Supreme Court of India
TATA STEEL LTD.versusRAJ KUMAR BANERJEE & ORS.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 639
- Decided
- 7 May 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- B PARDIWALA
Holding
The appeal was filed after the statutory 45‑day limit and the NCLAT lacked authority to condone delay beyond that period, rendering its order ultra‑vires.
Summary
The appellant, Tata Steel Ltd., had its resolution plan for Rohit Ferro‑Tech Ltd. approved by the NCLT on 7 April 2022. A minority shareholder, Respondent No. 1, filed an appeal to the NCLAT on 23‑24 May 2022, seeking condonation of delay beyond the 30‑day statutory period. The dispute centered on when the limitation period began, whether the additional 15‑day condonable period started after the court reopened, and whether the NCLAT could extend time beyond the 45‑day limit prescribed by Section 61(2) of the IBC. The Supreme Court held that the limitation period started on the date of pronouncement (7 April 2022), that the 30‑day period expired on 7 May 2022 (a working Saturday), and that the 15‑day discretionary period also expired on 22 May 2022, making the appeal time‑barred. Consequently, the NCLAT’s order condoning the delay was ultra‑vires and was set aside.
Issues considered
- Whether the additional 15‑day condonable period under Section 61(2) IBC commences from the expiry of the 30‑day prescribed period or from the day the court reopens after a holiday
- Interpretation of the term ‘prescribed period’ under Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with Section 4 and Rule 3 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016
- Whether the NCLAT has the power to condone delay beyond the combined 45‑day period (30 days prescribed + 15 days discretionary) under the IBC
Legislation cited
- Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016s. 238A, s. 61(2)
- Limitation Act, 1963s. 2(j), s. 4
- NCLAT Rules, 2016s. Rule 14, s. Rule 22(2), s. Rule 3
Headnote
Issue for Consideration (i) Whether the additional condonable period of 15 days as provided under section 61(2) IBC commences from the end of the prescribed limitation period of 30 days, in case the prescribed limitation period for filing the appeal falls on a day when the court is closed or (ii) What is the meaning of the term ‘prescribed period’ as defined under Section 2(j) read with Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and Rule 3 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016? (iii) Whether the NCLAT has the power to condone the delay beyond the said prescribed and condonable
Subjects
DelayPrescribed limitation periodCondonation of delayResolution planNational Company Law Appellate Tribunal
Judgment
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 814 : 2025 INSC 639
Tata Steel Ltd.
v.
Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 408 of 2023)
07 May 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
(i) Whether the additional condonable period of 15 days as
provided under section 61(2) IBC commences from the end
of the prescribed limitation period of 30 days, in case the
prescribed limitation period for filing the appeal falls on a
day when the court is closed or commences from the day
when the court reopens?
(ii) What is the meaning of the term ‘prescribed period’ as defined
under Section 2(j) read with Section 4 of the Limitation Act,
1963 and Rule 3 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016?
(iii) Whether the NCLAT has the power to condone the delay
beyond the said prescribed and condonable period under
the IBC.
Headnotes†
Limitation Act, 1963 – Sections 2(j) and 4 – Applicability to
IBC proceedings in light of Section 238A IBC as inserted by
the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment)
Act, 2018 r/w Rule 3 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016:
Held: The resolution plan of the appellant was approved by
the NCLT vide order dated 07.04.2022 – Though the Company
Secretary of the appellant duly informed the listing departments
of both NSE and BSE about the NCLT order within 30 minutes of
its pronouncement, the intimation of the said approval was given
by the BSE and NSE only on 08.04.2022, making the respondent
aware of it only then – The limitation period for filing the appeal
commenced on 07.04.2022 and expired on 07.05.2022, a working
Saturday for the registry of the NCLAT – The appeal, along with
an application for condonation of delay was e-filed before the
* Author
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 815
Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors.
NCLAT on 23.05.2022 and physically filed on 24.05.2022 by the
respondent no.1 herein – The NCLAT condoned the delay vide
impugned order.
Section 238A IBC makes the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to
IBC proceedings – Section 2(j) of Limitation Act defines the terms
‘period of limitation’ and ‘prescribed period – Section 4 of Limitation
Act states that when the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or
application expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit,
appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the
day when the court reopens including days wherein it is closed
during any part of its normal working hours – Rule 3 of the NCLAT
Rules, 2016 also extends the prescribed period of limitation to the
next working day when the period ends on a day when the office
of the Tribunal is closed. [Paras 10, 10.1]
Thus, the benefit of exclusion of period during which Court is
closed is available only when application for setting aside the
award is filed within “prescribed period of limitation” and it is not
available in respect of period extendable by the Court in exercise
of its discretion [Para 10.2]
IBC, 2016 – Section 61(2) – Computation of limitation period in
appeals – Limitation period for filing an appeal to the NCLAT
commences from the date of pronouncement of the order by
the NCLT – Though Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules mandates
filing of a certified copy of the impugned order along with
the appeal, the limitation period is not contingent upon the
receipt of such a copy:
Held: The total permissible period for filing an appeal under
Section 61(2) gives a total permissible period 45 days to appeal
i.e., comprising 30 days as the prescribed period and an additional
15 days that may be condoned upon showing sufficient cause – In
V. Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat & Power Ltd., (2022)2 SCC 244 this
Court held that the Limitation period for filing an appeal to the
NCLAT commences from the date of pronouncement of the order
by the NCLT and not from the date when the order is received or
made available to the aggrieved party – Though Rule 22(2) of the
NCLAT Rules mandates filing of a certified copy of the impugned
order along with the appeal, the limitation period is not contingent
upon the receipt of such a copy – If in case an appellant applies
for a certified copy, the time taken to obtain it can be excluded
from the limitation period under section 12(2) of the Limitation
816 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Act – The litigant has to file its appeal within thirty days, which
can be extended up to a period of fifteen days, and no more,
upon showing sufficient cause – In Sanjay Pandurang Kalate v.
Vistra ITCL India Ltd. & Others, (2024) 3 SCC 27; A. Rajendra v.
Gonugunta Madhusudhan Rao & Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC
721 – The Court held that date on which the limitation begins to
run is intrinsically linked to the date of pronouncement – Where the
judgment was pronounced in open Court, the period of limitation
starts running from that very day. [Para 10.3]
The IBC prescribes strict timelines for filing appeals and taking
legal action so as to ensure that insolvency proceedings are
not misused to recover time-barred debts – The NCLAT cannot
condone any delay beyond 15 days even on equitable grounds as
the appellate mechanism under IBC is strictly time-bound by design
to preserve the speed and certainty of the insolvency resolution
process. [Paras 11, 11.1]
The impugned order of the NCLAT is ultravires as it has no power
to condone delay beyond the period stipulated under the statute –
Allowing condonation in such cases would defeat the legislative
intent and open the floodgates to belated and potentially frivolous
petitions, thereby undermining the efficacy and finality of the
appellate mechanism. [Paras 11-13].
Case Law Cited
Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. M/s. Subash
Projects & Mktg. Ltd. [2012] 1 SCR 403 : (2012) 2 SCC 624; Sagufa
Ahmed and Others v. Upper Assam Plywood Products (P) Ltd. &
Others [2020] 9 SCR 472 : (2021) 2 SCC 317; Bhimashankar
Sahakari Sakkare Karkhane Niyamita v. Walchandnagar Industries
Limited (WIL) [2023] 4 SCR 361 : (2023) 8 SCC 453; My Preferred
Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. and Another v. Faridabad
Implements Pvt. Ltd, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 70; V. Nagarajan v.
SKS Ispat & Power Ltd. [2021] 14 SCR 736 : (2022) 2 SCC
244; Sanjay Pandurang Kalate v. Vistra ITCL India Ltd. & Others
[2023] 15 SCR 313 : (2024) 3 SCC 27; A. Rajendra v. Gonugunta
Madhusudhan Rao & Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 721; Mobilox
Innovations Private Limited v. Kirusa Software Private Limited
[2017] 10 SCR 1006 : (2018) 1 SCC 353; Kalpraj Dharamshi v.
Kotak Investment Advisors Limited & Another [2021] 2 SCR 677 :
(2021) 10 SCC 401 – Relied on.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 817
Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors.
Safire Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund
Commissioner & Another, Civil Appeal No. 2212 of 2021; National
Spot Exchange Limited v. Mr. Anil Kohli, Civil Appeal No. 6187
of 2019; Ajay Gupta v. Raju @ Rajendra Singh Yadav [2016] 3
SCR 225 : (2016) 14 SCC 314 – Referred to.
List of Acts
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Limitation Act, 1963.
List of Keywords
Delay; Prescribed limitation period; Condonation of delay;
Resolution plan; National Company Law Appellate Tribunal.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 408 of 2023
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.12.2022 of the National
Company Law Appellate Tribunal at New Delhi in CAAT(I) No.
615 of 2022
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Ramji Srinivasan, Sr. Adv., Ashok Mathur, Udit Mediratta, Shivkrit
Rai, Ms. Apeksha Singh, Arjun Bhatia, Ms. Shefali Munde.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Brijesh Singh Bhaduriya, Aviral Kapoor, Ms. Sonal Alagh, Divyanshu
Jha, Vedant Singh, Ms. Shagufa Salim, Ms. Ekta Choudhary, Anand
Krishna, Ayush Kumar.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
R. Mahadevan, J.
1. This appeal is filed against the order dated 14.12.2022 passed by
the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal1. By the said order,
1 For short, “NCLAT”
818 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the NCLAT has allowed interlocutory application bearing No. 1667
of 2022 filed by Respondent No. 1 seeking condonation of delay in
filing the appeal bearing no. C.A. (AT) (Insolvency) No. 615 of 2022.
2. The appellant is the successful resolution applicant for Rohit Ferro-
Tech Limited (Corporate Debtor) having its resolution plan approved
by the Committee of Creditors and subsequently by the National
Company Law Tribunal2, Kolkata, by order dated 07.04.2022 in
CP(IB)/1214(KB)/2018. Respondent No.1 is an erstwhile minority
shareholder of the Corporate Debtor.
3. Respondent No.1 preferred an appeal under Section 61 of the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 20163 to set aside the order dated
07.04.2022 passed by the Adjudicating Authority and direct the
Resolution Professional to scrutinise the resolution plan proposed
by the appellant in accordance with Section 30(2) IBC. Along with
the appeal, he also filed an interlocutory application bearing No.
1667 of 2022 praying for condonation of delay of 15 days in filing
the same. By the order impugned herein, the NCLAT condoned the
delay and allowed the said application. Aggrieved by the same, the
appellant is before us with the present appeal.
4. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the NCLT passed
the order approving the appellant’s resolution plan for the Corporate
Debtor under Section 31 IBC on 07.04.2022. In terms of Section 61(2)
IBC, the limitation period of 30 days for filing an appeal against the
said order expired on 07.05.2022, which fell on a Saturday. Even
assuming the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 were
available, the additional / grace/ condonable period of 15 days as
provided under the proviso to Section 61(2), expired on 22.05.2022.
Therefore, the right of Respondent No.1 to file an appeal stood
extinguished on 22.05.2022 itself.
4.1. Adding further, it is submitted that after the expiry of the 30-day
limitation period and the additional 15-day grace / condonable
period, Respondent No. 1 e-filed the appeal along with an
application for condonation of delay before the NCLAT, on
23.05.2022, which was the 46th day from the date of the NCLT’s
2 For short, “NCLT”
3 For short, “IBC”
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 819
Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors.
order. The physical filing of the appeal was done on 24.05.2022,
i.e., on the 47th day. Accordingly, the appeal was clearly barred
by limitation and not maintainable in law. However, by the order
impugned herein, the NCLAT erroneously allowed the application
for condonation of delay by observing that Respondent No. 1
was entitled to the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act,
1963. It incorrectly held that the 30-day limitation period for filing
the appeal expired on 09.05.2022 instead of 07.05.2022, on
the ground that 07.05.2022 was a Saturday and, therefore, a
court holiday. Consequently, the NCLAT wrongly computed the
additional / grace/ condonable period of 15 days from 10.05.2022
instead of 08.05.2022, and concluded that this period expired
on 24.05.2022 - the date on which Respondent No.1 physically
filed the appeal before the NCLAT.
4.2. The learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions of this
Court in V. Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat Powers Limited & Others4,
Kalpraj Dharamshi & Another v. Kotak Investment Advisors
Limited & Another5, Safire Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Regional
Provident Fund Commissioner & Another6, and National Spot
Exchange Limited v. Mr. Anil Kohli7, wherein, it was held that
a litigant under Section 61 IBC can file an appeal before the
NCLAT within 30 days, which may be extended by a further
period of up to 15 days upon showing sufficient cause; and no
appeal can be entertained beyond this extended period.
4.3. Referring to the judgment of this Court in Ajay Gupta v. Raju @
Rajendra Singh Yadav8, the learned counsel submitted that the
benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not attracted
where the last day for filing falls on a working Saturday, and
the court registry is open. It has been judicially recognized
that while Saturday may be a non-working day for the judges,
it remains a working day for the registry. Therefore, if the last
date for filing falls on such a Saturday, the benefit of Section
4 cannot be invoked. In the present case, 07.05.2022 was the
4 (2022) 2 SCC 244
5 (2021) 10 SCC 401
6 Civil Appeal No. 2212 of 2021
7 Civil Appeal No. 6187 of 2019
8 (2016) 14 SCC 314
820 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
first Saturday of May, 2022 and was a working Saturday for the
Registry of the NCLAT. Hence, Respondent No.1 could have
filed the appeal on that date, but failed to do so.
4.4. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the order of the NCLAT
condoning the delay in filing the appeal beyond the statutorily
permissible period of 30 days, and the additional condonable
period of 15 days under the proviso to Section 61(2) IBC, is
contrary to established legal principles and the scheme of the
IBC, and is therefore liable to be set aside.
5. On the contrary, the learned counsel for Respondent No.1, at the
outset, submitted that the appeal filed by Respondent No. 1 before
the NCLAT is well within the statutorily condonable period of 15 days
as mentioned in the proviso of Section 61(2) IBC and hence, the
order impugned herein is sustainable in law.
5.1. Elaborating further, it is submitted that pursuant to the approval
of the resolution plan, an intimation letter was issued by the
Corporate Debtor to the Listing Departments of Bombay Stock
Exchange and National Stock Exchange of India Limited on
08.04.2022. This was the first time, on which Respondent No.1
became aware of the approval of the resolution plan. Accordingly,
the initial limitation period of 30 days (22 days in April 2022 + 8
days in May 2022) ended on 08.05.2022, which was a Sunday.
In accordance with the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963,
when the last day falls on a holiday, the period extends to
the next working day. Hence, the limitation period ended on
09.05.2022 (Monday). Thereafter, the statutory condonable
period of 15 days commenced from 10.05.2022 and ended on
24.05.2022. Respondent No. 1 e-filed the appeal along with
the condonation application on 23.05.2022 and the appeal
was physically filed on 24.05.2022, which is within the 45-day
period prescribed under section 61(2) IBC (30 days limitation +
15 days condonable delay). Thus, the NCLAT rightly registered
the appeal and passed the impugned order by allowing the
condonation application.
5.2. It is further submitted that the Resolution Professional of the
Corporate Debtor has failed to comply with the disclosure
obligations mandated under the SEBI (Listing Obligation and
Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015. This failure directly
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 821
Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors.
contributed to the delay in filing the appeal before the NCLAT.
Moreover, the failure of the Resolution Professional to adhere
to the mandatory disclosure requirement adversely impacted
the respondent’s right to access timely and material information,
thereby delaying the initiation of the appeal process.
5.3. It is further submitted that the prescribed limitation period under
section 61(2) IBC did not commence from the date of the
approval order i.e., 07.04.2022, but rather from 08.04.2022 -
the date on which the Resolution Professional furnished the
disclosure regarding the approval of the resolution plan. This is
because Respondent No. 1 was not a party to the proceedings
before the NCLT and was not privy to the order passed by the
Adjudicating Authority or the deliberations of the Committee
of Creditors (CoC). Additionally, as per the SEBI Circulars
and Listing Regulations, the Corporate Debtor was under an
obligation to intimate the stock exchanges at least two working
days prior to the NCLT hearing, in which, the resolution plan
was to be considered. This mandatory requirement was not
complied with by the Corporate Debtor or the Resolution
Professional. In view of these lapses, the limitation period did
not commence from 07.04.2022, the date of the NCLT order,
but from 08.04.2022, when the disclosure was finally made.
This disclosure was the first time Respondent No.1 became
aware of the approval of the resolution plan, and hence, the
right to appeal accrued only from that date.
5.4. According to the learned counsel, the provisions of the Limitation
Act, 1963 are applicable to the present case. It is reiterated that
the limitation period commenced only after 08.04.2022 i.e., the
date on which the appellant made the mandatory disclosure of the
approval order to the stock exchanges and not from 07.04.2022,
the date of passing of the approval order by the NCLT. The
30-day limitation period thus commenced on 08.04.2022 and
expired on 08.05.2022 which was a Sunday. In view of section
4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and Rule 3 of the NCLAT Rules,
when the prescribed period expires on a day when the tribunal
is closed, the filing may be done on the next working day.
Accordingly, the limitation period was extended to 09.05.2022
(Monday). Subsequently, the 15-day condonable period under the
822 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
proviso to Section 61(2) IBC expired on 24.05.2022. Respondent
No. 1 physically filed the appeal along with the application for
condonation of delay on the same day i.e., 24.05.2022 well within
the total period of 45 days. Therefore, the impugned order of
the NCLAT allowing the application for condonation of delay is
in consonance with the provisions of the IBC and the Limitation
Act, 1963. In view of the same, the contention of the appellant
that Saturday is the working day for the court registry, has no
nexus with the present case.
5.5. The learned counsel finally submitted that Respondent No. 1
was not a party to the petition filed under Section 7 IBC and
therefore, was not in possession of the relevant documents
required to file an appeal under Section 61. This lack of access
to essential documents contributed to the delay in filing the
appeal. The NCLAT in the impugned order, duly acknowledged
this fact and observed that the delay was attributable to the
respondent’s inability to obtain necessary documents in a timely
manner. In light of these circumstances, the only requirement
under law is to demonstrate the existence of “sufficient cause”
for not filing the appeal within the prescribed period, as per
the proviso to Section 61(2) IBC. Respondent No. 1 has
adequately met this threshold, and the delay was neither wilful
nor deliberate, but rather due to practical constraints beyond
the respondent’s control.
5.6. With these submissions, the learned counsel for Respondent
No. 1 sought dismissal of the appeal filed by the appellant.
6. As a riposte, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that
Respondent No. 1 has raised a completely new and unfounded
allegation that the Resolution Professional of the Corporate Debtor
issued a disclosure to the listing departments of the NSE and BSE
on 08.04.2022 - i.e., one day after the resolution plan was approved
by the NCLT - instead of within the prescribed time period of 30
minutes from the pronouncement of the order. According to the
learned counsel for the appellant, the Company Secretary of the
Corporate Debtor vide letter dated 07.04.2022, duly informed the
listing departments of the NSE and BSE regarding the NCLT order
within the prescribed period of 30 minutes - at 11.06.13 A.M. to
NSE and 11.11.51 AM to BSE - following the pronouncement of the
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 823
Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors.
NCLT order. Therefore, the Resolution Professional fully complied
with the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements)
Regulations, 2015.
7. Having considered the arguments advanced and the documents on
record, the central issues for adjudication are:
(i) Whether the appeal filed by Respondent No. 1 was within the
prescribed limitation period of 30 days, along with the additional
condonable period of 15 days as provided under section 61(2)
IBC; and
(ii) If not, whether the NCLAT has the power to condone the delay
beyond the said prescribed and condonable period under the
IBC.
ISSUE NO. 1
8. Concededly, the resolution plan submitted by the appellant in respect
of the Corporate Debtor was approved by the Committee of Creditors
on 05.06.2021 and subsequently, by the NCLT, Kolkata, by order dated
07.04.2022. Any appeal, if aggrieved by the said approval, ought to
have been filed before the NCLAT in accordance with the provisions
of section 61(2) IBC, which prescribes a strict timeline for the same.
For better appreciation, the said provision is reproduced below:
“S.61 – Appeals and Appellate Authority
(1) ….
(2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within
thirty days before the National Company Law Appellate
Tribunal:
Provided that the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal
may allow an appeal to be filed after the expiry of the
said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was
sufficient cause for not filing the appeal but such period
shall not exceed fifteen days.
(3) .…”
Thus, the total permissible period for filing an appeal under section
61(2) is 45 days – comprising 30 days as the prescribed period
and an additional 15 days that may be condoned upon showing
sufficient cause.
824 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
9. In the present case, Respondent No. 1 e-filed appeal along with an
application for condonation of delay before the NCLAT on 23.05.2022
and physically filed the same on 24.05.2022. The NCLAT allowed the
application for condonation of delay by the order impugned herein.
The appellant challenged the maintainability of the appeal on the
ground that it was filed beyond the 45-day period prescribed under
section 61(2) IBC – comprising a 30-day limitation period and a
further 15-day condonable period – and was, therefore, time-barred.
Whereas, according to Respondent No.1, although the resolution
plan was approved by the NCLT on 07.04.2022, the intimation of the
said approval was given to the listing departments of the BSE and
NSE only on 08.04.2022; and he became aware of the approval on
that date, as he was not a party to the petition filed under section
7 IBC. Accordingly, the 30-day limitation period for filing the appeal
commenced on 08.04.2022 and was set to expire on 08.05.2022.
However, since 08.05.2022 was a Sunday, by virtue of Section 4
of the Limitation Act, 1963, the prescribed period was extended
to the next working day i.e., 09.05.2022 (Monday). Thereafter, the
additional grace period of 15 days for seeking condonation of delay,
as permitted under the proviso to Section 61(2) IBC expired on
24.05.2022. As Respondent No. 1 physically filed the appeal along
with the condonation application on 24.05.2022, it was within the
statutorily permissible period of 45 days. Hence, the appeal was
not barred by limitation. The NCLAT rightly allowed the application
seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal.
10. Pertinently, Section 238A IBC which was inserted by the Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2018, makes the
Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to IBC proceedings, and the same
reads as under:
“238A.Limitation –
The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963)
shall, as far as may be, apply to the proceedings or appeals
before the Adjudicating Authority, the National Company
Law Appellate Tribunal, the Debt Recovery Tribunal or the
Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be.”
10.1. Now, the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 –
namely Section 2(j), which defines the term ‘period of limitation’
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 825
Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors.
and Section 4, which deals with the expiry of the prescribed
period on a holiday - are extracted below:
“Section 2 – Definitions
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, -
(j) “period of limitation” means the period of limitation
prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by
the Schedule, and “prescribed period” means the
period of limitation computed in accordance with the
provisions of this Act”.
“Section 4 - Expiry of prescribed period when court
is closed.
Where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or
application expires on a day when the court is closed,
the suit, appeal or application may be instituted,
preferred or made on the day when the court reopens.
Explanation.—
A court shall be deemed to be closed on any day
within the meaning of this section if during any part
of its normal working hours it remains closed on
that day.”
Moreover, the same is also highlighted under Rule 3 of the
NCLAT Rules, 2016, which reads as under:
“3. Computation of time period-
Where a period is prescribed by the Act and these
rules or under any other law or is fixed by the Tribunal
for doing any act, in computing the time, the day
from which the said period is to be reckoned shall
be excluded, and if the last day expires on a day
when the office of the Tribunal is closed, that day and
any succeeding days on which the Tribunal remains
closed shall also be excluded.”
Thus, the above provisions clarify that the benefit of Section
4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and Rule 3 of the NCLAT Rules,
2016, extends the limitation period to the next working day, if
the prescribed period expires on a holiday.
826 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
10.2. At the same time, this Court has, in the following decisions,
categorically explained the meaning of the term ‘prescribed
period’ as defined under Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act,
1963, and clarified the scope and applicability of Section 4 of
the said Act, particularly, in cases where the last date for filing
an appeal or application falls on a court holiday:
(i) Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. M/s.
Subash Projects & Mktg. Ltd.9
“10. The facts in the present case are peculiar.
The arbitral awards were received by the
appellants on 26-8-2003. No application for
setting aside the arbitral awards was made by
the appellants before elapse of three months
from the receipt thereof. As a matter of fact,
three months from the date of the receipt of
the arbitral award by the appellants expired on
26-11-2003. The District Court had Christmas
vacation for the period from 25-12-2003 to 1-1-
2004. On reopening of the court i.e. on 2-1-2004,
admittedly, the appellants made applications
for setting aside those awards under Section
34 of the 1996 Act. If the period during which
the District Court, Kamrup, Guwahati, remained
closed during Christmas vacation, 2003 is
extended and the appellants get the benefit of
that period over and above the cap of thirty days
as provided in Section 34(3), then the view of
the High Court and the District Judge cannot
be sustained. But this would depend on the
applicability of Section 4 of the 1963 Act.
11. The question, therefore, that falls for our
determination is whether the appellants are
entitled to extension of time under Section 4 of
the 1963 Act in the above facts.
12. Section 4 of the 1963 Act reads as under:
“4. Expiry of prescribed period when court is
closed.—Where the prescribed period for any
9 (2012) 2 SCC 624
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 827
Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors.
suit, appeal or application expires on a day when
the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application
may be instituted, preferred or made on the day
when the court reopens.
Explanation.— A court shall be deemed to be
closed on any day within the meaning of this
section if during any part of its normal working
hours it remains closed on that day.”
The above section enables a party to institute a
suit, prefer an appeal or make an application on
the day the court reopens where the prescribed
period for any suit, appeal or application expires
on the day when the court is closed.
13. The crucial words in Section 4 of the 1963
Act are “prescribed period”. What is the meaning
of these words?
14. Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act defines:
“2(j) ‘period of limitation’ [which] means the period
of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or
application by the Schedule, and ‘prescribed
period’ means the period of limitation computed
in accordance with the provisions of this Act;”
Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act when read in the
context of Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, it
becomes amply clear that the prescribed period
for making an application for setting aside an
arbitral award is three months. The period of
30 days mentioned in the proviso that follows
sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act
is not the “period of limitation” and, therefore,
not the “prescribed period” for the purposes
of making the application for setting aside the
arbitral award. The period of 30 days beyond
three months which the court may extend on
sufficient cause being shown under the proviso
appended to sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the
1996 Act being not the “period of limitation” or,
in other words, the “prescribed period”, in our
828 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
opinion, Section 4 of the 1963 Act is not, at all,
attracted to the facts of the present case.
15. Seen thus, the applications made by the
appellants on 2-1-2004 for setting aside the
arbitral award dated 26-8-2003 were liable to
be dismissed and have rightly been dismissed
by the District Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati, as
time-barred.”
(ii) Sagufa Ahmed and Others v. Upper Assam Plywood
Products (P) Ltd. & Others10
20. The words “prescribed period” appear in
several sections of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Though these words “prescribed period” are
not defined in Section 2 of the Limitation Act,
1963, the expression is used throughout, only
to denote the period of limitation. We may see
a few examples:
20.1. Section 3(1) makes every proceeding
filed after the prescribed period, liable to be
dismissed, subject however to the provisions in
Sections 4 to 24.
20.2. Section 5 enables the admission of any
appeal or application after the prescribed period.
20.3. Section 6 uses the expressionprescribed
period in relation to proceedings to be initiated
by persons under legal disability.
21. Therefore, the expression “prescribed period”
appearing in Section 4 cannot be construed to
mean anything other than the period of limitation.
Any period beyond the prescribed period, during
which the court or tribunal has the discretion
to allow a person to institute the proceedings,
cannot be taken to be “prescribed period”.
22. In Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage
Board v. Subash Projects & Mktg. Ltd.[(2012) 2
10 (2021) 2 SCC 317
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 829
Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors.
SCC 624 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 831], this Court
dealt with the meaning of the words “prescribed
period” in paras 13 and 14 as follows: (SCC pp.
627-28)
“13. The crucial words in Section 4 of the 1963
Act are “prescribed period”. What is the meaning
of these words?
14. Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act defines:
“2. (j)“period of limitation” which means the period
of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or
application by the Schedule, and “prescribed
period” means the period of limitation computed
in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”
Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act when read in the
context of Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, it
becomes amply clear that the prescribed period
for making an application for setting aside arbitral
award is three months. The period of 30 days
mentioned in proviso that follows sub-section (3)
of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is not the “period of
limitation” and, therefore, not “prescribed period”
for the purposes of making the application for
setting aside the arbitral award. The period of
30 days beyond three months which the court
may extend on sufficient cause being shown
under the proviso appended to sub-section (3) of
Section 34 of the 1996 Act being not the “period of
limitation” or, in other words, “prescribed period”,
in our opinion, Section 4 of the 1963 Act is not,
at all, attracted to the facts of the present case.”
Therefore, the appellants cannot claim the benefit
of the order passed by this Court on 23-3-2020
[Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re,
(2020) 19 SCC 10 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 343],
for enlarging, even the period up to which delay
can be condoned. The second contention is thus
untenable. Hence the appeals are liable to be
dismissed. Accordingly, they are dismissed.”
830 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(iii) Bhimashankar Sahakari Sakkare Karkhane Niyamita v.
Walchandnagar Industries Limited (WIL)11
“50. Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act and
Sections 2(j) and 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963
fell for consideration before this Court in Assam
Urban [Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage
Board v. Subash Projects & Mktg. Ltd., (2012) 2
SCC 624 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 831]. Even the
very issue raised in the present appeal fell for
consideration before this Court in Assam Urban
(supra). In the aforesaid decision, this Court
interpreted the aforesaid provisions and has
specifically observed and held that the benefit of
exclusion of period during which Court is closed
is available only when application for setting
aside the award is filed within “prescribed period
of limitation” and it is not available in respect of
period extendable by the Court in exercise of
its discretion.
52. Before this Court there existed, similar facts
like in the present case. In the case before this
Court, the arbitral awards were received by
the appellants on 26-8-2003. No application
for setting aside the arbitral award was made
before elapse of three months from the receipt
thereof. Three months from the date of receipt
of the award expired on 26-11-2003. The District
Court had Christmas vacation for the period
from 25-12-2003 to 1-1-2004. On reopening of
the Court i.e. on 2-1-2004, the appellants made
application for setting aside the award under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Considering
the aforesaid facts and thereafter considering
Sections 2(j) and 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
this Court observed and held and concluded in
paras 11 to 15 as under: (Assam Urban case)
…..
11 (2023) 8 SCC 453
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 831
Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors.
53. Therefore, as such the question involved in
the present appeal is squarely answered against
the appellant and the said issue is as such not
res integra.
…..
58. Therefore, in light of the application of the
Limitation Act, 1963 to the proceedings under
the Arbitration Act and when Section 10 of
the General Clauses Act, 1897 specifically
excludes the applicability of Section 10 to any
act or proceeding to which Limitation Act, 1963
applies and in light of the definition of “period of
limitation” as defined under Section 2(j) read with
Section 4 of the Limitation Act and as observed
and held by this Court in Assam Urban, benefit
of exclusion of period during which the Court is
closed shall be available when the application
for setting aside award is filed within “prescribed
period of limitation” and shall not be available in
respect of period extendable by Court in exercise
of its discretion.”
(iv) My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. and
Another v. Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.12
“25. As per Section 4, if the ‘‘prescribed period’’,
which is defined in Section 2(j) of the Limitation
Act as the period of limitation computed in
accordance with its provisions, expires on a day
when the court is closed, the application may
be made on the day when the court reopens.
26. This Court in Assam Urban (supra) considered
the applicability of Section 4 of the Limitation Act
in a situation when the condonable period of 30
days expired on a court holiday. The brief facts
are that the appellants received the arbitral
awards on 26.08.2003, the 3-month limitation
period expired on 26.11.2003, on which date the
12 2025 SCC OnLine SC 70
832 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
court was open. The further condonable period of
30 days expired during court vacation between
25.12.2003 to 01.01.2004. The application
under Section 34 was filed on 02.01.2004, on
the date of court reopening. This Court upheld
the dismissal of the Section 34 application on
the ground of delay, as the same could not be
condoned.
26.1 First, the Court held that by virtue of Section
43(1), the Limitation Act applies to matters of
arbitration, “save and except to the extent its
applicability has been excluded by virtue of the
express provision contained in Section 34(3) of
the 1996 Act”.
26.2 It then considered the meaning of the
expression ‘‘prescribed period’’ in Section 4,
to determine whether the appellants in this
case would be entitled to an extension of time.
Reading Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act in
the context of Section 34(3) of the ACA, it held
that the “prescribed period” for an application
to set aside the arbitral award is 3 months. The
30-day period is not the period of limitation, but
the condonable period, and is therefore not the
“prescribed period”. Hence, it held that Section
4 was not attracted to the facts of the case.
27. Contrary to the interpretation of the judgment
put forth by Mr. Kaul during the hearings, a
reading of the entire judgment does not indicate
that the Court in Assam Urban(supra) held
Section 4 of the Limitation Act to be inapplicable.
The wording of para 9 of the judgment makes it
clear that the Limitation Act does not apply only
to the extent that its applicability is excluded by
an express provision in Section 34(3). While the
Court did not explicitly deal with whether Section
4 of the Limitation Act was excluded, a reading
of the entire judgment makes it clear that the
Court proceeded on the basis that Section 4
applies. Therefore, we find it difficult to accept
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 833
Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors.
Mr. Kaul’s submission that Section 4 was held
to be excluded in Assam Urban (supra). His
further submission that once the Limitation Act
is inapplicable, there was no occasion for the
Court to decide on the applicability of Section 4
only to the prescribed period of 3 months, must
also be rejected for the same reason.
28. The position of law after Assam Urban(supra)
is that while Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies
to Section 34(3) of the ACA, it only applies in
relation to the prescribed period of 3 months.
It does not apply when the condonable period
of 30 days expires on a day when the court is
not working.
29. This position of law was subsequently
considered and reiterated in Bhimashankar(supra)
as well. Here, the arbitral award was made on
24.08.2016, the 3-month period of limitation
expired on 24.11.2016, and further 30 days
came upto 24.12.2016, which fell during the
court’s winter/Christmas vacation. The Court
here considered the applicability of Section 4 of
the Limitation Act and Section 10 of the GCA.
29.1 On the issue of Section 4 of the Limitation,
it held that the issue is covered by Assam
Urban(supra), where it was held that the benefit
of exclusion of the period when the court is closed
is only available with respect to the “prescribed
period of limitation” and not the period extendable
by the court in exercise of its discretion.
29.2 To determine the applicability of Section 10
of the GCA, it considered whether the Limitation
Act applies to the ACA. It specifically rejected the
submission that the Limitation Act does not apply.
It further referred to Assam Urban(supra) on the
extent of exclusion and held as follows in para 54:
“54. Now, so far as the submission on behalf
of the appellant that the Limitation Act shall
not be applicable to the proceedings under the
834 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Arbitration Act is concerned, the aforesaid has
no substance. Section 43(1) of the Arbitration
Act specifically provides that the Limitation Act,
1963 shall apply to arbitrations as it applies to
proceeding in Court. However, as observed and
held by this Court in Assam Urban, the Limitation
Act, 1963 shall be applicable to the matters of
arbitration covered by the 1996 Act save and
except to the extent its applicability has been
excluded by virtue of express provision contained
in Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
In paras 55 and 56, it discussed Popular
Construction(supra) andHindustan Construction
(supra) on the inapplicability of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act and the mandatory nature of the
30-day time limit for condonation of delay,
respectively.
29.3 Finally, in paras 57 and 58, in light of
the proviso to Section 10 of the GCA which
specifically excludes its applicability to any act
or proceeding to which the Limitation Act applies,
the Court rejected the applicability of Section 10
of the GCA to Section 34(3).
30. The logic of the above reasoning
in Bhimashankar (supra), like in Assam
Urban(supra), proceeds on the basis that
Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies to Section
34(3), as the same is not expressly or impliedly
excluded. Reading paragraphs 54 to 58 together,
it is clear that any apparent contradiction within
them, which was raised by Mr. Kaul, does not in
fact exist. The judgment is consistent throughout,
in that it necessarily affirms the applicability of
Section 4 of the Limitation Act while calculating
limitation under Section 34(3), and consequently,
relies on the proviso of Section 10 of the GCA to
hold that Section 10 of the GCA does not apply.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 835
Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors.
31. The applicability of Section 4 of the Limitation
Act is also implicit in the recent decision in State
of West Bengal v. Rajpath Contractors(supra).
Here, the award was served on the appellant on
30.06.2022. The 3-month limitation was reckoned
from 01.07.2022, which came upto 30.09.2022.
The court vacation started from 01.10.2022. The
further 30-day period ended on 30.10.2022,
which was during the court vacation. The
application was filed on 31.10.2022. The Court
held that the prescribed limitation period ended
on 30.09.2022, when the court was working.
Hence, by referring to Assam Urban(supra), it
held that the appellant could not benefit from
Section 4 of the Limitation Act as only the 30-
day period expired on a court holiday. Hence,
it held that the application was filed beyond the
time under Section 34(3) and the delay could
not be condoned.”
Thus, it is clear that the benefit of exclusion of period during
which the court is closed shall be available when the application
is filed within “prescribed period of limitation” and shall not be
available in respect of period extendable by court in exercise
of its discretion.
10.3. In V. Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat & Power Ltd.13, this Court provided
crucial clarifications regarding the computation of limitation
periods under the IBC. It was held that under section 61(2)
IBC, the limitation period for filing an appeal to the NCLAT
commences from the date of pronouncement of the order by
the NCLT, not from the date when the order is received or made
available to the aggrieved party. This Court further clarified that
while Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules mandates the filing of a
certified copy of the impugned order along with the appeal, the
limitation period is not contingent upon the receipt of such a
copy. However, if an appellant applies for a certified copy, the
time taken to obtain it can be excluded from the limitation period
under section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. Thus, this decision
13 (2022) 2 SCC 244
836 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
underscores the IBC’s objective of ensuring timely resolution
of insolvency proceedings and the parties are expected to act
diligently and within the prescribed timelines, with limited scope
for condonation of delay. The relevant paragraphs of the said
decision read as under:
“24. IBC is a complete code in itself and overrides
any inconsistencies that may arise in the application
of other laws. Section 61 IBC, begins with a non
obstante provision— “notwithstanding anything to the
contrary contained under the Companies Act, 2013”
when prescribing the right of an aggrieved party to file
an appeal before NCLAT along within the stipulated
period of limitation. The notable difference between
Section 421(3) of the Companies Act and Section
61(2) IBC is in the absence of the words “from the
date on which a copy of the order of the Tribunal
is made available to the person aggrieved” in
the latter. The absence of these words cannot
be construed as a mere omission which can be
supplemented with a right to a free copy under
Section 420(3) of the Companies Act read with Rule
50 of the NCLT Rules for the purposes of reckoning
limitation. This would ignore the context of IBC’s
provisions and the purpose of the legislation.
31. …A Person wishing to file an appeal is
expected to file an application for a certified
copy before the expiry of the limitation period,
upon which the “time requisite” for obtaining a
copy is to be excluded. However, the time taken by
the court to prepare the decree or order before an
application for a copy is made cannot be excluded. If
no application for a certified copy has been made,
no exclusion can ensue. In fact, the Explanation to
the provision is a clear indicator of the legal position
that the time which is taken by the court to prepare
the decree or order cannot be excluded before the
application to obtain a copy is made. It cannot be said
that the right to receive a free copy under Section
420(3) of the Companies Act obviated the obligation
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 837
Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors.
on the appellant to seek a certified copy through an
application. The appellant has urged that Rule 14 of
the Nclat Rules empowers Nclat to exempt parties
from compliance with the requirement of any of the
rules in the interests of substantial justice, which
has been typically exercised in favour of allowing a
downloaded copy in lieu of a certified copy. While it
may well be true that waivers on filing an appeal with
a certified copy are often granted for the purposes of
judicial determination, they do not confer an automatic
right on an applicant to dispense with compliance and
render Rule 22(2) of the Nclat Rules nugatory. The act
of filing an application for a certified copy is not just
a technical requirement for computation of limitation
but also an indication of the diligence of the aggrieved
party in pursuing the litigation in a timely fashion. In
a similar factual scenario, Nclat had dismissed an
appeal as time-barred under Section 61(2) IBC since
the appellant therein was present in court, and yet
chose to file for a certified copy after five months of
the pronouncement of the order.
33. The answer to the two issues set out in Section C
of the judgment—(i) when will the clock for calculating
the limitation period run for proceedings under IBC;
and (ii) is the annexation of a certified copy mandatory
for an appeal to Nclat against an order passed under
IBC — must be based on a harmonious interpretation
of the applicable legal regime, given that IBC is a Code
in itself and has overriding effect. Sections 61(1) and
(2) IBC consciously omit the requirement of limitation
being computed from when the “order is made
available to the aggrieved party”, in contradistinction
to Section 421(3) of the Companies Act. Owing to the
special nature of IBC, the aggrieved party is expected
to exercise due diligence and apply for a certified copy
upon pronouncement of the order it seeks to assail,
in consonance with the requirements of Rule 22(2)
of the Nclat Rules. Section 12(2) of the Limitation
Act allows for an exclusion of the time requisite for
obtaining a copy of the decree or order appealed
838 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
against. It is not open to a person aggrieved by an
order under IBC to await the receipt of a free certified
copy under Section 420(3) of the Companies Act, 2013
read with Rule 50 of the NCLT Rules and prevent
limitation from running. Accepting such a construction
will upset the timely framework of IBC. The litigant
has to file its appeal within thirty days, which
can be extended up to a period of fifteen days,
and no more, upon showing sufficient cause. A
sleight of interpretation of procedural rules cannot
be used to defeat the substantive objective of a
legislation that has an impact on the economic
health of a nation.
34. On the second question, Rule 22(2) of
the Nclat Rules mandates the certified copy being
annexed to an appeal, which continues to bind litigants
under IBC. While it is true that the tribunals, and
even this Court, may choose to exempt parties from
compliance with this procedural requirement in the
interest of substantial justice, as reiterated in Rule 14
of the Nclat Rules, the discretionary waiver does
not act as an automatic exception where litigants
make no efforts to pursue a timely resolution of
their grievance. The appellant having failed to
apply for a certified copy, rendered the appeal
filed before Nclat as clearly barred by limitation.”
10.3.1. This Court in Sanjay Pandurang Kalate v. Vistra ITCL India
Ltd. & Others14, has pointed out that the date on which the
limitation begins to run is intrinsically linked to the date of
pronouncement. After referring to this decision, this Court in
A. Rajendra v. Gonugunta Madhusudhan Rao & Others15,
has clearly stated that where the judgment was pronounced
in open Court, the period of limitation starts running from that
very day. The following paragraphs are relevant in this regard:
“23. In Sanjay Pandurang Kalate v. Vistra ITCL
India Pvt. Ltd. & Others, this Court had an occasion
14 (2024) 3 SCC 27
15 2025 SCC OnLine SC 721
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 839
Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors.
to deal with the case where an application was
heard by NCLT on 17.05.2023 but no order was
pronounced. The Order came to be uploaded by the
Registry on 30th April 2023 directly carrying the date
of the Order as 17.05.2023. The appellant applied
for the certified copy on 30th May 2023 which was
received on 01.06.2023 and the appeal was filed
in NCLAT on 10.07.2023 along with the application
for condonation of delay. The issue which was dealt
by this Court in this case was as to which date
triggers limitation to commence when the matter
is conclusively heard on one day and the Order
is directly uploaded on the website on another. It
was held that the period to compute limitation to
file an appeal under Section 61 IBC from the Order
of NCLT commences from the date of uploading of
the Order by the Registry as the commencement
of the period of Limitation is intrinsically linked to
the date of pronouncement.
24. Therefore, the incident which triggers limitation
to commence is the date of pronouncement of the
Order and in case of non-pronouncement of the
Order when the hearing concludes, the date on
which the Order is pronounced or uploaded on
the website.
25. However, where the judgment was pronounced
in open Court, the period of limitation starts running
from that very day. The appellant is however
entitled to seek relief under Section 12(2) of the
Limitation Act for excluding the period during which
the certified copy was under preparation on an
application preferred by that party.”
10.4. In the present case, Respondent No. 1 was neither a party
to the proceedings before the NCLT nor privy to the CoC
deliberations, and became aware of the order only upon
its subsequent disclosure. However, it is evident that the
Company Secretary of the Corporate Debtor duly informed the
listing departments of both NSE and BSE about the NCLT order
dated 07.04.2022 within 30 minutes of its pronouncement.
840 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Hence, the limitation period for filing the appeal commenced on
07.04.2022 and expired on 07.05.2022. Notably, 07.05.2022
fell on the first Saturday of the month, which is a working day
for the Registry of the NCLAT. Even otherwise, the benefit
of section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be granted,
as Respondent No. 1 filed the appeal beyond not only the
prescribed period of 30 days but also the condonable period
of 15 days, i.e., on 24.05.2022. In view of the same reason,
Rule 3 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016 has also no application to
the facts of the present case. Thus, applying the principles
laid down in the decisions referred to above, we arrive at
the irresistible conclusion that Respondent No. 1 filed the
appeal beyond the statutory maximum period of 45 days
prescribed under section 61(2) IBC. Accordingly, the first
issue is answered by us.
ISSUE NO. 2
11. As indicated above, the IBC prescribes strict timelines for filing appeals
and taking legal action so as to ensure that insolvency proceedings
are not misused to recover time-barred debts. The proviso to Section
61(2) clearly limits the NCLAT’s jurisdiction to condone delay only up
to 15 days beyond the initial 30-day period. Where a statute expressly
limits the period within which delay may be condoned, an Appellate
Tribunal cannot exceed that limit. In other words, the NCLAT being
a creature of statute, operates strictly within the powers conferred
upon it. Unlike a civil suit, it lacks inherent jurisdiction to extend time
on equitable grounds.
11.1. Once the prescribed and condonable periods (i.e., 30 + 15
days) expire, the NCLAT has no jurisdiction to entertain appeals,
regardless of the reason for the delay. In Mobilox Innovations
Private Limited v. Kirusa Software Private Limited16, while
interpreting Section 9 IBC, this Court underscores the IBC’s strict
procedural discipline i.e., only applications strictly conforming
to statutory requirements can be entertained. This principle is
also applicable to limitation issues under section 61(2), as it
supports the idea that tribunals must operate within the bounds
of the Code, without adding equitable or discretionary powers
16 (2018) 1 SCC 353
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 841
Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors.
not conferred by statute. This Court in Kalpraj Dharamshi v.
Kotak Investment Advisors Limited & Another17 has categorically
held that the NCLAT cannot condone any delay beyond 15 days
even on equitable grounds; and that the appellate mechanism
under IBC is strictly time-bound by design to preserve the speed
and certainty of the insolvency resolution process.
11.2. Thus, the NCLAT has no power to condone delay beyond the
period stipulated under the statute. Accordingly, the second
issue is answered by us.
12. In view of the foregoing, the order passed by the NCLAT condoning
the delay in filing the appeal, is ultra vires and liable to be set aside.
13. Before parting, we may observe that time is of the essence in
statutory appeals, and the prescribed limitation period must be
strictly adhered to. Even a delay of a single day is fatal if the statute
does not provide for its condonation. As held by us, the NCLAT
has no power to condone delay beyond the period stipulated under
the statute. Allowing condonation in such cases would defeat the
legislative intent and open the floodgates to belated and potentially
frivolous petitions, thereby undermining the efficacy and finality of
the appellate mechanism.
14. In fine, the order dated 14.12.2022 passed by the NCLAT in
I.A.No.1667 of 2022 in CA (AT) (Insolvency) No.615 of 2022 is set
aside and this appeal is allowed. However, there is no order as to
costs.
15. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Application(s), if any, shall
stand closed.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Swathi H. Prasad, Hony. Associate Editor
(Verified by: Kanu Agrawal, Adv.)
17 (2021) 10 SCC 401
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "Delay"Sign in to search