Holding

An appeal under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act is maintainable only against an order made in exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt; the interim injunction restraining the Managing Director was not such an order, and the appellant’s abuse of process precludes any equitable relief, leading to dismissal of the appeals.

Summary

The Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Share Holders Welfare Association (appellant) sought to restrain the election of directors at the bank's 83rd, 84th and 85th Annual General Meetings, alleging that the meetings violated a 26 July 2006 injunction that allowed only certain agenda items to be considered. After the High Court appointed a retired judge to chair the meetings, directors were elected and a contempt petition was filed against the Managing Director for alleged disobedience of the earlier order. The High Court then issued an ex‑parte interim injunction restraining implementation of the election results and the appellant filed intra‑court appeals under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act. The Supreme Court examined whether such an appeal was maintainable, whether the injunction constituted a contempt order, and whether the appellant’s conduct amounted to abuse of process and forum‑shopping. It held that the interim injunction was not a punishment in contempt proceedings, that Section 19(1) appeals lie only against orders made in exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt, and that the appellant’s machinations barred equitable relief. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed with costs.

Issues considered

The maintainability of an appeal under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act against an interim injunction issued in contempt proceedings.
Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to pass the interim injunction as a contempt order.
Whether the appellant’s conduct amounted to abuse of process and forum‑shopping, rendering it ineligible for equitable relief.
Whether the order passed by the Single Judge qualifies as a 'judgment' within the meaning of the Madras High Court Letters Patent.
The effect of the doctrine of comity on conflicting orders of courts exercising separate jurisdiction.

Legislation cited

Companies Act, 1956s. 166, s. 210
Constitution of Indias. Article 136, s. Article 142, s. Article 215
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 12, s. 14, s. 19, s. 20

Subjects

Contempt of Courts ActSection 19 appealInterim injunctionAbuse of processForum shoppingAnnual General MeetingDirector electionCorporate democracyDoctrine of comityJudicial jurisdictionCompanies Act

Judgment

[2008] 17 S.C.R. 85

TAMILNAD MERCANTILE BANK SHARE HOLDERS A
WELFARE ASSOCIATION
v.
S.C. SEKAR AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 7129-7130 of 2008)
B
DECEMBER 5, 2008
[S.B. SINHA AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, JJ.]

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: s. 19 - Appeal against
contempt - Association of shareholders of Bank - Annual c
General Meetings - Non-holding of, for several ·years -
Issuance of notice convening AGM, challenge. to, by
Association - Interim order - Permission of holding of
meeting only in respect of some items in Agenda . . :. Items in
Agenda relating to election of directors adjourned - D
Appointment of retired High Court Judge to hold AGM -
... Subsequently, AGM held and directors elected - Contempt
Petition against Managing Director of Bank - Allegation of
disobedience of interim order and that election of directors
at AGM be declared null and void - Injunction order by a E
different judge that resolution passed as regard election of ·
directors in AGM not to be implemented - Intra court appeal
~
by directors elected in AGM- Division Bench holding appeal
to be maintainable - Interference· with - Held: Not called for
-, - When order has been passed adverse to the interest of F
alleged contemnor, appeal would be maintainable particularly
where judgment has been passed by a court beyond its
jurisdiction "'"'." Persons aggrieved could move the higher co&rt
-Furthermore, if two views possible, contempt would not ~if!
- On facts, interim order was obtained upon suppression of
G
facts - Association took recourse to forum shopping - They
~
were guilty of abuse of process of court, thus not entitled to
equitable relief.
_;.
Doctrines/Principles: Doctrine of amity or comity -
85 H
86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A . Requires that different courts exercising separate jurisdiction
pass similar orders - Even irregular order can be set aside
by same court or by higher court.

Judiciary: Superior judiciary - Necessity of - Superior
courts must discourage forl)m shopping.
B
Equity: Person seeking equity must do equity - Party
cannot take recourse to a machination which amounts to
abuse of process of court - Administration of justice.

C Tamilnad Mercantile Bank is carrying on banking
business. Appellant-association are shareholders of the
Bank. Its Annual General Meetings could not be held for
· a number of years. 83rd Annual General Meeting of the
Bank was to be held on 27th July, 2006. There were six
items of the agenda, item no. 1, 2 and 6 and item no.3, 4
0
and 5 relating to filling up of the posts of the directors.
Pursuant to the injunction orCler dated 26th July 2006
passed by the High Court, meeting was held in respect
of item no. 1, 2 and 6 of the Agenda and item Nos. 3, 4
and 5 were adjourned. Bank filed application seeking
E directions as regards holding of 84th Annual General
Meeting, claiming that 84th Annual General Meeting could
not be convened unless 83rd Annual General Meeting .'
was held as per law. By order dated 27th March 2008,
Single Judge of High <;;ourt appointed Justice R.
F Balasubramaniam, Judge (Retd) High Court, Madras to
chair the 83rd, 84th and 85th Annual General Meetings.
Single Judge of High Court, by order dated 29th April
2008, directed that Annual General meeting would be held
but any resolution passed therein would not be
G implemented until orders of the Court and dispute
pertaining to convening of Annual General Meeting would
be dealt with by this Court only. Appellant filed application ·
seeking injunction restraining holding of election of the
Directors alone. Meanwhile Annual General Meeting was
H held on 5th June, 2008 under the Chairmanship of
TAMILNAD MERCANTILE BANK SHARE HOLDERS 87
WEL. ASSO. v. S.C. SEKAR AND ORS.

Justice R. Balasubramaniam. Appellant filed an intra A
court appeal against the order dated 29th April, 2008
which was dismissed. Thereafter, it filed Contempt
Petition against the Managing Director of the Bank, G.
Narayanamurthy for alleged disobedience of order dated
26th July, 2006; and that the election of directors held at B
the 83th, 84th and 85th Annual General Meeting be
declared null and void. Matter came up before another
Judge. He was not disclosed about the previous
proceedings filed from time to time. Single Judge passed
an ex parte interim order and restrained G. c
Narayanamurthy from implementing the resolution or
item of business in relation to the election of DirectQrs
passed at the Annual General Meetings held on 5th June,
2008 till the disposal of contempt petition. Respondents
initiated several proceedings. 1st respondent filed 0
application impleading himself as a party and for vacating
the ex-parte interim order. G. Narayanamurthy also filed
an affidavit for vacation of ex-parte interim order.
However, 1st respondent withdrew the said application
and filed an intra ·court appeal. Shri 5.C. Sekhar, elected E
in the Annual General Meeting held on 5th June, 2008
also filed an intra court appeal u/s. 19(1) of the Contempt

- - of Courts Act, 1971. Division Bench of the High Court
held that the contempt appeals are maintainable. Hence
the present appeal.
F
Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD:1.1. The chain of events clearly show that
although in the subsequent orders it was not expressly
stated that it is in continuation of the earlier order dated G
26th July, 2006, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever
that agenda item nos. 3 to 5 were allowed to be taken up
in the 83rd Annual General Meeting resulting in the
election of the Directors. High Court evidently appointed
Justice R. Balasubramaniam to chair the meeting with a
H
88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A view to see that elections for the years 2004-2005, 2005-
2006 and 2006-2007. are conducted in accordance with
law and in a peaceful manner. [Paras 35 and 36] [106-F-
H]

1.2. The contempt petition was filed against the
8
Managing Director alone who had no role to play in the
matter of holding of the meeting. Action of the court was
not sought for against Mr. Justice R. Balasubramaniam
who acted as an officer of the court. The Directors
representing the Reserve Bank of India were not made
c parties in the contempt petition. Full disclosure as
regards the subsequent proceedings was not made
therein. The contempt petition was taken up by a Judge
who was not acquainted with the fact of the matter. [Paras
36 and 37] [106 A, G, H; 108-A-B]
D
1.3. The submission that 1st respondent and S.C.
Sekar being not a party to the contempt proceeding could
not have maintained an appeal, if accepted, shall lead to "·
a strange situation. Admittedly they were not parties to
E the suit. They were elected during the pendency of the
suit, whether legally or otherwise. The order granting
injunction against the Managing Director had affected
their valuable right. They were elected for a limited period.
The principle of corporate democracy demands that the
Bank functions through its elected Directors. The
F
endeavour on the part of the appellant had been to see r
that old Directors may continue despite the expiry of their
tenure. When, however, day to day affairs of the Bank
were left at the hands of the Managing Director and the
two representatives of the Reserve Bank of India, an
G attempt was made to see that the newly elected Directors
do not assume their office. In this attempt the appellant
has succeeded so far by adopting measures which '7
amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Appellant
did not approach the Court with clean hands, thus was
H not entitled to any equitable relief. It is surprising
TAMILNAD MERCANTILE BANK SHARE HOLDERS 89
WEL..ASSO. v. S.C. SEKAR AND ORS.

to see the manner in which interim order was passed by A
Single Judge· in the contempt proceedings. [Paras 38 and
39] (108-C-~i 109-B-C]

Udyami ·Evam Khadi Gramodyog Welfare Sanstha vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh 2008 (1) S.C.C. 560, relied on. B
V.R. Dalal and Ors. v. Yougendra Naranji Thakkar and
Anr. 2008 (8) SCALE 156, referred to.
-(

1.4. The suit related to 83rd Annual General Meeting.
The contempt application related to election of Directors c
of the Bank at the 83rd, 84th and 85th Annual General
~
_ Meetings. Although the sub-application was directed to
be posted for 23rd July, 2008.the order of injunction was
not limited to that date. It was directed to· continue till
disposal of the contempt application; though it was D
stated earlier that the ad interim injun~tion was. tilt
21.7.2008. It does not contain any reason. There is no
x finding as regards existence of a prima facie case ..There
~
is no finding that G: Narayanm_oorthy had pr~ma facie
<;
committed the contempt. The order is _not a speaking one. E
Ordinarily a direction cannot be issued in contempt
proceedings without arriving at a finding as to how the
....,.., Managing Director of the Bank can be said to have
,. flouted the order. [Para 40] (109-A-B; G-H]

Municipal Corpn., Jabalpur v. Om Prakash Dubey 2007 F
1
(1) sec 373, held applicable.

1.5. In view of the interim order dated 20th June, 2008
'
~
• respondents were prejudiced. They were, thus, 'persons
aggrieved'. As persons aggrieved they could move the G
higher court. If an interim order was passed wholly
--4 '(
without jurisdiction, an appeal would lie thereagainst.
[Para 41] [110-G]

1.6. Th~re cannot be any doubt that in a situation
H
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A where order has been passed adverse to the interest of
the alleged contemnor an appeal would be maintainable
particularly where a judgment has been passed by a court
which is beyond its jurisdiction. [Para 44] [112-A-B]

B Purshotam Dass Goel v. B.S. Dhillon 1978 (2) SCC 370;
Dharam Singh v. Gulzari Lal & Ors SLP (Civil) No. 18852 of
2005; R.N. Dey v. Bhagyabati Pramanik 2000 (4) SCC 400;
D.N. Taneja v. Bhajan Lal 1988 (3) SCC 26; Ashoke Kumar
Rai v. Ashoke Arora and Anr. 96 CWN 278 Ashis Chakraborty
C and others v. Hindustan Lever Sramik Karamchari Congress
and others 96 CWN 673 and Midnapore Peoples' Coop.
Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda 2006 (5) SCC 399, referred to.

1.7. Ass.uming that an appeal uls. 19 was technically
not maintainable, having regard to the fact tnat the interim
D injunction was granted till disposal of the contempt
application, it was a judgment within the meaning of
Clause 15 of the Lette{s Patent of the Madras High Court.
However, it would be proceeded on the assumption that
no appeal was maintainable. An aggrieved person cannot
E be left without a remedy. Access to justice is a human
right. In certain situations it may also be considered to
be a fundamental right. [Paras 50 and 51] [116-8-D]

Tashi Delek Gaming Solutions Ltd. v. State of Karnataka
2006 (1) SCC 442 and Arunima Baruah v. Union of India
F 2007 (6) sec 120, relied on.

1.8. The order of the High Court speak in two voices.
Doctrine of amity or comity requires that different courts
exercising separate jurisdiction pass similar orders. Even
G an irregular order can be set aside by the same court or
b,y a higher court. [Para 53] [116-117-F-A]

Isaacs v. Robertson 1984 (3) All. E.R. 140, referred to.

The ~aw of Injunctions by Lewis & Spelling's p 10,
H
TAMILNAD MERCANTILE BANK SHARE HOLDERS 91
WEL. ASSO. v. S.C. SEKAR AND ORS.

referred to. A

1.9. If this Court while deciding a matter of this nature
may, in exercise of its special jurisdiction under Article
142 of the Constitution of India, not only quash the order
~
appealed against but also in the event it is found that B
quashing of an illegal order gives rise to another illegality,
it may also refuse to exercise its jurisdiction or quash
'~
both the orders. Apart from the fact that the order passed
by the Single Judge dated 20th June, 2008 is found to be
illegal, and without jurisdiction having been passed
without any application of mind and furthermore as the
c
same was obtained by the appellant by suppressing
material facts and the proceedings between the parties,
it is eminently a fit case where this Court should refuse
to interfere with the impugned order of ~he High Court.
[Para 54) [118-0-F] D

;. 1.10. The superior courts of this country must
discourage the forum shopping. A person seeking equity
must do equity. A party cannot take recourse to a
machination which amounts to abuse of the process of E
the court. [Para 55) [118-G]

1.11. If two views are possible, a contempt petition
would not lie. Furthermore this Court does not exercise
its jurisdiction only because it is lawful to do so. Thus, it
y
is not a fit case wherein jurisdiction under Article 136 of F
,.
the Constitution of India should be exercised. [Paras 56,
57 and 58] [119-E-F]

Sushi/a Raje Holkar v. Anil Kak (Retd.) 2008 (7) SCALE
484; The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari AIR 1961 'G
SC 221; Tanna and Modi v C.I. T. Mum,bai XXV 2007 (8)
¥
SCALE S'1; C.K. Prahalad and others. v State of '<arnataka
and others 2008 (8) SCALE 600 and T. Vijendradas v. M.
Subramanian 2007 (8) SCC 751, relied on.
H
e
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R. l-

A Case Law Reference:
2008 (8) SCALE 156 Referred to. Para 38
2008 (1} SCC_560 Relied on. Para 38

B
2001 (1) sec 373
1978 (2) sec 370
Held applicable.
Referred to.
Para 40
Para 41
--
I
I
I
2000 (4) sec 400 Referred to. Para 45 '.-'

1988 (3) sec 26 Referred to. Para 47
c
96 CWN 278 Referred to. Para 47
96 CWN 673 Referred to. Para 48
200& (5) sec 399 Ref~rred to. Para 49
D 2006 (1) sec 442 Relied on. Para 51
2001 (6) sec 120 Relied on. Para 51 _J

2001 (8) sec 151 Relied on. Para 52

E 1984 (3) All. E.R. 140 Referred to. Para 53
•
2008 (7) SCALE 484 Relied on. Para 56 r

AIR 1961 SC 221 Relied on. Para 56
2007 (8) SCALE 51 Relied on. Para 57
.,
F
2008 (8) SCALE 600 Relied on. Para 57
"'
,.,
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
7129-7130 of 2008.
G From the Judgment and Order dated 29.7.2008 of the High
Court of judicature at Madras in Contempt Appeal SR Nos.
'7
c
52638 & 52963 of 2008.

T.R. Andhyarujina, L.N. Rao, C.A. Sundaram, Dushyant
.-
H Dave, V. Kanakaraj, S. Vallinayagam, Y. Raja Gopala Rao, R.
TAMILNAD MERCANTILE BANK SHARE HOLDERS 93
WEL. ASSO. v. S.C. SEKAR AND ORS.

; Shankarnatrajan, K.S. Mahadevan, Rajesh Kumar, Krishan A
Kumar, Aman Gupta, Mayank Mishra, Vibha Datta Makhija,
Niharika, R. Musa, Abhishek Gupta, Zafar lnayat, V.G.
Pragasam, Elam Bharathi, S.J. Aristotle and Prabu Rama
Subramanian for the appearing parties.
B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.
~

2. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. (for short, "the
Company") was established by the Nadar Community. It is c
incorporated and registered under the Indian Companies Act,
1956. It carries on banking business inter alia in the State of
Tamil Nadu.
Members of the Appellant-Association hold a large
D
number of shares in the company. For one reason or the other
its Annual General Meetings could not be held for a number of
).
years. By reason of an order dated 14th October, 2003, the
Company Law Board directed that Annual General Meetings
for the years 1996 to 2003 be held. Pursuant thereto meetings
were held and some Directors were elected. E

3. 24th December, 2004 was the date fixed for holding of
82nd Annual General Meeting. Appellant, however, filed a suit
which was registered as C.S. No.981 of 2004 in the High Court
l
of Judicature at Madras in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. F
Indisputably proceedings in contempt in respect of an order
relating to the said suit came up for consideration before this
Court in Civil Appeal No.3034 of 2006 and by an order dated
12th July, 2006 the matter was remitted to the High Court for
consideration thereof afresh, observing:- G
y
"In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the
High Court cannot be said to have committed an error in
'-" holding that if a proceeding for contempt was not
maintainable, no direction could have been issued therein.
H
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A We are, however, of the opinion that in view of the order ~
passed by the Division Bench and also for the views we
have taken, it is necessary to pass a consequential order,
namely, directi11g the learned Single Judge to consider the
matter afresh. Learned Single Judge of the High Court is,
B therefore, requested to consider the application for grant
of injunction filed by the appellants afresh on merits. All the
contentions raised by the parties shall remain open. We
may place on record the statement made before us by Mr. 1--
Salve, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
c appellants that the Bank and its Directors shall be
impleaded as parties in the Suit. We may further notice
that learned counsel for the Bank and learned counsel for
some of its Directors have been appearing in the matter
throughout It may also be stated that some of the Directors
have also preferred appeals before the Division Bench.
D
L'earned counsel appearing on behalf of the Bank states
that the Ba.nk shall enter formal appearance in the Suit and ,.:,
file written statement within two weeks. ".

Learned Single Judge is also requested to consider
E the desirability of disposing of the Suit as expeditiously as
possit?le. It would be open to the learned Single Judge to
issue such direction(s) as may be found fo be necessary
as regards holding of 83rd Annual General Meeting for the
said purpose extend the time therefor. We may further
F place on record that by our order dated 11.5.2006 the time 1
for holding 83rd Annual General Meeting was extended
upto 30.7.2006. · · . ~ .. ·

In view of the order aforementioned, the said order need
not be complied with." ·' ·
G
. 4. A notice conveping 83rd Annual General Meeting on . 'l
27th July, 2006 was issued on 14th ·June, 2006. . .

5. Before the High Court app_i_ications being OA Nos. 597
H to 599 of 2006, praying for grant of injunction were filed in the
TAMILNAD MERCANTILE BANK SHARE HOLDERS WEL. 95
ASSO. v. S.C. SEKAR AND ORS. [S.S. SINHA, J.]

said suit and by an order dated 26th July, 2006 a learned A
~ Single Judge of the High Court passed an order of injunction,
directing:--

"Till such time, without postponing the meeting, there
can be a better arrangement to conduct the Annual·General B
Meeting as scheduled on 27.7.2006 so far as the subject
matters 1, 2 and 6 found in the agenda (by show of hands)
are concerned and regarding the other subject matter
Nos.3 to 5 found in the agenda, the General Body Meeting
may be adjourned until further orders of the Court and to C
which meeting, fresh proxies may be allowed in
accordance with the result of the enquiry to be made in
these applications. Suppose, the proxies of GPA holders
were not allowed to participate in the election, then no fresh
proxies need be made. There is also no serious objection
by anyone concerned (counsel)." D

6. Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said direction a
>-- meeting was held on 27th July, 2006. However, three items of
Agenda, being item Nos. 3, 4 and 5 stood adjourned.
Indisputably the said items of the Agenda read as under:- E

"3. To appoint a director in the place of Thiru P.H. Arvindh
Pandian who retires by rotation and being eligible offers
himself for reappointment.

4. To appoint a director in the place of Thiru A. F
Rajagopalan who retires by rotation ..

5. To appoint a director in the. place of Thiru P. Prem Vetty
who retires by rotation."

7. Standard Chartered Bank, Mumbai, acting as an agent G
of some of their clients/investors filed applications for transfer
~ of 95,418 (Ninety five thousand four hundred and eighteen}
shares. A letter dated 30th March, 2007 issued by the Reserve
"" Bank of India relating thereto was also placed-in the meeting.
A Resolution was passed by the Board of Directors on 13th H
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.
e
A May, 2007 resolving to transfer the said shares.

8. In the meantime 85th Annual General Meeting also fell
due.

9. The Bank filed OA No.23 of 2007 seeking suitable
B directions as regards holding of the 84th Annual General
Meeting. It was inter alia averred that 84th Annual General
Meeting cannot be convened unless the 83rd Annual General
Meeting is held in accordance with law.

.c Referring to Sections 166 and 210 of the Companies Act
it was contended that 84th Annual General Meeting of the Bank
for the year 2006 should have been held on or before 20th
September, 2006.

The application (OA No.23 /2007) came up for
·o consideration before a learned Single of the High Court and
by an order dated 27th March, 2008, it was directed :-

"1. That the Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. Balasubramaniam, . ._
Judge (Retd) High Court, Madras residing at
E No.157/17, Greenways Road, Chennai-600 028
be and is hereby appointed to chair the 83rd, 84th
and 85th Annual General Meetings of Tamilnad
Merchantile Bank Ltd., Tuticorin. ,,
2. That the time for convening 83rd, 84th and 85th
F
Annual General meeting shall stand extended upto
6th June, 2008." ·

10. ,In the meantime another suit, marked as C.S. No. 481
of 2008 was filed by the appellant questioning the transfer of ...
G aforementioned shares. One of the reliefs prayed for therein
reads as under:-

"granting permanent injunction restraining the 1Oth-31 st "
Defendants, their men, agents, servants and the nominees
from exercising any right as a shareholders of the 2nd
H
TAMILNAD MERCANTILE BANK SHARE HOLDERS WEL. 97
ASSO. v. S.C. SEKAR AND ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.)

Defendant in relation to the abovesaid shares." A

11. The question as to whether the said meeting could be
postponed or not came up for consideration before the learned
Single Judge on 29th April, 2008, when it was directed:-

"2. In the meantime, it is submitted that the Annual General '8
Meeting is scheduled to be held on 5.6.2008. Taking into
account the past history of the litigation, I do not propose
~
to stall the meeting. Therefore, the Annual General Meeting
shall go on. However, any resolution passed in the Annual
General Meeting shall not be implemented until further c
orders of this Court.

3,_ Registry is directed to list the applications alongwith C.S.
No.981 of 2004 on 9.6.2008 immediately after motion list.
D
4. It is made clear that any matter relating to the dispute
pertaining to the convening of the Annual General Meeting
of the Bank, shall be dealt with only by this Court and not
by ay other court. The applicants shall take private notice
to all the other respondents returnable by 9.6.2008"
E
12. Indisputably a meeting was held under the
Chairmanship of Justice R. Balasubramaniam on 5th June,
2008. Theretobefore, he met all the shareholders who desired
to make representations on the mode and manner for
conducting the Annual General Meeting on 1st June, 2008. F
) Appellant did not submit any petition on that date. It did so,
however, at a later stage.

13. Appellant filed an 0.A. No.621 of 2008 in C.S. No. 481
of 2008 seeking for an order of injunction restraining holding
G
of election of the Directors alone. The matter was placed before
the Court on 3rd June, 2008 when an adjournment was taken
and the application was posted for 9th June, 2008. In the
meantime Annual General Meeting was held on 5th June, 2008.
14. Appellant preferred an intra court appeal against the H
98 - SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A order dated 29th April, 2008. The Division B.ench while .
observing that the order dated 29th f".\pril, 2009 sufficiently
protected the interest of the appellant, dismissed the same.

15. Some other proceedings were also initiated with which
we are not concerned.
8
16. On or about 10th June, 2008 Contempt Petition, being
C.P. No.508 of 2008 was filed. Managing Director of the Bank,
Shri G. Narayanamurthy, was alone made a party-contemnor.
The petition was filed for afleged disobedience of the order of
C the learned Single Judge dated 26th July, 2006 passed in O.A.
No. 597 to 599 of 2006. In the said petition the following prayer
was made:-

"to punish the respondent for the disobeying the orders of
0 this Hon'ble Court dated 26.7.2006 in O.A. No. 597 to 599
of 2006 in C.S. No.981 of 2004."

An interim injunction was also prayed for therein, which
reads as under:-

E "to declare the election of directors held at the 83rd, 84th
and 85th Annual General Meeting as null and void as the
same is contrary to the orders of this Hon'ble Court dated
26th July, 2006 in O.A. No.597 of 2005 in C.S. No.981 of
2004"
F
17. The contempt matter came up before another learned f .
Single Judge of the High Court. As would be noticed hereinafter
no disclosure was made in the said proceeding as regards the
orders passed by the learned Single Judge in the applications
filed from time to time as also other proceedings taken by the
G p_arties. However, the learned Single Judge passed an ad
interim ex parte injunction on 12th ·June, 2008 restraining the
Managing Director of the.Company Shri G. Narayanamurthy
from implementing the resolution or item of business in relation
to the election of Directors passed at the Annual General
.H Meetings held on 5th June, 2008 till the disposal of contempt
TAMILNAD MERCANTILE BANK SHARE HOLDERS WEL. 99
ASSO. v. S.C. SEKAR AND ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

petition. The matter was directed to be posted on 21st July, A
J 2008.

18. What is the nature of that order would be considered
a little later as there exists a dispute as to whether such an order
can be said to be a final order satisfying the definition of a
8
'judgment' or·not.

19. Several proceedings were initiated by the respondents
herein. On or about 24th June, 2008, the 1st respondent Shri
T. Rajakumar filed an application in Civil Appeal arising out of
SLP (C) No. 19379 of 2008 for impleading himself as a party C
and for vacating the ex-parte interim order dated 12th June,
2008 passed in the said contempt proceedings before the
learned Single Judge. Shri G. Narayanamurthy, Managing
Director of the Bank, also filed an affidavit praying for vacation
of ex-parte interim order. On or about 26th June, 2008, Judges D
Summons in terms of Order XIV Rule 8 of the Original Side
Rules of the High Court were also taken out by him for vacating
the ex-parte ad interim order dated 20th June, 2008.

20. It is stated that the matter was fixed for hearing on 21st E
July, 2008.

21. However, Shri T. Rajakumar withdrew the said
application and preferred an intra court appeal. Shri S.C.
Sekhar, who is also said to have been elected in the said
Annual General Meetings dated 5th June, 2008 also preferred F
, '1' an intra court appeal.

Both the appeals were preferred under Section 19( 1) of
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. A question as regards
maintainability of said appeal was raised. G

A Division Bench of the High Court by reason of the
impugned order answered' the same in the affirmative, stating:-

" We have gone -through the said provision. Prima facie
we are of the considered view that only when some orders H
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 17 S.C.R.

A adversely affecting any person, who makes a claim that
he is intending to prefer ·an appeal, this court in exercise
of the power under the provisions to sub section (3) of
Section 19 of the CC Act, 1971 may suspend such an
order. We have found that the contempt appellants are the
B persons aggrieved by the order of the learned Single
Judge of this court and this court has only on prima facie
consideration held that the contempt appeals are
maintainable and the rights of the respondents to canvas
their arguments either in the contempt petition or in the
c contempt appeals are still open. We therefore find that the
order holding that the contempt appeals are maintainable
does not in any way adversely affect the right of the second
respondent. Accordingly, the submission made by the Id.
Counsel for the second respondent is not acceptable and
the permission sought for is consequently rejected."
D
It is this order which is in question before us.

22. At the outset, we may place on record that in the
meantime in the O.As. filed in C.S: 481 of 2006,
E Ramasubramanian, J., passed an order on 23rd June, 2008,
wherein it has been noticed:-
"8. Today, when the applications were taken up for hearing,
Mr. V. Ramakrishnan, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, fairly
.submitted that without ~is knowledge and without the
F knowledge of the learned Senior Counsel leading him in
the matter, the plaintiffs moved a Contempt Petition in
r ,
Contempt Petition No. 508 of 2006. In the said Contempt
Petition, it appears that notice was ordered to the
'Managing Directors on 20.6.2008. Pending Contempt
G Petition, an interim order of injunction has also been
passed in Sub Application No.163 of 2008, on 20.6.2008,
re'straining the Managing Director from implementing the
resolution or item of business relation to the Election of the
Directors of the Bank at the 83rd, 84th and 85th Annual
H General Meetings, held on 5.6.2008 .. Mr. V.
TAMILNAD MERCANTILE BANK SHARE HOLDERS WEL. 101
ASSO. v. S.C. SEKAR AND ORS. (S.B. SINHA, J.]
Ramakrishnan, lea med counsel appearing for the plaintiffs A
himself produced a copy of the interim order passed in the
Sub Application in the Contempt Petition and submitted
that this has happened behind his back and he felt
embarrassed and very sorry about it. Therefore the learned
counsel wanted to withdraw his appearance, since he did B
not wish to appear for such a party any more."

23. Despite the same the teamed Judge refused to adjourn
the matter stating :-
"Under normal circumstances, I would have simply c
adjourned the mater to another date, to enable the plaintiffs
to engage a different counsel to make submission. But my
attention was dawn to the fact that Mr. R. Mathuselvam,
President of the first plaintiff Association, who has verified
the pleadings, is present in Court. Therefore, I questioned D
him, as to the circumstances under which a Contempt
Petition was moved, contrary to the statement made at the
Bar on 16.6.2008. He submitted that the Contempt Petition
was moved, on the basis that the convening of the Annual
General Meeting was in violation of the order passed on E
26.7.2006, in O.A. Nos. 597, 598 and 599 of 2006 in C.S.
No. 981 of 2004."

24. Taking notice of the earlier order of the court dated
26th July, 2006 in terms whereof the erstwhile Directors wer~
directed to continue in the office and to maintain status quo until F
" further orders of the court and furthermore taking notice of the
fact that in the meantime Annual General Meetings had already
been held wherein resolution had been passed electing the
Directors and that the appellants having failed to obtain any
interim order either in the present suit or in the previous suit G
C.S. No.981 of 2004 and after having allowed the meetings to
go on, the first plaintiff has adopted a dubious method of moving
<
a Contempt Petition and getting an interim order of injunction
on 20.6.2008 contrary to the statement made across the Bar
on 16.6.2008 amounted to an abuse of the process of the H
1: ;~

102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A Court, observed:-·
·~
"The interim injunction which the first plaintiff has now _,
obtained on 20.6.2008 in the Contempt Petition is the very
same injunction which the plaintiffs have prayed for in the
present suit and failed to get. Their attempt to get a similar
B
injunction before the Division Bench and the Surpeme
Court have also failed. It appears from the answer given
by Mr. P. Muthuslevam that all these orders were not
brought to the notice of the learned Judge hearing the
Contempt Petition was suppressed before this Court. Thus
c the first plaintiff has clearly taken both the Courts for a ride.
s ·uch a person is not entitled to the equitable relief of
injunction.

· 14. The plaintiffs are guilty of abuse of the process of law
D and guilty of Forum Shopping. After having failed to obtain
an. interim order of the very same nature from this Court
ana after trying their luck before the Division Bench and
~
the Supreme Court, they had gone be.fore the other Court
and obtained an interim order in a Contempt Petition. In
E the Contempt Petition, the first plaintiff herein does not
appear to have mentioned anything about the new suit C.S.
No. 481 of 2008 and the orders passed in the injunction
applications. Thus the ~irst plaintiff is also guilty of
suppression of material fa;ts: Under such circumstances,
I have. n_o__alternative, xcept to dismiss all these .
F .

applications for injunction. Hence O.A. Nos. 534, 536 and r
621 are dismissed .. "

25. It was, however, made clear that the same
arrangement, as was directeli to be maintained by the court
G prior to 5th June, 2008 shall continue till the sub-application in
the contempt petition is disposed of.
)
26. Indisputably intra court appeals were preferred
thereagainst by the appellant which were marked as O.S.A.
H Nos. 274 to 277 of 2008.
TAMILNAD MERCANTILE BANK SHARE HOLDERS WEL. 103
ASSO. v. S.C. SEKAR AND ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.J

By an order dated 4th September, 2008, Prabha Sridevan, A
J. speaking for the Division Bench dismissed the appeals upon
noticing the proceedings taken by the appellant, stating:-

"The facts extracted above would show that the appellants
have with impunity been filing applications after B
applications for almost the same relief, though in each, the
prayer is somewhat differently worded, in order to disguise
it as a different prayer. More than one suit has been filed
in this Court and we are given to understand, in Courts
elsewhere. The appellants have not made out a prima facie
case for grant of injunction. More than that, the conduct of C
the appellants, the suppression of facts and the devious
methods adopted by them leave us without any doubt that
the appellants are not entitled to the grant of injunction. To
grant an order of injunction merely because only one of the
appellants had moved the contempt petition and not the D
other and therefore, the other appellant was entitled to a
fair hearing is something that deserves to be rejected. In
fact, it may not be by chance but by design that only one
of the appellants chose to file the contempt petition and
therefore, to grant any indulgence on this score would be E
indirectly rewarding the persons who have come to court
with unclean hands. In the result, · we hold that on the
ground of prima facie case and on grounds of equity, the
appellants are not entitled to injunction and therefore, the
dismissal of the applications by the learned single Judge F
deserves to be confirmed." .

27. Mr. T.R. Andhyarujina, learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant has raised the following
three principal contentions before us.
G
(i) An appeal under Section 19( 1) of the Contempt of
<
Courts Act, 1977 was not maintainable against an
·ad interim order of injunction.

(ii) The ad interim order of injunction dated 20th June, H
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 17 S.C.R.

A 2008 does not satisfy the test of a 'judgmenf as has
been held by this Court in Shah Babula/ Khimji v.
_,
Jayaben D. Kania, [ (1981) 4 sec 8] and thus the
Division Bench even could not have entertained an
intra court appeal.
B
(iii) One of the respondents T. Rajakumar as also G.
Narayanamurthy, Managing Director of the Bank
having filed applications for vacation of the order
dated 20th June, 2008 could have waited for the
outcome thereof and intra court appeals preferred
c by respondents amounted to an abuse of the
process of the court.

28. Mr. C.A. Sundaram, Mr. Dushsyant Dave and Mr. L.N.
Rao, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of S/Shri
D S.C. Sekar, T. Rajkumar and G. Narayanamurthy, on the other
hand, contended:-
~-
(i) As an interim order of injunction was obtained upon
suppression of facts and as even the applications
for vacating the stay was not being taken up for
E
hearing immediately, an intra court appeal was
maintainable both under Section 19( 1) of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1977 as also under Clause
15 of the Letters Patent of the Madras High Court.

F (ii) In view of the observations made by the learned r
Single Judge also the Division Bench of the High
Court in the main proceedings, this Court should not
interfere with the impugned judgment as the
appellant had taken recourse to Forum Shopping .
G
(iii) A direction can be issued by a contempt court only
in three situations, namely - >
a) to stop continuance of disobedience of the
orders of the court ; ,_
H
TAMILNAD MERCANTILE BANK SHARE HOLDERS WEL. 105
ASSO. v. S.C. SEKAR AND ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

b) some order to maintain status quo; and A

c) an order by way of restitution after arriving at a
finding that the alleged contemnor is guilty of
contempt.

(iv) In any event, the appellant being guilty of the abuse B
of the process of the court, is not entitled to any
equitable relief.

29. Appellant is an Association of shareholders of the
Bank. The first suit filed by it involved the question as to whether C
the power of attorneys executed by the share-holders were
required to be registered or not.

The suit was filed at a point of time when 83rd Annual
General Meeting of the Bank was to be held. In view of the
D
orders of injunction passed by the learned Single of the Madras ·
High Court, admittedly the Annual General Meeting could not
_J ~-
be held. It is now not in dispute that in terms of the order dated

•
I

26th July, 2006 the Annual General Meeting was permitted to

-
-,,'

'
be held in respect of Item Nos. 1, 2 and 6 of the agenda. Item
Nos. 3 to 5 of the agenda related to filling up of the posts of E
Directors caused as the Directors were to vacate their office.

30. Indisputably the Annual General Meetings could not be
held continuously for three years for one reason or the other.
F
"' Pursuant to the order of the learned Single Judge dated
26th July, 2006, 83rd Annual General Meeting was held in
' respect of item Nos. 1, 2 and 6 and the same was adjourned
in respect of agenda items i.e. Nos. 3 to 5.

31. Indisputably when an adjourned meeting was to be G
conducted, it must be for the adjourned agenda, i.e., item Nos.
{
3 to 5. Appellant knew thereabout. It not only filed an
application for injunction but also raised objections before the
-"':
Chairman appointed by the Court in terms of the order dated
27th March, 2008. Reports of the Chairman show that H
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS · [2008] 17 S;C.R
e
A consultative process had been taken recourse to.
\
32. Appellant had participated in the election. The three .
reports submitted by the Chairman in sealed covers were read
over and opened by the learned Judge, copies whereof were
v
'\
also handed over to the parties. It is in that situation a limited
B ~
order of injunction, namely that no effect to the said Resolution
be given, was passed on 29th April, 2008.
)•/
33. Although at one point of time contentions had been
raised before us that election had not been held as the
c adjourned agenda items were not taken up or even could not
have been taken up in 83rd Annual General Meeting as it was
held simultaneously with 84th and 85th Annual General
Meetings, it is now clear from the records that election of the
Directors had in fact been held.
D
34. Appellant sought for an injunction. It moved an
application before the Vacation Bench but the same was ·not
-4.
pressed. However, before the matter could be taken up for
hearing on -9th June, 2008 a petition for initiation of
proceedings for contempt of court for alleged disobedience of .f
E
the order of the learned Single Judge dated 26th July, 2006 was
filed.
.... ·~

i
35. The chain of events noticed by us heretobefore clearly
show that although in the subsequent orders it was not expressly
F stated that it is in continuation of the earlier order dated 26th
,-;:,
July, 2006, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that agenda
item nos. 3 to 5 were allowed to be taken up in the 83rd Annual
General Meeting resulting in the election of the Directors.

G 36. The High Court evidently appointed Mr. Justice R.
Balasubramaniam to chair the meeting with a view to see that
elections for the years 2004-2005, 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 )
are conducted in accordance with law and in a peaceful
manner. Strangely enough the contempt petition was filed ,...
,-
-

. against the Managing Director alone who had no role to play
H
e . ,.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.
- 108
..,..
37. Action of the court was not sought for against Mr. \
A
Justice R. Balasubramaniam who acted as an officer of the
court. The Directors representing the Reserve Bank of India
were not made parties in the contempt petition. Full disclosure
as regards the subsequent proceedings was not made therein.
B The contempt petition was taken up by a learned Judge who
was not acquainted with the fact of the matter.

The question is as to whether in such a situation the ).-
purported ad interim order passed by the learned Single Judge
in contempt proceeding should have been interfered with or not
c by the Division Bench.

38. Mr. Andhyarujina would submit that T. Rajkumar and
S.C. Sekar being not a party to the ~ontempt proceeding could
not have maintained an appeal. This argument, if accepted, shall
D lead to a strange situation. Admittedly they were not parties to ;.
the suit. They were elected during the pendency of the suit,
whether legally or otherwise. The order granting injunction
against the Managing Director had affected their valuable right.
.
They were elected for a limited period. The principle of
corporate democracy demands that the Bank functions through
E
its elected Directors. T~e endeavour on the part of the appellant
had been to see that old Directors may continue despite the
expiry of their tenure. When, however, day to day affairs of the
Bank were left at the hands of the Managing Director and the
two representatives of the Reserve Bank of India, an attempt
-,
F r
was made to see that the newly elected Directors do not
f-
assume their office. In this attempt the appellant has succeeded
so far by adopting measures which amount to an abuse of the
process of the Court.

G In V.R. Dalal and others v. Yougendra Naranji Thakkar
and another, [ 2008 (8) SCALE 156 ] this Court held :-
\-
*-

H
"16. When a proceeding is found to be an abuse of the
process of court, this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Article 142 of the Constitution of India may not allow
-
"
.. TAMILNAD MERCANTILE BANK SHARE HOLDERS WEL .
ASSO. v. S.C. SEKAR AND ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
109

) it to continue. For the said purpose, the fact of the matter A
can be looked into."

Forum Shopping, it is well settled, is not encouraged by
the Court. {See Udyami Evam Khadi Gramodyog Welfare
Sanstha vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, [(2008) 1 S.C.C. 560]} B
39. Apart from the fact that the appellant did not approach
the Court with clean hands and was thus not entitled to any
equitable relief, we are surprised to see the manner in which
the interim order was passed by the learned Single Judge in
the contempt proceedings, which reads :-. c
- "1. That G. Narayanamurthy, the respondent herein, be and
is hereby restrained by an ad-interim injunction till
21.07.2008 not to implement the resolution of item of
business relating to the election of Directors of the D
respondent bank at the 83rd , 84th and 85th Annual
General Meeting held on 05.06.2008 till disposal of the
contempt application.

2. That the notice of this Sub Application No.163 of 2008
returnable by 21.07.2008 be served on the respondents E
herein; and

3. That the Sub Application No. 163 of 2008 be posed on
21.07.2008."
F
" 40. The suit related to 83rd Annual General Meeting. The
contempt application related to election of Directors of the Bank
at the 83rd, 84th and 85th Annual General Meetings. Although
the sub-application was directed to be posted for 23rd July,
2008 the order of injunction was not limited to that date. It was
G
directed to continue till disposal of the contempt application;
~
though it was stated earlier that the ad interim injunction was
till 21.7.2008.

It does not contain any reason. There is no finding as r:
regards existence of a prima facie case. There is no finding H

..
110 SUPREME . CdURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.
•
'
A that G. Narayanmoorthy had prima facie committed the
contempt.

The order is not a speaking one. Ordinarily a direction
cannot be issued in contempt proceedings without arriving at
B a finding as to how the Managing Director of the Bank can be
said to have flouted the order.

In Municipal Corpn., Jabalpur v. Om Prakash Dubey,
[(2007) 1 SCC 373 ], this Court held:-

c "21. We are in this case not
' '
called upon. to consider the
.
implication of the awards, which might have been passed
in favour of the workmen. The Division Bench, by reason.·
of the impugned judgment had issued directions in
exercise of its jurisdiction underSection 12 of the
D Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, without arriving at a finding
as to how the Corporation has violated its order. It issued
directions which are contrary to or inconsistent with the
- directions issued by a learned Single Judge by an order
dated 27-2-2003.
~
E 22. The judgment .of the Division Bench is, thus, subject
to correction by. this Court both under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India as also under Section 19 of the
Contempt of Courts Act."
. .

F The said _decision ap'plies-~lrf ~Uforce to the fact of the· .
present case. ·· ·. - · ·· : · · . ,
41. · · 1ridi~PL.Jt~hly 'iri .vjew>oi.tJe ,interirii:.·order dated' ~Oth
June, 2008 responden'ts· ofwer~pre]udiced.Theywere, thus,
'persons aggrieved'. As persons aggrieved they could move the
G higher court. _If an .interim order was passed wholly without
jurisdiction, an.appeal would Jie thereagainst.
. .

In Purshot~m Dass Goel v. B.S..Dhillon, [(1978)" 2 SCC
370 ), this Court.held:
·H
TAMILNAD MERCANTILE BANK SHARE HOLDERS WEL. 111
ASSO. v. s:c. SEKAR AND ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

"He submitted that initiation of the proceeding by the A
) High Court will be without jurisdiction if it is in violation of
Section 20. It may be so. If the alleged contemner in
response to the notice appears before the High Court and
asks it to drop the proceeding on the ground of its being
barred under Section 20 of the Act but the High Court holds B
that the proceeding is not barred, it may well be that an
appeal would lie to this Court under Section 19 from such
an order although the proceeding has remained pending
in the High Court. We are not called upon to express our
final opinion in regard to such an order, but we merely c
mention this type of order by way of an example to show
..... that even orders made at some intermediate stage in the
proceeding may be appealable under Section 19... "

42. Mr. Andhyarujina submitted that such observation was
made by this Court having regard to a situation where the D
contempt proceedings had·been entertained by a court beyond
the period of limitation as prescribed under Section 20 of the
\.-
Act.
43. We may repeat that it may be a different matter if the E
court while passing an order decided some disputes raised
before it by the contemnor asking it to drop the proceedings _
on one ground or the other. Thus, in a given situation, an appeal
would be maintainable even agairist a notice to show cause.
Here even such a notice has not been issued and thus the F
question of satisfying the court by showing cause that the
contemnors/respondents had not committed any contempt did
not arise. Allegations had not been made against the Chairman
of the meeting. The contempt proceedings .
had '<·
been initiated
only against the Managing Director of the Bank.
G
44. Although we need not go into the larger question of
-( maintainability of the appeal in view of the fact that the matter
has been referred to the Three Judge Bench in Dharam Singh
..
==+- v. GulzariLal and others (SLP (Civil) No. 18852 of 2005), but
. prima facie, in view of the decision of this Court.in Purshottam H
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R. e
-
··.
A Das (supra). there cannot be any doubt that in a situation where '
order has been passed adverse to the interest of the alleged
\
contemnor an appeal would be maintainable particularly where
a judgment has been passed by a court which is beyond its
jurisdiction.
B
45. This aspect of the matter has also been considered
in R.N. Dey v. Bhagyabati Pramanik, [(2000) 4 SCC 400 ]
wherein it was opined :-

"In our view the aforesaid contention for the learned
c counsel for the respondents requires to be rejected on the
ground that after receipt of the notice, officers concerned
tendered unconditional apology and after accepting the
same, the High Court rejected the prayer for discharge of
...
the rule issued for contempt action. When .the court either
D suo motu or on a motion or a reference, decides to take
action and initiate proceedings for contempt, it assumes
jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of
jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the ...,
initiation of a proceeding for contempt and if the order is
E passed not discharging the rule issued in contempt
proceedings, it would be an order or decision in exercise
of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Against such
order, appeal would be maintainable."

46. But we do not find it necessary to express our opinion
F on the correctness thereof in one way or the other.

47. We may, however, notice that according to Mr.
-r
Andhyarujina, in view of the Three Judge Bench decision of this
Court in D.N. Taneja v. Bhajan Lal, [(1988) 3 SCC 26 ], the
G appeal was not maintainable.
,
'
We may place on record that a Division Bench of the
Calcutta High Court in Ashoke Kumar Rai v. Ashoke Arora and }
another, [ 96 CWN 278] opined:- .....
~
H "The right of appeal will be available under Sub-section (1) •
\

~ TAMILNAD MERCANTILE BANK SHARE HOLDERS WEL. 113
ASSO. v. S.C. SEKAR AND ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
'
of Section 19 only against any decision or order of a High A
Court passed in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish
for contempt. In this connection, it is pertinent to refer to
the provision of Article 215 of the Constitution which
provides that every High Court shall be a Court of record
and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the B
power to punish for contempt of itself. Article 215 confers
on the High Court the power to punish for contempt of
itself. In other words, the High Court derives its jurisdiction
-..,, to punish for contempt from Article 215 of the Constitution.
As has been noticed earlier, an appeal will lie under c
Section 19(1) of the Act only when the High Court makes
.... an order or decision in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish
for contempt. It is submitted on behalf of the respondent
and, in our opinion rightly, that the High Court exercises
its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215
D
of the Constitution when it imposes a punishment for
contempt. When the High Court does not impose any
punishment on the alleged contemner, the High Court does
not exercise its jurisdiction or power to punish for
contempt. The jurisdiction of the High Court is to punish.
When no punishment is imposed by the High Court, it is E
difficult to say that the High Court has exercised its
jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of
the Constitution.

Punishment in our opinion is not confined only to F
detention of a person or imposition of fine. A direction to
do a particular thing in a particular way would come within
the purview of the said terminology. A statute has to be read
reasonably. Effort must be made to give effect to every
word employed therein. In any event curtailment of a right G
of appeal cannot be presumed."

~
48. A similar view had been taken in Ashis Chakraborty
and others v. Hindustan Lever Sramik Karamchari Congress
and others, [ 96 CWN 673 ], by the Calcutta High Court, stating:-
H
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
..
[2008] 17 S.C.R
e
A 'We are, however, not oblivious of the fact that Section
19(1) does not merely speak of an appeal lying only ~ '

· against punishment for contempt but uses the expression
that an appeal lies from any 'order or decision' passed in
exerci~e of ,the jurisdiction to punish for contempt. As

B regards the meaning of the expression "any order or
decision" we understand a variety of orders and decisions
that may be passed by a court. in exercise of its jurisdiction
to punish for contempt Our own. High Court in 1981 (2)
y'
CHN page 97 Ranjit Chatterjee v. Rambadan· Choubey
c .. a
held that if the order ordecisioh prejtjdicially affects party,
· he has indeed a right of appeal. tfno ·Other order except
punishment would have been appe53lable, there wouid have
' been no necessity of using. the words ·"any order or
decision'1 in the expression "the execution of the
punishment or order appeal against"- as used in Section·
D
19(2)(a) of the Act. If the scope of appeal Under Section_" .··
19 is restricted only to punishment imposed Under Section
12 and nothing beyond, then a person who is ex facie -1..
found guilty of contempt Under Section 14 and is detained
in custody pending the hearing on the charge of contempt
E and is refused bail, would have no right of appeal against
such refusal of bail pending the decision on the charge of
contempt which will amount to deprive the alleged
contemner of the right of appeal in such circumstances. If
in case of such an exigency, where he is directed to be
F released on a parti~ular bond which is found to be much
excessive, his right is to be defeated to a large extent and y
the very purpose of making provision for appeal to give
relief in appropriate caseswill be ·lost. We are of the clear
view that white the contemner is detained in custody Under
G Section 14 pending determination of the charge, there is
no punishment imposed on him as yet Under Section 12.
The contention of Mr. Mukherjee is that the detention in
I)-
SljCh
.
circumstances
. . . .· . ~
WOUid also be a form
. '
Of puriishment
.
Under Section 12 is really untenable. The legislature in its
H · wisdom does not use surplus words but obviously uses
:.:
. •.;·
~
TAMILNAD MERCANTILE BANK SHARE HOLDERS WEL. 115
ASSO. v. S.C. SEKARAND ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

such words which would advance its object and would A
) remove the mischief of ambiguity. We have exhaustiibly

- dealt with all the contingencies in this regard over
appealability or otherwise of an order or decision in
Ashoke Kumar Rai V; Ashoke Arora, F.M.A.T. No. 2146
of 1991 decided by us on 17.12.91 to hold that even B
though it was Stated in D.N. Taneja V; Bhajanlal, (1988)
3 sec 26 that unless a punishmen_t is imposed, no appeal
lies against it, at best. relates to a case of crimi.nal
'"' contempt and nothing beyond and if any order or decision
is arrived at deciding any bone of contention or any issue c
in the controversy, an appeal lies."

49. It is also relevant to notice that a Division Bench of this
Court in Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal
· Nanda, [(2006) 5 SCC 399], opined as under :
D
. "If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue
or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute
.l.. between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the
aggrieved person is riot without remedy. Such an order is
open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was E
of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an
intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other
cases).

xxx xxx xxx F
'I
15. Interim orders/interlocutory orders passed during the
pendency of a case, fall under on_e or the other of the
following categories :
G
(i) to (iii)

{ (iy) Routine o.rders which are passed to facilitate the
progress ofthe case till its culmina_tion in the final
... judgment. .
H
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A (v) Orders .which may cause some inconvenience or
some prejudice to a party, but which do not finally
determine the rights and obligations of the parties."

50. As?uming that an appeal under Section 19 was
'-
technically not maintainable, having regard to the fact that the
8
interim injunction was granted till disposal of the contempt
application, in our opinion, it was a judgment within the meaning
of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Madras High Court.

51. We will, however, proceed on the assumption that no
c appeal was maintainable. .

An aggrieved person cannot be left without a remedy.
Access to justice is a human right. In certain situations it may
also be considered to be a fundamental right. (See Tashi Delek
D Gaming Solutions Ltd. v. State of Karnafaka, [(2006) 1 SCC
442 ] and Arunima Baruah v. Union of India, [(2007) 6 SCC
120].
_j_
52. Concededly this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain
a special leave petition. When the entire matter is before us
E this ·court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 read
with Article 142 of the Constitution of India may pass such
orders which would do complete justice to the parties. [See -
j
T. Vijendradas v. M. Subramanian, (2007) 8 SCC 751 ].

F 53. The orders of the High Court-speak in two voices.
Doctrine of amity or comity requires that different courts
( )
exercising separate jurisdiction pass similar orders.

In Lewis & Spelling's - "The Law of Injunctions" at .page
10 it is stated:-
G
"Where a court having general jurisdiction and: having
acquired jurisdiction of the subject-matter has issued an
injunction, a cq_urt_of concurrent jurisdiction will usually )-
refuse to interfere by issuance of a second injunction."
H
TAMILNAD MERCANTILE BANK SHARE HOLDERS WEL. 117
ASSO. v. S.C. SEKAR AND ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

It is also well settled that even an irregular order can be A
set aside by the same court or by a higher court.
)
In Isaacs v. Robertson, [(1984) 3 All. E.R. 140), it has been
held:

"Their Lordships would, however, take this opportunity to 8
point out that in relation to orders of a court of unlimited
jurisdiction it is misleading to seek to draw distinctions
between orders that are 'void' in the sense that they can
be ignored with impunity by those persons to whom they
are addressed, and orders that are 'voidable' and may be C
enforced unless and until they are set aside. Dicta that refer
to the possibility of there being such a distinction between
orders to which the descriptions 'void' and 'voidable'
respectively have been applied can be found in the
opinions given by the Judicial Committee of the Privy D
Council in Marsh v. marsh [1945) AC 271 at 284 and
MacFoy v. United Africa Co. Ltd. [1961] 3 ALL ER 1169,
(1962] AC 152; but in neither of those appeals nor in any
other case to which counsel has been able to refer their
Lordships has any order of a court of unlimited jurisdiction E
been held to fall in a category of court orders that can
simply be ignored because they are void ipso facto without
there being any need for proceeding to have them set
aside. The case that are referred to in these dicta do not
support the proposition that there is any category of orders F
of a court of unlimited jurisdiction of this kind: what they
do support is the quite different proposition that there is a,
category of oraers of such a court which a person affected
by the order is entitled to apply to have set aside ex debito
justitiae in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the G
. court without his needing to have recourse to the rules that
deal expressly with proceedings to set aside orders for
irregularity and give to the judge a discretion as to the

- order he will make. The judges in the cases that have drawn
the distinction between the two types 'of orders have H
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

.. A cautiously refrained from seeking to lay down a
comprehensive definition of defects that bring an order into
·the category that attracts ex debito justitiae the right to
have it set aside, save that specifically it includes orders
that have been obtained in breach of rules of natural justice.
B
The contrasting legal concepts of voidness and
. voidability form part of the English law of contract. They are
inapplicable to orders made by a court ()f unlimited
jurisdiction in the course of contentions litigation. Such an
. o·rder is either irregularor regular. If it is irregular it can be
c ' set aside by the court that made it on application to.that
court; if it is regular it can only be set aside by an appellate
court on appeal if there is on~ to which an appeal lies."

54. If this Court while deciding a matter of this nature may,
D in exercise of its special jurisdiction under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India, not only quash the order appealed against
but also in the event It is found that quashing of an illegal order
gives rise to another illegality, it may also Jefuse to exercise
its jurisdiction or quash both the orders. Apart from the fact that
E the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 20th June,
2008 is found to be illegal and without jurisdiction having been
passed with()ut any application of mind and furthermore as the
same was obtained by the appellant by suppressing material
facts and the proceedings be~een the parties, it is eminently
F a fit case where this Court should refuse to interfere with the
impugned order of the High Court.

55. The superior courts of this country must discourage the
forum shopping. A person seeking equity must"do equity. A
party cannot take recourse to a machination which amounts to
G abuse of the process of the court.

56. If two views are possible, as held by this Court, a
)-
contempt petition would not lie.
':-•
In Sushi/a Raje Holkar v. Ani/ Kak (Retd.) [2008 (7)
·H
TAMILNAD MERCANTILE BANK SHARE HOLDERS WEL. 119
ASSO. v. S.C. SEKAR AND ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

SCALE 484], relying upon the decision in The State of Bihar A
)
v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, [AIR 1961 SC 221 ], this Court held:-

"19. It may be true that this Court upon hearing the parties,·
by the order dated 1.5.2007 granted the respondent 15
days' time to deposit all arrears of rent at the rate of B
Rs.50,000/- per mqnth including the rent for the month of
April 2007. We are not concerned with the implementation
of the said order as violation thereof is not the subject
matter of the contempt proceedings pending before us.

The order of this Court properly construed, therefore, c
would mean that the admitted lease would cover only
16,000 square feet of land. Different phraseologies like
"entire" and "admitted" have been used by this Court.
Construction of the said order, therefore, must be resorted
to upon reading the same in its entirety. It is a well settled D
principle of law that if two interpretations are possible of
).... the order wnich is ambiguous, a contempt proceeding
would not be maintainable.

57. It is furthermore well settled that this Court does not
exercise its jurisdiction only because it is lawful to do so. (See
t
Tanna and Modi v. C.I. T. Mum,bai XXV, [2007 (8) SCALE 51
] and C.K. Prahalad and others v. State of Karnataka and
others, [ 2008 (8) SCALE 600].

F
...
Y· 1
. 58. For the reasons aforementioned we are of the
considered opinion that it is not a fit case wherein we should
exercise our jurisdiction Linder Article 136 of the Constitution
of India. The appeals are dismissed with costs. Counsel fee
. assessed at Rs.50,000/- in. each case.
G
N.J. Appeals dismissed.