

SEPTEMBER 10, 1997
I ·. . . .. .
[QR. A.S. ANAND AND K. VENKATASWAMI, JJ.] B

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 : Sections 2(c), 19(1) (b)-:-Election
Petition before High. Court-:-Transfer applicatio~ filed-Baseless a/legation
levelled against the Judge-Suo moto contempt proceedings initiated-Held, C
the allegations :ex-facie contum"acious and the scurrilous attack was intended
to· scandalise the Court-Guilty of contempt of court.

Contempt of Courts Act, I 97 I : Section 20-Limitation-Contempt
proceedings initiated on· 16.4.85-Allegation containing contempt affidavit
filed on 27.3.85-Held Contempt proceedings not barred by li:nitation-Act D
merely provides for limitation' to initiate the proceedings and not for the
conclusion of contempt proceedings.

Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 215 and 329(b)-Election Petition
filed before High Court-Held, High Court has jurisdiction to take action for
co~tempt of Court while trying an election petition-Representation of the E
People Act, 1951 : Ss. BOA and 98. ·

The appellant, a. candidate for biennial elections to Rajya Sabha filed an
Election Petition in the High Court In the said election petition, the appellant
filed a miscellaneous application dated 27.3.1985 requesting Hon'ble Chief F
Justice of High Court to transfer the election petition before some other judge.
Certain baseless allegations with a view to scandalise the Court were made
in the application. Contempt proceedings were initiated against the appellant
on 16.4.85 and the matter was heard by a Division Bench of High Court. The
appellant was not regular in appearing before the Court and bailable and non-
bailable warrants were issued to secure. his presence. In the meantime th_e G
appellant approached this Court for early disposal of the contempt petition.
Directions were issued by this Court for disposing ofthe contempt petition
within six weeks. The.High Court by its order dated 15.7.1989 held the
appellant guilty of contempt of court and sentenced him to undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of three months. Hence the present appeal. H
39
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A The contention of the appellant was that the contempt petition was time
barred under section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It was also
contended that the High Court dealing with an election petition must be
deemed functioning as an 'authority' only and not as a court and therefore
has no jurisdiction to issue suo moto notice under the Contempt of Courts
B Act
Dismissing the appeal, ttiis Court

HELD : 1. The allegations constituting the contempt are ex-facie
contumacious and the scurrilous attack was intended to scandalise the court
C within the meaning of criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt
of Courts Act, 1971. Such attack is punishable as contempt for the reason
that it tends to create distrust in the popular mind and impairs confidence of
the people in courts which are of prime importance to the litigants in the
protection of their rights and liberties. (47-F]

D Jn Re S. Mulgaokar, (1978) 3 SCC 339, held applicable.

2. The High Court was right in holding that Section 20 of the Act
merely provides for limitation to initiate the proceedings and not for the
conclusion of contempt proceedings. The proceedings were initiated by order
E dated 16.4.85 whereas the.allegations constituting contempt were contained
in an affidavit filed on 27.3.1985. Besides the delay was on the part of the
appellant also in not appearing before the Court on the date or' hearing,
necessitating the High Court to issue initially bailable warrant and later on
non-bailable warrant to secure his presence. Thus the contempt proceedings
are not barred by limitation. [47-C-D]
F
3. The High Court has jurisdiction to take action for contempt of court
as a 'Court ofrecord' under Article 215 of the Constitution, while trying an
election petition. [47-A]

G CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 451
of 1989.

From the Judgment and Order dated 11.7.89 of the Aridhra Pradesh High
Court in Cont~mpt Case No. 60 of 1985.

H Appellant-in-Person.
...
T.D. DAY AL v. HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH [K. VENKATASWAMI, J.] 4J
K. Ram Kumar, T.V.S. _Narasimhachari arid Ms. Asha, Nair .for the A
Respondent.

the Judgment of the Court was delivered by

K. VEN KAT ASWAMI, J. This appeal under Section 19(1 )(b) of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter called the 'Act') is preferred against B
the judgment dated 15. 7 .89 of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court punishing the appellant after finding him guilty of contempt -of court
with simple imprisonment for a period of three months.

The appellant contested the biennial elections to Rajya Sabha held in
the year 1984. In that connection, he filed an Election Petition No. 1/84 on the C
file of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. That Election Petition was tried by
Mr. Justice Upendralal Waghray. During the hearing of the said Election
Petition, the appellant filed a Miscellaneous Application being S.R. No. 16572/
85 .requesting the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh High Court to
withdraw the said Election Petition from the Court of Mr. Justice Upendralal D
Waghray and transfer the same to some other learned Judge. In the said
Miscellaneous Application for transfer, the appellant made the following
allegations :

"It is alleged that his lordship the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Upendralal
Waghray is under the evil influence of Sri N. T. Rama Rao, Chief E
Minister of Andhra Pradesh, ·because of his relative, Mr: Shravan ·
Kumar, I.A.S., Chief Secretary to.the Chief Minister Sri N.T. Rama Rao,
since the said Mr. Shravan Kumar. is behind the fraud in connection
with the.resignation of the 1st respondent, viz., Mr. P. ,Radhakrishna
from .the membership of the A.P. Public Service Commission ..... In . F
these circumstances, I submit that his lordship the Hon'ble Mr. Justice
Upendralal Waghray cannot do justice to me in the above election
petition and request that the Hon 'ble Chief Justice, High Court of
'·· Artdhra Pradesh, at Hyderabad inay be pleased to withdraw the election ·
petition from the file of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice u·pendralal Waghray
and make it over to some other Judge ......". G
On perusing these allegations, the foamed Judge felt that the allegations
made against him were not only baseless but also made recklessly with a view
to scandalise the Court. Accordingly, the learned Judge passed an order on
16.4.85 holding that the allegatfon made in the Transfer Application 'amounts
to interference with, and obstruction to administration of justice, amounting . H
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A to 'criminal contempt' as defined in Section 2(c) of the Act. Hence, the learned
Judge proposed initiation of contempt proceedings against the appellant and
issued notice to the appellant to put forward his defence and adjourned the
matter to 25.4.85. On the adjourned date, the learned Judge directed the
papers to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for placing the matter
before any other learned Judge. In the first instance, the matter came up
B before Mr. Justice P.A. Choudhary, who passed an order directing the matter
to be placed for hearing before a Division Bench, accepting the contention
of the appellant that the matter being a criminal contempt was required to be
dealt with by a Division Bench. The matter was then heard by a Division ·
Bench consisting of Mr. Justice Seetharam Reddy and Mr. Justice M.N. Rao.
C It appears that the appellant was not regular in appearing before the Division
Bench and the Division Bench, therefore, directed to issue a bailable warrant
on 9.6.87 to secure the presence of the appellant. Thereafter, the case was
listed before a Bench consisting of Mr. Justice Jeevan Reddy and Mr. Justice
Neeladri Rao. Even before this Bench the appellant did not appear at the time
of hearing and the Court was compelled to issue a non-bailable warrant to
D secure his presence. In the meanwhile, it is seen from the records th.at the
appellant moyed this Court in Transfer Petition (Criminal) No. 147/87 for.
transfer of the contempt case. This Court requested the Chief Justice of the
High Court to fix a Division Bench for hearing the case to ensure an l!arly
disposal of the matter. He also filed Criminal Miscellaneous Petition Nos.
E 2988-90of1988 in T.P. (Cr!.) No. 147/87 for punishing Respondents 1 and 3
therein for not complying with the Order in T.P. (Cr!.) No. 147/87. This Court
again directed the High Court to dispose of the contempt petition within six
weeks from 22.7.88. As noticed earlier, the appellant without disclosing the
!aches on his part in not appearing before the Court resulting in issue of
bailable and non-bailable warrants to secure his presence, seems to have
F moved this Court for early disposal of the contempt petition. The case was
ultimately heard on 3rd and 4th July, 1989 by the Division Bench.

It will be relevant to mention that a notice for initiation of proceedings
under the Act was issued calling upon the appellant to show-cause. He has
G filed the Counter Affidavit containing allegations graver in nature aggravating
the offence. In the Counter Affidavit in para 4 he has stated as under :

"His Lordship the Hon 'ble Mr. Justice Upendralal Waghray in his
order dated 16.4.85, initiated contempt proceedings against me, quite
in violation of Section 13 of the Contempt of the Courts Act, 1971,
H allegedly because Sri P. Upendra, M.P. (3rd respondent in Election
' .
T.D. DAY AL v. HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH[K. VENKATASWAMI, J.] 43

Petition No. 1/84) paid a bribe of Rs. 2 lakhs, vide Crl. M.P. No. 2988/ A
88 in Transfer Petition (Criminal) No. 147/87 ordered by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of I~dia, New Delhi, on 22. 7. l 98S."
...
Before the High Court t!ie appellant argued in person and the learned
Advocate Generaf appeared for prosecuting the case. The~ learned Advocate
General submitted before the High Court that having regard to the fact that B
the Contemn~r made baseless allegations against the learned Judge in the
Transfer Application and adding scurrilous allegation in the Counter Affidavit
in the Contempt Applicat.ion aggravating the offence, .he should be dealt with
severely. "

Tiie appellant appearing in person before the High Court challenged the
c
jurisdiction of the learned Judge to initiate proc~edings under the Act as,
according .to him, the learned J~dge ·was acting only as· an 'authority' as
contemplated by Article 329(b) of the Constitution of India. He further
contended that the initiation of proceedings by the learned Judge was in
violation of Section 13 of the Act. His thitd contention was that· by reason D
of the or<l,er dated L7.86 passed by P.A. Chaudhary, J., the order dated 16.4.85
passed by Upendralal Waghray, J. "was defeated''. He next contended that
the proceedings were barred by limitation provided in Section 20 of the Act.
His fifth contention was that the learned Judge while making an order of
16.4.85 partially denied the aileg~tions and thereby indirectly admitted the E
other p~ of allegation made by him. The last contention was that while
passing the order on 25.4.85 the learned judge has discharged him and
thereafter
.
the question of
.
continuing the contempt
J
proceedings will not arise.

The High Court rejecting the. first contention held that Article 329(b)
cannot be construed as precluding the Parliament from conferring the F
· j11risdiction to try an election petition, upon a Court or a High Court and the
expression 'authority' is not defined either in Article 366 of the Constitution
or iri the General Clauses Act, 1897. On that basis the learned judges rejected
the first ~ontention and held that it was permissible for the Parliament to
designate a Court, namely, the High .Court, to try_ election petitions. On the G
second contention based on paragraph 4 of the Counter Affidavit, the learned
Judges, after observing that the averment in that paragraph was extremely
scandalous, and compounds the gravity of the allegations, held that the
· contention wa5 neither a legal contention nor a factual .one ·against the charge
levelled against him. Likewise, dealing With the third contention it was held
that the .order dated l.7.86·passed by Mr. Justice P.A .. Chaudhary referring the H
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A contempt case to be. heard by a Division Bench, will not defeat the order
dated 16.4.85 of Mr. Justice Upendralal Waghray. On the point of limitation
based on Section 20 of the Act, the learned judges held that section 20
provides for limitation for initiation, but not for conclusion of contempt
proceedings. While· rejecting the fifth contention as irrelevant which could
B not be entertained the learned Judges held that a Contemner cannot expect
a learned Judge of the Court to reply to every one of his reckless allegations.
As regards the last contention based on the order dated 25.4.85 of the learned
Single Judge, the High Court found that that contention was based on a
m.isreading of the order dated 25.4.85 and from the material placed before the
Court it was clear that the respondent was put on clear notice of the charge
C he has to meet and that the proceedings were not proceedings under Section
14, but under Section 15 of the Act.

The High Court in its detailed judgment considered each and every one
of the contention raised before it and ultimately came to the conclusion as
under:
D
"We are of the opinion, that the allegations made in the affidavit,
which we have extracted hereinabove, do constitute a clear case of
criminal contempt. The respondent wanted to scandalise the learned
judge and thereby lower the authority of the Court within the meaning
of sub-clause (i) of Clause (c) in Section 2. The said statement also
E
attracts sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) as well, since they interfere with the
due course of a judicial proceeding and the administration of justice.
At no stage, has the respondent offered any apology, or expressed
regret. On the other hand, he has made graver allegations in. his
counter, saying that the learned Judge has received a bribe of Rs. 2
F lakhs. It is clear that the respondent is a totally irresponsible person,
who has no respect for. Court and, he is bent upon scandalising the
Court and brow beacing its Judges. It is evident that when his petition
for additional issues was dism.issed, he resorted to the said scandalous
allegations with a view to stall the trial of the election petition. His
attitude as exhibited in his counter-affidavit and his arguments !>efore
G us, indicate that he is an incorrigible person who has to be dealt with
severely. We are equally satisfied that the contempt is of such a
nature that it has substantially interfered with the due course of
justice. The parties cannot be allowed to resort to such stratagems,
either with a view to get an adjournment or to obtain a change of the
H judge.
T.D. DAYAL v. HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH [K. VENKATASWAMI, J.l 45
For the above reasons, we hold the respondent, Sri T. Deen Dayal, A
guilty of contempt of court. We are of the opinion that he deserves
no leniency and that substantial punishment should be imposed upon
him. Accordingly, we punish him with simple imprisonment for a
period of three months. The sentence shall be carried out forthwith."

The learned Judges after pronouncing the judgment holding the appellant B
guilty of contempt of court, at the request of the appellant, suspended the
order tu enable him to approach this Court by way of appeal for a period of
two weeks.

The appellant has thereafter .filed this appeal. When the appellant opened C
the case, we asked him whether he would take the legal assistance. The
appellant declined that offer. He challenged the order under appeal contending
that inasmuch as this Court's orders in Transfer Petition (Crl.) No. 147/87 and
Criminal M.P. No. 2989/88 in Transfer Petition No. 147/87 having not been
complied with within the specified time, the order under appeal must be set
aside on that ground. We do not find any substance in this argument as the D
orders of this Court, directed the Hjgh Court to dispose of the Contempt
Petition at an early date giving specific time. We find from the order under
appeal, the delay was on the part of the appellant also in not appearing before
the Court on the dates of hearing, necessitating the High Court to issue
initially bailable warrant and later on non-bailable warrant to secure his E
presence. Therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of the appellant to make any
complaint against the delay in the disposal of the'Contempt Petition by the
High Court.

The appellant next argued that the Chief Justice of High Court has not
authorised the Division Bench which delivered the order under appeal to hear F
the Contempt Application. We are at a loss to know on what basis this
argument was advanced. It is a known fact that the Chief Justice constitutes
the Benches for disposal of cases and without the orders of Chief Justice, the
Contempt Application would not have been. posted before the Bench for
disposal. This contention also is, therefore, rejected,
G
The appellant then argued that under Article 329-A of the Constitution,
the disputes arising out of electoral matters are to be decided by 'an authority
provided under any law made by the appropriate legislature. Therefore,
notwithstanding Section 80A of the Representation of People Act, 1951
investing the High Court with the jurisdiction to try an election petition, it H
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A must be deemed that the High court is functioning as an 'authority' only and
not as a court and, therefore, has no jurisdiction to issue suo moto notice
under the Contempt of Courts Act. Here again, the High Court has dealt with
th is point in detail and expressed its opinion as under:

"80-A. High Court to try election petitions :
B
(!) The court having jurisdiction to try an election petition shall be
the High Court.

(2) Such jurisdiction shall be exercised ordinarily by a single judge of
the High Court and the Chief Justice shall, from time to time, assign
c one or more Judges for that purpose;

Provided that where the High Court consists only of one Judge, he
shall try all election petitions presented to that Court.

(3) The High Court in its discretion may, in the interests of justice or
D convenience, try an election petition, wholly or partly, at a place other
than the place of seat of the High Court."

This Section expressly says that "the court having jurisdiction to try
an election petition shall be the High Court." It says further that such
jurisdiction shall be exercised ordinarily by a single Judge of the High
E
Court. The jurisdiction to try an election petition is thus given to a
'Court'. viz., the High Court. In such a situation, the argument that
the Judge trying the election petition should be deemed to be an
'authority' and not a 'Court', is contrary to the express language in
the enactment. We see no substance in the contention that because
F clause (b) in Article 329, employs the expression 'authority', the
Parliament was not competent to confer the said jurisdiction on a
Court, or that the Court empowered by the Parliamentary enactment,
should still be treated as an 'authority'. We do not find any such
limitation in Article 329 (b ). It cannot be construed as precluding the
Parliament from conferring the jurisdiction to try an election petition,
G upon a Court or a High Court. The expression 'authority' is not
defined either in Article 366 of the Constitution, or in the General
Clauses Act, 1897. Having regard to the context and the purpose
underlying Article 329(b), we are inclined to hold that it was permissible
for the Parliament to designate a Court, viz., the High Court, to try
H election j)Ctitions. The first objection is, accordingly, rejected."
T.D. DA VAL v. HIGHCOURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH [K. VENKATASWAMI, J.) 47

We agree with the above view expressed by the High Court and also A
add that the authority designated being High Court, it has jurisdiction to take
action for contempt of court as a 'court of record' under Article 215 of the
Constitution, while trying an election petition. After inviting our attention to
Section 98 of the Representation of People Act; 1951, the appellant argued
1
that the High Court while exercising the power can pass orders as contemplated B
in the Section and nothing more. This argument also· lacks· substance. As
·pointed out earlier,. the High Court has jurisdiction under Article 215 additionally
to initiate proceedings for contempt of court.

. Lastly, it was argued that the petition was barred by time under Section
20 of the Act. As rightly pointed out by the High Court, Seetion 20 of the C
Act merely provides for limitation to initiate the proceedings and not for the
. conclusion of contempt proceedings. The proceedings were initiated by Order
. dated 16.4.85 whereas the allegations constituting contempt were contained
in an affidavit filed on 27.3.1985. Therefore, the time taken for disposal beyond
one year partly on account of the. appellant himself, as pointed out earlier, D
cannot be permitted to argue that application was barred by limitation.

Having regard to the passage of time since the .date of initiation of
contempt proce.edings, we thought that the appellant would take a reasonable
stand. To our utter dismay, the appellant reiterated the allegations with same E
vehemence, refusing to express any repentance or regret.

We .have extracted the allegations constituting the contempt in the
beginning of this Order. We are satisfied they are ex facie contumacious and
the scurrilous attack wa~ intended to scandalise the court within the meaning
ofcrimimil contempt under Section 2(c) of the Act.Such attack as seen above, F
is punishable as contempt for the reason that it tends to create distrust in the
popular mind and iinpairs confidence of the people in courts which are prime
importance to the litigants in the protection of their rights and liberties. This
Court In Re. S: Mulgaokar, [ 1978] 3 SCC 339, observed as follows :

''The sixth consideration is t.~at, after evaluating the totality of factors, G
if the court considers the attack on the Judge or Judges scurrilous,
offensive, intimidatory or malicious beyond condonable limits, the
strong arm of the law must, in the name of public interest and public
justice~ strike a blow on him who challenges the supremacy of ti:e rule
of law by fouling its source and stream." H
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A On the facts of this ca~e, we are of the view that the above test squarely
applies and therefore, the order of the High Court should be confirmed.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. Appellant shall be taken into custody
to undergo the sentence imposed by the Division Bench of the High Court.
However, there will be no order as to costs.
B
S.VKI. Appeal dismissed.