THE COMMISSIONER, AGRA AND ORS.versusROHTAS SINGH AND ORS.

              THE COMMISSIONER, AGRA AND ORS.                               A
                                    v.
                     ROHTAS SINGH AND ORS.

                          DECEMBER 9, 1997
                                                                             B
        [SUJATA V. MANOHAR AND G.T. NANAVATI, .JJ.]

      Contempt of Cowts Act, 1971: Sections 2(b), (c) and 15.

        Contempt of court-Commissio11 of-By Govemmenl officials-Ap-
peara11ce of Law Officers lo defend Govemment officials against whom C
11otices for contempt of cowt were issued for disobedience of order of
Cowt-Authorisation of-field : State Govemment can autho1ise any of its
Law Officers to appear and defe11d such Govemment Officials--High Court
11ot justified in stiiking down Govemment Order which provided for a pa11el
of Advocates for defending Government Officials in contempt peti- D
tions-High Court cannot also give general directions that the litigation expen-
ses in contempt proceedings would be bome not by the Govemment but by
the Govemment Officials-Howeve1; in ce1tai11 situations Advocate General
may decline to appear for an alleged comem11er who is a Govemment
Official-Wl1ere the conduct of the Govemme11t official is contzunaciow; the
cowt ca11 direct him to pay costs perso11ally-Allahabad High Cowt Rules, . E
1952-R.. 6----<:onstitzttiOn of bzdia, 1950-Articles 129 a11d 215--Legal
Remembrancer's Manual, 1975.

      Co11tempt of cowt-Proceedings f01---Nature of-field : Contempt
proceedings cannot be equated with prosecutio11 of ciiminals-Co111empt      F
proceedings are essentially a matter between cowt and colltemnors.

     In the Alll!habad High Court, Advocates for the State appearing in
criminal matters are tlesignated as Government Advocates while advocates
on behalf of the State appe~ring i11 civil matters are designated as Stand-
ing Counsel. The Allahabad High Court in its impugned order had held G
that neither category of Advocates could appear in civil and criminal
contempt proceedings on behalf of an alleged contemnor who was an
ollicial of the State Government. It further held that no monetary help
from the State Exchequer could be extended to such Government ollicials
towards litigation expen~es in contempt proceedings. These expenses ~ere H
                                    317
    318                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A to be incurred personally by the Government officials concerned, which
    could be subsequently reimbursed to them if they were honourably ex-
    onerated in contempt proceedings. The High Court had also struck down
    a Government Order dated 12.9.1996 issued by the Special Secretary and
    Additional Legal Remembrancer, Government of U.P. under which a panel
B   of Advocates had been nominated for appearance in cont.empt petitions
    filed against the Government of U.P. and its ollicers and/or employees. The
    High Court had struck down the names of Additional Chief Standing
    Counsel from both these panels. It had also held as of no consequence, the
    relevant provisions in the Legal Remembrancer's Manual, 1975 permitt!ng
    Government Advocates and/or Standing Counsel to appear in such mat-
c   ters. Hence this appeal.

          Allowing the appeals, this Court


D        HELD : 1. It was on account of the mistaken notion that the State
  had to prosecute an action for contempt of Court against the contemnor
  that the High Court, in the present case, came to the conclusion that the
  Advocates appointed by the State to represent it in Courts of law cannot
  appear for an officer of the State who is charged with contempt. This
  foundation of the High Court's reasoning is not sound. A contempt
E proceeding is often described as a 11uasi-criminal proceeding because it
  results in punishment for the contemnor. The proceeding, however, cannot
  be equated with the prosecution of a criminal by the State.· Contempt
  proceedings are essentially a matter between the court and the contemn or.
  Contempt jurisdiction enables the court to ensure proper administration
F of justice and maintenance of the Rule of Law. It is meant to ensure that
  the courts are able to discharge their functions properly, unhampered and
  unsullied by wanton attacks on the system of administration of justice or
  on officials who administer it, and to prevent wilful defiance of' orders of
  the court or undertakings given to the Court. That is why the Supreme
   Court and the High Courts have an inherent power to punish for contempt
G even deho1:~ legislation pertaining to contempt of Court. This is apparent
  also from the definition of "contempt" under the Contempt of Courts Act,
   1971. From this definition it is clear that the Courts' power to punish for
   contempt is a power which is re11uired in furtherance of proper ad-
   ministration of justice and preserving the authority of the court. This
H power is expressly preserved under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitu·
                       <COMMR. AGRA v. ROHTAS SINGH                           319
     tion. It is, therefore open to the State to nominate its Advocates to appear    A
     for its officials in contempt proceedings. [321-H; 322-A-B; 323-B-C]

           D.N. Taneja v. Bhajan Lal, [1988] 3 SCC 26; T.C. Hingorani v. G.P.
     Misra, (1967) Law Reports, Lucknow 662 and Mohd. Iqbal Khandey v.
     Abdul Majid Rathe1; [1994] 4 SCC 34, relied on.
                                                                                     B
           2.1. Rule 6 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 framed under
     Section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act which provided for a notice of
     criminal contempt being served on the Government Advocate, however,
     does not make the Government Advocate an interested party in the con-
     tempt 11roceedings. Moreover, the present case deals not with criminal          C
     contempt but with civil contempt. [324-A-B]

            2.2. The State is, therefore, entitled to authorise a law officer to
     appear in cases where the contempt consists of disobedience of an order
     of the Court by an official or employee of the State. The further directions
     given by the High Court that in all such cases the legal expenses should        D
     be borne personally by the alleged contemnor except when he is honourably
     acquitted also appear to be unwarranted. The High Court seems to have
     been moved into issuing such a direction because of the large number of
     contempt cases pending in that Court against the officers of the State for
     their failure to carry out the orders of the court. It is indeed a disturbing   E
     situation. Where the conduct of the concerned official is contumacious, the
     court can direct him to pay costs personally, if the facts and circumstances
     of the case so warrant. But a general direction of the kind given by the
     High Court cannot be sustained. [324-B-D]

           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 8588-89                   F
     of 1997.

          From the Judgment and Order dated 19.11.96 of the Allahabad High
-·   Court in C.M.W.P. Nos. 28721 and 21843 of 1996.

          Ashok H. Desai, Attorney General, R.B. Misra, Kamlendra Misra              G
     and Arvind Verma for the Appellants.

           Tripurari Ray, Prashant Kumar and Joseph Pokkatt for the Respon-
     dent in C.A. No. 8588/97.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                                 H
    320                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A         MRS. SU.JATA V. MANOHAR, .J. Leave granted.

         These appeals are from a judgment of the Allahabad High Court
  holding that Government Advocates and Standing Counsel for the State of
  Uttar Pradesh cannot be allowed to appear and defend Government
  officials against whom notices for contempt of court are issued. In the
B Allahabad High Court advocates for the State appearing in criminal mat -
  ters are designated as Government Advocates while advocates on behalf
  of the State appearing in civil matters are designated as standing Counsel.
  The High Court has held that neither category of advocates can appear in      l
  contempt proceedings on behalf of an alleged contemnor who is an official
C of the State Government. The Allahabad High Court has further held that
  no monetary help from the State Exchequer can be extended to such
  Government officials towards litigation expenses in contempt proceedings.
  These expenses are to be incurred personally by the Government officials
  concerned which can be subsequently reimbursed to them if they are            ..
D honourably exonerated in contempt proceedings. The High Court has also
  struck down a Government Order dated 12th of September, 1996 issued
  by the Special Secretary and Additional Legal Remembrancer, Govern-
  ment of U .P. under which a panel of Advocates has been nominated for
  appearance in contempt petitions filed against the Government of U.P. and
  its officers and/or employees. The High Court has struck down the names
E of the two Additional Chief Standing Counsel from both these panels. It
   has also held as of no consequence, the relevant provisions in the Legal
   Remembrancer's Manual permitting Government Advocates and/or Stand-
   ing Counsel to appear in such matters.

F       The impugned judgment has been pronounced in the course of
  contempt proceedings for alleged violation of the orders of the Allahabad
  High Court dated 6.9.1996 in Civil (Misc.) Writ Petition No. 28721 of 1996
  - Rohtas Singh v. The Commissioner, Agra Division and Ors. and the order
  of the High Court dated 11.7.1996 in Civil (Misc.) Writ Petition No. 21843
  of 1996 - Gaon Panchayat of Village Bhavokara & Ors. v. Distiict Panchayat
G Raj Adhikwi, Bulandshaher and Ors. In these proceedings, Shri S.M.A.
  Kazmi, Additional Chief Standing Counsel appeared for the alleged con-
  temnors who were Government officials and who were alleged to have
  violated the respective orders in the above two writ petitions. When the
  Court raised an objection that the Srate Law Officers cannot appear in
H contempt proceedings to defend the contemnors, Shri S.M.A. Kazmi,
    COMMR. AGRAv. ROHTAS SINGH [SUJATA V. MANOHAR,J.]                  321
Additional Chief Standing Counsel drew the attention of the court to the A
above Government Order No. D/2714/7-Nyay-3-96-83/96 dated 12th Sep-
tember, 1996 under which six State Law Officers as aforesaid had been
appointed by the State Government to appear in all contempt cases in the
High Court of judicature at Allahabad and its Bench at Lucknow for the
purpqse of defending the State Government Officers/employees who were B
charged with contempt. Mr: Kazmi contended that he being one of the six
State Law Officers so named, was authorised to appear for the alleged
contemnors.

      The attention of the High Court was also drawn to "the Legal
Remembrancer's Manual of 1975. Under the Legal Remembrancer's C
Manual of 1975 Chapter V deals with Chief standing Counsel and Standing
Counsel in the High Court who are responsible for the conduct of all civil
cases in the High Court to which the State Government is a party. Under
Clause 5.04 of Chapter V the Standing Counsel is entitled to represent the
State or any authority within the State in such other civil cases in which he D
might be required or directed to appear by the Government, the Legal
Remembrancer or the High Court. Chapter IV deals with Government
Advocate, his deputies and assistants. Under Clause 4.07 of Chapter IV,
the Government Advocate, Additional Government Advocate, Deputy
Government Advocate or Assistant Government Advocate shall have the
right of private practice but shall not, except under special permission of E
the Government, appear for the defence in any criminal or quasi-criminal
case or proceedings nor can he advise any private party regarding any
criminal case which might be pending or be likely to be instituted in Uttar
Pradesh.
                                                                             F
       It was contended by Shri Kazmi, Additional Chief Standing Counsel
for the State of U.P. that the Government order of 12th of September, 1996
constituted special authorisation entitling him to appear in contempt
proceedings on behalf of an alleged contemnor when that alleg-:d contem-
nor was an employee or officer of the State. the High Court, however,
rejected this contention while holding that the Government Advocates and     G
Standing Counsel cannot be allowed to so appear.

      The High Court seems to have proceeded on the basis that it is for
the State to prosecute contemnors. Therefore, counsel for the State cannot
appear for the "accused" contemnor. This foundation of the High Court's      H
    322                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A reasoning is unfortunately not sound. A contempt proceeding is often
  described as a quasi-criminal proceeding because it results in punishment
  for the contemnor. The proceeding, however, cannot be equated with the
  prosecution of a criminal by the State. Contempt proceedings are essen-
  tially a matter between the court and the contemnor. Contempt jurisdiction
  enables the court to ensure proper administration of justice and main-
B
  tenance of the Rule of Law. It is meant to ensure that the Courts are able
  to discharge their functions properly, unhampered and unsullied by wanton
  attacks on the system of administration of justice or on officials who
  administer it, and to prevent wilful defiance of orders of the court or
  undertakings given to the court. That is why the Supreme Court and the
C High Court have an inherent power to punish for contempt even dehors
  legislation pertaining to contempt of court.

          This is apparent also from the definition of 'contempt' under the
    Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Two types of contempt are defined. Under
D   Section 2(b), Civil Contempt means wilful disobedience to any judgment,
    decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach
    of an undertaking given to a court. While criminal contempt is defined
    under Section 2(c) to mean the publication (whether by words, spoken or
    written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise), of any
    matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which - (i) scandalises or
E   tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court;
    or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course
    of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or
    obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administrations, of justice in any other
    manner. From this definition it is clear that the court's power to punish for
F   contempt is a power which is required in furtherance of proper administra-
    tion of justice and preserving the authority of the court. This power is
    expressly preserved under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution. That
    is why the question of contempt is a question which is essentially between
    the court and the contemnor.

G            Explaining this position, this Court in the case of D.N. Taneja v.
     Bhajan Lal, (1988) 3 SCC 26 observed, "A contempt is a matter between
     the court and the alleged contemnor. Any person who moves the machinery
     of the court for contempt only brings to the notice of the court certain facts
     constituting contempt of court. After furnishing such information he may
H    still assist the court but it must always be borne in mind that in a contempt
         COMMR. AGRA v. ROHTAS SINGH [SUJATA V. MANOHAR, .!.]                323

     proceeding there arc only two parties, namely, the court and the contcm- A
     nor." In that case this Court held that the person who had lodged the
     complaint was not entitled to any right of appeal because he was not a
     necessary party in contempt proceedings.

            Tl is on account of the mistaken notion that the State has to prosecute
                                                                                    B
     an action for contempt of court ag~~nst the contemnor that the High Court,
     in the present case, came to the conclusion that the Advocates appointed .
     by the State to represent it in courts of law cannot appear for an officer of
     the State who is charged with contempt. It is, therefore, open to the State
     to nominate its advocates to appear for its officials in contempt proceed-
     ings. In fact, in the case of the highest law officer of the State - the      c
     Advocate General, this Court, in the case of T.C. Hingorani v. G.P. Misra,
     (1967) (Law Reports Lucknow, page 662), held that the State Government
     could assign to the Advocate General the duty to appear in a contempt
-'   proceeding for a contcmnor, and the Advocate General was entitled to so
     appear. This has been reiterated in Mohd. Iqbal Kha11dey v. Abdul Majid D
     Rathe1; j1994J 4 SCC 34 where the Court held that there was no justification
     for the court to direct the counsel for the appellant, namely the Additional
     Advocate General, not to appear for the appellant or to direct that he
     should instead, assist the court.

            It is possible that there might be situations where the Advocate E
     General may decline to appear for an alleged contemnor who is an officer
     or employee of the State. Section 15, for example, of the Contempt of
     Courts Act, 1971, which deals with cognizance of criminal contempt,
     provides that in the case of a criminal contempt, other than a contempt
     referred to in Section 14, the Supreme Court or the High Court may take F
     action on its own motion or on a motion made by (a) the Advocate
     General, or (b) any other person with the consent in writing of the
     Advocate General, or (c) in relation to the High Court for the Union
     Territory of Delhi, such law officer as the Central Government may, by
     notification in the Official Gazette, specif)· in thi~ behalf, or any other G
     person, with the consent in writing of such law officer. In the case of any
     criminal contempt of a subordinate court, the High Court may take action
     on a reference made to it by the subordinate court or on a motion made
     by the Advocate General or, in relation to a Union Territory, such law
     officer as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official
     Gazette, specify in this behalf. The Advocate General or the law officer H
    324                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A concerned may in such a case decline to appear for the alleged contemnor
    in a criminal contempt case.

          Our attention was also drawn to Rule 6 of the Allahabad High Court
    Rules framed under Section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act which
    provides for a notice of a criminal contempt being served on the Govern-
B   ment Advocate. This, however, does not make the Government Advocate
    an interested party in the contempt proceedings. Moreover, the present
                                                 ' civil contempt.
    case deals not with criminal contempt but with

         The State is, therefore, entitled to authorise a law officer to appear
  in cases where the contempt consists of disobedience of an order of the
C court by an official or employee of the State. The further directions given
  by the High Court that in all such cases the legal expenses should be borne
  personally by the alleged contemnor except when he is honourably ac-
  quitted also appear to be unwarranted. The High Court seems to have been        ,-
  moved into issuing such a direction because of the large number of con-
D tempt cases pending in the court against the officers of the State for their
  failure to carry out the orders of the Court. It is indeed a disturbing
  situation. Where the conduct of the concerned official is contumacious, the
  Court can direct him to pay costs personally, if the facts and circumstances
  of the case so warrant. But a general direction of the kind given by the
E High Court cannot be sustained.
         Hence, the impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the
    appeals are allowed. There will, however, no order as to costs.

    v.s.s.                                                   Appeals allowed.