Holding

The term "undischarged insolvent" acquires a special legal meaning under the Insolvency Act and can be determined only by a court constituted under that Act; a High Court cannot decide that question in an election petition.

Summary

Thampanoor Ravi was elected to the Kerala Legislative Assembly and his election was challenged on two grounds: (i) that he was an "undischarged insolvent" within the meaning of Article 191(1)(c) of the Constitution, and (ii) that he had indulged in corrupt practices under Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The Kerala High Court held him disqualified as an undischarged insolvent, relying on a broad, non‑technical meaning of the term, but dismissed the corrupt‑practice allegations due to lack of reliable evidence. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that "undischarged insolvent" has a specialised legal meaning under the Insolvency Act and can be determined only by a court constituted under that Act; consequently the High Court lacked jurisdiction to declare the appellant insolvent in an election petition. The Court therefore set aside the High Court's declaration of disqualification, while affirming its finding that no corrupt practice was proved. The appeal filed by the returned candidate was allowed, and the separate appeal concerning corrupt practices was dismissed. No order as to costs was made.

Issues considered

Whether a High Court trying an election petition under the Representation of the People Act can determine the question of "undischarged insolvent" for purposes of disqualification under Article 191(1)(c) of the Constitution.
Whether the expression "undischarged insolvent" must be given its technical meaning under the Provincial Insolvency Act or can be interpreted in a broader, general sense.
Whether the evidence adduced was sufficient to establish the allegation of bribery under Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 191(1)(c), s. Article 329(b)
Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920s. Section 27, s. Section 2(8), s. Section 28, s. Section 3, s. Section 4, s. Section 41, s. Section 44, s. Section 7, s. Section 73
Representation of the People Act, 1951s. Section 100, s. Section 123, s. Section 77, s. Section 80A
Sale of Goods Act, 1930s. Section 2(8)

Subjects

election petitiondisqualificationundischarged insolventinsolvency lawRepresentation of the People Actcorrupt practicesbriberyjurisdictionstatutory interpretationconstitutional law

Judgment

THAMPANOOR RA VI A
v.
CHARUPARA RAVI AND ORS.

SEPTEMBER 15, 1999

[DR. A.S. ANAND, C.J., S. RAJENDRA BABU AND B
R.C. LAHOTI, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950: Article 191(/)(c).

Election- "Undischarged insolvent"-Disqualification-For election C
as MLA-Determination of-Held: Cannot be determined by High Court
trying an election petition-A person has to be adjudged as insolvent under
the Insolvency Act before attracting disqualification under Art. 19/(J)(c)-
lnsolvency Act is a complete code and court constituted under that Act alone
is competent to decide that question and not any court or authority-
Dictionary or general·meaning of "insolvency" has no relevance-The special D
meaning of "undischarged insolvent" under the law of insolvency is only
applicable-The meaning of 'insolvent' under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930
irrelevant-Representation of the People Act, 1951, S.100.

Article 191-Disqualification-Conditions for-Election as MLA-Held: E
Cannot be enlarged by importing any meaning other than permissible on a
strict interpretation of the expressions used therein.

Representation of the People Act, 1951:

Section JOO-Election-Election petition-Trial-High Court-
Jurisdiction of-Held : Is limited to the extent conferred by the Act- F
Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 329(b).

Election-Voting, electing and contesting-Rights of-Held: These are
statutory rights circumscribed by limitation contained therein-Therefore, if
the statutes clearly indicate the policy of law, it is not open to the court to G
interpret such statutes to find out the legislative intent of the provisions.

Section 123-Election-Corrupt practices-Bribery-Allegation that
the returned candidate using his position and status secured several bottles
ofrum from Military Canteen and supplied them in his constituency-Witnesses
did not have any personal knowledge and came to know about the matter H
419
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A from the employee of the Military Canteen who was not examined-Held: In
the absence of examination of the said employee, evidence is vague, not clear
and definite much less reliable-Hence, High Court rightly held there was
no acceptable evidence which could bring the case within the expression of
"bribery" under S.I23-0ther allegations of corrupt practices also not
established.
B
Interpretation of Statutes:

External aids-Dictionary meaning-Relevancy of- Held: If an
expression has acquired a special connotation in law, it must be assumed
that the legislature has used it in a legal sense, not according to dictionary
C or general meaning.
External aids-Constituent Assembly Debates-Discussion in-
Reference to-Implication of-Stated.

"'' Words and Phrases:
D
"Undischarged insolvent "-Meaning of-In the context ofArt. 191 (1) (c)
of the Constitution of India, 1950.

ltisolvent"-Meaning of-In the context of S.2(8) of the Sale of Goods
Act, 1930.
E "Bribery"-Meaning of-In the context of S.123 of the Representation
of the People Act, 1951.

The appellant was declared elected to State Legislative Assembly. The
respondent, the defeated candidate, filed an election petition challenging the
F election of the appellant on the grounds that he was disqualified from being
chosen as a MLA since he was an undischarged insolvent within the meaning
of Article 19l(l)(c) of the Constitution and that he had indulged in corrupt
practices within the meaning of Section 123 of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951. The respondent alleged that the appellant using his position
and status secured several bottles of rum from a Military Canteen and
G supplied them in his constituency. The witnesses had no personal knowledge
of'the bottles being carried but they came to know about the matter from the
employee of the Military Canteen who was not examined.

The High Court held that the expression "undischarged insolvent"
which was not defined in the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 should be given
H its natural meaning. instead of a technical meaning given in the Insolvency
r

THAMPANOORRAVI v.CHARUPARARAVI 421

Act so that the disqualification applied to any person who was shown to be A
unable to pay his debts on the relevant date. The High Court referring to the
Debates in the Constituent Assembly and to the suggestion of Sir AIJadi
Krishnaswamy Ayyar that the expression "if he is an undischarged insolvent"
should be in terms of Section 73 of the Insolvency Act which was not
accepted by the Constituent Assembly and held that the framers of the
Constitution did not want to confine the operation of the disqualification only
B
·to cases where a person was adjudged insolvent under the Insolvency Act.
~ The High Court, therefore, accepted the submission that pre-adjudication by
r an insolvency court is not required and observed that a candidate who was
found to be an insolvent by the Court trying the election petition and a
candidate who had already been adjudicated insolvent by the Insolvency Court c
but who had not obtained an order for discharge were both covered by Article
19l(l)(c) of the Constitution. The High Court declared the appellant as an
"undischarged insolvent" and held his election as void. The High Court,
however, decided against the respondent-Election Petitioner-on the allegation
of corrupt practices. Hence this appeal.
D
I
On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the High Court could
not in deciding an election petition under the R.P. Act examine the question

r whether the appellant was an undischarged insolvent.

Allowing the appeals, the Court
~ E
HELD : 1. The expression 'undischarged insolvent' has acquired a
special meaning under the Law of Insolvency, the Court must understand
that that is the meaning that is sought to be attributed to the expression used
in Article 191(1)(c) of the Constitution. The High Court was not justified in
holding that the expression 'undischarged insolvent' should be understood
de hors the Insolvency Act in a general sense. [434-H; 435-A}
F

Bhcigwati Prasad Dixit 'Ghorewala' v. Rajeev Gandhi, (1985) All WC
682, referred to.

2.1. The Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 is a complete code and
G
determination of all questions regarding insolvency including a question as
to whether (1) a person is an insolvent or not, or (2) an insolvent be discharged
... • or not and subject to what conditions, can be decided by the court constituted
under that Act alone. It is only when exceptions are carved out as is done
in the case of Section 2(8) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, any other court
or authority can decide such questions. [430-E) H
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 2.2. Under the scheme of the provisions of the Insolvency Act, the
exclusive jurisdiction to deal with any question relating to insolvency could
be adjudicated upon only by the court constituted under that Act. In such a
situation, it would not be possible to hold that the High Court had, while
dealing with an election petition, jurisdiction to decide a question· as to
B whether a person is an undischarged insolvent or not. Admittedly, in this
case, there is no such adjudication. Hence The High Court could not declare
the appellant to be an "undischarged insolvent". (431-F-G)

3. Conferment of power under the Representation of the People Act,
1951 to try an election petition does not amount to enlargement of existing
C jurisdiction of the High Court. The jurisdiction exercisable under the R.P.
Act is a special jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by virtue of Article
329(b) of the Constitution. Even an ordinary ~ivil Court will not have
jurisdiction to decide questions arising under insolvency enactment; much
less a special Authority like the High Court when it is not invested with such
power under the Insolvency Act. {430-G; 431-B)
D
Upadhyaya Hargovind Devshanker v. Dhirendra Singh Virbhadrasinhil
Solanki, AIR (1988) SC 915 and Bhagwati Prasad Dixit 'Ghorewala' v.
Rajeev Gandhi, (1985) All WC 682, 'followed."
,. ·

4. Under what circumstances and subject to what limitations a person
E
could be declared to have incurred disqualification is a matter of policy of
law and the courts have cautioned themselves by stating that right to vote,
right to elect or contest an election is a creature of statute and circumscribed
by the limitations contained therein. Therefore, so long as the Constitution
or the R.P. Act indicates in clear terms as to what its policy is, it would not
·F be open to a court to interpret such a provision by trying to find out what
the intent could be by ignoring the actual expressions used. Therefore, the
supposed scheme of the provisions would not afford sufficient guidance to
take the view that the expression "undischarged insolvent" should be
understood as meaning an insolvent who is a person who is in impecunious
G circumstances as is unable to repay the debt. (432-E-F)

5. Even though Article 191(1) of the Constitution does not include
declaration by an insolvency court, but by reason of expression used that he
is an "undischarged insolvent" it clearly indicates that be could become
"discharged" only in terms of the provisions of the insolvency Acts and not
H otherwise. It is implicit in the expression "undischarged insolvent" that a
THAMPANOORRAVI v.CHARUPARARAVI 42~

person does not become so unless he has been adjudged insolvent and is not A .
discharged by the court under the insolvency Acts. The expression
"undischarged insolvent" has acquired a particular legal connotation and
such expression cannot be used otherwise than in terms of the insolvency
enactment. Redundancy and tautology cannot be attributed to the Legislature.
When the Legislature bas used the expression "undischarged insolvent" B
that expression must be given its full meaning. (432-H; 433-A)

6. Article 19l(l)(c) does not contemplate mere impecuniousity or
ineapacity of a person to repay one's debts but he should not only be adjudged
insolvent but also remain undischarged. Such a contingency could only arise
·under the insolvency law. Article 19l(l)(c) refers to disqualification of a C
person from getting elected to the State Legislature. The conditions for
disqualification cannot be enlarged by importing to it any meaning other
than permissible on strict interpretation of expressions used therein for it
is a case of disqualification. Whenever any disqualification is imposed
naturally the right of a citizen is cut down ·and in that event a narrow
intereretation is required. Therefore, the liberal view taken by the High D
Court to the contrary does not appear to be correct. (433-G-H]

1.. In ascertaining the meaning of an expression used in a statute,
certain norms are adopted. If the legislature has used an expression which
has acquired a technical meaning and such expression is used ordinarily in
the context of a particular branch of law, it must be assumed that because E
of its constant use the legislature must be deemed to have used such
expression in a particular se~se as is understood when used in the similar
context. If an expression has acquired a special connotation in law, dictionary
or general meaning ceases to be helpful in interpreting such a word. Such
an expression must be given its legal sense and no other. If the expression F
"undischarged insolvent" has acquired a special meaning under the law of
insolvency, the court must understand that that is the meaning that is sought
to be attributed to the expression used in Article 19l(l)(c) of the Constitution.
[434-F-H]

State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd, [1959) G
SCR 379, relied on.

8. The reference made by Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar is to reduce
the rigour of the disqualification in the event the adjudication is annulled or
if an insolvent obtains a discharge with the certificate that it was caused by
misfortune and not by misconduct. Merely because the suggestion made by H
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar is not accepted by the Constituent Assembly
it does not mean that the expression used in Article 191(1)(c) as to.
"undischarged insolvent" will be different from what is contained under the
insolvency enactment. The reference to Section 73 of the Insolvency Act
made by Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar is in the background stated above
B and, therefore, has no effect on the interpretation of the meaning of the
expression "undischarged insolvent". [433-D-E]

9. Under the Sale of Goods Act, a special definition of the expression
'insolvent' had to be given to the effect that a person is said to be 'insolvent'
who has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary course of business, or cannot
C pay his debts as they become due, wbether he has committed an act of
insolvency or not, and the definition is declaratory in character. Question of
insolvency of a buyer is of considerable importance in the context of the
seller's lien. It is in special context a meaning is given to the expression
'insolvent' even though a person had not been adjudged an insolvent in the
Insolvency Act to be insolvent for the purposes of the Act. That definition
D cannot be imported into the R.P. Act. [434-B-C]

10. In the absence of examination of the employee of the Military
Canteen the evidence adduced is vague and not clear and definite much less
reliable and, therefore, the High Court rightly held that there is no acceptable
evidence which can bring the case against the appellant within the expression
E of "bribery" under Section 123 of the R.P. Act. The other acts of undue
influence or that the returned candidate has made an appeal in the name of
religion or that he has made any statement with a false reference to the
personal character and conduct of the candidate were not established.
[436-:B-C]

f CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 7395-96 of
1997.

From the Judgment and order dated 29.9.97 of the Kerala High Court in
E.P. Nos. 16 and 15of1996.

G R.F. Nariman, E.M.S. Anam, Fazlin Anam, C.N. Sreekumar, P Sureshan,
B. V. Deepak and Ms. Baby Krishnan for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RAJENDRA BABU, J. : Civil Appeal Nos. 7395-7396 of 1997

H The appellant in these appeals was declared elected to the Kerala
THAMPANOORRAVI v.CHARUPARARAVI[RAJENDRABABU,J.] 425
Legislative Assembly from No. 139, Neyyattinkara constituency in an election A
held on April 27, 1996. Two election petitions were filed - one by a voter in
that constituency and another by a defeated candidate who had secured the
next highest number of votes to the appellant and in his petition a claim was
also made for the declaration that he was duly elected.

In the election petition filed by the voter the election of the appellant B
was challenged on the ground that he was disqualified for being chosen as
a member of the Legislative Assembly as he was an undischarged insolvent
within the meaning of Article 191 ( 1)(c) of the Constitution of India, at the time
of filing of his nomination, at the time of his election and even on the date
of the filing of the election petition. In the petition filed by the defeated C
candidate, in addition to the aforesaid ground of disqualification of the
appellant, he also alleged that the appellant had indulged in corrupt practices
within the meaning of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act,
1951 [hereinafter referred to as 'the R.P. Act'].

The High Court upheld the contention of the Election Petitioners that D
the appellant had incurred the disqualification under Article 191 (1)( c) of the
Constitution and declared his election to the Kerala Legislative Assembly as
void. The High Court, however, decided against the Election Petitioner on the
allegation of corrupt practices. Hence there are two sets of appeals - two by
the returned candidate in regard to invalidation of his election to the Assembly E
and the other by Election Petitioner with regard to findings recorded as to
corrupt practices.

The principal issue to be decided in this case is whether the appellant
is disqualified for being chosen as a member of the Legislative Assembly on
the ground that he is an undischarged insolvent and whether his election F
could be declared to be void under Section 100 of the R.P. Act. The pleadings
raised in this regard are that the appellant is a partner of a registered firm by
name 'Kavitha Printers' along with P.A. Thomas, Smt. Krishnamma and
Gopendra Nath; that the said firm borrowed a sum of Rs. 3,16,000 from the
Kerala Financial Corporation, Thiruvananthapuram; that the partners of the G
firm did not repay the loan in spite of the repeated demands; that the revenue
recovery proceedings were initiated against the appellant in terms of certificate
dated April 22, 1994 issued by the District Collector, Thiruvananthapuram and
at that time the iutal liability of the partners of the firm was amountin13 to Rs.
10,62,000; that the appellant failed to settle his liability with Kerala Financial
Corporation till the filing of his nomination papers and he was unable to pay H
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

. A the debts in the ordinary course of business as and when they became due;
that the demand notice issued by the Tehsildar for the purpose of revenue
recovery also stood returned on account of the closure of the business of
the firm; that the appellant absented himself from the office of the firm and
deliberately avoided service of notice upon him; that the appellant was not
B in a position to repay anything more than Rs. 3 lakhs on behalf of the firm
and, therefore, he was disqualified from being chosen as a member of the
State Legislature as he was an undischarged insolvent, that thereby his
I
election has become void in terms of Article 191 ( 1)( c) of the Constitution. In
the written objections filed, the appellant admitted that he was a partner of
the firm along with certain others who are mentioned in the petition, but
C claimed that he retired from the partnership as per the report filed on July 20,
1985 before the Registrar of Firms. It was contended that having severed
relationship with the firm, he had no knowledge or information as to the plea
that the partners of the firm did not repay the loan in spite of the repeated
demands. He pleaded that he did not receive any notice under the Revenue
Recovery Act and he .was not aware of the fact that any revenue recovery
D proceedings were initiated against other partners of the firm. The allegation
that he was due to pay any money to the Kerala Financial Corporation was
not correct and he did not make any attempt to deliberately avoid service of
any notice upon him nor he has departed from his usual place of business
so as to defeat or delay repayment of debts due to the Kerala Financial
E Corporation. He claimed that he was in public life and was a member of the
Kerala State Legislature for five years and thus his official as well as residential
addresses were known to the Kerala Financial Corporation. It was also claimed
that he has not incurred any disqualification in terms of Article 191 (I)( c) of
the Constitution and he has denied that he was an undischarged insolvent.
In the connected petition, the allegations raised were identical and the pleadings
F in answer filed by the appellant were also similar.
On the aspect as to the disqualification of the returned candidate, the
High Court framed Issue Nos. 2-11. The High Court held that the appellant
is partner of the firm and although he may have retired at the time of filing
G the nomination inasmuch as no public notice has been issued, he was liable
jointly with all other partners for all the acts done while he was a partner. Thus
he was a partner at the time of filing his nomination for the election to the
Legislative Assembly in question. It was further noticed that the appellant
continued to be liable for the debts due to the Kerala Financial Corporation.
It is held that the Kerala Financial Corporation has made efforts to realise the
H debts by getting initiated proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act but
THAMPANOORRAVI v.CHARUPARARAVI[RAJENDRABABU,J.] 427
it does not appear that those steps have been vigorously pursued with. The A
High Court also held that the appellant had avoided service of notice issued
to him by the Tehsildar, Revenue Recovery and although he had not abscon~ed
himself but he was trying to get himself exonerated from liability without
offering to repay anything to the Kerala Financial Corporation towards the
large amounts due from him and the other partners of the firm. The High Court B
went on to examine as to whether any money had been paid by the firm of
which the appellant was a partner and came to the conclusion that the
appellant did not have the means to repay the debt due to the Kerala Financial
Corporation and held as under :

"On the evidence, it is thus clear that the first respondent was and C
is a debtor, that he is a debtor who is unable and unwilling to pay his
debts, that he is not shown tq be possessed of assets sufficient to
meet his obligations and consequently, he is an insolvent. But he has
not been adjudicated an insolvent thus far under the Insolvency Act
either on an application by the creditor or on an application by
himself." D
Thereafter the High Court, in the absence of the definition of the
expression 'insolvent' in the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 [hereinafter
referred to as 'the Insolvency Act'] considered the nature of proceedings
arising under the Insolvency Act, went on to notice that under Section 2(8)
of the Sale of Goods Act, an insolvent is defined as a person who had ceased E
to pay his debts in the ordinary course of business, or cannot pay his debts
as they become due, whether he has committed an act of insolvency or not,
and thereafter referred to various dictionaries and concluded as follows :

"Suffice it to say that as far as I can gather, general meaning of the
word 'insolvent' is that he is a person who is unable to pay his debts F
as and when they become due or whose assets are not sufficient to
meet his obligations as and when they arise. Looked at from that point
of view and going by the meaning of the expression 'insolvent' as
referred to above, it is clear that the first respondent was an insolvent
on the date of the filing of the nomination by him, on the date of the 0
election, on the date of filing of the election petition and even on the
date of his examination in court."

A contention was raised on behalf of the appellant before the High
Court that he has not been adjudged insolvent by any court under the
Insolvency Act as applicable in the State of Kerala. So long as he is not H
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 2 S.C:R.

A adjudged insolvent the question of his being undischarged insolvent would
not arise and thereby he could not be disqualified in tenns of Article 191 ( 1)(c)
of the Constitution. In substance the contention is that the High Court could
not in deciding an election petition hold that the appellant to be an
undischarged insolvent for the purposes of Article l9l(l)(c) of the Constitution.
B In answer to this contention, the High Court examined the scheme of different
clauses in Article 191 of the Constitution. A person who is elected to a
legislature cannot carry on his duties fearlessly without being subjected to
Governmental pressure if such a person enters into a contract with the
Government or holds an office which brings him remuneration and the
Government has a voice in continuance of his contract or office and there is
C every likelihood of such person succumbing to the wishes of Government and
in order to eliminate such a contingency it would be appropriate to ensure
that persons who have received favours or benefits from the executive are
disqualified and in the same manner if the appellant is indebted to the Kerala
Financial Corporation he would not be a free person to act as a legislator. The
High Court considered that this underlying scheme of the Constitutional
D provisions and the R.P. Act must be borne in mind in interpreting the expression
'undischarged insolvent' under the R.P.Act. The High Court proceeded to
explain that the expression "undischarged insolvent" was not defined in the
Insolvency Act and there is no justification for giving the expression a
technical meaning as was propounded by the appellant's counsel. The High
E Court proceeded to give the expression 'undischarged insolvent' its natural
meaning so that the disqualification applies to any person who is shown to
be unable to pay his debts on the relevant date. The High Court referred to
the Debates in the Constituent Assembly and to the suggestion of Sir Alladi
Krishnaswamy Ayyar that the expression "if he is an undischarged insolvent"
should be in tenns of Section 73 of the Insolvency Act but was not accepted
F by the Constituent Assembly and held that the framers of the Constitution
did not want to confine the operation of the disqualification only to cases
where a person is adjudged insolvent under the Insolvency Act. The High
Court ultimately held that it would be appropriate to understand the expression
"undischarged insolvent" in its broad and general sense rather than in the
G technical sense of the insolvency legislation. The High Court then proceeded
to hold that even if a retiirning officer may not be in a position to accept an ·
objection in a case where the objection is not backed by an order of
adjudication by the court, there is nothing standing in the way of the Court
to examine such a question. The High Court, therefore, accepted the submission
that the pre-adjudication by an insolvency court is not required and observed
H that a candidate who is found to be an insolvent by the court trying the
THAMPANOORRAVI v.CHARUPARARAVI[RAJENDRABABU,J.] 429
election petition and a candidate who had already been adjudicated insolvent A
by the Insolvency Court but who has not obtained an order for discharge are
both covered by Article 191 (1 )( c) of the Constitution.

As this question goes to the root of the matter, we shall examine this
aspect first.
B
Before us it is urged on behalf of the appellant that the High Court
could not, in deciding an election petition under the R.P. Act, examine the
questio.n whether the appellant is an undischarged insolvent or not. The
learned counsel for the respondents supported the view taken by the High
Court by relying upon the decision in Bhagwati Prasad Dix it 'Ghorewa/a' C
v. Rajeev Gandhi, (1985) All Weekly Cases 682.

In State of Kerala, the Provincial Insolvency Act is applicable. Under
Section 3 of the Insolvency Act, the District Court shall be the court having
jurisdiction under the Act unless by a notification in the official gazette any
court subordinate to the district court is invested with such jurisdiction and D
it shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the District court and a court of small
causes shall be deemed to be subordinate to the district court for the purposes
of this Section. Under Section 4 of the Insolvency Act, the court shall have
full power to decide all questions whether of title or property or of any nature
whatsoever, and whether involving matters of law or of fact, which may arise E
in any case of insolvency coming within the cognizance of the court, or which
the court may deem it expedient or necessary to decide for the purpose of
doing complete justice of making a complete distribution of property in any
such case. Under Section 7 of the Insolvency Act, a petition for adjudication
could be filed by a creditor or by a debtor and the court may on such petition
adjudge him ~n insolvent. Under Section 27 of the Insolvency Act it is F
provided that if the court does not dismiss the petition, it shall make an order
of adjudication that the debtor is an insolvent, and shall specify in such order
the period within which the debtor shall apply for his discharge and the court
has power to, if sufficient cause is showri, to extend the period within which
the debtor shall apply for his discharge, in which case a notice of the order G
will have to be published. Under Section 28 of the Insolvency Act, various
consequences as an effect of an order of adjudication are provided. Under
. Section 41 of the Insolvency Act, it is provided that a debtor may, at any time
'· after the order of adjudication, within the period specified by the court, apply
to the court for an order of discharge, and the court may, after considering
the objections of any creditor and, where a receiver has been appointed, on H
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the report of the receiver -
[a] grant or refuse an absolute order of discharge; or
[b] suspend the operation of the order for a specified time; or

[c] grant an order of discharge subject to any conditions with
B respect to any earnings or income which may afterwards become
due to the insolvent, or with respect to his after- acquired
property.

Effect of an order of discharge is dealt with under Section 44 of the
Insolvency Act. Except as provided under sub-Section (1) of Section 44 of
C the Insolvency Act, an order of discharge shall release the insolvent from all
debts provable under the Insolvency Act. For the purpose~ of Section 73 of
the Insolvency Act an order of insolvency has been considered as a
disqualification to hold certain elective offices. An order of discharge, however,
restores the original status of an insolvent. So long as the debtor remains
D undischarged he suffers from several disabilities under the Insolvency Act.
The Insolvency Act is a complete code and determination of all questions
regarding insolvency including a question as to whether (1) a person is an
insolvent or not, or (2) an insolvent be discharged or not and subject to what
conditions, can be decided by the court constituted under that Act alone. It
is only when exceptions are carved out as is done in the case of Section 2(8)
E of the Sale of Goods Act any other court or authority can decide such
questions.

Under Article 329(b) of the Constitution no election to a legislature shall
be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority
and in such manner as may be provided by or made by the appropriate
F legislature. Under Section 80A of the R.P.Act, the forum for adjudication of
an election petition is the High Court. The scope of this provision is considered
by this Court in Upadhyaya Hargovind Devshanker v. Dhirendra Singh
Virbhadrasinhil Solanki & Ors., AIR (1988) SC 915. In that decision, the
question was whether an order made on interlocutory application in election
G petition could be the subject of a Letters Patent Appeal. It was observed in
that decision that conferment of power under R.P. Act to try an election
petition does not amount to enlargement of existing jurisdiction of the High
Court. The jurisdiction exercisable under the R.P. Act is a special jurisdiction
conferred on the High Court by virtue of Article 329(b) of the Constitution.
Therefore, even though the High Court may otherwise exercise ordinary and
H extraordinary jurisdiction it would be difficult to envisage a situation that
THAMPANOORRAVI v.CHARUPARARAVI[RAJENDRABABU,J.] 431

while trying an election petition in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by A
the R.P.Act it can adjudicate upon vires of the R.P.Act or any rule or order
made thereunder and the election petition has to be tried in accordance with
the provisions of the R.P .Act and thus the court cannot entertain and
pronounce upon matters which do not fall within the ambit of Section 100 of
the RP.Act. Even an ordinary civil court will not have jurisdiction to decide B
questions arising under insolvency enactments; much less a special Authority
like the High Court when it is not invested with such power under the
Insolvency Act. This Court in Bhagwati Prasad Dixit 'Ghorewala' v. Rajeev
Gandhi, [1986] 2 SCR 823, reversed the view taken in 1985 All Weekly Cases
682 on which reliance was placed by respondent that the High Court can
decide whether a person has acquired citizenship or lost citizenship. In that C
case a question arose as to whether in an election petition the High Court
had jurisdiction to determine the citizenship of a person. The High Court had
taken the view that notwithstanding the statutory bar contained in Section
9(2) of the Citizenship Act that wherever a question arises as to whether when
and how a person has acquired the citizenship of another country it shall be D
determined by such authority in the manner prescribed by the rules of evidence
as may be prescribed in that behalf; that since by virtue of Article 329(b) of
the Constitution all questions arising in an election petition filed under the
R.P. Act were exclusively triable in an election petition, it had jurisdiction to
decide the question whether a candidate had ceased to be an Indian citizen.
This Court took the view that when such a question arises it would be a E
matter to be decided by the authority constituted under the Citizenship Act
and when no decision is given by the competent authority under the
Citizenship Act, the question whether he ceased to be a citizen of India could
not be adjudicated in an election petition.

In the present case, as we have explained earlier the scheme of the F
provisions of the Insolvency Act, the exclusive jurisdiction to deal with any
question relating to insolvency could be adjudicated upon only by the court
constituted under that Act. In such a situation, it would not be possible to
hold that the High Court had, while dealing with an election petition, jurisdiction
to decide a question as to whether a person is an undischarged insolvent or G
not. Admittedly, in this case, there is no such adjudication. Hence the High
Court could not declare the appellant to be an 'undischarged insolvent".

The contention put forward before the High Court is that disqualification
contained in Article 19l(l)(c) could be attracted only in a case where a person
is adjudged as insolvent as per the Insolvency Act and in the absence of H
432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A such adjudication it is not open to the High Court while trying an election
petition to find that the returned candidate is an insolvent and he could be
held to be disqualified. The learned Judge in the High Court got over this
initial hurdle of the jurisdiction of the High Court to decide whether the
appellant is an undischarged insolvent by giving that expression a meaning
B in ordinary parlance. To achieve this result, the learned Judge adopted strained
and strange logic or reasoning to which we have referred to in the earlier part
of this ju · ·ve shall now consider each of those reasons.

The learned Judge referred to the scheme of different clauses of Article
191 ( 1) of the Constitution anq that such scheme would indicate that if a
C member has any pecuniary interest in any governmental or quasi-governmental
body such member may not be in a position to perform his duties impartially
with free lT'inrl inasmuch as he can be under pressure of the financial institution
which has i; •• Lended finances to him. Therefore, he was of the view that the
policy of Jaw should be borne in mind in interpreting the meaning of the
expression "undischarged insolvent".
D
Under what circumstances and subject to what limitations a person
could be declared to have incurred disqualification is a matter of policy of law
and the courts have cautioned themselves by stating that right to vote, right
to elect or contest an election is a creature of statute and circumscribed by
E the limitations contained therein. Therefore, as long as the Constitution or the
R.P. Ad indicates in clear terms as to what its policy is, it would not be open
to a court to interpret such a provision by trying to find out what the intent
could be by ignoring the actual expressions used. Therefore, the supposed
scheme of the provisions would not afford sufficient guidance to take the
view that the expression "undischarged insolvent" should be understood as
F meaning an insolvent who is a person who is in impecunious circumstances
as is unable to repay the debt.

The learned Judge noticed that under Article 19l(l)(b) while providing
for disqualification on the ground of "unsound mind" it is made clear that a
G person is of unsound mind if so declared by a competent court and such
declaration is not required in the case of an insolvent. The extended logic
applie~ by the learned Judge in the case of interpreting the expression
"undischarged insolvent" is that even when such declaration has not been
formally made by a court of competent jurisdiction still the Election Court can
decide such a question. Even though Article 191 ( 1) of the Constitution does
H not include declaration by an insolvency court, but by reason of expression
.
THAMPANOORRA VI v. CHARUPARA RA VI [RAJENDRA BABU, J.] 433
used that he is an "undischarged insolvent" it clearly indicates that he could A
... become "discharged" only in terms of the provisions of the insolvency Acts
and not otherwise. It is implicit in the expression "undischarged insolvent"
that a person does not become so unless he has been adjudged insolvent and
is not discharged by the court under the insolvency Acts. The expression
"undischarged insolvent" has acquired a particular legal connotation and
such expression cannot be used otherwise than in terms of the insolvency
B
enactments.

The learned Judge, in this context, referred to the statement made by
Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar in the course of the debates in the Constituent
.
~ Assembly wherein he tried to impress upon the Assembly that similar words
as contained in Section 73 of the Insolvency Act should be used and
c
disqualification should be removed and cease to be effective if adjudication
is annulled or if an insolvent obtains a discharge with certificate that it was
caused by misfortune and not by mis-conduct. Reliance upon this part of the
debate by the learned Judge, in our opinion, is misplaced. The reference made
by Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar is to reduce the rigour of the disqualification D
in the event the adjudication is annulled or if an insolvent obtains a discharge
with the certificate that it was caused by misfortune and not by mis-conduct.
Merely because the suggestion made by Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar is
not accepted by the Constituent Assembly it does not mean that the expression
... , used in Article 191 ( l )(c) as to "undischarged insolvent" will be different from
E
what is contained under the insolvency enactments. The reference to Section
73 made by Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar is in the background stated above
and, therefore, has no effect on the interpretation of the meaning of the
expression "undischarged insolvent".

The learned Judge noticed that if a person is not to be held an insolvent F
as in ordinary parlance it would result in non-application of disqualification
even if the court is satisfied that the returned candidate is not in a position

-. to repay debts and could be adjudged to be insolvent. Article 19l(l)(c) does
not contemplate mere impecuniousity or incapacity of a person to repay one's
j

debts but he should not only be adjudged insolvent but also remain
G
undischarged. Such a contingency could only arise under insolvency law.
Article 191 (1 )(c) refers to disqualifications of a person from getting elected to
..... State Legislature. The conditions for disqualification cannot be enlarged by
importing to it any meaning other than permissible on strict interpretation of
expressions used therein for what we are dealing with is a case of
disqualification. Whenever any disqualification is imposed naturally the right H
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [1999] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A of a citizen is cut down and in that event a narrow interpretation is required.
Therefore, the liberal view taken by the learned Judge to the contrary does
not appear to be correct.

Under the Sale of Goods Act, a special definition of the expression
insolvent' had to be given to the effect. that a person is said to be 'insolvent'
B who has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary course of business, or
cannot pay his debts as they become due, whether he has committed an act
of insolvency or not, and the definition is declaratory in character. Question
of insolvency of a buyer is of considerable importance in the context of the
seller's lien. It is in special context a meaning is given to the expression
C 'insolvent' even though a person had not been adjudged an insolvent in the
Insolvency Act to be insolvent for the purposes of the Act. That definition
cannot be imported into. the R.P. Act.

The learned Judge goes on to observe that an insolvent is a person who
is unable to repay his debts and as long as he remains in that position he
D is an undischarged insolvent, that is, as long as he has not discharged his
debts he is an "undischarged insolvent". Redundancy and tautology cannot
be attributed to the Legislature. When the Legislature has used the expression
"undischarged insolvent" that expression must be given its full meaning. A
person on being adjudged insolvent remains so unless discharged in terms
E of the provisions of Section 41 of the Insolvency Act, either absolutely or
conditionally, or in the absence of annulment as contained in Section 35 of
the Insolvency Act.

In ascertaining the meaning of an expression used in a statute, certain
norms are adopted. If the legislature has used an expression which has
·F acquired a technical meaning and such expression is used ordinarily in the
context of a particular branch of law, it must be assumed that because of its
constant use the legislature must be deemed to have used such expression
in a particular sense as is understood when used in the similar context. If an
expression has acquired a special connotation in law, dictionary or general
G meaning ceases to be helpful in interpreting such a word. Such an expression ·-
must be given· its legal sense and no other. In this context, we may refer to
the weighty observation in the decision of this Court in the State of Madras
v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd., [1959] SCR 379, that a term of
well recognised import in the general law should be accepted as confming the
meaning in interpreting the Constitution. If the expression "undischarged
H insolvent" has acquired a special meaning under the law of insolvency, we
THAMPANOORRAVI v.CHARUPARARAVl[RAJENDRABABU,J.] 435
must understand that that is the meani~g that is sought to be attributed to A
the expression used in Article 191 (I)( c) of the Constitution.

We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was not justified in
holding that the expression "undischarged insolvent" should be understood
de hors the Insolvency Act in a general sense.
B
Civil Appeal No. 8361 of 1997

In this appeal preferred by the unsuccessful candidate who contested
the election contention is that there are various corrupt practices alleged
against the returned candidate and they have been established by producing C
proper evidence which should have been accepted by the High Court and in
rejecting the same, it is submitted, it has erred.

The allegation is that the appellant using his position and status secured
450 bottles of rum from Military Canteen, Pangode, Thiruvananthapuram and
supplied in certain Harijan colonies of the constituency on 24, 25 and 26 April, . D
1996. K.S. Subramaniya Pillai saw K. Krishnankutty who is an employee of
military camp, taking a number of cases of rum to an ambassador car bearing
Reg. No. KL-Ol-Fl098 and on enquiries K. Krishnankutty told K. S. Subramaniya

... Pillai that this rum were purchased by workers of the first respondent. The
Harijan colonies where rum was supplied are Vengode and Manathottam and E
rum was supplied through R. Gopalakrishnan Nair, Vice President, Vellarada
Panchayat and V. Sudhakaran, Member, Vellarada Panchayat by the first
respondent for bribing the voters to secure votes. The evidence adduced
before the court was only that of K.S. Subramaniya Pillai and G. Suresh. So
far as K.S. Subramaniya Pillai is concerned, he does not seem to have personal
knowledge of the bottles being carried and he came to know from K. F
Krishnankutty. K. Krishnankutty has not been examined in the case. K.S.
Subramaniya Pillai (P.W. 12) stated that he did not see any bottles and came
to know that there were liquor bottles kept in the card board boxes from K.
Krishnankutty. The bottles were squarely closed and the distance from him
where he stood to the place where the loading took place was 50 yards. He G
asked K. Krishnankutty as to what was happening and that it was he who
told him that it was liquor for distribution in the Neyyattinkara constituency.

- So far as G. Suresh (P.W. 15) is concerned, his evidence is to the effect that
liquor was taken to various areas for distribution. He saw bottles being loaded
in a car and he approached the panshopwala and asked him and two or three
persons present there as to where these bottles were being taken to and they H
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A told him that they were being taken to Neyyathinkara and those people
standing there also told him that the liquor was being taken for distribution
in Neyyattinkara constituency to further the prospects of the appellant. He
noted the number of the car. In the absence of examination ofK. Krishnankutty
the evidence adduced is vague and not clear and definite much less reliable
B and, therefore, the High Court rightly held that there is no acceptable evidence
which can bring the case against the appellant within the expression of
'bribery'. under Section 123 of the R.P. Act.

The other acts of undue influence or that the returned candidate has
made an appeal in the name of religion or that he has made any statement
C with a false reference to the personal character and conduct of the candidate
were not established. The trial Judge has given cogent reasons in this regard
and the learned counsel for the appellant in this case is not able to dislodge
this conclusion by any material placed· on record. The contention that the
returned candidate indulged in corrupt practice by incurring expenditure in
excess of the amount permitted in contravention of Section 77 of the Act was
D also rejected by the learned Judge. The evidence adduced before the court
was only in the shape of something conjectural and imaginary through P. W.
16 who stated that substantial expenditure had been incurred by the returned
candidate. It is not made clear as to who might have incurred this expenditure
and the evidence was not adduced to show that the contractors used for the
E erection of the stage or platform were examined to indicate the payments
having been made by the returned candidate. Therefore, the view taken by
the learned Judge in this regard appears to us to be correct.

The issue relating to whether the returned candidate had obtained or
procured assistance for the furtherance of the prospects of his election from
F any person in service of the government and whether he had misused his
official position also to such effect, it is stated that there was no clear
evidence in this regard. The allegation that he utilised the services of the Sub-
Inspector Vincent and the acts attributed to him were done at all, much less
at the instance of the returned candidate. Again the allegation made is in
G respect of taking assistance from Antony, Block Development Officer (B.D.O.),
that the returned candidate used his official jeep for distributing propaganda
material. Though this aspect was deposed to by P. W. 16, the learned Judge
felt that he could not act upon the evidence of P.W. 16 alone. He noticed that .,
there was hardly any evidence to show that the B.D.O. acted at the instance
of the returned candidate or he was requested by him. His evidence is that
-
H on that day Shri Karunakaran was to address a meeting. The B.D.O. told the
THAMPANOORRAVI v.CHARUPARARAVI[RAJENDRABABU,J.] 437
Congress workers that such thin attendance would not do when a prominent A
leader who was a Minister in the Central Government was going to address
the meeting. On hearing this the Congress workers got into the vehicle fitted
with mike and went around exhorting people to come to the meeting. The '
learned Judge held that the allegation made by the witness that the jeep meant
for government officer was used by the Congress workers is not established
as having been done at the behest of the returned candidate. Therefore, this B
view of the learned Judge has got to be upheld. He also noticed that there
was no clear or direct evidence to prove that the first respondent has misused
his official position as a sitting member of the Legislative Assembly. We
agree.
c
In the result, we allow the appeals [C.A.Nos. 7395-7396/97] filed by the
returned candidate and set aside the order passed by the learned Judge
declaring his election to be void on the ground that he has incurred necessary
disqualification as provided under Article 19l(l)(c) for being chosen to the
Assembly as Member thereof on account of the fact that he was an
"undischarged insolvent". So far as the appeal [C.A. No. 8361/97] filed by the D
unsuccessful contesting candidate is concerned, the same has to be and is
dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

V.S.S. Appeals allowed.