T.P. VISHNU KUMARversusCANARA BANK P.N. ROAD, TIRUPPUR & ORS.
- Citation
- 2013 INSC 92
- Decided
- 11 February 2013
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- K S RADHAKRISHNAN
Holding
If a specific remedial provision such as Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, is available, the High Court cannot invoke Article 226 to interfere with the Debt Recovery Tribunal's orders unless there is a statutory violation, prejudice, or arbitrariness.
Summary
Canara Bank filed an original application before a Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) for recovery of a large sum. The respondents filed interim applications seeking production of banking documents, which the DRT rejected, deeming them a delay tactic. The respondents approached the High Court under Article 226, and the Single Judge ordered production of the documents, holding they were needed for an additional written statement. The Bank appealed, and the Division Bench set aside the order, stating that the respondents had an alternative remedy under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. The Supreme Court held that when a specific statutory remedy is available, the High Court cannot invoke Article 226 to interfere with DRT orders unless there is a statutory violation or arbitrariness. Consequently, the writ petitions were dismissed as the High Court’s interference was impermissible and had caused undue delay.
Issues considered
- When can a High Court exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 to review orders of a Debt Recovery Tribunal?
- Does the availability of an appeal under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, preclude the use of Article 226 for the same grievance?
- Whether the rejection of interim applications by the DRT amounted to a statutory violation warranting writ intervention?
Legislation cited
- Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993s. 17, s. 18, s. 20
Subjects
Judgment
[2013] 1 S.C.R. 977
T.P. VISHNU KUMAR A
v.
CANARA BANK P.N. ROAD, TIRUPPUR & ORS.
(SLP (C) Nos. 1258-1260 of 2013)
FEBRUARY 11, 2013
B
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.)
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 226 - Writ jurisdiction
under - In the matter of recovery of dues to the Bank under
Recovery of Debts Act - Original application filed by Bank C
before Debt Recovery Tribunal - The defendants filing
applications before Tribunal for direction to the Bank to
produce certain documents - Application dismissed - Writ
Petition - Single Judge of High Court holding that documents
were necessary for filing Additional Written Statement - D
Division Bench of High Court allowed Writ Appeal holding that
the defendant had alternative remedy available u/s. 20 of the
Act - On appeal, held: When specific remedy is available u/
s. 20, interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226
is not justified - Powers under Article 226 cannot be invoked E
in the matter of recovery of dues under the Act, unless there
is any statutory violation resulting in prejudice to party or
where such proceedings are arbitrary, unreasonable and
unfair - Single Judge decided the matter on merit which is
impermissible in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 - F
Intervention of the writ court has delayed the proceedings for
four years defeating the very purpose and object of the Act -
Recovery of Debts Due to Financial Institutions Act, 1993 -
s. 20 - Administration of Justice.
The respondent-Bank filed Original Application G
against the petitioner and respondent Nos. 2 to 6 before
Debts Recovery Tribunal for recovery of total amount of
Rs. 1,59,51,477.93 with interest @ 17%. The appellant and
977 H
978 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 1 S.C.R.
A respondent Nos. 2 to 6 filed interim applications before
the tribunal seeking a direction to produce the extract of
accounts as well as documents relating to banking
transactions. The applications were rejected on the
ground that the intention of the petitioner was only to
B delay the proceedings. Petitioner challenged the order of
the Tribunal in a Writ Petition. Single Judge of High Court
allowed the petition holding that the documents were
necessary for the purpose of filing additional written
statement. Division Bench of High Court allowed the writ
c appeal, holding that alternative remedy was available ul
s. 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and
Financial Institutions Act, 1993. Hence the present
petition.
Dismissing the petition, the Court
D
HELD: 1. Debt Recovery Tribunals in the country are
established for expeditious adjudication and recovery of
debts due to banks and financial institutions. The
Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial
E Institutions Act, 1993 provides the mechanism to an
aggrieved party, if he is dissatisfied with an order passed
by the tribunal. Section 20 of the Act says that any person
aggrieved by an order made, or deemed to have been made,
by a Tribunal under the Act may prefer an appeal to an
F Appellate Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter. When a
specific remedy is made available to the aggrieved party
under Section 20 of the Act, the Single Judge of the High
Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, was not justified in interfering
G with the orders passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal.
[Paras 6 and 8] [981-E-H; 982-A-B, E-F]
2. Powers of the High Court under Article 226 cannot
be invoked in the matter of recovery of dues under the
Act, unless there is any statutory violation resulting in
H
T.P. VISHNU KUMAR v. CANARA BANK P.N. ROAD, 979
TIRUPPUR
prejudice to the party or where such proceedings or A
action is wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and unfair. When
the Act itself provides for a mechanism, by an appeal
under Section 20 of the Act, the High Court is not justified
in invoking jurisdiction under Article 226 to examine that
the rejection of the applications by the tribunal was B
correct or not. The petitioner and the contesting
respondents have no case that either the Bank or the
Tribunal had violated any statutory provisions by
rejecting their applications. Writ petition was preferred
against the rejection of applications and the same were c
entertained by the Single Judge of High Court and
decided on merits, which is impermissible while
exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution. If the correctness of otherwise of each and
every interim order passed by the Tribunal, is going to be D
tested in a writ court, it will only defeat the object and
purpose of establishing such tribunal. In the instant case,
due to the intervention of the writ court, the matter got
delayed for four years defeating the very purpose and
object of the Act. [Paras 9 and 1OJ [982-G-H; 983-A-C]
E
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : SLP (Civil) Nos.
1258-1260 of 2013.
From the Judgment & Order dated 04.09.2012 of the High
Court of Judicature at Madras in W.A. Nos. 559 to 561 of 2009. F
S. Thananjayan for the Petitioner.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN 1 J. 1. Canara Bank, Tiruppur G
(first respondent herein) filed O.A. No. 152 of 2002 before Debt
Recovery Tribunal, Coimbatore for a decree directing the
defendants therein to pay a sum of Rs.29,68, 161.93 with
interest at 17% per annum, being the amount on account of
Open Cash Credit facilities; a sum of Rs.30,82,758 being the H
980 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 1 S.C.R.
A amount due on account of packing credit facilities and a sum
of Rs.99,00,558 being the amount due for Foreign Bills of
Exchange facilities and also for a further direction.
2. The petitioner and respondent nos. 2 to 6 herein
B preferred I.A. No. 873 to 875 of 2007 before the Tribunal
seeking a direction to produce the extract of accounts as well
as documents relating to banking transactions. Those
applications were opposed by the bank contending that none
of the documents sought for were germane to the issue to be
C decided in the applications but only to protract the proceedings.
The applications were rejected by the tribunal on the ground
that the intention of the petitioner was only to delay the
proceedings, against which the petitioner herein filed writ
petition nos. 14428-14430 of 2008 before the High Court of
judicature at Madras. It was contended before the learned
D Single Judge of the High Court that the documents and
accounts paid for are absolutely necessary for the purpose of
filing additional written statement and that the bank cannot
withhold those documents. The prayer was opposed by the
bank stating that none of the documents sought for were
E germane to the issue to be decided and attempt was only to
protract the proceedings. Further, it was also contended that
in view of the matter, the petitioner had an alternative remedy
available under the Act.
F 3. Learned Single Judge passed an elaborate order and
allowed the writ petition and held that the petitioner therein had
made out a case for production of documents sought for in I.A.
Nos. 873 to 875 of 2007 except the promissory notes which
were reported to be untraceable. Canara Bank took up the
G matter in appeal before the Division ,Bench by filing writ appeal
Nos. 559 to 561 of 2009. Writ appeals were allowed holding
that the petitioner had not availed of the alternative remedy
available under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debs due to
Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short 'the Act').
Aggrieved by the same, this appeal has been preferred.
H
T.P. VISHNU KUMAR v. CANARA BANK P.N. ROAD, 981
TIRUPPUR [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
4. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner. This A
is a classic case which shows how the parties can protract
proceedings in fiscal matters. Parties as well as the system
have contributed to the delay. At every stage of the proceedings
there was delay. Facts disclosed that Canara Bank had filed
the application in the year 2002 vide O.A. No. 152 of 2002 for B
total amount of Rs. 1,59,51,477.93 with interest and the OA
stands at the stage at which it was filed, not-an inch forward.
5. I.A. Nos. 873 to 875 of 2007 were filed by the petitioner
as well as respondent Nos. 2 to 6 before the Tribunal after a C
period of five years of filing the original applications.
Applications were dismissed by the Tribunal on 18.02.2008.
Writ petitions filed in the year 2008 were allowed by the learned
Single Judge on 07.11.2008. Writ appeals were filed before
the Division Bench by the Canara Bank in the year 2009, which D
could be disposed of only after a period of 3 years. Bank's
appeals were allowed, since the contesting respondents did
not avail of the alternative remedy available under the Act.
6. Debt Recovery Tribunals in the country are established
for expeditious adjudication and recovery of debts due to banks E
and financial institutions. It was noticed that banks and financia!
institutions have been experiencing considerable difficulties in
recovering loans and enforcement of securities charged with
them and therefore the actual need was felt to work out a
suitable mechanism through which the dues to the banks and F
financial institutions could be realized without delay. It was
noticed that on 30.09.1990 more than fifteen lacs of cases filed
by the public sector banks and about 304 cases filed by the
financial institutions were pending in various courts, recovery
of debts involved more than Rs.5622 crores in dues of public G
sector banks and about 391 crores of dues of the financial
institutions. The locking up of such huge amount of money in
litigation, it was noticed, prevents proper utilization and recycling
of the funds for the development of the country. It is in the above
scenario, Parliament enacted The Recovery of Debts due to H
982 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 1 S.C.R.
A Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (Act 51 of 1993).
The Act itself provides the mechanism to an aggrieved party,
if he is dissatisfied with an order passed by the tribunal. Section
20 of the Act says that any person aggrieved by an order
made, or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under
B the Act may prefer an appeal to an Appellate Tribunal having
jurisdiction in the matter.
7. Section 18 of the Act deals with Bar of Jurisdiction
which says:
C "On and from the appointed day, no court or other authority
shall have, or be entitled to exercise, any jurisdiction,
powers or authority (except the Supreme Court, and a
High Court exercising jurisdiction under articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution) in relation to the matters specified
D in section 17."
8. Powers, which were conferred on the civil court, now
stands conferred on a Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act
thereby it can deal with applications from banks and financial
E institutions for recovery of debts due to such banks and financial
institutions. We are of the view when a specific remedy is made
available to the aggrieved party under Section 20 of the Act,
learned Single Judge of the High Court, in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, was
not justified ~n interfering with the orders passed by the Debt
F Recovery Tribunal.
9. Powers of the High Court under Article 226 cannot be
invoked in the matter of recovery of dues under the Act, unless
there is any statutory violation resulting in prejudice to the party
G or where such proceedings or action is wholly arbitrary,
unreasonable and unfair. When the Act itself provides for a
mechanism, by an appeal under Section 20 of the Act, in our
view, the High Court is not justified in invoking jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India to examine that the
H rejection of the applications by the tribunal was correct or not.
T.P. VISHNU KUMAR v. CANARA BANK P.N. ROAD, 983
TIRUPPUR [K.S. RAqHAKRISHNAN, J.]
The petitioner and the contesting respondents have no case A
that either the bank or the tribunal had violated any statutory
provisions by rejecting their applications.
10. Writ petition was preferred against the rejection of
applications and the same were entertained. by the learned 8
Single Judge and decided on merits and which in our view is
impermissible while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution. If the correctness of otherwise of each and
every interim order passed by the Tribunal, is going to be tested
in a writ court, it will only defeat the object and purpose of C
establishing such tribunal. We already noticed that due to the
intervention of the writ court, the matter got delayed for four
years defeating the very purpose and object of the Act. We,
therefore, find no merit in these petitions and the same are
dismissed.
D
K.K.T. Petitions dismissed.
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