TARUN JIT TEJPALversusTHE STATE OF GOA & ANR.

                          [2019] 10 S.C.R. 675                           675


                       TARUN JIT TEJPAL                                  A
                                  v.
                  THE STATE OF GOA & ANR.
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 1246 of 2019)
                         AUGUST 19, 2019                                 B
    [ARUN MISHRA, M. R. SHAH AND B. R. GAVAI, JJ.]
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: ss.227, 228 – Scope of
exercise of power at the stage of framing of charge – In the instant
case, appellant-original accused was facing trial for offences under
                                                                         C
ss.354, 354A, 354B, 341, 342, 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(k), IPC – Charge
sheet filed by Investigating officer – Sessions Judge ordered charges
to be framed against the appellant for offences under the aforesaid
sections – Appellant filed revision application before the High Court
– High Court dismissed the revision application and refused to
discharge the appellant of charged offences – Hence the appeal –         D
Discharge was sought on the ground that in the present case, both,
the informant and the Investigating Officer were same and, therefore,
entire criminal proceedings were vitiated – Reliance was placed
upon the decision of this Court in Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab (2018)
17 SCC 627 – Held: The submissions made on behalf of the appellant
                                                                         E
are on merits and are required to be dealt with and considered at an
appropriate stage during the course of trial – Some of the
submissions made on behalf of the appellant on the conduct of the
victim/prosecutrix also are required to be dealt with and considered
at an appropriate stage during trial – The same are not to be
considered at the stage of framing of the charge – There is ample        F
material against the appellant and, therefore, trial court rightly
framed charge against him and the same is rightly confirmed by
High Court – No interference called for – Further held that appellant
shall not be discharged on the ground that in the present case, both,
the informant and the Investigating Officer are same, as decision
                                                                         G
of this Court in Mohan Lal case shall not be applicable as in the
present case proceedings were initiated prior to the decision in
Mohan Lal case – No interference called for – Trial court directed
to conclude the trial at the earliest – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.354,
354A, 354B, 341, 342, 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(k) – Crime against
women.                                                                   H
                                  675
676           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2019] 10 S.C.R.


A           Dismissing the appeal and disposing of the M.A., the Court
            HELD : 1. The decision in the case of Mohan Lal shall not
      be applicable to the facts of the case on hand as criminal
      prosecution has been initiated in the instant case much prior to
      the decision in the case of the Mohan Lal. Therefore, the appellant
B     cannot be discharged at this stage on the said ground mainly that
      as the Investigating Officer and the complainant/informant are
      the same the trial is vitiated, relying upon the decision of this
      Court in the case of Mohan Lal. Even the decision of this Court
      in the case of Bhagwan Singh, relied upon by the Counsel
      appearing on behalf of the appellant-original accused, also shall
C     not be of much assistance to the appellant at this stage. In the
      case of Bhagwan Singh and after the trial this Court held that as
      the complainant herself was the Investigating Officer, the case of
      the prosecution would not be free from doubt. It was the case
      after trial and not at the stage of framing of the charge. Where
D     the complainant himself had conducted the investigation, such
      aspect of the matter can certainly be given due weightage while
      assessing the evidence on record but it would be completely a
      different thing to say that the trial itself would be vitiated for
      such infraction. Therefore, the said ground is not required to be
      considered at this stage, namely, at the stage of framing of the
E     charge. At the stage of framing of the charge, the different
      considerations would weigh. [Para 8.2] [685-A-H]
            2. The submissions made on behalf of the appellant on merits
      are required to be dealt with and considered at an appropriate
      stage during the course of the trial. Some of the submissions
F     made on behalf of the appellant on the conduct of the victim/
      prosecutrix also are required to be dealt with and considered at
      an appropriate stage during the trial. The same are not required
      to be considered at this stage of framing of the charge. There is
      more than a prima facie case against the accused for which he is
G     required to be tried. There is sufficient ample material against
      the accused and therefore the trial court has rightly framed the
      charge against the accused and the same is rightly confirmed by
      the High Court. No interference of this Court is called for.
      [Para 9.5] [694-A-E]

H
     TARUN JIT TEJPAL v. THE STATE OF GOA & ANR.                 677


     Bhagwan Singh v. The State of Rajasthan (1976) 1 SCC        A
     15 ; Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab (2018) 17 SCC
     627 : [2018] 9 SCR 1006 – held inapplicable.
     Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal (1979) 3 SCC
     4 : [1979] 2 SCR 229 ; State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh,
     (1977) 4 SCC 39 : [1978] 1 SCR 257 ; Stree Atyachar         B
     Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia (1989) 1
     SCC 715 : [1989] 1 SCR 560 ; Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh
     Chander (2012) 9 SCC 460 : [2012] 7 SCR 988 ; Ajay
     Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh (2017) 3 SCC 330 :
     [2017] 1 SCR 286 ; Niranjan Singh Karam Singh
     Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya (1990) 4 SCC            C
     76 : [1990] 3 SCR 633 ; State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan
     (2014) 11 SCC 709 : [2014] 1 SCR 135 ; State v. S.
     Selvi (2018) 13 SCC 455 ; Mauvin Godinho v. State of
     Goa (2018) 3 SCC 358 : [2018] 1 SCR 821 ; Varinder
     Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2019) SCC               D
     OnLine SC 170 – referred to.
                     Case Law Reference
(1976) 1 SCC 15               held inapplicable       Para 5.5
[2018] 9 SCR 1006             held inapplicable       Para 5.5   E
[1979] 2 SCR 229              referred to             Para 6.3
[1978] 1 SCR 257              referred to             Para 6.3
[1989] 1 SCR 560              referred to             Para 6.3
[2012] 7 SCR 988              referred to             Para 6.3   F
[2017] 1 SCR 286              referred to             Para 6.3
[1990] 3 SCR 633              referred to             Para 6.3
[2014] 1 SCR 135              referred to             Para 6.3
(2018) 13 SCC 455             referred to             Para 6.3   G
[2018] 1 SCR 821              referred to             Para 6.3



                                                                 H
678            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 10 S.C.R.


A           CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
      No. 1246 of 2019.
           From the Judgment and Order dated 20.12.2017 of the High Court
      of Bombay at Goa in Crl. Revision Application No. 60 of 2017.
            With
B
            M.A. No. 2207/2018 in S.L.P.(Crl) No. 3149-3150/2014.
           Vikas Singh, Sr. Adv., Ankur Chawla, Aamir Khan, Aditya Pujari,
      Bhanu Soodh, Sarvesh Singh Baghel, Advs. for the Appellant.
             Tushar Mehta, SG, Pratap Venugopal, Ms. Surekha Raman,
C     Santosh Salvador Rebello, Ms. Viddusshi, M/s. K J John And Co., Advs.
      for the Respondents.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            M. R. SHAH, J. 1. Leave granted.
D            2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned Judgment
      and Order dated 20.12.2017 passed by High Court of Bombay at Goa in
      Criminal Revision Application No. 60 of 2017 by which the High Court
      has dismissed the said Revision Application preferred by the appellant
      herein – original accused and has refused to discharge the appellant-
      original accused for offences under Sections 354, 354A, 354B, 341, 342,
E
      376 (2) (f) and 376 (2) (k) of the IPC, appellant–original accused has
      preferred the present appeal.
             3. That the appellant herein – original accused is facing the trial
      for the offences under Sections 354, 354A, 354B, 341, 342, 376 (2) (f)
      and 376 (2) (k) of the IPC. The criminal proceedings were initiated
F
      against the appellant herein pursuant to the FIR lodged on 22.11.2013 by
      the Police Inspector, CID, Crime Branch, Dona Paula for the aforesaid
      offences alleged to have been committed on 21.11.2013. That the
      Investigating Officer collected the relevant material/evidence and also
      recorded the statement of the relevant witnesses including the prosecutrix
G     and thereafter filed the charge-sheet against the appellant for the
      aforesaid offences. That thereafter, the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
      Mapusa vide Order dated 07.09.2017 ordered charge to be framed
      against the appellant for the offences under Sections 354, 354A, 354B,
      341, 342, 376 (2) (f) and 376 (2) (k) of the IPC.
H
       TARUN JIT TEJPAL v. THE STATE OF GOA & ANR.                              679
                      [M. R. SHAH, J.]

      3.1 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the Order dated               A
07.09.2017 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mapusa
ordering charge to be framed against the appellant herein – original
accused for the aforesaid offences, the appellant herein-original accused
approached the High Court by way of Revision Application.
      3.2 By the impugned Judgment and Order, the High Court has                B
dismissed the said Revision Application and has refused to discharge the
accused for the offences for which he has been charged. Hence, the
appellant-original accused is before this Court by way of present appeal.
      4. Shri Vikas Singh, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on
behalf of the appellant herein – original accused and Shri Tushar Mehta,        C
learned Solicitor General of India has appeared on behalf of the
respondents.
       5. Shri Vikas Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf
of the appellant-original accused has vehemently submitted that, in the
facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has materially erred        D
in not exercising the revisional jurisdiction and has materially erred in not
discharging the appellant – original accused from the offences for which
he has been charged.
      5.1 Shri Vikas Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf
of the appellant-original accused has further submitted that the High           E
Court has materially erred in not properly appreciating the scope and
ambit of powers to be exercised under Section 227 and 228 of the CrPC.
       5.2 It is further submitted by Shri Vikas Singh, learned Senior
Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant-original accused that the
material collected during the course of the investigation and the evidence      F
so far on record do not make out even a prima facie case against the
appellant for the offences for which he has been charged.
       5.3 Shri Vikas Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf
of the appellant-original accused has further submitted that even from
the CCTV footage no case is made out against the appellant for the
                                                                                G
offences for which he has been charged.
      5.4 Shri Vikas Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf
of the appellant-original accused has taken us to some WhatsApp
messages by the prosecutrix and has commented upon the same and
                                                                                H
680             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 10 S.C.R.


A     has submitted that the prosecutrix is not reliable at all and the prosecutrix
      shall not be believed.
             5.5 It is further submitted by Shri Vikas Singh, learned Senior
      Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant-original accused that in
      the present case, the complainant and the Investigating Officer are the
B     same and therefore the entire criminal proceedings have been vitiated.
      In support of his above submissions, Shri Vikas Singh, learned Senior
      Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant-original accused has heavily
      relied upon the decisions of this Court in the case of Bhagwan Singh v.
      The State of Rajasthan (1976) 1 SCC 15 as well as the subsequent
      decision of this Court in the case of Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab
C     (2018) 17 SCC 627.
             5.6 It is further submitted by Shri Vikas Singh, learned Senior
      Advocate that as such the decision of this Court in the case of Mohan
      Lal (Supra) is referred to a larger Bench by a two Judge Bench of this
      Court vide Order dated 17.01.2019 in the case of Mukesh Singh v.
D     State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi) SLP (Crl.) D. No.39528 of 2018 and,
      therefore, if this Court is not inclined to consider/follow the decision of
      this Court in the case of Mohan Lal (Supra), the present appeal may be
      kept pending till the decision by a larger Bench in the case of Mukesh
      Singh (Supra). It is submitted that, however, in the case of Mohan Lal
E     (Supra), this Court has specifically observed and held that if the
      complainant and the Investigating Officer are the same, the trial is vitiated.
      Therefore, by heavily relying upon the decision of this Court in the case
      of Mohan Lal (Supra) and the decision of this Court in the case of
      Bhagwan Singh (Supra) it is prayed to quash the criminal proceedings
      against the appellant and discharge the appellant from the offences for
F     which he has been charged.
             5.7 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant- original
      accused has also made submissions on merits. However, in view of the
      limited scope of jurisdiction to be exercised at the stage of Sections 227/
      228 of the CrPC which shall be dealt with hereinbelow, we do not propose
G     to go in detail and consider the submissions on merits at this stage as
      even otherwise any observation by this Court at this stage in the present
      proceedings may ultimately affect either of the parties in the trial.
            5.8 Making the above submissions and relying upon above
      decisions, it is prayed to allow the present appeal and quash and set
H
       TARUN JIT TEJPAL v. THE STATE OF GOA & ANR.                               681
                      [M. R. SHAH, J.]

aside the impugned Judgment and Order passed by the High Court as                A
well as the Order passed by the learned Trial Court and discharge the
appellant from the offences under Sections 354, 354A, 354B, 341, 342,
376 (2) (f) and 376 (2) (k) of the IPC.
      6. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by Shri Tushar Mehta,
learned Solicitor General of India appearing on behalf of the respondents.       B
        6.1 Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General of India appearing
on behalf of the respondents has vehemently submitted that in the present
case, after thorough investigation and thereafter having found the prima
facie case against the accused, the Investigating Officer has filed the
charge-sheet against the accused for the offences under Sections 354,            C
354A, 354B, 341, 342, 376 (2) (f) and 376 (2) (k) of the IPC. It is
submitted that thereafter, after considering the material/evidence on
record, the learned Trial Court has framed the charge against the accused.
It is submitted that thereafter, considering the limited scope of jurisdiction
to be exercised at the stage of framing the charge under Section 227/
228 of the CrPC, the High Court has rightly refused to discharge the             D
appellant-original accused and has rightly refused to set aside the Order
passed by the learned Trial Court ordering charge to be framed against
the appellant-original accused.
       6.2 Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General of India appearing
on behalf of the respondents has heavily relied upon the following               E
decisions of this Court in support of his submission that at the stage of
Section 227 and/or Section 228 of the CrPC - at the stage of framing of
the charge, the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the
Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is
any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is          F
vehemently submitted by Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General
that it is not obligatory for the Judge, at the stage of framing of the
charge, to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether
the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the
accused or not. It is vehemently submitted by Shri Tushar Mehta, learned
Solicitor General that at the stage of framing of the charge the Court is        G
only required to consider whether there is ground for presuming that the
accused has committed the offence and nothing more than that. It is
submitted that even it is held by this Court that if, at the initial stage,
there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is
                                                                                 H
682            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 10 S.C.R.


A     ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it
      is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for
      proceeding against the accused.
            6.3 It is further submitted by Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor
      General that in the present case, there is ample material/evidence on
B     record against the accused and sufficient grounds are available for
      proceeding against the accused.
             6.4 It is further submitted by Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor
      General that whatever submissions are made by the learned counsel
      appearing on behalf of the appellant-original accused are on merits of
C     the case and/or they can be said to be of defence which may be available
      to the accused and they are not required to be considered at the stage of
      framing of the charge. And thereafter, it is prayed to dismiss the present
      appeal. In support of his above submissions and prayer to dismiss the
      present appeal, Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General has heavily
      relied upon the following decisions of this Court :
D
            (i) Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4
      (Para 10),
            (ii) State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39 (Para 4),
           (iii) Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal
E     Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715,
            (iv) Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460,
            (v) Ajay Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2017) 3 SCC 330,
            (vi) Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj
F     Bijjaya, (1990) 4 SCC 76,
             (vii) State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 (Para
      29 to 31.3),
            (viii) State v. S. Selvi, (2018) 13 SCC 455,

G           (ix) Mauvin Godinho v. State of Goa, (2018) 3 SCC 358.
            6.5 Now, so far as the submissions made by Shri Vikas Singh,
      learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant-original
      accused that as in the present case the Investigating Officer and the
      complainant are the same and therefore the criminal proceedings are
H
      TARUN JIT TEJPAL v. THE STATE OF GOA & ANR.                              683
                     [M. R. SHAH, J.]

required to be quashed and the reliance placed upon the decisions of this      A
Court in the case of Bhagwan Singh (Supra) and in the case of Mohan
Lal (Supra) are concerned, it is vehemently submitted by Shri Tushar
Mehta, learned Solicitor General that in the case of Mohan Lal (Supra)
this Court was considering its earlier decision in the case of Bhagwan
Singh (Supra), however, subsequently, another three Judge Bench of
                                                                               B
this Court in the case of Varinder Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh
Criminal Appeal No.2450-51 of 2010 dated 11.02.2019, (2019) SCC
OnLine SC 170 has specifically observed and held that the decision of
this Court in the case of Mohan Lal (Supra) shall be applicable
prospectively and that all pending criminal prosecutions, trials and appeals
prior to the law laid down in Mohan Lal (Supra) shall continue to be           C
governed by the individual facts of the case. It is submitted therefore
that in view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Varinder
Kumar (Supra), as in the present case, the criminal prosecution has
been initiated prior to the decision of this Court in the case of Mohan
Lal (Supra), the criminal proceedings are not required to be quashed
                                                                               D
and set aside and the appellant-original accused against whom strong
grounds are made out for prosecution, is not required to be discharged.
      6.6 Making the above submissions and relying upon the above
decisions, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeal.
       7. In rejoinder and on the reliance based upon the subsequent           E
decision of this Court in the case of Varinder Kumar (Supra) relied
upon by Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General, Shri Vikas Singh,
learned Senior Advocate has vehemently submitted that in the case of
Varinder Kumar (Supra) it was not open for the subsequent Bench to
observe and hold that the decision in the case of Mohan Lal (Supra)
would be applicable prospectively. It is vehemently submitted by Shri          F
Vikas Singh, learned Senior Counsel that only in the case of Mohan Lal
(Supra), the Court could have observed and held that the said decision
shall be made applicable prospectively. It is submitted that in the case of
Mohan Lal (Supra) the Bench did not observe that the said decision
shall be applicable prospectively. It is submitted that therefore it was not   G
open for the subsequent Bench to observe and hold that the decision in
the case of Mohan Lal (Supra) would be applicable prospectively. It is
submitted that therefore the decision of this Court in the case of Mohan
Lal (Supra) shall be applicable with full force to the facts of the case on

                                                                               H
684             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 10 S.C.R.


A     hand and as the complainant and the Investigating Officer are the same,
      the entire criminal proceedings have been vitiated and therefore it is
      prayed to allow the present appeal and discharge the appellant from the
      offences for which he has been charged.
             8. We have heard the learned Counsel for the respective parties
B     at length. We have also gone through and considered the Judgment and
      Order passed by the High Court as well as the relevant material on
      record.
             8.1 At the outset it is required to be noted that after conclusion of
      the investigation, the Investigating Officer had filed the charge-sheet
C     against the accused for the offences under Sections 354, 354A, 354B,
      341, 342, 376 (2) (f) and 376 (2) (k) of the IPC. That thereafter, learned
      Trial Court has framed the charge against the appellant-original accused
      for the aforesaid offences, in exercise of its powers under Section 227/
      228 of the CrPC. Framing of the charge against the accused for the
      aforesaid offences was the subject matter before the High Court. By
D     the impugned Judgment and Order the High Court has dismissed the
      Revision Application and has confirmed the Order passed by the learned
      Trial Court ordering to frame the charge against the accused for the
      aforesaid offences. Hence, the appellant-original accused is before this
      Court by way of present appeal.
E             8.2 That it is mainly contended on behalf of the appellant that in
      the present case as the complainant and Investigating Officer are the
      same and therefore in view of the decision of this Court in the case of
      Mohan Lal (Supra) the entire criminal proceedings are vitiated and
      therefore the appellant – original accused is to be discharged. However,
F     it is required to be noted that apart from the fact that the decision of this
      Court in the case of Mohan Lal (Supra) has been doubted and pursuant
      to the Order passed by this Court dated 17.01.2019 in SLP (Crl.) D.
      No.39528 of 2018, the same is referred to the larger Bench. In the
      subsequent decision in the case of Varinder Kumar (Supra), a three
      Judge Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider the decision of
G     this Court in the case of Mohan Lal (Supra) and the three Judge Bench
      of this Court has held that the decision of this Court in the case of Mohan
      Lal (Supra) shall be applicable prospectively, it is further held that all
      pending criminal prosecutions, trials and appeals prior to the law laid
      down in Mohan Lal (Supra) shall continue to be governed by the
H
       TARUN JIT TEJPAL v. THE STATE OF GOA & ANR.                              685
                      [M. R. SHAH, J.]

individual facts of the case. Therefore, the reliance placed upon the           A
decision of this Court in the case of Mohan Lal (Supra) by the learned
Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-original accused is
misplaced. Now, the submission made by Shri Vikas Singh, learned Senior
Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant-original accused that the
subsequent Bench in the case of Varinder Kumar (Supra) could not
                                                                                B
have held that the decision of this Court in the case of Mohan Lal
(Supra) shall be applicable prospectively is concerned, at the outset, it is
required to be noted that this Bench is not considering whether in the
subsequent decision in the case of Varinder Kumar (Supra), the Bench
could not have considered the prospective applicability of the decision in
the case of Mohan Lal (Supra) or not? The three Judge Bench of this             C
Court held that the decision of this Court in the case of Mohan Lal
(Supra) would be applicable prospectively and the same shall not affect
criminal prosecutions, trials and appeals. We are bound by that decision.
Therefore, we are of the opinion that the decision of this Court in the
case of Mohan Lal (Supra) shall not be applicable to the facts of the
                                                                                D
case on hand as criminal prosecution has been initiated in the present
case much prior to the decision in the case of the Mohan Lal (Supra).
Therefore, the appellant cannot be discharged at this stage on the
aforesaid ground mainly that the Investigating Officer and the
complainant/informant are the same the trial is vitiated, relying upon the
decision of this Court in the case of Mohan Lal (Supra). Even the decision      E
of this Court in the case of Bhagwan Singh (Supra), relied upon by the
learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-original accused,
also shall not be of much assistance to the appellant at this stage. In the
case of Bhagwan Singh (Supra) and after the trial this Court held that
as the complainant herself was the Investigating Officer, the case of the
                                                                                F
prosecution would not be free from doubt. It was the case after trial and
not at the stage of framing of the charge. Where the complainant himself
had conducted the investigation, such aspect of the matter can certainly
be given due weightage while assessing the evidence on record but it
would be completely a different thing to say that the trial itself would be
vitiated for such infraction. Therefore, the aforesaid ground is not required   G
to be considered at this stage, namely, at the stage of framing of the
charge. At the stage of framing of the charge, the different considerations
would weigh, which are dealt with hereinbelow.


                                                                                H
686            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 10 S.C.R.


A           9. Now, so far as the prayer of the appellant to discharge him and
      the submissions made by Shri Vikas Singh, learned Senior Advocate on
      merits are concerned, the law on the scope at the stage of Section 227/
      228 CrPC is required to be considered.
             9.1 In the case of N. Suresh Rajan (Supra) this Court had an
B     occasion to consider in detail the scope of the proceedings at the stage
      of framing of the charge under Section 227/228 CrPC. After considering
      earlier decisions of this Court on the point thereafter in paragraph 29 to
      31 this Court has observed and held as under:
            “29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions
C           and the submissions made by Mr Ranjit Kumar commend us. True
            it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for
            discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution
            or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out
            whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass
            an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration
D           of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an
            assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution
            are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a
            view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at
            their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients
E           constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, probative value of
            the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to
            go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not
            warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered
            is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has
            been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the
F           accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks
            that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis
            of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the
            charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the
            conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law
G           does not permit a mini trial at this stage.
                30. Reference in this connection can be made to a recent
                decision of this Court in Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat v. State of
                U.P. [(2013) 11 SCC 476 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 21 : AIR 2013
                SC 52] , in which, after analysing various decisions on the
H
TARUN JIT TEJPAL v. THE STATE OF GOA & ANR.                             687
               [M. R. SHAH, J.]

   point, this Court endorsed the following view taken in Onkar         A
   Nath Mishra v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2008) 2 SCC 561 :
   (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 507] : (Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat
   case [(2013) 11 SCC 476 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 21 : AIR 2013
   SC 52] , SCC p. 482, para 15)
      “15. ‘11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge      B
      the court is required to evaluate the material and documents
      on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging
      therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the
      existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged
      offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep
      into the probative value of the material on record. What          C
      needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for
      presuming that the offence has been committed and not
      a ground for convicting the accused has been made
      out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on
      material which leads the court to form a presumptive              D
      opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients
      constituting the offence alleged would justify the
      framing of charge against the accused in respect of the
      commission of that offence.’ (Onkar Nath case [(2008)
      2 SCC 561 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 507] , SCC p. 565, para
      11)”                                                              E

                                              (emphasis in original)
31. Now reverting to the decisions of this Court in Sajjan
Kumar [Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC
(Cri) 1371] and Dilawar Balu Kurane [Dilawar Balu                       F
Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135 : 2002 SCC
(Cri) 310] , relied on by the respondents, we are of the opinion
that they do not advance their case. The aforesaid decisions
consider the provision of Section 227 of the Code and make it
clear that at the stage of discharge the court cannot make a roving
enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence     G
as if it was conducting a trial. It is worth mentioning that the Code
contemplates discharge of the accused by the Court of Session
under Section 227 in a case triable by it; cases instituted upon a
police report are covered by Section 239 and cases instituted
                                                                        H
688      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2019] 10 S.C.R.


A     otherwise than on a police report are dealt with in Section 245.
      From a reading of the aforesaid sections it is evident that they
      contain somewhat different provisions with regard to discharge
      of an accused:
      31.1. Under Section 227 of the Code, the trial court is required to
B     discharge the accused if it “considers that there is not sufficient
      ground for proceeding against the accused”. However, discharge
      under Section 239 can be ordered when “the Magistrate considers
      the charge against the accused to be groundless”. The power to
      discharge is exercisable under Section 245(1) when, “the
      Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded that no case
C     against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would
      warrant his conviction”.
      31.2. Section 227 and 239 provide for discharge before the
      recording of evidence on the basis of the police report, the
      documents sent along with it and examination of the accused after
D     giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard. However, the
      stage of discharge under Section 245, on the other hand, is reached
      only after the evidence referred in Section 244 has been taken.
      31.3. Thus, there is difference in the language employed in these
      provisions. But, in our opinion, notwithstanding these differences,
E     and whichever provision may be applicable, the court is required
      at this stage to see that there is a prima facie case for proceeding
      against the accused. Reference in this connection can be made to
      a judgment of this Court in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay [(1986) 2
      SCC 716 : 1986 SCC (Cri) 256] . The same reads as follows:
F     (SCC pp. 755-56, para 43)
         “43. … Notwithstanding this difference in the position there is
         no scope for doubt that the stage at which the Magistrate is
         required to consider the question of framing of charge under
         Section 245(1) is a preliminary one and the test of ‘prima facie’
G        case has to be applied. In spite of the difference in the language
         of the three sections, the legal position is that if the trial court is
         satisfied that a prima facie case is made out, charge has to be
         framed.”


H
      TARUN JIT TEJPAL v. THE STATE OF GOA & ANR.                             689
                     [M. R. SHAH, J.]

       9.2 In the subsequent decision in the case of S. Selvi (Supra) this    A
Court has summarised the principles while framing of the charge at the
stage of Section 227/228 of the CrPC. This Court has observed and
held in paragraph 6 and 7 as under:
      “6. It is well settled by this Court in a catena of judgments
      including Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal [Union of              B
      India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC
      (Cri) 609] , Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of
      Maharashtra [Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra,
      (2002) 2 SCC 135 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 310] , Sajjan
      Kumar v. CBI[Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010)
      3 SCC (Cri) 1371] , State v. A. Arun Kumar [State v. A. Arun            C
      Kumar, (2015) 2 SCC 417 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 96 : (2015) 1 SCC
      (L&S) 505] , Sonu Gupta v. Deepak Gupta [Sonu
      Gupta v. Deepak Gupta, (2015) 3 SCC 424 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri)
      265] , State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi [State of
      Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2003) 2 SCC 711 : 2003 SCC              D
      (Cri) 688] , Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra
      Bhimraj Bijjaya [Niranjan Singh Karam Singh
      Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya, (1990) 4 SCC 76 : 1991
      SCC (Cri) 47] and Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal
      Affairs v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal
      Affairs v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC 274 : 1979 SCC               E
      (Cri) 1038] that the Judge while considering the question of framing
      charge under Section 227 of the Code in sessions cases (which is
      akin to Section 239 CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the
      undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited
      purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against        F
      the accused has been made out; where the material placed before
      the court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which
      has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in
      framing the charge; by and large if two views are equally possible
      and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him
      while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against     G
      the accused, he will be fully within his rights to discharge the
      accused. The Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a
      mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad
      probabilities of the case, the total effect of the statements and the
                                                                              H
690      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 10 S.C.R.


A     documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities
      appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean
      that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and
      cons of the matter and weigh the materials as if he was conducting
      a trial.
B     7. In Sajjan Kumar v. CBI [Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC
      368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371] , this Court on consideration of the
      various decisions about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the
      Code, laid down the following principles: (SCC pp. 376-77, para
      21)
C        “(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the
         charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to
         sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding
         out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has
         been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would
         depend upon the facts of each case.
D
         (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave
         suspicion against the accused which has not been properly
         explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge
         and proceeding with the trial.

E        (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a
         mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad
         probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and
         the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities,
         etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry
         into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as
F        if he was conducting a trial.
         (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could
         form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence,
         it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion
         is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
G        accused has committed the offence.
         (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value
         of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing
         a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material

H
      TARUN JIT TEJPAL v. THE STATE OF GOA & ANR.                              691
                     [M. R. SHAH, J.]

         placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of         A
         offence by the accused was possible.
         (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required
         to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view
         to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face
         value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting      B
         the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence
         as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all
         that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed
         to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.
         (vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to         C
         suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial
         Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this
         stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or
         acquittal.””
       9.3 In the case of Mauvin Godinho (Supra) this Court had an             D
occasion to consider how to determine prima facie case while framing
the charge under Section 227/228 of the CrPC. In the same decision this
Court observed and held that while considering the prima facie case at
the stage of framing of the charge under Section 227 of the CrPC there
cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and
weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.                            E

       9.4 At this stage the decision of this Court in the case of Stree
Atyachar Virodhi Parishad (Supra) is also required to be referred to.
In that aforesaid decision this Court had an occasion to consider the
scope of enquiry at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227/
228 of the CrPC. In paragraphs 11 to 14 observations of this Court in the      F
aforesaid decision are as under :
      “11. Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure having bearing
      on the contentions urged for the parties, provides:
         “227. Discharge.—If, upon consideration of the record of the
                                                                               G
         case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing
         the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf,
         the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for
         proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused
         and record his reasons for so doing.”
                                                                               H
692      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 10 S.C.R.


A     12. Section 228 requires the Judge to frame charge if he considers
      that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed
      the offence. The interaction of these two sections has already
      been the subject-matter of consideration by this Court. In State
      of Biharv. Ramesh Singh [(1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri)
      533 : (1978) 1 SCR 257] , Untwalia, J., while explaining the scope
B
      of the said sections observed: [SCR p. 259 : SCC pp. 41-42 : SCC
      (Cri) pp. 535-36, para 4]
         Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they
         have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the
         initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the
C        evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to
         be meticulously Judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to
         the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for
         the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and
         weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would
D        be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The
         standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied
         before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of
         the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding
         the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At
         that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient
E        ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is
         sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the
         accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot
         take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial.
         But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads
F        the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the
         accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the
         court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding
         against the accused.
      13. In Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal [(1979) 3 SCC
G     4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609 : (1979) 2 SCR 229] , Fazal Ali, J.,
      summarised some of the principles: [SCR pp. 234-35 : SCC p. 9 :
      SCC (Cri) pp. 613-14, para 10]
         “(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing
         the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted
H
TARUN JIT TEJPAL v. THE STATE OF GOA & ANR.                               693
               [M. R. SHAH, J.]

   power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of        A
   finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the
   accused had been made out.
   (2) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave
   suspicion against the accused which has not been properly
   explained the court will be fully justified in framing a charge        B
   and proceeding with the trial.
   (3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally
   depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay
   down a rule of universal application. By and large however if
   two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that         C
   the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some
   suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will
   be fully within his right to discharge the accused.
   (4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the
   Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and            D
   experienced court cannot act merely as a post office or a
   mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad
   probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and
   the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities
   appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean
   that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and          E
   cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was
   conducting a trial.”
14. These two decisions do not lay down different
principles. Prafulla Kumar case [(1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC
(Cri) 609 : (1979) 2 SCR 229] has only reiterated what has been           F
stated in Ramesh Singh case [(1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri)
533 : (1978) 1 SCR 257] . In fact, Section 227 itself contains
enough guidelines as to the scope of enquiry for the purpose of
discharging an accused. It provides that “the Judge shall discharge
when he considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding       G
against the accused”. The “ground” in the context is not a ground
for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in
the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be
determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The court,
therefore, need not undertake an elaborate enquiry in sifting and
                                                                          H
694             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 10 S.C.R.


A           weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various
            aspects. All that the court has to consider is whether the evidentiary
            material on record if generally accepted, would reasonably connect
            the accused with the crime. No more need be enquired into.”
             9.5 Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
B     decisions and considering the scope of enquiry at the stage of framing of
      the charge under Section 227/228 if the CrPC, we are of the opinion that
      the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the
      appellant on merits, at this stage, are not required to be considered.
      Whatever submissions are made by the learned Counsel appearing on
      behalf of the appellant are on merits are required to be dealt with and
C     considered at an appropriate stage during the course of the trial. Some
      of the submissions may be considered to be the defence of the accused.
      Some of the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing on
      behalf of the appellant on the conduct of the victim/prosecutrix are required
      to be dealt with and considered at an appropriate stage during the trial.
D     The same are not required to be considered at this stage of framing of
      the charge. On considering the material on record, we are of the opinion
      that there is more than a prima facie case against the accused for which
      he is required to be tried. There is sufficient ample material against the
      accused and therefore the learned Trial Court has rightly framed the
      charge against the accused and the same is rightly confirmed by the
E     High Court. No interference of this Court is called for.
             10. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
      present appeal fails and as a result the appeal stands dismissed.
      Considering the fact that the allegations against the appellant of sexual
      abuse are very serious and affecting the dignity of a woman and is the
F     most morally and physically reprehensible crime in a society, an assault
      on the mind and privacy of the victim and the trial for such offences are
      required to be decided and disposed of at the earliest and considering
      the fact that in the present case the learned Trial Court has framed the
      charge against the accused and the incident is of 2013 and there is already
G     a delay in concluding the trial because of the pending proceedings, we
      direct the learned Trial Court to conclude the trial at the earliest within a
      period of six months from the date of receipt of the Order of this Court.
      All concerned are directed to cooperate with the Trial Court in the earlier
      disposal of the trial and within the stipulated time observed hereinabove.

H
       TARUN JIT TEJPAL v. THE STATE OF GOA & ANR.                               695
                      [M. R. SHAH, J.]

      With these observations present appeal stands dismissed. Pending           A
application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.
       MA No.2207 of 2018 in SLP (Crl.) No.3149-3150 of 2014
       The present MA has been filed in a disposed of matter in SLP
(Crl.) No.3149-3150 of 2014 with the prayer to direct the Trial Court to
release the passport of the applicant so as to enable him to travel to           B
London anytime between 21.08.2018 to 01.09.2018. Since that period is
already over, the present MA has become infructuous and is disposed of
as such.

                                                                                 C
Devika Gujral                           Appeal dismissed and M.A. disposed of.




                                                                                 D




                                                                                 E




                                                                                 F




                                                                                 G




                                                                                 H