Holding

A second FIR cannot be registered for the same cognizable offence; therefore the FIR (Crime No.268/97) and the investigation founded upon it are invalid and must be quashed.

Summary

During a minister's visit to Kannur in 1994, police firing resulted in five deaths and many injuries, leading to two FIRs (Crimes 353/94 and 354/94). After a change of government, a Commission of Inquiry blamed the firing and the Director‑General of Police ordered a fresh FIR (Crime 268/97) three years later, initiating a new investigation against the former minister, a deputy superintendent and several constables. The petitioners challenged the validity of this second FIR, arguing that only one FIR may be filed for a cognizable offence and that subsequent information should be dealt with under Section 162 or Section 173 of the CrPC. The Supreme Court held that the second FIR was impermissible, that the investigation based on it was illegal, and that the Commission’s report is merely recommendatory. Consequently, the Court quashed the second FIR and allowed the petitioners' appeals while dismissing the State’s appeals. The judgment also clarified that further investigation may proceed under the original FIRs with court permission.

Issues considered

Whether a second FIR can be registered under Section 154 of the CrPC for the same cognizable offence already covered by an earlier FIR.
Whether investigation based on such a second FIR is lawful.
Whether the findings of a Commission of Inquiry have binding effect on criminal proceedings.
Whether a fresh investigation by the CBI is warranted in the circumstances.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 154, s. 155, s. 156, s. 157, s. 162, s. 169, s. 170, s. 173, s. 482
Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952s. 3(1)
Explosive Substances Acts. 3, s. 5
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 143, s. 147, s. 148, s. 149, s. 201, s. 302, s. 306, s. 307, s. 324, s. 332, s. 353, s. 427

Subjects

FIRsecond FIRCriminal Procedure CodeSection 154Section 173Police investigationCommission of InquiryAbuse of processSection 482Article 226Article 227Political violence

Judgment

-
'

A T.T. ANTONY
v.
STATE OF KERALA AND ORS.

JULY 12, 2001

B [SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI AND S.N. PHUKAN, JJ.]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973--Sections 154,155, 156, 157, 162,169, 170
and 173. X...
~·
i-

c Second FIR-Maintainability of-Held, there can be no second FIR in
respect of the same cognizable offence-Only information first entered in the
Station House Diary can be regarded as FIR under Section 154-All
'-
subsequent information regarding the case, will fall under Section 162.
.....
Power of Police officer to investigate a case-Scope of-Held, Police
D Officer not merely to investigate a congnizable offence reported in FIR but
all other connected offences committed in the course of same transaction. ..
t
Constitution of India, J950-Articles 226, 227 and J36-Statuto1y i
power of police officer to investigate a congnizable offence-lnteiference by
E Courts-Permissibility of-Filing of second FIR and fresh investigation in /'--

respect of the same cognizable offence-Validity of-Held, power of
investigation can be inteifered with. if the police officer transgresses his
statut01y power-Registration of second FIR and fi·esh investigation pursuant
thereto is beyond the purview of sections 154 and 156 and amounts to abuse :. ';~
of process of statut01y power of investigation-Criminal Procedure Code,
F 1973-Sections 482, 154, 156. -!

Commission of lnqui1y Act, 1952-Section 3(1)-Report of Commission
of biqui1y-Nature of-Held, not binding on government or courts-However,
investigating agency can adva.ntageously make use of such report.
G Words and Phrases
~.

F.l.R.·-Meaning of in the context of Section 154 of Criminal Procedure '
Code. 1973.

During the Visit of a Minister belonging to ruling UDF Governm"ent of
H 942
-~
T.T. ANTONY v. ST ATE 943
Kerala to Kannur District, violent demonstrations were held by members of A
Y,Oµth wing of a rival political party (CPI(M)). To bring the situation under
-~
control, police resorted to firing and lathi charge, as a result of which five
persons died and more than hundred persons suffered injuries. Two FIRs
were lodged against several unidentifiable persons belonging to rival political
party in respect of such incidents of violence at two places. On public demand,
State Government appointed an Inquiry Commission. In the meantime, B
,- assembly elections were held in the State and LDF Government led by CPI
(M) came to power. The Inquiry Commission submitted its report holding that
,x the police firing was unjustified and a former Minister, Dy. Superintendent
of Police, Kannur and Dy. Collector Kannur were responsible for the incident.
Government accepted the Inquiry Commission report and directions were c
issued for taking legal action against those who were held guilty in the
report. Director General of Police held that since the firing was without
justification, in which people were killed, it amounted to murder, and ordered
registration of case under the appropriate section. Thus, fresh F.I.R. was
registered against the former Minister, the Dy. Superintendent of Police,
·Kannur, the former Dy. Collector, Kannur and several other police personnel. D
Aggrieved, writ petitions were flied for quas~ing the F.I.R or alternatively for
investigation of the case by C.B.I. Single Judge of High Court disposed of tlie
\ writ petitions by directing re-investigation of the case by C.B.I. On appeal,
Division Bench of High Court wLile quashing the F.I.R. against Dy.
Superintendent of Police, directed fresh investigation of the case by State E
Police instead of investigation by C.B.I. Hence the present appeal.

On behalf of the appellants it was contended that second FIR was
registered in respect of the same cognizable offence regarding which two
FIRs were already filed and investigation in those cases were pending. Thus,
y registration of a fresh information in respect of very same incident as an FIR F
under Section 154 Cr.P.C. was not valid and, therefore, all steps taken
pursuant thereto including investigation were illegal and liable to be quashed.
., . Disposing of the appeals, the Court
.J
HELD : 1.1. There can be no second FIR under Section 154 of the G
,.. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 in respect of very same cognizable offence
and consequently there can be no fresh investigation pursuant thereto. Thus,
in the instant case, registration of second FIR regarding very same cognizable
_.,,(
offence is invalid and investigations made thereunder is improper. (959-A)

1.2. An information given under sub-section (1) of Section 154 of the H
.-.;;..,.
944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (200 I] 3 S.C.R.

A Code is commonly known as First Information Report (F.I.R.) which sets the
criminal law into motion and marks the commencement of the investigation jr,
which ends up with the formation of opinion under Section 169 or 170 of the
Code and forwarding of a police report under Section 173 of the Code. It is
quite possible and it happens not infrequently that more information reports
than one are given to a police officer in charge of a Police Station in respect
B of the same incident involving one or more than one cognizable offence. In
such a case he need not enter every one of them in the Station House Diary )

and this is implied in Section 154 of the Code. The information first entered
><..._
in the station house diary, kept for this purpose, by a police officer in charge
of a police station is the First Information Report - F.I.R. postulated by Section
c 154. All other information made orally or in writing after the commencement
of the investigation into the cognizable offence will be statements falling
under Section 162 of the Code. No such information/statement can properly
be treated as an FIR and entered in the station house diary again, as it would
in effect be a second FIR and the same cannot be in conformity with the
scheme of the Code. [957-F-H; 958-AJ
D
Ram Lal Narang & Ors. v~ State (Delhi Administration), [1979) 2 SCC
322 and M. Krishna v. State of Karnataka, [1999) 3 SCC 247, distinguished.
I
1.3. The scheme of the Code is that an officer in charge of a Police
Station has to commence investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157 Cr.
E
P.C. on the basis of entry of the First Information Report, on coming to know
of the commission of a cognizable offence. On completion of investigation and
on the basis of evidence collected he has ~o form opinion under Section 169
or 170 of the Code, as the case may be, and forward his report to the
concerned Magistrate under Section 173(2). However, even after filing such
F a report if he comes into possession of further information or material, he
y
need not register a fresh FIR, he is empowered to make further investigation,
normally with the leave of the court; and where during further investigation
he collects further evidence, oral or documentary, he is obliged to fonyard the .•.
same with one or more further reports; this is the import of sub-section (8) ....
.....
of Section 173 Cr.P.C. On receipt of information about a cognizable offence
G or an incident giving rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on entering
~"'
the F.I.R. in the Station House Diary, the officer in charge of a Police Station
has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but
')._
also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of
the same transactjon or the same occurrence and file one or more n:ports
H as provided in Section 173 Cr.P.C.-[958-E-G; 959-B)

),
T.T. ANTONY v. STATE 945
1.4. In the instant case, the second FIR was registered in respect of the A
same incident and on the same facts after three years. In truth and substance,
;.j{ the essence of the offence registered under the first ·FIR was same as in the
second FIR. When the Inquiry Commission submitted its report to the
Government, investigation on the basis of first FIR was in progress. The,
correct course of action should have been to take note of the findings and the,
contents of the report, streamline the investigation to ascertain the true and B
correct facts, collect the evidence in support thereof, form an opinion under
Sections 169 and 170 Cr.P.C., as the case may be, and forward the report/
reports under Section 173(2) or Section 173(8) Cr. P.C. to the concerned
Magistrate. The course adopted in the instant case, namely, the registration .
of the information as the second FIR in regard to the same incident and , C
making a fresh investigation is not permissible under the scheme of the
provisions of Cr.P.C., therefore, investigation undertaken and the report
thereof cannot but be invalid. (964-H; 965-A-B)

2.1. The right of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence is .
a statutory right over which the court does not possess any supervisory 0
jurisdiction under the Code. This plenary power of the police to investigate
a cognizable offence is, however, not unlimited. It is subject to certain well
recognised limitation. Where the police transgresses its statutory power of
investigation the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 226/227
of the Constitution and this Court in appropriate case can interdict the E
investigation to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice. (960-H; 961-C-EJ

2.2. A just balance between the fundamental rights of the citizens under
Articles 19 and 21 of Constitution and the expansive power of the police to
investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the Court. There cannot F
be any controversy that sub-section (8) of Section 173 Cr.P.C. empowers the
police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and
documentary) and forward a further report or reports to the Magistrate.
However, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a
citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same G
incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon
filing of successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final report under
Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. It would clearly be beyond the purview of Sections 154
and 156 Cr.P.C. nay, a case of abuse of the statutory power of investigation
in a given case. A case .of fresh investigation based on the second or successiye
FIRs, not being a counter case, filed in connection with the same or connected H
946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [200 I] 3 S.C.R.

A cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same
transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation
)
is underway or final report under ·section 173(2) has been forwarded to the
Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
or under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. [963-A-C]

B Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR (32) 1945 PC 18 and State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., [1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335, relied on.

State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha, [1982) 1 SCC 561; S.N.
Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari, [1970) 1 SCC 653; R.P. Kapur v. State of
C Punjab, [1960) 3 SCR 388; Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, [1978) 2 SCC 424
and Prabhu Dayal Deorah v. District Magistrate, Kamrup, [1974) 1SCC103,
referred to.

3. The finding of the Commission of Inquiry is not binding on the
Government or Courts and it is purely recommendatory in nat'ure. The report
D and findings of the Commission of Inquiry are meant for information of the
Government. Acceptance of the report of the Commission by the Government
~ould only suggest that being bound by the Rule oflaw and having duty to
act fairly, it has endorsed to act upon it. The duty of the police - investigating
agency of the State - is to act in ?Ccordance With the law of the land. Acting
thus, the investigating agency may with advantage make use of the report of
E the Commission in its onerous task of inv.estigation bearing in mind that it
does not preclude the investigating agency from formi_ng a different opinion
under Section 169/170 ofCr.P.C. ifthe evidence obtained by it supports such
a conclusion. The Courts, civil or criminal, are not bound by the report or
findings of the Commission of Inquiry as they have to arrive at their own
F decision ~n the evidence placed before them in accordance with law.
[966-H; 967-D)
•
Re : Maharaja Madhava Singh, (3) Indian Appeals 239 (PC); Shri Ram
Krishna f?almia v. Shri Justice S.R. Te_ndolkar & Oii, [1959) SCR 279; State
of Karnataka v. Union of India & Anr., [1977) 4 SCC 608 and Sham Kant
G v. State of Maharashtra, [1992) Suppl. 2 sec 52i, relied on.

R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, (1968) 1 All E.L.R. 763, referred
to.

M. V. Rajwade,J.A.S. District Magistrate v. Dr. S.M. Hassan & Ors., ;\IR
H (1954) Nagpur 71, approved.
T.T. ANTONY v. STATE [QUADRI, J.] 947
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. A
689 of 2001.

From the Judgment and Order dated 29.2.2000 of the Kerala High Court
in W.A. No. 52 of 2000.

WITH B

CIVIL APPEAL No. 4066 of2001.

From the Judgment and Order dated 29.2.2000 of the Kerala High Court
in W.A. No. 200of2000. ·
c
WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 690-691 of2001.

From the Judgment and Order dated 29.2.2000 of the Kerala High Comt D
in W.A. No. 2709/99-A and 8 of2000.

Harish N. Salve, Solicitor General, Mahendra Anand, C.S. Vaidyanathari,
T.L.V. Iyer Sr. Advs., Ramesh Babu M.R., M.T. George, M.K. Damodaran,
Gopala K. Kurup, G. Prakash, Ms. Beena Prakash, Roy Abraham, Dileep Pillai,
Himinder Lal, P. Parmeswaran, T.C. Sharma, Jyothis and Mohammed Yusuf for E
the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI, J. Leave is granted in all the
special leave petitions. F
These four appeals arise out of the common judgment of a Division
Bench of the High Court ofKerala at Emakulam in WA Nos. 2708/1999, 2709/
1999, 2710/1999, 8/2000, 52/2000 and 200/2000 dated February 29, 2000. Criminal
Appeal No. 689 of2001 (arising out ofSLP(Crl.) No.1522/2000) is filed by T.T. G
Antony, Deputy Collector and Executive Magistrate, Kannur; Civil Appeal
No. '4066 of 200 l (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 8840/2000) is filed by fourteen
police constables; and Criminal Appeal Nos. 690-691 of2001 (Arising out of
SLP(Crl.) Nos. 2724-25/2000 are filed by the State of Kerala. These appeals
relate to the same incident and raise common questions of facts and law so
they are being dealt with together. H
~·
'
.~.I

948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.

A The relevant facts, giving rise to these appeals, which have a strong
political backdrop, need to be noticed for appreciating the contentions of the
parties. "J. ·

The Communist Party of India (Marxist), C.P.I.(M), is said to have a
strong hold in Kannur District of the State of Kerala. One Mr. M.V. Raghavan
'B who was once a comrade-in-arms in C.P.I.(M) and was its M.L.A. for over 15
years, broke away from that party and formed a new party-'The Communist
Marxist Party' (CMP). He was elected as an M.L.A on t}le ticket of CMP from
the Azheekkode Constituency, Kannur District. The CMP became a constituent
of United Democratic Front (UDF) which formed the Government and was in
C power in the State of Kerala during the relevant period. He was a Minister
in UDF Government having the portfoliO"of Co-operation and Ports. This gave
rise to retribution in the rank and tile of C.P.1.(M) particularly in the youth
wing (DYFI) which took upon itself to prevent his visits to Kannur District.
In January 1993 during his visit to Azhikal (Kannur District) a few country-
made bombs were hurled on him:ln view of that incident, the then Government
D ordered elaborate security arrangements for all his visits to Kannur District.
It appears, much against the advice of the district administration, the Minister
finalised his visit, for inauguration of the 'evening branch of the Co~operative
Urban Bank' in the Alakkandy Complex at Kuthuparamba - Tellicherry Road
(Kannur District) on November 25, 1994. Far from being auspicious, it turned
E out to be an ill-starred day not only for the victims of police excesses and
their families but also for the public and the public authorities as five persons
died and six persons were injured in the police firing purportedly resorted to
for the protection of the Minister and of public and private properties. In the
melee which preceded the police firing more than hundred persons suffered
injuries in the lathi charge and a few police pe'rsonnel also sustained injuries.
F
The police opened fire at two places - (i) in the proximity of the town
hall on the orders of the Executive Magistrate and the Deputy Superintendent
of Po!lce and (ii) in the vicinity of police station, Kuthuparamba on the orders
of the Superintendent of Police. In respect of the occurrence near the town
G hall, the Assistant Superintendent of Police of Thalassery registered Crime
No: 353/94 ofKuthuparamba Police Station under Sections 143, 147,148, 332,
353,324, 307 read with Section 149 IPC, Section 3(2)(e) of P.D.P.P. Act and
Sections 3 and 5 of Explosive Subs_tances Act against eight named and many
other unidentifiable persons belonging to CPl(M) including the President of
DYFI. In regard to the occurrence in the vicinity of the Police Station, the
H Superintendent of Police registered Crime No. 354/94 of Kuthuparamba Police
I
I

T.T. ANTONY v. STATE (QUADRI, J.] 949
Station under Sections 143, 147, 148, 427, 307 read with Section 149 IPC and A
-""< Section 3(2)(e) of P.D.P.P. Act against unidentifiable persons of CPI(M) fot
forming an unlawful assembly. Both the said crimes were registered on the
date of the incident-on November 25, 1994. On that day itself the Executiv~
Magistrate submitted a report to the District Collector who in tum informed.
the Commissioner and Secretary to the Government regarding the police firing B
at Kuthuparamba (Ex.P3). On November 26, 1994, the Superintendent of Police
sent a report of the incident of the previous day to Director General of Police,
Kerala (Ex.P-4).

That incident gave rise to public uproar and demand for judicial inquiry.
On January 20, 1995, the then Kerala Government of UDF appointed Mr. K. C
Padmanabhan Nair, the learned District & Sessions Judge, Thalassary as
Commission of Inquiry under Section 3(1) of the Commission of Inquiry Act,
1952 to inquire into :

"(i) The circumstances which led to the firing by police on 25.11.94
at Kuthuparamba Kannur District which resulted in the death of D
five persons and injuries to many others.
(ii) Whether the said firing by the police was justified.
\
(iii) The person/persons responsible for the firing.
(iv) Such other matters as the incidental to and arising out of the
above."
E
The 1996 assembly elections in the State of Kerala resulted in the
change of the Government. The UDF lost to LDF which came to power and
headed by CPI(M) formed the Government. On May 27, 1997 the Commission
submitted its report to the LDF Government of Kerala recording the following F
findings :

"(I) The uncomprising attitude of Sri M.V. Raghavan, former Minister
of Co-operation and Ports to attend the inaugural function of the
opening of the evening branch of the Co-operative Urban Bank,
Kuthuparamba inspite of the prior informations of the possible O
consequences of his visit to Kuthuparamba is the root cause for
the firing. The avoidable lathi charge which ignited the incidents
at the instance and leadership of Sri Abdul Hakkim Bathery, Dy.
S.P. Kannur paved way for the firing. The failure on t):ie part of
Sri T.T. Antony, Dy. Collector and Executive Magistrate to
evaluate and take stock of the situation ended in the police firing H
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] 3 S.C.R.

A resulting in the death of five persons and injuries to many ..
others.
(2) The police firing at Kuthuparamba on 25.11.94 was not justified.
(3) Sri M.V. Raghavan, the former Minister for Co-operation and
Ports. Sri Abdul Hakkim Bathery Dy. S.P. Kannur and Sri T.T.
B Antony former Dy. Collector, Kannur were responsible for the
police firing."

The report of the Commission was acc.epted by the Government. On ::..:_
June 30, 1997, as a follow-up action, the Additional Chief Secretary to the
Government of Kerala, while enclosing a copy of the said report, wrote to the
C Director General of Police regarding acceptance of the report of the Commission
by the Government and directed that legal action be taken against those
responsible on the basis of findings of the Commission. The Director General
of Police issued orders to the Inspector General of Police (North Zone), on
July 2, 1997, to register a case immediately and have the same investigated
D by a senior officer. On July 4, 1997 the Inspector General of Police noted that
firing without justification by which people were killed amounted to murder
and issued direction to the Station House Officer to register a case under the
appropriate sections and forward the investigation copy of the F.l.R. to the
Deputy Inspector General of Police, Nor~h Zone, for urgent personal
investigation. On that information the Deputy Superintendent of Police,
E Thalassery, registered Crime No. 268/97 ofKuthuparamba Police Station under
Section 302, IPC arraigning the said M.V. Raghavan, A.H. Bathery and T.T.
Antony as accused 1 to 3 respectively (Ex. P-6). On September 29, 1998, the
DIG of Police who investigated Crime No. 268/97 filed interim report (Ex. P-
8) in the court of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kuthuparamba implicating
F 19 police officers including R.A. Chandrasekhar and fourteen constables who
are parties to these appeals.

At that stage three Writ Petitions - 0.P. No. 3408/98 by the Executive
Magistrate (T.T. Antony); O.P. No. 24401/98 by the Assistant Superintendent
of Police (R.A. Chandrasekhar) and O.P. No. 23702/99 by 14 constables
G (Damodaran and 13 others) - were filed in the High Court of Kerala praying
to quash the F.l.R. in Crime No. 268/97; alternatively for directing investigation
into the said crime by the C.B.I.

It is noticed that cases registered as Crime Nos. 353/94 and 354/94 of
Kuthuparamba Police Station which were mainly against the workers and
H DYFI (youth wing of CPI(M)) came to be closed as being false and undetected
- -~·

T.T. ANTONY v. STATE [QUADRI, J.] 951
some time in April 1999 and June 1999 respectively after the said Crime No. A
268/97 of Kuthumparamba Police Station was registered.

The learned Single Judge who dealt with the said O.Ps thought it fit,
having regard to peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, to have the
case re-investigated by the C.B.I. instead of quashing the FIR at the threshold
and accordingly disposed of the writ petitions on November 29, 1999. Against B
the said judgment of the learned Single Judge, six writ appeals were filed -
three by the said writ petitioners and three by the State of Kerala. A Division
Bench of the High Court, by its judgment dated February 29, 2000, confirmed
in part the order of the learned Single Judge in regard to quashing the FIR
in the said Crime No.268/97 ofKuthuparamba Police Station by ordering that C
as against the Assistant Superintendent of Police the FIR be quashed; however,
it directed a fresh investigation by the State Police headed by one of the three
senior officers named in the judgment instead of a fresh investigation by CBI.
Dissatisfied by the said judgment of the Division Bench, the appellants
preferred the above-mentioned appeals.
D
Mr. R.F. Nariman, the learned senior counsel appearing for the Executive
Magistrate, has argued that the allegations against him do not constitute any
offence; they relate to discharge of his official duties in evaluating the law
and order situation at Kuthuparamba in the following background : a mob of
about 2000 DYFI workers assembled in front of Town Hall, the venue of the E
Minister's programme, and on arrival of the Minister, the crowd surged forward
which prompted the Dy. S.P. and the police party under him, who were on
escort duty with the Minister, to lathi charge; the agitated crowd turned
violent and pelted stones at the police ~n.d motorcade of the Minister, set fire
the Government vehicles parked in the m:arby electricity office and indulged
in arson; on finding that both the lathi charge as well as tear gas shells failed F
to control the mob, he ordered the ASP to disperse the mob by resorting to
firing. It was pointed out that the Inquiry Commission also found that DYFI
had resorted to a very crude and uncivilized form of agitation. The said action
of the Executive Magistrate, it was submitted, being protected under Section
132 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, could never be termed as an offence G
so implicating him as an accused was wholly unjustified and illegal as such
criminal proceedings against him ought to be qtlashed. It was brought to our
notice that immediately after the police firing\ the appellant submitted a
complete report of the incident to the District Collfctor on November 26, 1994;
th,.e Additional District Magistrate and the S.P. had also sent their reports of
the incident. The Collector in tum reported the incident to the Government H
952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (200 I] 3 S.C.R.

'. A on November 27, 1994. It was highlighted that all the police personnel on duty
on the scene of occurrence were rewarded for their meritorious services and
the constables who were injured were paid Rs. 500 each ex-gratia. The wind
changed after the change in the Government; it resulted in arresting the said
Executive Magistrate on the charge under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code
B and shielding the S.P. who also ordered firing which caused the death of five
persons by charging him only under Section 201 I.P.C. as he turned an
approver. It is also submitted that the Executive Magistrate has been under
suspension from 1997 and thus lost one chance of promotion and if he is put
to the ordeal of trial on the basis of the final report submitted by the new
investigating team, which is a mere re-production of the first report, his career
C will be seriously. affected.

Mr. Mahendra Anand, the learned Senior counsel, has argued that out
of 350 police personnel deployed to take care of law and order in
Kuthuparamba, fourteen constables for whom he is appearing, are arbitrarily
booked under Section 302 read with Section 34 l.P.C.; they were under the
D leadership of the ASP and obeyed his orders; the criminal proceedings against
bim were quashed by the Division Bench of the High Court on the ground
that he was exonerated by the Commission of Inquiry; all those reasons which
justify quashing of the proceedings against ASP should equally apply to
them and therefore as against them also the proceeding should have been
E quashed. The constables, it is submitted, were given cash award for good
performance of their duties during very difficult situation by the then
Government but after the change of the Government they are made to face
the trial when indeed there could be no case against them in view of Sections
76 and 79 l.P.C. and that their action cannot be termed as offence much less
murder under Section 302 I.P.C. The investigation has proceeded with pre-
F determined conclusions; the FIRs which were lodged on the date of the
occurrence (FIR Nos. 353/94 and 354/94) against DYFI, the workers and the
. leaders of CPI(M), were reported as false and got closed on their coming into
power subsequently; the SP who was in overall charge of the law and order
and who ordered firing which resulted in the death of five persons turned
G approver giving statement contrary to the report submitted by him earlier, is
charged only under Section 2011.P.C. but on the basis of tainted investigations
the constables are charged under Section 302 I.P.C. It is further submitted that
to concoct the· evidence against the appellants-accused, two special
prosecutors have been appointed to assist the investigators. The alternative
contention urged on their behalf is that as on the face of it the investigation
H has not been fair and impartial and is also vitiated by ma/a fide and irregularity,
T.T. ANTONY v. STATE [QUADRI, J.] 953

... fresh investigation by CBI may be ordered. A
The learned Solicitor General appearing for the State of Kerala has ·
contended that when the Division Bench suggested that a fresh team should
investigate the crime, none of the accused objected to that course of action
on June 29, 2000; the new team after due investigation filed the final report
in the court of the Magistrate and it is only thereafter that this Court passed B
interim order on July 24, 2000, therefore, they cannot be permitted to challenge
the report in this court or seek direction for fresh investigation by CBI; as
the FIR discloses a cognizable offence, no challenge against investigation
into the offence is permissible. The FIR, it is submitted, is not necessarily 1

......
against an offender but is in respect of an offence which is cognizable and C
requires investigation and collection of evidence by the investigating agency.
Both the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Division Bench of the
High Court did not find any ma/a fide intention in filing the FIR; they took
note of the fact that the FIR was lodged on the basis of findings recorded
by the Inquiry Commission that the firing was unjustified, therefore, there
could be no interference with the investigation by the police in view of the D
guidelines laid down by this Court in Bhajan Lal's case. Inasmuch as after
investigation the final report has been filed and the learned Magistrate has
taken cognizance and issued summons, the trial court can consider the pleas
of the accused under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. but at this stage neither the
investigation can be challenged in these appeals nor can the sufficiency of £
the evidence be gone into by the High Court/the Supreme Court except to see
whether a cognizable offence has been disclosed. Insofar as the appeal
against quashing of criminal proceedings against the ASP by the Division
Bench is concerned, it is contended that the reasons given by the High Court
are untenable. It is submitted that the order directing firing at the mob was
unjustified as the crowd was not violent; there was no danger to the life of F
the Minister as the crowd had withdrawn from the Town Hall and that the lathi
charge and the firing started by the escort police party headed by Dy. SP
without lawful orders from competent authority; the escort party left the
Minister and went far away to the area under the control of the ASP who did
not prevent the escort party from resorting to unjustified and unlawful firing G
on the crowd and that the ASP himself also ordered firing on peaceful crowd
of people. The learned Solicitor General urged that the facts disclosed in the '
investigation showed complicity of ASP in the crime but as the criminal
proceedings against him were quashed by the Division Bench of the High
Court, the material could not be referred to in the final report nor could he.
be included in the array of the accused. It is argued that the Commission of l-I
--y-
'

954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [200 I] 3 S.C.R.

A Inquiry has no judicial powers and its report is purely recommendatory and
not effective proprio vigore and that the findings of the Commission have
...
)-..
also no evidentiary value, hence the accused persons cannot claim to be
exonerated on the basis of its findings particularly when, in the investigation,
sufficient material has come to light pointing to the involvement of Deputy '
SP, ASP and others. As none of the requirements for quashing the investigation
B is present, submits the learned Solicitor General, the High Court erred in
interfering with the investigation of the cognizable offence by quashing the
proceedings against the ASP.· It is argued that the High Court committed a
serious illegality in coming to the conclusion that once the Government x
accepts the Report of Commission, the investigating agency cannot give a go
....
c by to it and failed to notice that the role of the Government in any investigation
is only supervisory and it cannot dictate either the mode or the outcome of
the investigation, therefore the investigating agency rightly conducted
investigation uninfluenced by acceptance of Commission's report by the ...
Government. Regarding the Executive Magistrate, it is submitted, that he is
a party to the conspiracy which resulted in the death of innocent persons and
D that the legality of the FIR and the investigation cannot be challenged or
examined on the basis of disputed questions of fact in proceedings under
Article 226/227 of the Constitution. Inasmuch as in compliance with Section
132(1) Cr.P.C. sanction of the State Government has been obtained, the question
whether the Executive Magistrate is protected under Section 129 ofCr.P.C. is
E a matter of defence in the trial and cannot be gone into at this stage. With
regard to the police constables, it is contended that though they belong to
different groups, namely, 'escort' party and 'law and order' party they
subsequently merged into one group and resorted to indiscriminate firing; in
any event they are not entitled to the benefit of Section 132(2) of Cr.P.C. which
is applicable only to the armed forces; further the police constables who
F participated in unjustified firing cannot be permitted to plead defence of
obedience to the order of the superior. It is argued that the material collected
in investigation reveals that the Dy. SP took rifle from one Abdul Salam to
whom it was officially issued and handed it over to Damodaran who had no
--....
authority to use the rifle for firing thus he resorted to deliberate illegal firing. '
G The persons who fell to the shots and died were found to be far away from
the Town Hall, the place where the Minister was to address a meeting, which
shows that callous and indiscriminate firing was resorted to by the police in
violation of the guidelines in the Police Manual. It is fairly conceded by the
-
)._
learned Solicitor General that if this Court is not inclined to interfere with the
judgment under challenge in Chandrasekhar's case, the case of the constables
H cannot be dealt with differently. It is further submitted that no allegation was
y-
-4

T.T. ANTONY v. STATE [QUADRI, J.] 955
made against any of the members of the new investigating team; even in the A
~
appeal, there is no mention of any bias or malice against any of the officers
of the new investigating team, therefore, at this stage the plea for a fresh
investigation by a different agency, CBI, is not called for nor is it permissible
in view of the dictum of this Court in Chandrasekhar v. State of Kera/a,
[1998] 5 SCC 223. From the fact that the case diary runs into six volumes,
submits the learned Solicitor General, it is evident that thorough investigation B
has been made and at this stage no useful purpose will be served by directing
a fresh investigation by a new agency which will be a futile exercise. It is
"' argued that by re-production of a portion of the report of the earlier investigating ,
"" team in the final report submitted by the new team, which deals with narration
of sequence of events, non-application of mind cannot be inferred. c
At the re-hearing of the appeals, ·the learned counsel for the parties
addressed arguments on the question of the legality of the second FIR
registered as Crime No.268/97 and the investigation that followed it in respect ,
of the cognizable offence mentioned therein after about three years of the
occurrence when in that regard two FIRs pertaining to two different places D
were already filed and registered as Crime No. 353/94 and Crime No. 354/94
on the date of the occurrence - November 25, 1994 and the investigations in
\
those cases were pending. The learned counsel for the accused have argued
that registration of a fresh information in respect of the very same incident
as an FIR under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. is not valid, therefore all the steps taken E
pursuant thereto including investigation are illegal and liable to be quashed.
The learned Solicitor General countered them stating that no illegality can be
attached to the second FIR or the investigation made thereunder as nothing
prevented the investigating agency from making further investigation on the
basis of the first FIR in view of the subsequent information received and
forwarding a further report; at any rate, the objection is merely one of a form F
and not of substance and it makes no difference so far as the final report is
concerned.

On these contentions, four points arise for determination:

(i) whether registration of a fresh case, Crime No. 268/97, G
,..
Kuthuparamba Police Station on the basis of the letter of the
DGP dated July 2, 1997 which is in the nature of the second FIR
,J
under Section 154 of Cr.P.C., is valid and can it form the basis
J' of a fresh investigation?

(ii) whether the appellants in Appeal Nos. 689/2001 & 4066/2001 H
~·
I

956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (200 I] 3 S.C.R.

A (arising out of SLP(Crl.) 1522/00 and SLP(C) 8840/00) and
respondent in Appeal Nos. 690-691101 (arising out of SLP(Crl.)
Nos. 2724-25/00) have otherwiSe made out a case for quashing
of proceedings Crime No.268/97 Kuthuparamba Police Station ;
(iii) what is the effec't of the report of Sri. K. Padmanabhan·
B Commission of Inquiry; and
(iv) whether the fac;ts and the circumstances of the case justify a
fresh investigation by .CBI.

As points (i) and (ii) are interconnected, it will be convenient to deal
C with them together. Inasmuch as the germane question relates to registration
of an F.l.R., we may usefully refer to Section 154 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) w?ich reads as under:

"15 4. Information in cognizable c.ases-

(1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable
D offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station,
shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and
be read over to the informant; and every such information,
i
whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall
be signed by the person giving it, and· the substance thereof
E sha 11 be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form
as the State Govern.111ent may prescribe in this behalf.
(2) A copy of the info1mation as recorded under sub-section (1)
shall be given. forthwith, free of cost, to the informant.
(3) , Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer in
F charge of a police station to record the information referred to
in sub-section (1) may send the substance of such information,
in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned
who, if satisfied that such information discloses the commission
of a·cognizable offence, shall either investigate the.case himself.
G or direct an inv~stiga!ion to be made by any police officer
subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code, and
such officer shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of
the police station in relation to that offence. \.

Sub-section ( 1) o( Section 154 of Cr.P.C. contains four mandates to ao
~
H officer in-charge of a police station. The first enjoins that every information
T.T. ANTONY v. STATE [QUADRI, J.] 957
relating to commission of a cognizable offence if given orally shall be reduced A
to writing and the second directs that it be read over to the informant; the
third requires that every such information whether given in writing or reduced
to writing shall be signed by the informant and the fourth is that the substance
of such information shall be entered in the Station House Diary. It will be apt
to note here a further directive contained in sub-section ( 1) of Section 157 of B
Cr.P.C. which provides that immediately on receipt of the information the
officer in charge of the Police Station shall send a report of every cognizable
offence to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence ~nd
then proceed to investigate or depute his subordinate officer to investigate
the facts and circumstances of the case. Sub-section (2) entitles the informant
to receive a copy of the information, as recorded under sub-section ( 1), free C
of cost. Sub-section (3) says that in the event of an officer in charge of a
police station refusing to record the information as postulated under sub-
section (1), a person aggrieved thereby may send the ·substance of such
information in writing and by post to the Superintendent of Police concerned
who is given an option either to investigate the case himself or direct the
investigation to be made by a police officer subordinate to him, in the manner D
provided by Cr.P.C., if he is satisfied that the information discloses the
commission of a cognizable offence. The police officer to whom investigation
is entrusted by the Superintendent of Police has all the powers of an officer
in charge of the police station in relation to that offence.
E
An information given under sub-section (1) of Section 154 ofCr.P.C. is
commonly known as First Information Report (F.l.R.) though this term is not
used in the Code. It is a very important document. And as its nick name
suggests it is the earliest and the first information of a cognizable offence
recorded by an officer in charge of a police station. It sets the criminal law
into motion and marks the commencement of the investigation which ends up F
with the formation ofopinion under Section 169 or 170 ofCr.P.C., as the case
may be, and forwarding of a police report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. It is
quite possible and it happens not infrequently that more informations than
one are given to a police officer ii). charge of a police station in respect of
the same incident involving one or more than one cognizable offences. In G
such a case he need not enter every one of them in the Station House Diary
and this is implied in Section 154 of Cr.P.C. Apart from a vague information
by a phone call or a cryptic telegram, the information first entered in the
J Station House Diary, kept for this purpose, by a police officer in charge of
a police station is the First Information Report - F.I.R. postulated by Section
154 of Cr.P.C. All other informations made orally or in writing after the H
958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.

A commencement of the investigation into the cognizable offence disclosed
from the facts mentioned in the First Information Report and entered in the
Station House Diary by the police officer .or such other cognizable offences
as may come to his notice during the investigation, will be statements falling
under Section 162 of Cr.P. C. No such information/statement can properly be
treated as an F.l.R. and entered in the Station House Diary again,. as it would
B in effect be a second FIR and the same cannot be in conformity with the
scheme of the Cr.P.C. Take a case where an FIR mentions cognizable offence
under Section 307 or 3261.P.C. and the investigating agency learns during the
investigation or receives a fresh infomiation that the victim died, no fresh FIR
under Section 302 1.P.C. need be registered which will be irre~ular; in such a
C case alteration of the provision of law in the first FIR is the proper course
to adopt. Let us consider a different situation in which H having killed W, his
wife, informs the police that she is killed by an unknown person or knowing
that W is killed by his mother or sister, H owns up the responsibility and
during investigation the truth is detected; it does not require filing of fresh
FIR against H - the real offender-who can be arraigned in the report under
D Section 173(2) or 173(8) of Cr.P.C., as the case may be. It is of ~ourse
permissible for the investigating officer to send up a report to the concerned
Magistrate even earlier that investigation is being directed against the person
suspected to be the accused.

E The scheme of the Cr.P.C. is that an officer in charge of a Police Station
has to commence investigation as.provided in Section 156 or 157 ofCr.P.C.
on the basis of entry of the First Information Report, on coming to know of
the commission of a cognizable offence. On completion of investigation and
on the basis of evidence collected he has to form opinion under Section 169
or 170 of Cr.P.C., as the case may be, and forward his report to the concerned
F Magistrate under Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C. However, even after filing such a
report if he comes into possession of further information or material, he need
not register a fresh FIR, he is empowered to make further investigation,
normally with the leave of the court, and where during further investigation
he collects further evidence, oral or documentary, he is obliged to forward the
G same with one or more further reports; this is the import of sub-section (8)
ofSection 173 Cr.P.C.

From the above discussion it follows that under the scheme of the
provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156,157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 ofCr.P.C. only. \
the earliest or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizabl<:
H offence satisfies the requirements.!lf Section 154 Cr.P.C. Thus there can be no
T.T. ANTONY v. STATE [QUADRI; J.] 959

- ~
second F.l.R. and consequently there can be no fresh investigation on receipt
of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence
or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable
A

,. offences. On receipt of information about a cognizable offence or an incident
giving rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on entering the F.l.R. in
the Station \House Diary, the officer in charge of a Police Station has to
investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also B
other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the
same transaction or the same occurrence and file one or more reports as
,,.,,_ provided in s.ection 173 of the Cr.P.C.

The learned Solicitor General relied on the judgment of this Court in
Ram Lal Narang & Ors. v. State (Delhi Administration, [1979] 2 S.C.C. 322
c
(referred to as N~rangs case) to contend that there can be a second F.l.R. in
respect of the same subject matter. In that case the contention urged by the
appellant was tha~ the police had committed illegality, acted without jurisdiction
in investigating i'nto the second case and the Delhi Court acted illegally in
taking cognizance of that (the second) case. A reference to the facts of that 1D
case would be interesting. Two precious antique pillars of sand stone were
dep~sited in the court of Ilaqa Magistrate, Kamal, as stolen property. One
\ N.N. Malik filed an application before the Magistrate seeking custody of the
pillars to make in detail study on the pretext that he was a Research Scholar.
It appears that the then Chief Judicial Magistrate of Kamal, (H.L. Mehra), was
E
a friend of Malik. At the instance of Mehra the said Ilaqa Magistrate ordered
that the custody of the pillars be given to Malik on his executing a bond.
About three months thereafter Malik deposited two pillars in the court of
Ilaqa Magistrate, Kamal. After sometime it came to light that the pillars
returned by Malik were not the original genuine pillars but were fake pillars.
An F.l.R. was lodged against both Malik and Mehra under Section 120-B read F
with Sections 406 and 420 of LP.C. alleging conspiracy to commit criminal
breach of trust and cheating. The C.B.L after necessary investigation filed
charge sheet in the court of Special Magistrate, Ambala, against both of them.
Ultimately on the application of the public prosecutor the case was permitted
to be withdrawn and the accused were discharged. Sometime later the original
G
genuine pillars were found in London which led to registering an F.LR. in
;
Delhi under Section 120-B read with Section 411 ofl.P.C, and Section 25(1)
of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972 against three persons who
j
were brothers (referred to as 'Narangs'). The gravamen of the charge against
them was that they, Malik and Mehra, conspired together to obtain custody
of the genuine pillars, got duplicate pillars made by experienced sculptors and H
960 SUPREME COURT R,EPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.

A had them substituted with a view to smuggle out the original genuine pillars
to London. After issuing process for appearance ofNarangs by the Magistrate
at Delhi, an application was filed for dropping the proceedings against them
on the ground that the entire second investigation was illegal as the case on
the same facts was already pe~ding before Ambala Court, therefore, the Delhi
B Court acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case on the basis
of illegal investigation and the report forwarded by the police. The Magistrate
referred the case to the High Court and Narangs also filed an application
under Section 482 of Cr.f'..C. to quash the proceedings. The High Court
declined to quash the proceedings, dismissed the application of Narangs and x.
thus answered the reference. On appeal to this Court it was contended that
C the subject-matter of the two F.1.Rs. and two charge-sheets being the same
there was an implied bar on the power of the police to investigate into the
subsequent F.I.R. and the court at Del,hi to take cognizance upon the report
of such infonnation. This Court indicated that the real question was whether
the two conspiracies were in substance and truth the same and held that the
conspiracies in the two cases were not identical. It appears to us that the
D Court did not repel the contention of the appellant regarding the illegality of
the second FIR and the investigation based thereon being vitiated, but on
facts found that the two FIRs in truth and substance were different - the first
was a smaller conspiracy and the second was the larger conspiracy as it
turned out eventually. It was pointed out that even under the Code of 1898
E after filing of final report there could be further investigation and forwarding
of further report. The 1973 Cr.P .C. specifically provides for further investigation
after forwarding of report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 of Cr.P.C. and
forwarding of further report or reports to the concerned Magistrate under
Section 173(8) ofCr.P.C. It follows that if the gravamen of the charges in the
two FIRs - the first and the second - is in substance and truth the same,
F registering the second FIR and making fresh investigation and forwarding r.
report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. will be irregular and the Court can not take
cognizance of the same.

On a perusal of the judgment of this Court in M. Krishna v. State of
G Karnataka, [1999) 3 sec 247, we do not find anything contra to what is
stated above. The case is distinguishable on facts of that case. In the. case
on hand the second FIR is filed in respect of the same incident and on the
same facts after about three years.

The right of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence is a
H statutory right over which the court does not possess any supervisory
T.T. ANTONY v. STATE (QUADRI, J.] 961
jurisdiction under the Cr.P.C.. in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR 32 A
(1945) PC 18, the Privy Council spelt out the power of the investigation of
the police, as follows :

"In India as has been shown there is a statutory right on the part of
the police to investigate, the circumstances of an alleged cognizable
crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and B
it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should
be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise
of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court."

This plenary power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence is,
however, not unlimited. It is subject to certain well recognised limitation. One C
of them, is pointed out by the Privy Council, thus :

"if no cognizable offence is disclosed, and still more if no offence of,
any kind is disclosed, the police would have no authority to undertake
an investigation."
D
Where the police transgresses its statutory power of investigation the
High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 226/227 of the Constitution
and this Court in appropriate case can interdict the investigation to prevent
abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
E
In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal & Ors,, [1992] Suppl. 1 SCC 335, after
exhaustive consideration of the decisions of this Court in State of West
Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha, [1982] I SCC 561; S.N. Sharma v. Bipen
Kumar Tiwari, [1970] 1SCC653; R.P. Kapur v. State ofPunjab, [1960] 3 SCR
388; Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, [1978) 2 SCC 424 and Prabhu Dayal
Deorah v. District Magistrate, Kamrup, [1974] 1 SC<; 103, approving the F
judgment of the Privy Council in Khwaja Nazir Ahmad's case (supra), it was
concluded in para 102 as follows :

"In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant
provisions of the code under Chapter XIV and of the principles oflaw G
enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the
exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
I reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way
of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of H
962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] 3 S.C.R.

A justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid
formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases
wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information rep<.>rt or the
B complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted
in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the fir~t information report and other
)<(.
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
c cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do
D not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of
E a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
F (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
G
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with ma/a
fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with
an ulterior motive for wrecking vengeance on the accused and
with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

H The above list, as noted, is illustrative and not exhaustive.
:."--v-
I

T.T. ANTONY v. STATE [QUADRI, J.] 963
A just balance between the fundamental rights of the citizens under A
Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the expansive power of the police
~ to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the Court~ There
cannot be any controversy that sub-section (8) of Section 173 Cr.P.C. empowers
the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral
and documentary) and forward a further report or reports to the Magistrate.
In Narangs' case (supra) it was, however, observed that it would be appropriate
B
to conduct further investigation with the permission of the Court. However,
the sweeping power of investiga\iob does not warrant subjecting a citizen
Joi
each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident,
giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of
.., successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final report under Section c
173(2) Cr.P.C. It would cleady be beyond the purview of Sections 154 and 156
Cr.P.C. nay, a case of abuse of the statutory power of investigation in a given
I
case. In our view a case of fresh investigation based on the second or
successive FIRs, not being a counter case, filed in connection wit~ the same
or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the
course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first D
FIR either investigation is underway or' final report under Section 173(2) ~as
been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of pow~r
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226/227 of the Constitution.

Coming to the facts of this case, which are not free from political
E
overtones, the incident which gave rise to registering of FIRs, took place, on
November 25, 1994 on the occasion of the visit of the Minister to Alakkandy
Complex at Kuthuparamba, Tellicherry Road (KanP"r District) for inauguration
of the evening branch of the Co-operative Urban Bank. The events that
developed there led to firing by police at two places - (i) in the vicinity of
·~· town hall for which FIR was lodged and Crime No. 353/94 under Sections 143, F
147, 148, 332, 353, 324, 307 read with Section 149 IPC, Section 3(2Xe) of P.D.P.P.
Act and Sections 3 and 5 of Explosive Substances Act, was registered and
(ii) in the vicinity of the Police Station, Kuthuparamba in respect of which FIR
was filed and Crime No. 354/94 ofKuthuparamba Police Station under Sections
143, 147, 148, 307 and 427 read with Section 149 IPC and Section 3(2)(e) of
G
P.D.P.P. Act was registered. While the investigations on the basis of the said
FIRs were pending, the report of Mr. K. Padmanabhan Nair, Inquiry Commission,
was submitted to the Government. On June 30, 1997, the Additional Chief
J Secretary wrote to the Director-General of Police that the Government ~ad
accepted the report of the Commission and directed that the legal action be
taken against those responsible on the basis of the findings of the Commission. H
964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] 3 S.C.R.

A On July 2, 1997, the Director-General of Police, however, wrote to Inspector
General of Police (North Zone) to register a case immediately and have the
same investigated by a senior officer. Two days thereafter, the Inspector
General of Police added his own remarks - "firing without justification by
which people were killed .amounted to murder" - and ordered the Station
House Officer to register a case under the appropriate sections and forward
B the investigation copy of the FIR to the ·Deputy Inspector General of Police
(North Zone) for urgent personal investigation. On the date when the
·Additional Chief Secretary wrote to the Director-General of Police, the
investigations initiated in the said two crimes relating to the same incident
wefe in progress. The investigating agency should have taken advantage of
C the report of the Commission for a proper further investigation into the case.
Ori the facts which might come to light during investigation, if necessary, the
investigating agency should have altered the offences under appropriate
section of the relevant Acts and concluded the investigations. In view of the
orders of the Director General of Police to register a case and on the further
direction of the Inspector General of Police, the officer in-charge of Police
D Station registered Crime No. 268/97 of Kuthuparamba Police Station.. A
cornparison and criticai examination of the FIRs in Crime Nos. 353 & 354 of
1994 on one hand and FIR in Crime No. 268/97 on the other, discloses that
the date and place of occurrence are the same; there is alluding reference to
the deaths caused due to police firing in the FIRs in Crime Nos. 353 and 354
E of 1994. In any event, that fact was evident on the scene of occurrence. The
narration of events, which we need not repeat here, are almost the same. The
additional averments in Crime No. 268/97 are based on the findings in the
report. of the Commission. Having regard to the test laid down by this Court
in Narangs' case (supra), with which we. are in respectful agreement, we find
that in truth and substance the essence of the offence in Crime Nos. 353 and
F 354of1994 is the same as in Crime No. 268of1997 ofKuthuparamba Police
. '
Station. In our view, i~ sending information in regard to the same incident,
duly enclosing a copy of the report of the commission of inquiry, to the
Inspector General of Police for appropriate action, the Additional Chief
Secre.tary adopted the right course of action. Perhaps the endorsement of the
G Inspector General of Police for registration of a case misled the subordinate
police officers and the said letter with regard ~o the incident of November 25,
1994 at Kuthuparamba was registered again under Section .154 ofCr.P.C. which
would be the second FIR and, .in our opinion, _on the facts of this case, was
-\
irregular and a fresh investigation by the investigating agency was _
unwarranted and illegal. Oft that date the investigations in the earlier cases
H (Crime Nos. 353 and 354of1994) were pending. The correct course of action
T.T. ANTONY v. STATE (QUADRI, J.) 965
should have been to take note of the findings and the contents of the repoi;t, A
streamline the investigation to ascertain the true and correct facts, collect the
evidence in support thereof, form an opinion under Sections 169 and 170
Cr.P.C., as the case may be, and forward the report/reports under Section
173(2) or $ection 173(8) Cr.P.C. to the c<:mcemed Magistrate. The course
adopted in this case, namely, the registration of the information as the secon.d B
FIR in regard to the same incident and making a fresh investigation is nc'.it
permissible under the scheme of the provisions of the Cr.P.C. as pointed out
above, therefore, the investigation undertaken and the report thereof cannot
but be invalid. We have, therefore, no option except to quash the same
leaving it open to the investigating agency to seek permission in Crime No.
353/94 or 354/94 of the Magistrate to make further investigation, forward C
further report or reports and thus proceed in accordance with law.
f

Regarding point No. 3, the principles as to the position of Commissioh
of Inquiry appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, the report and
finding recorded by the Commission are too well-settled to admit of any
elaborate discussion except to reiterate them here. As long back as in 1904, D
the Privy Council in Re: Maharaja Madhava Singh, [31 Indian Appeals 239
(PC)] laid down,

" ... .it is sufficient to say that the Commission in question was one
appointed by the Viceroy.himself for the information of his own min4,
in order that he should not act in his political and sovereign character E
otherwise than in accordance with the dictates of justice and equity,
and was not in any sense a Court..... ".

A Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in M. V. Rajwade, J.A.S.,
District Magistrate v. Dr. S.M. Hassan & Ors., AIR (1954) Nagpur 71 following
the said judgment of the Privy Council, held that the Commission was a fact F
finding body meant only to instruct the mind of the Government without
producing any document of a judicial nature and that findings of the
Commission of Inquiry were not definitive like a judgment. It was also pointed
out that there was no accuser, no accused and no specific charges for trial;
nor was the Government, under the law, required to pronounce, one way or G
the other, on the findings of the Commission. That judgment was approved
by various judgments of this Court.

/ In Shri Ram_Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar & Ors.,
[1959] SCR 279, a Constitution Bench of this Court while considering the
constitutional validity of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, indicated that the H
966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.

A Commission is merely to investigate, record its findings and make its
recommendations which are not enforceable proprio vigore and that the inquiry
or report cannot be looked upon as judicial inquiry in the sense of its being
an exercise of judicial function properly so called. The recommendations of
the Commission of Inquiry are of great importance to the Government in order
to enable it to make up its mind as to what legislative or administrative
B measures should be adopted to eradicate the evil found or to implement the
beneficial objects it has in view. It would be appropriate to notice the following
observations of the Constitution Bench :

"But seeing that the Commission of Inquiry has no judicial powers

c and its report will purely be recommendatory and not effective proprio
vigore and the statefuent made by any person before the Commission
of Inquiry is, under section 6 of the Act, wholly inadmissible in
evidence in any future proceedings, civil or criminal, there can be no
point in the Commission of Inquiry making recommendations for taking
any action "as and by way of securing redress or punishment" which,
D in agreement with the High Court, we think, refers, in the context, to
wrongs already done or committed, for redress or punishment for such
wrongs, if any, has to be imposed by a court of law properly constituted
exercising its own discretion on the ·facts and circumstances of the
case and without being in any way influenced by the view of any
person or body, howsoever august or high powered it may be."
E
In State of Karnataka v. Union of India and Anr., [ 1977] 4 SCC 608, the
observations referred to above were approved by a seven-Judge Bench of
this Court. In Sham Kant v. State of Maharashtra, [1992] Suppl. 2 SCC 521,
it was held that the findings of the Inquiry Commission would not be binding
· on the S~preme Court. There, the question was whether an undertrial died due
F to injuries sustained by hini. in police custody. The report of the Commission
of Inquiry mentioned that the injuries possibly might have been sustained by
him even prior to his arrest. In the appeal arising out of conviction and
sentence of the concerned police officer, this Court, on material before it,
found that the victim died on account of ill treatment meted out by the police
G and held that the findings of the Commission would not bind this Court. :
It is thus seen that the report and findings of the Commission of Inquiry
are meant for information of the Government. Acceptance of the report of the
Commi~sion by the Government would only suggest that being bound by the
R~le of law and having duty to ~ct fairly, it has endorsed to act upon it. The
H duty of the police - investigating agency of the State - is to act in accordance
/
T.T. ANTONY v. STATE [QUADRI, J.) 967
with the law of the lang. This is best described by the learned law Lord --Lord A
Denning - in R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, (1968) 1 All E.L.R. 763
at p.769 observed as follows :

"I hold it to be the duty of the Commissioner of Police, as it is of every
chief constable, to enforce the law of the land. He must take steps so
to post his men that crimes may be detected; and that honest citizens B
may go about their affairs in peace. He must decide whether or no
suspected persons are to be prosecuted; and, if need be, bring the
prosecution or see that it is brought; but in all these things he is not
the servant of anyone, save of the law itself."

Acting thus the investigating agency may with advantage make use of
c
the report of the Commission in its onerous task ()f investigation bearing in
mind that it does not preclude the investigating agency from forming a
different opinion under Section 169/170 ofCr.P.C. ifthe evidence obtained by
it supports such a conclusion. In our view, the Courts civil or criminal are not
bound by the report or findings of the Commission of Inquiry as they have D
to arrive at their own decision on the evidence placed before them in
accordance with law.

For the aforementioned reasons, the registration of the second FIR
under Section 154 ofCr.P.C. on the basis of the letter of the Director General E
of Police as Crime No.268/~7 of Kuthuparamba Police Station is not valid and
consequently the investigation made pursuant thereto is of no legal
consequence, they are accordingly quashed. We hasten to add that this does
not preclude the investigating agency from seeking leave of the Court in
Crime No.353/94 and Crime No. 354/94 for making further investigations and
filing a further report or reports under Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. before the F
competent Magistrate in the said cases. In this view of the matter, we are not .
inclined to interfere with the judgment of the High Court under challenge
insofar as it relates to quashing of Crime No. 268/97 of Kuthuparamba Police
Station against the ASP (R.A. Chandrasekhar); in all other aspects the
impugned judgment of the High Court shall stand set aside.
G
On this conclusion it is unnecessary to deal with the other aspects of
the case including the fourth point, namely to direct investigation of the case
/
by the C.B.I.

Criminal Appeal No. 689 of2001 [arising out ofSLP (Crl.) No. 1522/2000] H
968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [200 I] 3 S.C.R.

A and Civil Appeal No. 4066 of2001 [arising out ofSLP(C) No. 8840/2000] filed
by .the appellants [T.T. Antony and Damodaran P. & Ors. respectively] are
allowed.

Criminal Appeal Nos. 690-91 of2001 [arising out ofSLP(Crl.) Nos. 2724-
25/2000] filed by the State of Kerala are dismissed.
B
S.VK Criminal Appeal No. 689/2001 allowed.
C.A. No. 4066/2001 allowed.
Crl. A. Nos. 690-91/dismissed.