Holding

The High Court may entertain writ petitions in extraordinary circumstances and government employees have no right to strike; therefore, striking employees must be reinstated subject to apology and compliance with Rule 22.

Summary

The Tamil Nadu Government dismissed about two lakh employees who went on strike, prompting the employees to file writ petitions under Articles 226/227 challenging the dismissals and the validity of the Tamil Nadu Essential Services Maintenance Act, 2002 and Tamil Nadu Ordinance No.3 of 2003. The High Court initially stayed the dismissals but later held that the employees must first approach the Administrative Tribunal, setting aside the stay. The Supreme Court held that, given the extraordinary scale of the dismissals, the High Court could rightly exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 and entertain the petitions. It further ruled that government employees have no fundamental, statutory or equitable right to strike and that the conduct rules (Rule 22) expressly prohibit striking. Accordingly, the Court ordered reinstatement of all striking employees except those arrested or against whom FIRs were lodged, subject to an unconditional apology and an undertaking to obey Rule 22, and laid down a procedure for handling remaining representations through retired judges. The Court did not decide on the constitutional validity of the Act or Ordinance.

Issues considered

The scope of Article 226 jurisdiction when an alternative remedy (Administrative Tribunal) exists
Whether government employees possess a fundamental or statutory right to strike
Validity of dismissals of striking employees without departmental enquiry
Whether the Tamil Nadu Essential Services Maintenance Act, 2002 and Ordinance No.3 of 2003 are constitutionally valid (not finally decided)
Appropriate relief for employees not reinstated

Legislation cited

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985
Constitution of Indias. Article 19(1)(a), s. Article 19(1)(b), s. Article 226, s. Article 227, s. Article 32

Subjects

Right to strikeEssential Services Maintenance ActArticle 226 jurisdictionAdministrative TribunalGovernment employeesReinstatementRule 22Constitutional validityLabour lawPublic service

Judgment

T.K. RANGARAJAN A
v.
GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU & ORS.

AUGUST 6, 2003

[M.B. SHAH AND DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN, JJ.] B

Tamil Nadu. Essential Services Maintenance Act, 2002; Rule 22 and
Tamil Nadu Ordinance No.3 of 2003:

State Government terminating services of employees resorted to strike C
for their demands-Challenge to-Power ofthe High Court-Held: High Court
was empowered to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to meet unpr;cedented'
extraordinary situation arose due to termination of services ofa large number
of employees since Administrative Tribunal would not be in a position to
render justice to the cause of large number of employees-No Fundamental, D
Statutory or Equitable/Moral Right to strike exists with the Government
employees-Besides, it is against the interest of the society-They could resort
to available settlement machinery for redressa/ of their grievances-However,
State Government directed to reinstate all striking employees except those
arrested or against whom FIR was lodged, on tendering an unconditional
apology and an undertaking to abide by Rule 22 in future'-Representations E
of the employees not reinstated in service would be considered and disposed
of by three retired Judges of the High Court, nominated by the Chief Justice
ofthe High Court-Their decision would be binding on the State Government-'
If employees are aggrieved, they could move Administrative Tribunal for
redressal oftheir grievances-Constitutional validity ofthe Act and Ordinance · F
not considered-Hence no directions/orders thereon.

-I Tamil Nadu Government terminated the services of large number
of its employees who had resorted to strike for their demands. Aggrieved,
employees filed writ petitions. Single Judge of the High Court directed'
the State Government that pending enquiry in the matter, these employees G
be directed to resume duty and that order of their suspension/dismissal ,
be kept in abeyance. Aggrieved, State filed appeals and employees
challenged the validity of the Tamil Nadu Essential Services Maintenance
Act and also the Tamil Nadu Ordinance No. 3 of 2003. Division Bench of
the High Court held that without exhausting the alternative remedy before
251 H
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the Administrative Tribunal, writ petitions were not maintainable.
However, it directed to release the arrested employees. Hence the present
appeals and writ petitions.

It was contended for the respondent-State that about 90-% of the
total income of the State from direct tax is being spent on the salary of
B the employees and in view of large scale unemployment and availability
of number of qualified persons for employment in Government/PSUs, act
of employees resorting to strike could not be justified on equitable ground.

Disposing of the appeals/writ petitions, the Court

C HELD: 1.1. The High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution,
is empowered to exercise its extra-ordinary jurisdiction to meet
unprecedented extra-ordinary situation having no parallel. It is equally
true that extra-ordinary powers are required to be sparingly used. The
facts of the present case reveal that this was °'ost extra-ordinary case,
D which called for interference by the High Court when the State
Government had dismissed about two lacs employees for going on strike.
In a case like this, if thousands of employees were directed to approach
the Administrative Tribunal, the Tribunal would not be in a position to
render justice to the cause. Hence, in view of very very exceptional
circumstance that arose in the present case, there was no justifiable reason
E for the High Court not to entertain the petitions on the ground of
alternative remedy provided under the statute. [256-D, E; 260-A, BJ

Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kera/a, [1973) 4 SCC 225,
distinguished.

F 1.2. No Fundamental, Statutory or Equitable/Moral Right to strike
exists with the Government employees. Law on the subject of strike is well
settled and it has been repeatedly held by this Court that the employees
have no fundamental right to resort to strike. (260-B, C)

Kameshwar Prasad and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., (1962) Suppl.
G 3 SCR 369; Radhey Shyam Sharma v. The Post Master General, Central
Circle, Nagpur, [1964] 7 SCR 403; Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union ofIndia
and Anr., [2003] 2 SCC 45 and Communist Party of India (M} v. Bharat
Kumar and Ors., (1998) l SCC 201, relied on.

1.3. There is no statutory provision empowering the employees to
H
T.K. RANGARAJAN v. GOVT. OF T. N. 253
go on strike. Further, there is prohibition to go on strike under Rule 22 A
of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants Conduct Rules. 1261-H; 262-AI

1.4. Government employees cannot claim that they can take the
society to ransom by going on strike. Even if there is injustice to some
extent, as presumed by such employees, in a democratic welfare State, they
have to resort to the machinery provided under different statutory B
provisions for redressal of their grievances. Strike, as a weapon, is mostly
misused which results in chaos and total maladministration. Strike affects
the society as a whole and particularly when two lakh employees go on
strike enmasse, the entire administration comes to a grinding halt.
1262-D, El C
1.5. In the prevailing situation apart from being conscious of rights,
employees have to be fully aware of their duties, responsibilities and
effective methods for discharging the same. For redressing their
grievances, instead of going on strike, if employees do some more work
honestly, diligently and efficiently, such gesture would not only be D
appreciated by the authority but also by people at large. The reason being,
in a democracy even though they are Government employees, they are part
and parcel of governing body and owe duty to the Society. [263-B, q

2.1. The misconduct by the Government employees is required to be
dealt with in accordance with law. However, considering the gravity of E
the situation and the fact that sometimes, irrespective of disagreement of
the employees with the views of the leader who encourage the strikes, they
were forced to go on strikes for reasons beyond their control. Therefore,
even though the provisions of the Act and the Rules are to be enforced,
they are to be enforced after taking into consideration the situation and F
the capacity of the employees to resist. On occasion, there is tendency or
compulsion to blindly follow the others. In this view of the matter, it is
directed to reinstate all striking employees except those against whom FIR
was lodged and who were arrested. Further, reinstatement would be
subject to tendering an unconditional apology and undertaking to abide
by Rule 22 of the Tamil Nadu Essential Services Maintenance Act. The G
Government would proceed under the Disciplinary Rules only against
those employees who had indulged in violence and who had incited the
other employees to go on strike. In respect of employees who would be
reinstated in service with regard to the period for which they remained
absent, appropriate order would be passed by the State Government for H
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A regularizing their absence. However, this would not be treated as a break
in service.

2.2. Out of 6072 employees, who cannot claim a right to be reinstated
viz. 2215 Secretarial staff and 534 officers ~olding higher positions, it is
made clear that they would be treated as suspended, instead of dismissed.
B Remaining 8063 employees would be reinstated in service as stated above.
(265-F-G]
'.-
2.3. The representations of the aggrieved employees, who are not
reinstated in service, would be considered by three retired High Court
Judges to be named by the Chief Justice of the High Court. Each Judge
C would decide approximately representations of 2000 employees within a
period of one month or thereabout from the date of allocation of
representations. The concerned Judges would decide the representation
of the employees without taking into consideration Section 7 of the
Ordinance and as far as possible in accordance with the Conduct Rules
D and equity. The three Retired Judges should be pa.id honorarium at the
rate of Rs.50,000 per month. All the three Judges are requested to evolve
a common procedure for disposing of the representations. Their decision
would be binding on the State Government and the State Government
would act in accordance with the same. However, if any of the employee
is aggrieved, it would be open to such employee to challenge the same
E before an appropriate forum. (263-G, H; 265-G, H; 266-A-C)

~.4. For those employees who are not reinstated in service on the
ground that FIRs are lodged against them or after holding any
departmental enquiry penalty is imposed, it would be open to them to
F challenge the same before the Administrative Tribunal and the Tribunal
would pass appropriate order including interim order within a period of
two weeks. (266-D, E]

2.5. It is unfortunate that the concerned authorities are not making
the Admi.nistrative Tribunals under ~he Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985,
G functional and effective by appointing men of caliber. It is for the High
Court to see that if the Administrative Tribunals are not functioning,
justice should not be denied to the affected persons. In case, if the
Administrative Tribunal is not functioning, it would be open to the
employees to approach the High Court. (266-E, F]

H 2.6. It is clarified that the Court had not at all dealt with and
T.K. RANGARAJAN v. GOVT. OF T. N. [SHAH, J.] 255

considered the constitutional validity of Tamil Nadu Essential Services A
Maintenance Act, 2002 and the Tamil Nadu Ordinance No.3 of 2003 or
interpretation of any of the provisions thereof, as the State Government
has gracefully agreed to re-instate most of the employees who had gone
on strike. Further, grievances of the employees have not been dealt with
by this Court, against various orders issued by the State Government B
affecting their service benefits. The State Government would try to
consider the same appropriately. (266-G, H; 267-A)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5556 of7003.
-'
From the Judgment and Order dated 11. 7 .2003 of the Chennai High
Court in W.P.No. 18941 of 2003.
c
WITH

W.P. Nos. 298, 308 and 330/2003 and C.A. Nos. 5549 and 5558 of
2003. D
Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, R. Mohan, R. Shanmugasundaram, Jitendra Sharma,
Ms. R.Vaigai, S.R. Setia, V.G. Pragasam, B.K. Pal and S.N. Jha for the
Appellants.

P. Chidambaram, Ms. Nalini Chidambaram, Sanjeev Kumar Singh and E
Bhargava V. Desai for the Petitioner in W.P.No. 298/2003.

Ms. Indu Malhotra for the Petitioner in W.P. No. 308/2003.

R. Nedumaran for the Petitioner in W.P.No. 330/2003.

K.K. Venugopal, P.P. Rao, Somaya Julu, T.R. Chandran, Adv. General
F
for State of Tamil Nadu, Jyothi, V. Balaji and P.N. Ramalingam for the
Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
SHAH, J. Leave granted.
--l
Unprecedented action of the Tamil Nadu Government terminating the
services of all employees who have resorted to strike for their demands' was
challenged before the High Court of Madras by filing writ petitions under
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. Learned Single Judge by interim order H
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A inter alia directed the State Government that suspension and dismissal of
employees without conducting any enquiry be kept in abeyance until further
orders and such employees be directed to resume duty. That interim order
was challenged by the State Government by filing writ appeals. On behalf of
Government employees, writ petitions were filed challenging the validity of
B the Tamil Nadu Essential Services Maintenance Act, 2002 and also the Tamil
Nadu Ordinance No.3 of 2003.

The Division Bench of the High Court set aside the interim order and
ao-ived at the conclusion that without exhausting the alternative remedy of
approaching the Administrative Tribunal, writ petitions were not maintainable.
C It was pointed out to the Court that the total detentions· were 2211, out of
which 74 were ladies and only 165 male and 7 female personnel have so far
been enlarged on bail, which reveals pathetic condition of the arrestees. The
arrestees were mainly clerks and subordinate staff. The Court, therefore,
directed that those who were arrested and lodged in jails be released on bail.

D That order is challenged by filing these appeals. For the same reliefs,
writ petitions under Article 32 are also filed.

At the outset, it is to be reiterated that under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the High Court is empowered to exercise its extra-ordinary
E jurisdiction to meet unprecedented e~tra-ordinary situation having no parallel.
It is equally true that extra-ordinary powers are required to be sparingly used.
The facts of the present case reveal that this was most extra-ordinary case,
which called for interference by the High Court, as the State Government had
dismissed about two lacs employees for going on strike.

p It is true that in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Ors., (1997]
3 SCC 261, this Court has held that it will not be open to the employees to
directly approach the High Court even where the question of vires of the
statutory legislation is challenged. However, this ratio is required to be
appreciated in context of the question which was decided by this Court wherein I
it was sought to be contended that once the Tribunals are established under
G Article 323-A or Article 3238, jurisdiction of the High Court would be
excluded. Negativing the said .contention, this Court made it clear that
jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution is a part of inviolable basic structure of the Constitution and it
cannot be said that such Tribunals are effective substitute of the High Courts
H in discharging powers of judicial review. It is also established principle that

·'
T.K. RANGARAJAN v. GOVT. OF T. N. [SHAH, J.) 257

where there is an alternative, effective, efficacious remedy available under A
the law, the High Court would not exercise its extra-ordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 and that has been reiterated by holding that the litigants
must first approach the Tribunals which act like courts of first instance. in
respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted and therefore,
it will not be open to the litigants to directly approach the High Court even B
where the question of vires of the statutory legislation is challenged.

In L. Chandra Kumar's case, the Court inter alia referred to and relied
upon the case in Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India, [1956] SCR267, wherejn
Bose, J. made the following observations:-

"The heart and core of a democracy lies in the judicial process, c
,; and that means independent and fearless Judges free from executive
control brought up in judicial traditions and trained to judicial ways
of working and thinking. The main bulwarks of liberty and freedom
lie there and it is clear to me that uncontrolled powers of discrimination
in matters that seriously affect the lives and properties of people D
cannot be left to executive or quasi-executive bodies even if they

... exercise quasi-judicial functions because they are then invested with
an authority that even Parliament does not possess. Under the
Constitution, Acts of Parliament are subject to judicial review
particularly when they are said to infringe fundamental rights,
therefore, if under the Constitution Parliament itself has not E
uncontrolled freedom of action, it is evident that it cannot invest

• lesser authorities with that power."

The Court further referred to the following observations from the decision
I

• in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kera/a, [1973] 4 SCC 225 as under:-
F
"77. From their conclusions, many of which have been extracted .
by us in toto, it appears that this Court has always considered the
power of judicial review vested in the High Courts and in this Court
under Articles 226 and 32 respectively, enabling legislative action to
be subjected to the scrutiny of superior courts, to be integral to our
constitutional. scheme."
G

The Court further held:
I
"78 ....... We, therefore,· hold that the power of judicial review
over legislative action vested in the High Courts under Article 226
and in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is an integral H
)
'l'

258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic
structure. Ordinarily, therefore, the power of High Courts and the
Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations can
never be ousted or excluded

81. If the power under Article 32 of the Constitution, which has
B been described as the "heart" and "soul" ofthe Constitution, can be
additionally conferred upon "any other court", there is no reason why
the same situation cannot subsist in respect of the jurisdiction conferred
upon the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution. So long
as the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and that
of this Court under Article 32 is retained, there is no reason why the
c power to test the validity of legislations against the provisions of the
Constitui'ion cannot be conferred upon Administrative Tribunals
created under the Act or upon Tribunals created under Article 323-
B of the Constitution ..."

Thereafter, the Court to emphasise that Administrative Tribunals are
D
not functioning properly, quoted the observations with regard to the functioning
of the Administrative Tribunals from the Malimath Committee's Report (1989),
:·
90, which are reproduced hereunder:-"

Functioning of Tribunals
E
8.63. Several tribunals are functioning in the country. Not all of them,
however, have inspired confidence in the public mind. The reasons
are not far to seek. The foremost is the lack of competence, objectivity
and judicial approach. The next is their constitution, the power and
method of appointment of personnel thereto, the inferior status and
F the casual method of working. The last is their actual composition;
men of calibre are not willing to be appointed as presiding officers
in view of the uncertainty of tenure, unsatisfactory conditions of
service, executive subordination in matters of administration and
political interference in judicial functioning. For these and other
reasons, the quality of justice is stated to have suffered and the cause
G of expedition is not found to have been served by the establishment
of such tribunals.

8.64. Even the experiment of setting up of the Administrative
Tribunals under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, has not been
widely welcomed. Its members have been_ selected from all kinds of
H
T.K. RANGARAJAN v. GOVT. OF T. N. [SHAH, J. ] 259
services including the Indian Police Service. The decision of the State A
Administrative Tribunals are not appealable except under Article 136
of the Constitution. On account of the heavy cost and remoteness of
the forum, there is virtual negation of the right of appeal. This ha~ Jed
to denial of justice in many cases and consequential dissatisfaction.
There appears to be a move in some of the States where they have B
been established for their abolition."

[It is to be stated that in Tamil Nadu, at present, the Administrative
Tribunal is manned by only one man.]

Finally the Court held thus:-
c
"99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that clause
2(d) of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323-B, to the extent
they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme
court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are
unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the "exclusioq of D
jurisdiction" clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis
of Articles 323-A and 323-B would, to the same extent, be
unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts
under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32
of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our
Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts E
and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the
powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The
Tribunals created under Article 323-A and Article 323-B of the
Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional
validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these
Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division F
Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal
concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like
courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they
have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to
directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question G
the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which
creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is
valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we
have indicated."
H
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A There cannot be any doubt that the aforesaid judgment of larger Bench
is binding on this Court and we respectfully agree with the same. However,
in a case like this, if thousands of employees are directed to approach the
Administrative Tribunal, the Tribunal would not be in a position to render
justice to the cause. Hence, as stated earlier because of very very exceptional
B circumstance that arose in..the present case, there was no justifiable reason for
the High Court not to entertain the petitions on the ground of alternative
remedy provided under the statute.

Now coming to the question of right to strike - whether Fundamental,
Statutory or Equitable/Moral Right - in our view, no such right exists with the
C government employees.

(A) There is no fundamental right to go on strike:-

Law on this subject is well settled and it has been repeatedly held by
this Court that the employees have no fundamental right to resort to strike. In
D Kameshwar Prasad and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., [l 962] Suppl. 3 SCR
369 this Court (C.B.) held that the rule in so far as it prohibited strikes was
valid since there is no fundamental right to resort to strike.·

In Radhey Shyam Sharma v. The Post Master General Central Circle,
Nagpur, [1964] 7 SCR 403, the employees of Post and Telegraph Department
E of the Government went on strike from the midnight of July 11, 1960 f-
throughout India and petitioner was on duty on that day. As he went on strike,
in the departmental enquiry, penalty was imposed upon him. That was
challenged before this Court. In that context, it was contended that Sections
3, 4 and 5 of the Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance No. I of 1960
were violative of fundamental rights guaranteed by clauses (a) and (b) of
F Article 19(1) of the Constitution. The Court (C.B.) considered the Ordinance
and held that Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the said Ordinance did not violate the
fundamental rights enshrined in Article 19(1 )(a) and (b) of the Constitution.
The Court further held that a perusal of Article 19(/)(a) shows that there is
no fundamental right to strike and all that the Ordinance provided was with
G respect to any illegal strike. For this purpose, the Court relied upon the earlier
decision in All India Bank Employees' Association v. National Industrial
Tribunal and Ors., [1962] 3 SCR 269 wherein the Court (C.B.) specifically
held that even very liberal interpretation of sub-clause (C) of clause (1) of
Article 19 cannot lead to the conclusion. that trade unions have a guaranteed
right to an effective collective bargaining or to strike, either as part of collective
H
T.K. RAN6ARAJAN v. GOVT. OF T. N. [SHAH, J. ] 261

bargaining or otherwise. A
In Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India and Anr., [2003] 2 SCC
45, the Court (C.B.) held that lawyers have no right to go on strike or give
a call for boycott and even they cannot go on a token strike. The Court has
specifically observed that for just or unjust cause, strike cannot be j~stified
in the present-day situation. Take strike in any field, it can be easily realised B
that the weapon does more harm than any justice. Sufferer is the society -
public at large.

In Communist Party of India (M) v. Bharat Kumar and Ors., [1998] 1
SCC 201, a three-Judge Bench of this Court approved the Full Bench decision C
of the Kerala High Court by holding thus:-

" .... There cannot be any doubt that the fundamental rights of the
people as a whole cannot be subservient to the claim of fundamental
right of an individual or only a section of the people. It is on the basis
of this distinction that the High Court has rightly concluded that there D
cannot be any right to call or enforce a "Bandh" which interferes with
the exercise of the fundamental freedoms of other citizens, in addition
to causing national loss in many ways. We may also add that the
reasoning given by the High Court particularly those in paragraphs
12, 13 and 17 for the ultimate conclusion and directions in paragraph
18 is correct with which we are in agreement." E
The relevant paragraph 17 of Kerala High Court judgment reads
as under:-"

17. No political party or organisation can claim that it is entitled to
paralyse the industry and commerce in the entire State or nation and p
is entitled to prevent the citizens not in sympathy with its viewpoints,
from exercising their fundamental rights or from performing their
duties for their own benefit or for the benefit of the State or the
nation. Such a claim would be unreasonable and could not be accepted
as a legitimate exercise of a fundamental right by a political party or
those comprising it." G
(B) Tllere is no legal/statutory rigllt to go on strike.

There is no statutory provision empowering the employees to go on
strike.
H
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Further, there is prohibition to go on strike under the Tamil Nadu
Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the
Conduct Rules"). Rule 22 provides that "no Government servant shall engage
himself in strike or in incitements thereto or in similar activities." Explanation
to the said provision explains the term 'similar activities'. It states that "for
B the purpose of this rule the expression 'similar activities' shall be deemed to
include the absence from work or neglect of duties without permission' and
with the object of compelling something to be done by his superior officers
or the Government or any demonstrative fast usually called "hunger strike"
for similar purposes. Rule 22-A provides that "no Government servant shall
conduct any procession or hold or address any meeting in any part of any
C open ground adjoining any Government Office or inside any Office premises
- (a) during office hours on any working day; and (b) outside office hours or
on holidays, save with the prior permission of the head of the Department or
head of office, as the case may be.

(C) There is no moral or equitable justification to go on strike.
D
Apart from statutory rights, Government employees cannot claim that
they can take the society to ransom by going on strike. Even if there is
injustice to some extent, as presumed by such employees, in a democratic
welfare State, they have to resort to the machinery provided under different
statutory provisions for redressal of their grievances. Strike as a weapon is
E mostly misused which results in chaos and total maladministration. Strike
affects the society as a whole and particularly when two lakh employees go
on strike enmasse, the entire administration comes to a grinding halt. In the
case of strike by a teacher, entire educational system suffers; many students
are prevented from appearing in their exams which ultimately affect their
F whole career. In case of strike by Doctors, innocent patients suffer; in case
of strike by employees of transport services, entire movement of the society
comes to a stand still; business is adversely affected and number of persons
find it difficult to attend to their work, to move from one place to another or
one city to another. On occasion$, public properties are destroyed or damaged
and finally this creates bitterness among public against those who are on
G strike.

Further, Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel appearing for the
State of Tamil Nadu also submitted that there are about 12 lacs Government
employees in the State. Out of the total income from direct tax, approximately
90% of the amount is spent on the salary of the employees. Therefore, he
H
T.K. RANGARAJAN v. GOVT. OF T. N. [SHAH, J. ] 263
rightly submits that in a Society where there is a large scale unemployment A
and number of qualified persons are eagerly waiting for employment in
Government Departments or in public sector undertakings, strikes cannot be
justified on any equitable ground.

We agree with the said submission. In the prevailing situation, apart
from being conscious of rights, we have to be fully aware of our duties, B
. responsibilities and effective methods for discharging the same. For redressing
their grievances, instead of going on strike, if employees do some more work
honestly, diligently and efficiently, such gesture would not only be appreciated
by the authority but also by people at large. The .-.eason being, in a democracy
(

even though they are Government employees, they are part and parcel of C
governing body and owe duty to the Society.

We also agree that misconduct by the government employees is required
to be dealt with in accordance with law. However, considering the gravity of
the situation and the fact that on occasion, even if the employees are not
prepared to agree with what is contended by some leaders who encourage the D
strikes, they are forced to go on strikes for reasons beyond their control.
Therefore, even though the provisions of the Act and the Rules are to be
enforced, they are to be enforced after taking into consideration the situation.
and the capacity of the employees to resist. On occasion, there is tendency .
or compulsion to blindly follow the others. In this view of the matter, we had.
suggested to the learned senior counsel Mr. Venugopal that employees who E
went on strike may be reinstated in service and that suggestion was accepted
by Mr. Venugopal after obtaining instructions from the State Government.
Hence, on 24.7.2003, we had passed the following order:-

"Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
F
Mr. K.K. Venugopal, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
State of Tamil Nadu after obtaining necessary instructions states that:

1. The State Government will re-instate all the government
employees who are dismissed because they had gone on strike, except
(i) 2,200 employees who had been arrested and (ii) employees against G
whom FIR had been lodged.

2. This reinstatement in service would be subject to unconditional
apology as well as undertaking to the effect that employees would
abide by Rule 22 of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants Conduct
H
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Rules 1973 which provides as under:

"22. Strikes: No Government servant shall engage himself
in strike or in incitements thereto or in similar activities."

B
Explanation - For the purpose of this rule the expression
'similar activities' shall be deemed to include the absence from
work or neglect of duties without permission and with the object
of compelling something to be done by his superior officers or
the Government or any demonstrative fast usually called "hunger
-
strike" for similar purposes."

It is also stated that Government will proceed under the Disciplinary
c Rules only against those employees who had indulged in violence
and who had incited the other employees to go on strike.

From 25th July such employees would be reinstated in service
subject to their giving unconditional apology for resorting to strike
and also an undertaking to the effect that in future he would abide by
D Rule 22.

He also states that for the employees who would be reinstated in
service with regard to the period for which they remained absent,
appropriate order would be passed by the State Government for
regularizing their absent. However, this would not be treated as a
E
break in service.

Ordered accordingly.

For further orders and directions list the matter on 31.7.2003."

F On 31st, number of affidavits were filed contending that large number
of employees are not reinstated in service despite the assurance given by the
State Government. Matter was adjourned at the request of learned counsel for
the respondent for verification of the said contention. After verification,
additional affidavit has been filed by Secretary to Government, Personnel
G and Administrative Reforms Department, Secretariat, Chennai, revealing the
exact figures with regard to dismissed and reinstated employees. In paragraph
6, it has been stated as under:-"

6. The following details are submitted for reference of this Hon'ble
Court:-

H
T.K. RANGARAJAN v. GOVT. OF T. N. [SHAH, J.] 265

l. Total number of Government servants 1,70,241 A
dismissed as per Section 7 of TESMA
and teachers of Aided Colleges suspended.

2. Total number reinstated so far, as per the 1,56,106
statement made before this Hon'ble Court. B
3. Number of employees and teachers not 14,135
reinstated.
CATEGORIES OF EMPLOYEES AND GOVERNMENT
TEACHERS WHO CANNOT CLAIM A RIGHT TO BE
REIN STATED. c
(a) Government servants arrested. 2,211

.
(b) Secretariat staff for the reasons mentioned 2,215
earlier.
(c) Officers holding higher position. 534
D
(d) Government servants (other than the 1,112
Secretariat staff) involved in offences
Under Section 5 or Section 5 read
with Section 4 of TESMA.
E
Total number of persons who cannot 6,072
Claim a right to be reinstated.

REMAINING NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES 8,063
WHOM THE STATE GOVERNMENT IS
F
WILLING TO REINSTATE."
For the categories (b) and (c) i.e. Secretarial staff of 2215 and 534
officers holding higher positions, it is agreed and made clear that they wc;mld

' be treated as suspended instead of dismissed. Remaining 8063 employees, as
stated above, will be reinstated in service (w.e.f. 25th July, 2003) on their
G
tendering unconditional apology for resorting to strike and also an undertaking
to abide by Rule 22 of Conduct Rules in future. He further makes a statement
that with regard to the representations which are made or are to be made by
the employees who are in category (a), (b), (c) and (d), the same would be
considered by three retired High Court Judges to be named by the Chief
Justice of the High Court of Madras. Each Judge would decide approximately H
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A representations of 2000 employees within a period of one month or thereaboµt
from the date of allocation of representations. For this purpose, a convenient
place for the~r office work and the secretarial staff would be made available
to all the three Judges by the State Government within a period of seven days

B
from today without fail. The concerned Judges would decide the representation
of the employees without taking into consideration Section 7 of the Ordinance
and as far as possible in accordance with the Conduct Rules and equity.
·-
Retired Judges to be paid honorarium at. the rate of Rs. 50000 per month. All
the three Judges are requested to evolve a common procedure for disposing
of the representations. The decision of the Judge on the representation would
be binding to the State Government and the State Government would act in
C accordance with the same. However, if any of the employees is aggrieved, it
would be open to such employee to challenge the same before an appropriate
forum.

Finally, it is made clear that employees who are re-instated in ser\tice
D would tf!ke care in future in maintaining discipline as there is no question of
having any fundamental, legal or equitable right to go on strike. The employees
have to adopt other alternative methods for redressal of their grievances. For
those employees who are not re-instated in service on the ground that FIRs
are lodged against them or after holding any departmental enquiry penalty is
imposed, it would be open to them to challenge the same before the
E Administrative Tribunal and the Tribunal would pass appropriate order
including interim order within a period of two weeks from the date of filing
of such application before it. It is unfortunate that the concerned authorities
are not making the Administrative Tribunals under the Administrative Tribunal
Act, 1985, functional and effective by appointing men of caliber. It is for the
F High Court to see that if the Administrative Tribunals are not functioning,
justice should not be denied to the affected persons. In case, if the
Administrative Tribunal is not functioning, it would be open to the employees
to approach the High Court.

Lastly, we make it clear that we have not at all dealt with and considered
G the constitutional validity. of Tamil Nadu Essential Services Maintenance
Act, 2002 and the Taniil Nadi.J Ordinance No. 3 of 200~ or interpretation of
any of the provisions thereof, as the State Government has gracefully agreed
to re-instate most of the employees who had gone on strike. For this, we
appreciate the efforts made and the reasonable stand taken by the learned
H Counsel for the parties. Further, we have not dealt with the grievances of the
T.K. RANGARAJAN v. GOVT. OF T. N. [SHAH, J.] 267

employees against various orders issued by the State Government affecting A
their service benefits. We hope that Government would try to consider the
same appropriately.

The Appeals and Writ Petitions are disposed of accordingly. There
shall be no order as to costs.
B
S.K.S. Appeals/Petitions disposed of