Holding

An FIR cannot be quashed unless it is shown that no offence is spelt out; here the FIR prima facie disclosed offences, so the High Court's order quashing the FIR was erroneous.

Summary

The appellant had executed a General Power of Attorney (GPOA) in favour of the first respondent, later cancelled it, but the first respondent still executed a sale deed in favour of the second respondent using the revoked GPOA. A private complaint was filed, leading to an FIR and registration of a criminal case for offences under IPC sections 464, 423, 420 read with 34. While investigation was ongoing, the respondents filed a petition under CrPC s.482 seeking quash of the FIR; the High Court dismissed the FIR, deeming the matter civil. The Supreme Court held that an FIR and its investigation can be quashed only if no offence is spelled out, and that the FIR here prima facie disclosed ingredients of the alleged offences. Consequently, the High Court's order was set aside and the appeal allowed.

Issues considered

Whether an FIR and the consequent investigation can be quashed under Section 482 of the CrPC when investigation is pending.
Whether the allegations in the FIR disclose offences under IPC sections 464, 423, 420 read with section 34.
Whether the dispute is a civil matter or a criminal offence warranting prosecution.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 156(3), s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 34, s. 420, s. 423, s. 464

Subjects

FIRSection 482 CrPCquash of investigationGeneral Power of Attorneycheatingforgerycivil vs criminalprima facie offence

Judgment

A T. VENGAMA
v.
T. DORA SWAMY NAIDU AND ORS.
1-
-
FEBRUARY 27, 2007

B [P.K. BALASUBRAMANY AN AND V.S. SIRPURKAR, JJ.)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
}'
s.482-FIR and consequent investigation cannot be quashed unless
c there is no offence spelt out from the same-On facts, FIR suggesting serious
allegations against accused persons-Investigation was pending-At that
stage the only inquiry to be made was as to whether complaint or FIR
contained allegations of any offence-Prima facie there were ingredients of
offences complained of and, therefore, High Court could not have quashed
D FIR as well as investigation-Penal Code, 1860-ss.464, 423, 420134.

The case of appellant-complainant was that he had executed a General
Power of Attorney (GPOA) in favour of first respondent in respect of his
properties. However, he cancelled the GPOA on realising that the first '""\
respondent was misusing the same. lnspite of cancellation ofGPOA, the first f
E respondent executed a registered sale deed in favour of second respondent.
An FIR was lodged on the basis of complaint filed by appellant against the
respondents, which was sent for investigation under s.156(3) Cr.P.C. to the
Police whereupon a criminal case was registered for the offences punishable
under ss.464, 423, 420 r.w. s.34 IPC.
F
While the investigation was in progress, the respondents filed a petition
under s.482 Cr.P.C. before High Court. High Court quashed the FIR holding
that this was a case of civil profile and none of the ingredients that constituted ~.~

the offences punishable under Sections 464, 423 and 420 read with Section
34 IPC were discernible from the said allegations.
G
In appeal to this Court, appellant-Complainant contended that the
investigation was yet incomplete and at that stage the respondents could not
have rushed to the High Court for getting the FIR quashed.
-\

Allowing the appeal, the Court
H 348
T. VENGAMA v. T. DORA SW AMY NAIDU 349

-
•
_.j
HELD: I.I. It cannot be disputed that a private complaint was filed before
the Magistrate who had made over the said complaint for investigation under
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. That order of the Magistrate has not been challenged.
A

On the basis of that order the police registered a crime probably treating the
complaint as the FIR. It is settled law that an FIR and the consequent
investigation cannot be quashed unless there is no offence spelt out from the
same. The said FIR has to be taken on its face value and then it is to be
B
examined as to whether it spells out the offences complained of. There was no
question of considering the merits of the allegations contained in the FIR at
that stage or testing the veracity of allegations. In this case, admittedly, the
"11.
investigation was in progress. The police had also not reported back to the
Magistrate the result of their investigation. Under such circumstances, the c
FIR could have been quashed only and only ifthere appeared to be no offence
spelt out therein. (Para 7f (352-B-D(

1.2. A glance at the FIR suggests that there were serious allegations
against both the accused, respondents I and 2 inasmuch as it was specifically
alleged that inspitc of the revocation of the GPOA and inspite of a specific D
notice to that effect by the complainant to the first respondent, the first
respondent went on dishonestly to execute the sale deed in favour of his own
)-
daughter on the basis of the said revoked GPOA. It is alleged against the
first respondent that he had no right over the property and yet he had executed
~
a document in favour of the second respondent without any authority with an E
intention to cause loss to the complainant and to cheat him. It was alleged
against the second respondent that she was well aware that the first respondent
was not competent to sell the property so as to defraud and cheat the
complainant and, therefore, she also was liable to be punished under Sections
464, 423, 420 read with Section 34 IPC. It was not for the judge at the stage
of investigation to examine the nature of the transaction and further to
F
examine as to whether any offence was actually committed by the accused
----)~ persons or not. At that stage the only inquiry which could have been made
was as to whether the complaint or the FIR did contain allegations of any
offence. Whether those offences were made out, even prima facie, could not
have been examined at that stage as the investigation was pending then. G
(Para 7f (352-D-A(

1.3. Primafacie there were ingredients of offences complained of and,
I' therefore, at that stage the High Court could not have quashed the FIR as
well as the investigation. (Para 711353-BI
H
-
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 274 of
2007. )...
•
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.4.2004 of the High Court of
Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Cr!. P. No. 4625/2003.

B V. Shekhar, A.V. Rao, Sateesh Galla and Venkateshwara Rao Anumolu for
the Appellant.

G. Ramakrishna Prasad, Suyodhan Byrapaneni, P. Vinay Kumar and D.
Bharati Reddy for the Respondents.

C The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. 1. Leave granted.

2. An order passed by a learned Singk Judge of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court is in challenge in this appeal. By that order the learned Single
D Judge allowed the Criminal Petition filed by the respondents herein and
quashed the FIR registered against them.

3. The appellant herein had filed a private complaint against these
respondents which was sent for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to -\
E the Police whereupon a criminal case was registered as Crime No.22/2002 ~
dated 13.1.2002 for the offences punishable under Sections 464, 423, 420 read
with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. It is an admitted position that this
investigation is not complete and while the investigation was in progress, the
respondents filed a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court
for quashing the FIR, which was lodged on the basis of the complaint, as well
F as the investigation. Aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court, the
original complainant has now come up before us.

4. We have gone through the FIR ourselves. Jn the FIR the complainant
had complained that he was the absolute owner of the vacant site in Sy.No.479/
2 situated at Tirupathi in Ward No.18 of Santhi Nagar Residential area jointly
G along with one Dammalapati Nagulu Naid. He had executed a General Power
of Attorney in favour of the first respondent. However, since the first
respondent was seen misusing the General Power of Attorney, the appellant-
complainant cancelled the said General Power of Attorney on 26.6.1997 by
issuing a legal notice. It is alleged that the first respondent had filed a false
H complaint against the appellant herein alleging the offences punishable under
T. VENGAMAv. T. DORA SW AMY NAIDU [SIRPURKAR . .I.] 351
""' Sections 447, 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code wherein the A
_;
respondent no.2 was shown as one of the witnesses. It is alleged that inspite
of cancellation of General Power of Attorney in 1997, the first respondent
executed a registered sale deed dated 16.6.2000 in favour of the second
respondent. The other accused, namely, respondent nos.3 to 6, who are not
parties before us, were shown as the witnesses therein. It was, therefore
B
alleged that both the accused persons were well aware that the first respondent
did not own the said land and could not have executed such a document and
thereby had cheated the complainant. The respondent no. I had also
.._ dishonestly executed sale deed without any authority and had also made a
false document.
c
5. While this FIR was under investigation by the orders of the Magistrate
under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., the only two accused, who are respondents
before us, out of the original six accused had filed a petition under Section
482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of the same. The learned Single Judge of the High
Court has allowed that petition by the impugned judgment. The learned Single
D
Judge has held that this was a case of civil profile and none of the ingredients
that constitute the offences punishable under Sections 464, 423 and 420 read
with Section 34 IPC were discernible from the said allegations. It was held that
)-. the petitioner herein, the original complainant, was the Principal and the first
~
respondent was his Agent and if an agent mismanages the property and fails
to account for the same, the proper remedy available to the Principal was to E
file a suit against the agent for rendition of accounts. It was also observed
that if at all the first accused had sold away the property in favour of the
second respondent and if at all the offence of cheating was alleged, the
aggrieved party would be the purchaser who purchases the property, i.e., the
second respondent. The learned Judge observed that there was a remedy F
available under the common law to the complainant to get the property by
filing a suit. It was on this ground that the learned Single Judge quashed the
-...~
FIR and the investigation.

6. The learned counsel for the complainant firstly points out that the
learned Single Judge was in complete error in allowing the petition and G
quashing the FIR inasmuch as the learned Judge has completely misunderstood
the allegations made as also the ingredients of the offences. Secondly it was
contended that the investigation was yet incomplete and at that stage the
J respondents could not have rushed to the High Court for getting the FIR
quashed. As against this the counsel for the respondent supported the order H
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A suggesting that there was much to be said against the original complainant ...
and that there were some genuine disputes amongst them. It was also urged l
before us that there could not be any offence alleged and none could be
viewed against the second respondent who was merely a purchaser. It was
urged that the complaint was filed only to harass the accused persons and
B the learned Judge was right in quashing the FIR as well as the complaint.

7. It cannot be disputed that a private complaint was filed before the
learned Magistrate who had made over the said complaint for investigation
under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. That order of the Magistrate has not been
challenged. On the basis of that order the police registered a crime probably
C treating the complaint as the FIR. It is settled law that an FIR and the
consequent investigation cannot be quashed unless there is no offence spelt
out from the same. The law in this respect is settled that the said FIR has to
be taken on its fa(.e value and then it is to be examined as to whether it spells
out the offences complained of. There was no question of considering the
D merits of the allegations contained in the FIR at that stage or testing the
veracity of allegations. In this case, admittedly, the investigation was in
progress. The police had also not reported back to the Magistrate the result
of their investigation. Under such circumstances, the FIR could have been
quashed only and only if there appeared to be no offence spelt out therein.
A glance at the FIR suggests that there were serious allegations against '.Joth
E the accused, respondents I and 2 herein inasmuch as it was specifically
alleged that inspite of the revocation of the General Power of Attorney and
inspite of a specific notice to that effect by the complainant to the first
respondent, the first respondent went on dishonestly to execute the sale deed
in favour of his own daughter on the basis of the said revoked General Power
p of Attorney. It is alleged against the first respondent that he had no right over
the property and yet he had executed a document in favour of the second
respondent without any authority with an intention to cause loss to the
complainant and to cheat him. It was alleged against the second respondent
that she was well aware that the first respondent was not competent to sell
the property so as to defraud and cheat the complainant and, therefore, she
G also was liable to be punished under Sections 464, 423, 420 read with Section
34 !PC. It was not for the learned Judge at the stage of investigation to
examine the nature of the transaction and further to examine as to whether
any offence was actually committed by the accused persons or not. At that
stage the only inquiry which could have been made was as to whether the
H complaint or the FIR did contain allegations of any offence. Whether those
... .J;
T. VENGAMA v. T. DORA SWAMY NAIDU [SIRPURKAR,J.] 353
offences were made out, even prima facie, could not have been examined at A
that stage as the investigation was pending then. We, therefore, do not agree
· with the learned Single Judge that the FIR was liable to be quashed. We also
do not agree with the learned Judge that there are no ingredients of the
offences complained of in the FIR and this was a civil dispute. However, we
do not wish to go deeper into that question. Our prima facie examination B
satisfies us that there were ingredients of offences complained of and,
therefore, at that stage the High Court could not have quashed the FIR as
well as the investigation. The appeal, therefore, has to be allowed, setting
aside the order of the learned Single Judge.

8. This appeal is accordingly allowed and the order of the learned Single C
Judge is set aside.

D.G. Appeal allowed.