Holding

The grant was a pure gift, not a legislative enactment, and therefore the land is subject to the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961.

Summary

Tej Singh Rao, a descendant of a Maratha general, held 294.61 acres in the former Nagpur State and claimed that the land was covered by a sovereign grant made by the ruler Raghoji II in 1793, which he argued was a legislative act protected by Article 372 of the Constitution and therefore exempt from the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961. The Special Deputy Collector declared 176.91 acres surplus, the Revenue Tribunal dismissed his appeal, and the Bombay High Court rejected his writ petition. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the historic grant constituted a legislative enactment or a mere gift. Relying on earlier decisions, the Court held that the grant was a simple gift, not a legislative act, and thus fell within the ambit of the land‑ceiling law. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with costs.

Issues considered

Whether a grant made by a sovereign ruler of a princely state amounts to a legislative grant protected under Article 372 of the Constitution.
Whether such a grant, if legislative, exempts the land from the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 226, s. Article 227, s. Article 366(10), s. Article 372
Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961s. 12, s. 33

Subjects

land ceilingsovereign grantArticle 372princely statelegislative vs executive grantland reformconstitutional protectionMaharashtra Agricultural Lands Act

Judgment

TEJ SINGH RAO
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

AUGUST 19, 1992

[KULDIP SINGH AND K. RAMASWAMY, JJ.) B
Maharashtra Agricultural Land (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961:
~ Section 12--Lands-Subject-matter of a grant made by fonner nller
of Princely State-Whether covered by sovereign legislative grant flowing from
a sovereign authori~Whether unaffected by Act of Legislature. c
The appellant, a lineal male descendant of one of the Generals of a
former ruler was holding 294.61 acres of land, which was the subject-mat-
ter of a grant made by the former ruler at the time of his daughter's
+ marriage. The appellant filed return under Section 12 of the Maharashtra
Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 without prejudice to
D
his claim that the lands were covered by a sovereign legislative grant
flowing from th·e sovereign authority of the ruler of the erstwhile princely
State, and as such did not come within the purview of the Act. The Special
Deputy Collector (Land Reforms) declared 176.91 acres· of the land as
surplus. The land owner preferred appeal before the State Revenue E'
~ Tribunal under Section 33 of the Act. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal.
The appellant challenged t~e order of the Special Deputy Collector and of
the Tribunal before the High Court. The High Court also dismissed the
~ writ petition. Hence the appeal, by special leave.

On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that the grant' in F'
question was sovereign legislative grant made by a sovereign ruler; it was
~ recognised and continued by the British Government; it was thus a special
law in favour of General's family, and as this law was existing on the date
of the commencement of the Constitution of India, it was protected by
Article 372 of the Constitution and should be deemed to be in force and G,
could not be abrogated except by an Act of the legislature specially made
in that respect.
)....
Dismissing the appeal,. by Special Leave, this Court

HELD : The High Court was right in holding that even in the case H
929
)

930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] 3 S.C.R.

A of a ruler who combined in himself both executive and legislative powers )r
of his Government and was undisputed head of the State, the jurispruden-
tial distinction between legislative enactment and executive action had not
been obliterated and the question, whether a particular grant was a
legislative grant or not, depended on the facts and circumstances or each
B case, and that the grant in question was a gift pure and simple and was
not a legislative Act on the part or the ruler. [934G, 9328-D]

Umad Mills Ltd. v. U.O./. AIR 1963 S.C.953; State of Gujarat v. Vora
Fidda Al~ AIR 1964 S.C.1043; Raj Kumar v. State of Orissa, AIR 1964 S.C. ~
1793; Union of India v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing Company, AIR
C 1964 S.C. 1903 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Lal Bhargavendra Singh,
AIR 1966 S.C. 704, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 608 of
1982.

D From the Judgment and Order dated 4/5.12.1979 of the Bombay -+
High Court in S.C.A. No. 1252 of 1970.

T.S. Krishnamurthy Iyer, Ranjit Kumar, D.K. Dubey, S.V.Nand,
V.Balakrishna and Mrs. P.P.Mange for the Appellant.

E R.B. Masodkar and A.S.Bhasme for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KULDIP SINGH, J. Tej Singh Rao is a lineal male descendant of
Pratap Rao Gujar who was one of the Generals of Shivaji the Great. He ~
F is holding 294.61 acres of land which is situated in the Bhiwapur Taluk of
the erstwhile Nagpur State. He filed return under Section 12 of the
Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (ceiling on holdings) Act, 1961 (the,Act) -~
without prejudice to his claim that the lands are covered by a sovereign
legislative grant flowing from the sovereign authority of Raghoji II, the
Bhonsle Ruler of Nagpur State, and as such did not come within the
G purview of the Act. The Special Deputy Collector (Land reforms) declared
176.91 acres of the land as surplus. The land owner preferred appeal before
the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal under Section 33 of the Act. The ...,/,
Tribunal dismissed the appeal. Tej Singh Rao challenged the order of the
Special Deputy Collector and of the Tribunal before the Nagpur Bench of
H Bombay High Court by way of writ petition under Article 226/227 of the
TEJ SINGH v. STATE [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 931

Constitution of India. The High Court dismissed the writ petition with A
costs. This appeal by Tej Singh Rao by way of special leave petition is •
against the judgment of the High Court.

The lands in question were subject-matter of the grant which was
made in the year 1793 by Raghoji II, the then ruier of Nagpur State, at the
time of marriage of his daughter Banubai to Vyankatrao alias Nanasaheb, B
son of Ramrao, a male descendant of Pratap Rao Gujar. As both
Vyankatrao and Banubai were minor, the grant was made in the name of
Ramrao. All villages in Bhiwapur Taluq and six villages in other Taluqs
and annual cash allowance of Rs. 17,415 were the subject matter of the
grant. c
Raghuji II died in the year 1816. It is not necessary for us to trace
·the history of Bhonsle family and Gujar family as the same is not relevant
+ for deciding the question which has survived for our consideration.

The orders of the Special Deputy Collector and of the Maharashtra D
Revenue Tribunal were challenged before the High Court on two grounds.

- The first was that the appellant being the direct descendant of a sovereign
ruler, the lands held by him for his personal use could not be the subject-
matter of ceiling laws. The second ground was that the grant in question
was a sovereign legislative grant made by Raghuji II, who was then the full E
sovereign ruler of Nagpur State and the said grant constituted a special law
in favour of Gujar family which could not be affected by any general
legislation like the Act.

The High Court decided both the points against the appellant. The F
learned counsel appearing for the appellan! has not challenged before us 1

-.,... the fmdings of the High Court on the first point. The only question raised ·
by the learned counsel before us is that the grant in question was sovereign
legislative grant made by a sovereign ruler, it was recognised and continued
by the British Government, it is thus. a spetjal law in favour of Gujar family,
and as this law was existing on the ·<Hite of the commencement of the G
Constitution of India it is protected by Article 372 of the Constitution and
),.< shall be deemed to be in force and cannot be abrogated except by an Act
of the· legislature specially made in that respect.

The question whether a grant made by a sovereign ruler amounts to H
)-

932 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] 3 S.C.R.

A law and if so under what circumstances, was examined by the High Court )r
at length. The High Court referred to the decisions of this Court in Umad
Mills Ltd. v. U.0.1., AIR 1963 S.C.953; State of Gujarat v. Vora Fidda Ali,
AIR 1964 S.C.1043; Raj Kumar v. State of Orissa, AIR 1964 S.C.1793;
Union of India v. Gwalior Reins Silk Manufacturing Company, AIR 1964
B S.C.1903 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Lal Bhargavendra Singh, AIR 1966
S.C.704 and came to the conclusion that even in the case of a ruler who
combined in himself both executive and legislative powers of his govern-
ment and was undisputed head of the state, the jurisprudential distinction ~
between legislative enactment and executive action has not been
obliterated and the question, whether a particular grant is a legislative
c grant or not, depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.

The High Court examined the evidence on the record in detail and
finally came to the conclusion that the grant in question was a gift pure
and simple and was not a legislative Act on the part of the ruler. The High 4-
D court reasoning is as under:

"So far as the grant in question is concerned, the exact manner
in which the grant was conferred, the procedure followed for
that purpose and the exact words in which it was couched are
not known and cannot be ascertained from the material on
E records .................The only evidence about the grant is the
entries in the settlement register, styled as Register of Maufi
>-
Holdings for the years 1866-1894 and 1913-14. The entries in
the registers of Maufi Holdings of the year 1866 show that the ~

grant was made by Raghuji II in 1783 in favour of Ramrao
F Gujar. In Column No. 10 detailed account of the State and
terms .of occupancy is given as follows:
~
'Original grantee Ramrao, the father-in-law
of Bannobai, the daughter of Raghuji II
from whom it descended, to her husband,
G than Banubaie's own son having been
Aopted by Pursoji Bhonsla as heir to the
throne, she adopted her grandson Chit- ""':
kojirao as her heir, he then came into pos-
session of all the villages forming the Taluq
H Bhiwapur and has held them ever since.'
TE.J SINGH v. STATE [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 93~
--.(- I

The remarks made by the Investigation Officer with whom thl A
Settlement Commissioner concurred finds place in column 1 !

of the register and they read as follows:

'Old record show that in 1203, Fausli A.O.
1793, this village with several villages form-
B
ing the talooka of Bhiwapur were granted to
grantee and that they have been held in the
family eversince. The grantee holds in addi-
tion to this talooks, the Mokassa village of
Kodamendhi and Kundala in the Ramtek
Tahsil and the Mukta villages of De6Iee c
Bhamdalee, Peethechha its Dakhilee and
Peepra in the Nagpur Tahseelee and
receives besides a cash allowance of Rs.
17,415 per annum. The grant is for support
of a member of the ruling family, and I
D
recommend that this village be continued
revenue free in perpetuity to present holder
and his heirs.'

Entries in Maufi register for the years 1894-95 are practically the
same. The entries in Maufi register of 1913-14 are also not very much E
different, except that in the entry for the year 1866, it is mentioned that the :
grant was for support of a member of the ruling family, while in the entries
-.:::
of later years the grant is considered to be for the support of the ruling
family. It will also be seen from all. these entries that the proposal that the
,,. grant should be continued in perpetuity revenue free to the claimant and F
his awful heirs was accepted by the Settlement Commissioner and the Chief
Commissioner. There is nothing in these entries to suggest that it was a
legislative grant. It was a gift pure and simple made by Raghuji II at the
time of his daughter's marriages. It was made in the name of Ramrao
because both Banubai and her husband were minors.
G
~ Relying on the letter dated 16.12.1867 from the India Office,
London, to the Governor General, it was sought to be urged
on behalf of the petitioner that a fresh grant was made by her
Magesty's Government, in exercise of its legislative function, in
favour of Chitkojirao Gujar in respect of the subject-matter of H
)-

934 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] 3 S.C.R.

A the grant of 1793. The letter reads as follows: )....--

'Having considered in Council your
Excellency's letter of the 23rd of May No.
94-A, Foreign Department (Political) with
the enclosed correspondence. I have much
B satisfaction in recommending to you the
sanction of her Magesty's Government to
the recommendation of your Excellency in
Council in favour of the proposed Grant to
Chitkojirao Babasahib Gujar, of the Bhosla
c Family of Nagpur and its continuance to his
adopted son Kooshanjee and his lineal male
issues in each generation as an act of special
indulgence.'
+
D There is nothing in this letter to show that a fresh grant was
made in respect of the subject-matter of grant of 1793 or that
the said grant was allowed to be continued. Except this letter
no other record is available to the petitioner to establish the
connection of the proposed grant sanctioned by His Magesty's
Government and the grant in question. Moreover, there is
E '~
I
nothing in this letter to indicate that the sanction to the
proposed grant was accorded by her Majesty's Government in
exercise of her legislative functions. There is no enactment of
the British Parliament sanctioning the said grant. It is, there-
fore, difficult to accept the contention that the grant in question
F was a sovereign legislative grant and that it was an existing law
as defined by Article 366 (10) of the Constitution, which con-
tinued to be operative till this date by virtue of Article 372(1)
of the Constitution."

G We find no infirmity in the High Court judgment. We agree with the
reasoning and the conclusions reached therein. ~

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

N.P.V. Appeal dismissed.