THAKUR KISHAN SINGH (DEAD)versusARVIND KUMAR

                                •

                 THAKUR KISHAN SINGH (DEAD)                                     A
                             v.
                      ARVIND KUMAR

                          SEPTEMBER 7, 1994

                  [R.~. SAHAI AND N.P. SINGH, JJ.]
                                                                                B

       Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1950/Registration
Act, 1908/Transfer of Property Act, 1882-Sections 6/471107,117-Lease of
land-Deed executed but registered subsequently--Deemed registration as on
the date of execution-Hence property did not vest in State, even though         C
registration was made subsequent to the Abolition Act-Agricultural leases
excluded from Transfer of Property Act.

      Constitution of India, 1950 :

      Article 136--Evidence led by parties before the lower courts-Reap-        D
preciation of under special leave jurisdiction-Not pennissible.

      The respondent-Plaintiff filed a suit for possession of a certain land.
It was claimed that the land in dispute was leased to the plaintiff by the
Iamberdar and the deed was executed in 1949 and registered in 1950; that        E
the appellant who was an agent of the Respondent, was permitted to be set
up a brick kiln in the land in 1960-61; and that the appellant had an
adjoining land and a trespassed initially on 0.14 acres and made further
encroachments on 0.42 acres. Appellant contested the suit. He claimed that
the deed having been registered on 3.4.1950, it was void under Section 6 of
the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietory Rights Act, 1950 as the land        F
had vested in the State on 31.3.1950.

      Tlie Trial Court held that the lease deed was executed on 5.12.1949
and even if it was registered subsequently, it would have been deemed to
have been registered on 5.12.1949 and therefore the provisions of Section       G
6 of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietory Rights Act, 1950 did
not stand in th~ way of the respondent acquiring title to the land. But the
suit was dismissed on the finding that the appellant had acquired rights
by adverse possession. In appeal the order was set aside and the suit was
decreed. The appellate court affirmed the finding on title. The High Court
upheld the same. Hence this appeal.                                             H
                                   1'99
    200                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A           Dismissing the appeal, this Court

          HELD : 1. Section 47 of the Registration Act provides that a
    registered document shall operate from the time it would have commenced
    to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made and not
    from the time of its registration. It is well established that a document so
B   long it is not registered is not valid yet once it is registered it takes effect
    from the; date of its execution. Since, admittedly, the lease deed was
    executed on 5th December, 1949, the plaintiff after registration of it on 3rd
    April, 1950 become owner by operation of law on the date when the deed
    was executed. Therefore, the land did not vest in the State. (202-A to CJ
c         Ram Saran Lall and Others v. Mst. Domini Kuer and others, AIR
    (1961) SC 1749 and Nanda Ballabh Gururani v. Smt Maqbool Begum,
    (1980) ILJ (SC) 597, relied on.

            2. Since under Section 117 of the Transfer of Property Act the
D agricultural leases are excluded from operation of the Act, the provisions
    of Section 107 did not apply to it. (202-D]

           3. Mere possession for howsoever length of time d~ not result in
    converting the permissive possession into adverse possession. Apart from
    it, the Appellate Court has gone into detail and after considering the
E   evidence on record found it as a fact that the possession of the appellant
    was not adverse. (202-B]

          4. Relying on the evidence led on behalf of the parti~s before the
    lower courts is not permissible even. in second appeal, what to say of the
p   jurisdiction exercised by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.
    Further, the appellant has not suffered any Injustice which requires to be
    remedied by this Court. (203-A, ·n1

            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. U,76 of
    1977.
G
         From the Judgment and order dated 18.3.77 of the Madhya Pradesh
    High Court in SA. No. 550 of 1970.

            B. Sen and S.K. Gambhir for the Appellant.

H           S.S. Kanduja for the Respondent.
                   T.K. SINGH (DEAD)v. ARVIND KR.                      201

      The following Order of the Court was delivered :                       A

      In this defendant's appeal directed against the judgment and order
of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, the question that arises for con-
sideration is if the High Court committed any error of law in upholding
the order of the Appellate Court decreeing the suit of the plaintiff-respon- B
dent on finding that the defendant-appellant had not acquired any rights
by adverse possession.

       The suit was filed for possession in respect of an area of ap-
proximately 0.56 acres of Khasra No. 526 located in Khurai Tehsil, District
Sagar. It was claimed that the land in dispute was leased to the plaintiff by C
the lamberdar and the deed executed on 5th December, 1949 which was
registered on 3rd April, 1950. It was alleged that the appellant was an agent
of the Respondent who was permitted to set up a brick kiln in the area in
dispute in the year 1960-61. The appellant, however, who had a house in
the adjoining Khasra No. 527 trespassed initially on 0.14 acres and made D
further encroachments on 0.42 acres. The claim was contested by the
appellant and it was claimed that the deed having been registered on 3rd
April, 1950, it was void under Section 6 of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition
of Proprietory Rights Act, 1950 (in brief 'the Act') as the land had vested
in the State on 31st March, 1950. In alternative, the plea of adverse
possession was raised. The trial court did not find any merit in the claim E
of the appellant and held that even though the lease deed was registered
after 30th March, 1950 but it having been executed on 5th December, 1949,.
it would be deemed to have been registered on 5th December, 1949 and,
therefore, the provisions of Section 6 of the Act did not stand in the way
of the respondent acquiring the title in land in dispute. But the suit was F
dismissed on the finding that the appellant had acquired rights by adverse
possession. In appeal the order was set aside and the suit was decreed. The
appellate court affirmed the finding on title. And set aside the finding on
adverse possession. The High Court did not interfere in second appeal.

        The findings recorded by the High Court and the trial court have G
 been assailed by Shri Sen, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
 appellant, and it is claimed that the lease deed having been registered after
 the material date, it could not confer any title on the respondent as the
 right title-in-interest of the respondent's predecessor already stocd vested
.in the State prior to registration of the lease deed. The argument does not H
    202                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A appear to be sound. Section 47 of the Registration Act provides that a
    registered document shall operate from the time it would have commenced
    to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made and not
    from the time of itS registration. It is well established that a document so
    long it is not registered is not valid yet once it is registered it takes effect
B   from the date of its execU:tion. (See Ram Saran Lall and others v. Mst.
    Domini Kuer and others, AIR (1961), SC 1749 and Nanda Ballabh Gururani
    v. Sn;it. Maqbool Begum, (1980) UJ SC 597). Since, admittedly, the lease
    deed was executed on 5th December, 1949, the plaintiff after registration
    of it on 3rd April, 1950-became owner by operation.of law on the date·
    when the deed was executed. Therefore, th~ land did not vest in the State.
C   And the courts below dld not coininit any error in negativing the claim of
    appellant.                                                  ·

           It is then urged that the lease was not signed by the respondent and
    it being a unilateral act of the lamberdar, was contrary to the provisions of
D the Transfer of Property Act. Since under section 117 of the Transfer of
    Property Act the agricultural leases are excluded from operation of the.
    Act, the provisions of Section 107 did not apply to it. Nor is there any merit
    in the submission that even if Transfer of Property Act -did not apply the
    principles contained therein would be applicable to agricultural lease. In ·
    view of a specific provision in the Transfer of Property Act excludllig
E · agricultural leases from the operation of the Act, and the Tenancy Act of
    the State having provided for execution of the lease which does not contain
    any provisions like Section 107 of. the Transfer of Property Act, thC
    principles of Section 107 cannot be extended to it.

p        As regards adverse possession, it was not disputed even 'by the trial
   court that the appellant entered into possession over the land in dispute
   under a licence from the respondent for purposes of brick-kiln. The
   possession thus initially being permissive, the burden· was heavy on the
   appellant to establish that it became adverse. A posseSsion of a co-owner
   or of a licencee or of an agent or a permissive possession to become
G adverse must be established by cogent and convincing evidence to show
   hostile animus and possession adverse to the knowledge of real owner.
   Mere possession for howsoever length of time does not result in converting
   the permissible possession into adverse ·possession. Apart from it, the
 . Appellate Court has gone into detail and after considering the evidence on
H record found it as a fact that the possession of the appellant was not
                    T.K. SINGH (DEAD)v. ARVIND KR.                       203 .

. adverse. The learned counsel, despite strenuous argument, eould not A
  demolish the finding of adverse possession. Attempt was made to rely on
  the evidence led on behalf of the parties and the evidence of the Commis-
  sioner who prepared the map. We are afraid that such an exercise is not
  permissible even in second appeal, what to say of the jurisdiction exercised
 by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Further, we do not find
  that the appellant has suffered any injustice which requires to be remedied B
 by this Court.

      In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. But there shall be no
order as to costs.

G.N.                                                      Appeal dismissed.