Holding

The Andhra Pradesh (Scheduled Areas) Land Transfer Regulation, 1959 and its amendments are prospective in nature and cannot affect land transfers made prior to their commencement.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined whether the Andhra Pradesh (Scheduled Areas) Land Transfer Regulation, 1959 and its amendments of 1963 and 1970 operate retrospectively to invalidate land transfers made before their commencement. The Court held that the Regulation, particularly Section 3(1)(a), is expressly prospective and does not affect vested rights arising from earlier transactions. Consequently, the authorities could not evict occupants based on those pre‑existing transfers. The Court dismissed the appeals of the Deputy Collector and other authorities (Civil Appeals Nos. 2909/1977, 6/1991, 8422/95, 8423/95) but allowed the appeal of T. Rajaiah (Civil Appeal No. 8424/95) where the transaction pre‑dated the Regulation, quashing the eviction orders. The judgment reaffirmed the principle that statutes are presumed not to have retrospective effect unless clearly expressed.

Issues considered

Whether the Andhra Pradesh (Scheduled Areas) Land Transfer Regulation, 1959 and its subsequent amendments have retrospective effect.
Whether Section 3(1)(a) of the Regulation can invalidate land transfers that occurred before the Regulation came into force.
Whether the authorities could lawfully evict occupants based on the Regulation when the transfers pre‑date the Regulation.

Legislation cited

Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1961s. 10
Andhra Pradesh (Scheduled Areas) Land Transfer Regulation, 1959s. 10, s. 3(1)(a), s. 3(2)(a), s. 9
Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1950s. 38(E)
Constitution of Indias. Article 244, s. Fifth Schedule

Subjects

Scheduled AreasLand Transfer RegulationRetrospective legislationProspective legislationEvictionTribal welfareVested rightsStatutory interpretation

Judgment

A THE DEPUTY COLLECTOR AND ANR.
v.
S. VENKATA RAMANAIAH AND ANR. ETC.

SEPTEMBER 18, 1995
B
[S.P. BHARUCHA, FAIZAN UDDIN AND S.B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.]

Andhra Pradesh (Scheduled Areas) Land Transfer Regulation of
1959-Regulation No. II of 1963 and Regulation No. I of 1970-Sections 3
(l)(a) and 3(2)(a)-Transfers of Lands in Agency tracts-Provisions of Sec.
C 3(1) are prospective in natur~Section 3(1)(a) r/ws 3(2)(a) hit only those
transfers of lands in Agency tracts which take place after the advent of Section
3 (1)(a).

The respondents· had purchased the land in their occupation on
D 19.6.1919 from a non-tribal. After the promulgation of the Andhra Pradesh
(Scheduled Area) Land Transfer Regulation of 1959 as amended by
Regulation I of 1970, the competent authority initiated proceedings against
the respondents on the ground that the said sale in their favour was hit
by Section 3(1)(a) of the Regulation and, therefore, the respondents were
liable to be evicted from the land in question which had to be restored to
E the original vendor or his successor in interest. The Deputy Collector
(Tribal Welfare) passed an order of eviction against the respondents. The
respondents' appeal before the District Collector failed. The respondents
filed writ petition before the High Court. The High Court allowed the writ
petition while holding that the provisions of the Regulation were not
F retrospective in nature and could not affect past transactions even though
the land was situated in a District which fell within the definition of
'Agency Tract' as laid down in section 2(1) of 1959 Regulation, and
therefore, the said transaction could not be processed or scrutinised by
the authorities functioning under the Regulation and they had no jurisdic-
tion to treat the said transaction to be null and void under the Regulation.
G These appeals had been filed against the judgment of the High Court.

The appellants contended that the provisions of the Regulation I of
1959 as well as the amending Regulation II of 1963 and Regulation I of
1970 had retrospective effect and consequently whether the transactions
H pertaining to the lands in question situated within the scheduled tracts
748
DY. COLLECTOR i: S.V. RAMANAIAH 749
,>

covered by the Regulations were entered into between tribal transferors A
and non- tribal transferees or even for that matter between non-tribal
transferors and non-tribal transferees at any time in past got covered by
the prohibitory and invalidating sweep of section 3(1) of the Regulation;
that even assuming that the provisions of these Regulations were prospec-
tive in nature the concerned transferees after the coming into force of these
B
Regulations in the scheduled areas were not entitled to continue in pos-
session as their possession became invalid at least from the dates on which
these Regulations applied to the areas where these lands were situated,
and that the orders of eviction as passed by the authorities below were
rightly passed and could not have been interfered with by the High Court.
c
The respondents submitted that the provisions of the Regulations
are purely prospective in nature as there was no express provision inade
in these Regulations to make them restrospective from only back date, nor
do the wording of these Regulations exhibit any necessary intendment
about restrospectivity and that they could not effect the vested and accrued
rights in favour of the transferees pursuant to old transactions in their D
favour which had taken effect years prior to the coming into operation of
these Regulation.

The question raised for consideration was whether the provisions of
the Regulation have restrospective effect and can affect transfers made E
prior to the coming into force of the said Regulations.

Dismissing the appeals, this Court

HELD : 1.1. On the express language of the Andhra Pradesh
(Scheduled Areas) Land Transfer Regulation of 1959, it was prospective in F
nature and even by necessary intendment it could not be posited that the
framer of the Regulation wanted to give it any retrospective effect. [760-G]

1.2. Provisions of Section 3(1) of the Regulation are purely prospec-
tive in nature and do not affect past transactions of transfers affected
between tribals and non-tribals or between non-tribals and non-tribals G
themselves in the Agency Tracts at a time when neither Regulation I of
1959 nor Regulation II of 1963 or Regulation I of 1970 was in force. Such
past transactions remained untouched by the sweep of these subsequently
enacted Regulations. On a conjoint reading of Section 3(1) (a) and Section
3(2) (a), it becomes clear that the Section seeks to hit the transfers effected H
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
'·
A after the Section came into force and possession only under such invalid
~ransfers is soug~t to be dealt with for the purpose of eviction of trans-
ferees and restoration of possession to transferors, as the case may be,
under Section 3(2)(a) of the Regulation. Section 3(2) (a) is a corollary to
·Section 3(1)(a) and cannot have any independent role to play. Nor can it
cover any area which is not encompassed by the sweep of Section 3(1)(a).
B (766-D, 767-D-E]
1.3. In the instant case, possession under transfers which were
beyond the sweep of Section 3(l)(a) could not be said to have continued
under any invalid transfers as envisaged by Section 3(1)(a). Such posses-
C sion obtained under the then existing old and valid transfers would be
outside the ken of the Regulation. (768-H, 769-A]

R. Rajagopal Reddy (Dead) by Lrs. and Others. v. Padmini
Chandrasekharan (Dead) by Lrs., (1995] 2 SCC 630, relied on.

D Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh & Am: v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, (1953)
SCR 1188 and Bishun Narain Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (1965)
1 SCR 693, distinguished.

Francis Bennion's, Statut01y Interpretation, Second Edition, referred
to.
E
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2909 of
1977.

From the Judgment and Order dated 29.3.76 of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in W.P. No. 4434 of 1975.
F
Mrs. K. Amreshwari, G. Prabhakar, K. Ramkumar for the Appel-
lants.

A.D.N. Rao and A. Subba Rao for the Appellant in C.A. N...1.
8424/95.
·a
V.A. Bobde, A.D.N. Rao and A.Subba Rao for the Respondent$.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. MAJMUDAR, J. Leave granted in S.L.P. (C) Nos. 10746of1981,
H 1041of1986 and 2407 of 1986.
DY. COLLECTOR v. S.V. RAMANAIAH [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 751

In this group of matters a common question arises for our considera- A
tion. It is as under :

"Whether the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Scheduled Areas)
Land Transfer Regulation) of 1959 (hereinafter referred to as
'Regulation') and the subsequent Regulation No. II of 1963 and
Regulation No. I of 1970 have retrospective effect and can affect B
transfers made prior to the coming into force of the said Regula-
tion."

We have heard learned counsel appearing for the respective contest-
ing parties in this group of matters. Accordingly all these appeals are being C
disposed of by this common judgment.

A few facts leading to these appeals may be noted at the outset.

Facts leading to Civil Appeal No. 2909 of 1977
D
The appellant authorities, namely, Deputy Collector (Tribal Welfare)
and the District Collector functioning in Srikakulam District in the State
of Andhra Pradesh, have brought in challenge a decision of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court allowing Writ Petition No. 4434 of 1975 moved by the
. respondents, praying for a writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India for quashing and setting aside the orders of the E
appellant authorities passed under the provisions of the Regulation. The
respondents, writ petitioners before the High Court had purchased the
land in their occupation on 19th June 1919 from a non-tribal named
Pappala Appanna. After the promulgation of the Regulation in 1959 as
amended by Regulation I of 1970 the competent authority being agent of F
the Government initiated proceedings against the respondents on the
ground that the said sale in their favour was hit by Section 3(1)(a) of the
Regulation and, therefore, the respondents were liable to be evicted from
the land in question which had to be restored to the original vendor or his
successor in interest. After hearing the respondents the Deputy Collector
(Tribal Welfare) passed an order of eviction against the respondents. The G
respondents' appeal before the District Collector failed. And that is how
the respondents filed writ petition · before the High Court. A Division
Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court by the judgment under appeal
allowed ~he writ petition by taking the view that the provisions of the
Regulation were not retrospective in nature and could not affect past H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A transactions like the transaction in question which was reflected by
Registered Sale Deed dated 19th June, 1919 even though the land was
situated in Srikakulam District which fell within the definition of 'Agency
Tracts' as laid down by Section 2(a) of 1959 Regulation. It was, therefore,
held that the said transaction could not be processed or scrutinised by the
authorities functioning under the Regulation and they had no jurisdiction
B to treat the said transaction to be null and void under the Regulation. Writ
Petition was accordingly allowed. The authorities as appellants before this
Court have filed this appeal having obtained special to appeal from this
Court against the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High
Court.
c
Facts leading to Civil Appeal No. 6 of 1991.

In this appeal the authorities functioning under the very same
Regulation have brought in challenge the order passed by the Division
D Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Appeal No. 121 of 1985
which came to be dismissed by the Appellate Court and whereby the order
of the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 1932 of 1978 came to be
confirmed. The first respondent herein was a protected tenant of Survey
No. 97 admeasuring 9 acres and 4 guntas and,Survey No. 98 admeasuring
8 acres and 8 guntas situated at Chirranukunta Village of Asifabad Taluk
E of Adilabad District of Andhra Pradesh. One Siddamshetti Narayana was
the Pattedar of the said land. Respondent No. 1 was cultivating the said
land as his tenant. The Pattedar of this land was a tribal. He had trans-
ferred this land for cultivation as a tenant to respondent No. 1 and it was
noted in Khasra Pahani of year 1954-55 through mutation. Respondent no.
F 1 is a non- tribal. On the basis of the said protected tenancy created in
favour of respondent no. 1 by the tribal, respondent no. 1 was declared
owner of the said land on 1.1.1975 under Section 38(E) of the Andhra
Pradesh (Telengana Area) Tenancy & Agricultural Act, 1950 and a cer-
tificate was issued under Section 38(E) in his favour.

G The Special beputy Collector (Tribal Welfare), Adilabad, issued a
notice to the first respondent stating that the first respondent was in
possession of the said land. The transfer of the said land in his favour
contravened the provisions of Section 3(1) of the Regulation. He was,
therefore, asked to show <;:ause as to why he should not be ejected from
H the said land. Ultimately order of ejectment was passed against him by the
DY. COLLECTOR v. S.V. RA.MANAIAH [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 753

Special Deputy Collector and the lands were ordered to be restored to A
respondent nos. 2 to 4. Respondent no. 1 unsuccessfully went in appeal
where stay was refused. He thereafter filed a writ petition in the Andhra
Pradesh High Court. A learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed
the writ petition on 8.2.1984 holding that the provisions of the Regulation
as extended to Adilabad District in ex- Telengana region by Regulation JI
B
of 1963 could not affect the transfer in favour of respondent no. 1 which
was made years back and when that transfer was valid and was supported
by certificate of ownership granted to respondent no.1 under Section 38(E)
of the Andhra P~adesh (Telengana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands
Act, 1950. The present appellant authority carried the matter in appeal
before the Division Bench of the High Court as noted earlier. That Writ c
Appeal came to be dismissed by the Division Bench by its order dated 11th
February 1985. It is this order of the Division Bench which is brought in
challenge in the present appeal after obtaining special leave to appeal from
this Court.
D
Facts leading to Civil Appeal No. 8422/95
arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 10746 of 1981.

This appeal is taken out by the Collector and Special Deputy Collec-
tor of Adilabad District in Andhra Pradesh. They have brought in chal-
lenge by special leave the judgment of the Full Bench of the Andhra E
Pradesh High Court rendered in Writ Petition No. 4204of1977 and group
decided on 21st August 1981. Respondent No. 3 herein had purchased the
disputed lands being Survey No. 33 measuring 0 acres and 17 cents and
Survey No. 34 measuring 13 acres and 02 cents situated at Nandagaon
Village in Adilabad Taluk of Adilabad District of Andhra Pradesh. Said F
area was declared to be a scheduled area as per the provisions of Regula-
tion I of 1959 as amended by Regulation II of 1963, being the ex-Telengana
area. These lands were purchased by respondent no. 3 under an Agreement
to Sell dated 10th May 1955 from one J aithu, a member of the scheduled
tribe. Respondent nos. 1 and 2 herein are said to be cultivating the said G
land as tenants of the third respondent. The land, survey No. 8 was
purchased under an Agreement of Sale dated 8th March 1963 by the
brother of the first respondent from the 4th respondent, who is a daughter
of the tribal Jaithu. Respondent nos. 3 and 4 are sons and daughters of
Jaithu. They filed a petition under Section 3(2) of the Regulation I of 1959
before the Special Deputy Collector alleging that the transfer of the lands H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A under the Agreements of Sale contravened the provisions of Section 3(1)
of the Regulation and that they were entitled to. be put back in the
possession of the said lands. Special Deputy Collector accepted their
request and held that respondent nos. 1 to 3 were in i!!_egal possession of
the lands and they were liable to restore the possession to the heirs of the
original tribal, that is, respondent nos. 4 and 5. This order was confirmed
B in appeal preferred by respondent nos. 1 to 3 to the District Collector, an
agent to the State Government. It was thereafter that respondent nos.1 to
3 filed ;writ petition No. 4204 of 1977 seeking a writ of mandamus for
quashing the orders of the Special Deputy Collector (Tribal Welfare) and
the Appellate Collector. This writ petition and other companion matters
C were ultimately placed for disposal on reference by a Division Bench of
the High Court before a Full Bench. The Full Bench of the High Court
speaking trough Ramachandra Rao, J., took the view that the provisions of
the Regulation were not retrospective in nature and could not invalidate
completed past transactions entered into in the scheduled area prior to
D the coming into force of Regulation I of 1959 as amended by Regulation
II of 1963 which applied to Adilabad area from 1.12.1963. Writ Petition
was accordingly allowed and the impugned orders were quashed. As noted
earlier the said decision of the Full Bench is brought on the anvil of scrutiny
by the appellant authorities in this appeal.

E Facts leading to Civil Appeal/No.8423/95
arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 1041of1986

This appeal is moved by Special Deputy Collector Tribal Welfare,
and the District Collector, Adilabad, being aggrieved by the judgment and
F order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. In Writ Appeal No. 52 of 1980
decided on 14th October 1985 by the impugned judgment the Division
bench of the High Court confirmed the order passed by learned Single
Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 4882 of 1977 decided on 13th
June 1979. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition moved by
G respondent herein and set aside the orders passed by the authorities below
under the Regulation. Respondent had purchased in 1942 10 acres and 34
guntas of Survey No. 92 of Sungapur Village in Asifabad Taluk of Adilabad
District from the father of one Madavi Nanu who was original respondent
-
no. 1 in the writ petition but who was not subsequently joined in the further
proceedings in writ appeal as respondent. Madavi's father was a tribal.
H Pursuant to the said sale in favour of respondent his name was recorded
DY. COLLECTOR v. S.V. RAMANAIAH [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 755

as occupant in the land records and in the Khasra Pahani of the year A
1954-55 and in the subsequent Pahani Partraks. The Special Deputy Col-
lector (Tribal Welfare) Adilabad issued a notice to respondent no. 3 under
Section 3(1) of the Regulation which came into force in the Telengan:a area
on 1.12.1963. Respondent was called upon to show cause why he should
not be evicted from the said land on the ground that possession of the B
respondent was in contravention of provisions of Section 3(1) of the
Regulation. Ultimately the said proceedings terminated against the respon-
dent. He was ordered to be evicted from the land in question and the land
was ordered to be restored to aforesaid Madavi. He unsuccessfully carried
the matter in appeal and thereafter filed Writ Petition No. 4882 of 1977 in
Andhra Pradesh High Court. Said writ petition was allowed by the learned C
Single Judge on 13th June 1979. The learned Judge took the view that the

- provisions of the Regulation did not affect the past transaction of 1942 in
favour of respondent. Appellants carried and matter in Writ Appeal which
came to be dismissed on 14th October 1985. As stated above the said
decision of the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 52 of 1980 is the subject D
matter of the present appeal.

Facts Leading to Civil Appeal No. 8424/95
Arising from S.L.P. (C) No. 2407 of 1986.

In this appeal appellant is one T. Rajaiah who has brought in E
challenge the order passed by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court dismissing appellant's Writ Appeal No. 406 of 1977 on
16.11.1985 and confirming the order of the learned Single Judge in Writ
Petition No. 2449 of 1977 dated 14th 1977. The appellant purchased 17
acres of Survey No. 28 situated at Dhanora Village in Asifabad Taluk of F
Adilabad District of Telengana area of Andhra Pradesh . He had pur-
chased said land on 3.6.1951 from one Mesram Gangu who was a tribal.
The third respondent herein being daughter of said Mesram Gangu filed
an application under Section 3(1) of the Regulation for restoration of
possession of the land on the ground that the appellant had purchased the
land from a tribal and, therefore, transaction in his favour was null and G
void under the said provisions. The Special Deputy Collector, Adilabad,
after hearing the parties, by his order dated 4th December 1975 directed
ejectment of appellant and restoration of land in favour of respondent no.
3 herein and one Naithan Bai another daughter of Mesram Gangu. The
~ appellant unsuccessfully carried the matter in appeal and then filed Writ H
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Petition No. 2449 of 1977 in the High Court against respondent nos. 1 and
2 and being the authorities whose orders were challenged and respondent
no. 3, the original applicant before the respondent no. 2. The said writ
petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on the ground that the
appellant had an alternative remedy by way of revision before State
authorities under the Regulation. It is this decision of the learned Single
B Judge which came to be confirmed by the Division Bench which dismissed
the appellant's writ appeal as aforesaid. That is how after obtaining special
leave to appeal from this Court the appellant has filed the present appeal.

Rival Contentions
c
Mrs. Amareshwari, learned senior counsel appearing for the appel-
lants - Deputy Collector and Collector in C.A. No. 2909/77, C.A. No. 6/91,
Civil Appeal arising from S.L.P. (C) No. 10746/81 and Civil Appeal arising ....
from S.L.P. (C) No. 1041/86, contended that the provisions of the Regula-
D tion I of 1959 as well as the amending Regulation II of 1963 and Regulation
I of 1970 had retrospective effect and consequently whether 'the transac-
tions pertaining to the lands in question situated within the schedule tracts
covered by the Regulations were entered into between tribal transferors
and non-tribal transferees or even for that matter between non-tribal
transferors and non-tribal transferees at any time in past got covered by
E the prohibitory and invalidating sweep of Section 3(1) of the Regulation,
that the Full Bench had committed a patent error of law in treating these
provisions as purely prospective. She alternatively contended that even
assuming that the provisions of these Regulations were prospective in
nature the concerned transferees after the coming into force of these
F Regulations in the scheduled areas were not entitled to continue in pos-
session as their possession became invalid at least from the dates on which
these Regulations applied to the areas where these lands were situated.
hence on that ground also the transactions were liable to be hit by Section
3(1) of the Regulation. Consequently the orders of eviction as passed by
the authorities below were rightly passed and could not have been inter-
G fered with by the High Court.

Learned advocates for the concerned contesting respondents on the
other hand submitted that the provisions of the Regulations in question are
purely prospective in nature as there is nq express provision made in these
H Regulations to make then retrospective from any back date, nor do the
DY. COLLECTOR v. S.V. RAMANAIAH [S.B. MAJMUDAR,J.) 757

wording of these Regulations exhibit any necessary intendment about A
retrospectivity. Consequently the High Court was right in holding these
Regulations· purely prospective in nature and therefore, concluding that
they could not affect the vested and accrued rights in favour of the
transferees pursuant to old transactions in their favour which had taken
effect years prior to the coming into operation of these Regulations.
B
Learned advocate appearing for the appellant in Civil Appeal arising
out of S.L.P. (C) No. 2407 of 1986 submitted that the High Court had
patently erred in dismissing his writ petition only on the ground of alter-
native remedy and when the Regulation itself was not retrospective in
character it could not affect the transaction in his favour entered into years C
back on 3.6.1951 even though the land was situated in Adilabad District
which ultimately got covered by the Regulation. And that if this Court takes
the view that the Regulation was prospective in nature and did not affect
past transactions then instead of relegating the appellant to the remedy of
revision before the State, his writ petition which was dismissed by the High D
Court may be allowed on merits. Mrs. Amareshwari, learned senior counsel
for the respondent- authorities reiterated her contentions in the other
appeals that the transaction was hit by the Regulation which was retrospec-
tive in effect and, therefore, appellant's writ petition be treated as dis-
missed also on merits and accordingly his appeal may be dismissed.
E
Before we deal with the question about the retrospectivity of the
Regulation in question it is necessary to note a few background facts
leading to the enactment of the Regulation.

Background facts leading to enactment of the Regulation
F
In the Andhra area, prior to the formation of the State of Andhra
Pradesh there existed before the inauguration of the Constitution certain
laws including The Agency Tracts Interest and Land Transfer Act, 1917
which, inter alia, prohibited transfer of land in the agency tracts areas
except in favour of members of hill tribes conferring upon the persons
belonging to the Scheduled Tribes certain benefits. After the Constitution G
of India came into force, Article 244 of the Constitution and the Fifth
Schedule were made applicable to the administration of the scheduled
areas. Para 6 of the Fifth Schedule empowered the President to notify the
Scheduled areas in consultation with the Governor of the State. The
scheduled areas in Andhra region of this State were notified by the H
758 SUPREME COUE.T REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A President through the Scheduled Area (Part 'A' States) Order, 1950. Para
5(2) of the Fifth Schedule empowered the Governor of the State to make
Regulations for the peace and good Government of the Sccheduled Areas.
Accordingly, the Governor made the A.P. Scheduled Areas Land Transfer
Regulations, 1959 (Regulation I of 1959). This Regulation came into force
with effect from 4.3.1959. Section 3(1) of this Regulation prohibited tram:-
B fer of immovable properties situated in the scheduled areas from a member
of scheduled tribal to non-tribals without previous sanction of the State
Government or subject to rules made in this behalf, with the previous
consent in writing of the Agent or of any prescribed officer. Similar laws
designed to protect .the tribals from exploitation were in operation in the
C Telengana area of the then State of Hyderabad. In exercise of powers
under paragraph 5(2) (a) of Fifth Schedule of the Constitution the Gover-
nor enacted the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Area Laws (Extensiop and
Amendment) Regulations, 1963 whereby certain rules and regulations
which already existed, and were in operation in the Andhra area of the
D State were extended to all parts of the State. The result was that the
Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulations_came to be
extended to the Telengana area of the State as well.

Under the 1959 Regulation, any transfer of immovable property
situated in the Agency Tracts, by a member of a Scheduled Tribe was
E declared null and void unless, made in favour of any other member of a
Scheduled Tribe or a registered cooperative society composed solely of
members of the Scheduled Tribes or with the previous consent in writing
of the Agent. The said Regulation further empowered the Agent to decree
ejectment against any person in possession of any immovable property, the
transfer of which was made in contravention of its provisions and to restore
F
it back to the transferor or his heirs. If the transferor or his heirs were not
willing to take the property or where their whereabouts were not known,
the Agent was further empowered to order assignment or sale of the
property to any other member of a Scheduled Tribe or a registered
cooperative society composed solely of members of the Scheduled Tribes
G or otherwise dispose of it, as if it was a property at the disposal of the State
Government.

However, as difficulties w'ere experienced by the Government in
implementing the ejectment procedures under the said Regulation, inas-
.H much as it was not always easy for the concerned authority to ascertain the
DY. COLLECTOR v. S.V. RAMANAIAH [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.) 759

origin of the right under which the non-tribal was claiming possession and A
whether the land now under the possession of a non-tribal was previously
acquired from a tribal or not, the said 1959 Regulation was amended by
the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer (Amendment)
Regulation, 1970 with a view to remedy the said mischief. The amending
Regulation of 1970 in order to facilitate effective enforcement of the said
B
1959 Regulations introduced inter-alia, the following charges, namely :

(i) A rule of presumption was introduced to the effect that unless
the contrary is proved, where a non-tribal is in possession of
land in the Scheduled areas, he or his predecessors-in-inter-
est, shall be deemed to have acquired in through transfer from C
a tribal;

(ii) Transfers of land in Scheduled Areas in favour of non-tribals
shall be wholly prohibited in future;

(iii) Non-tribals holding lands in the Scheduled Areas shall be D
prohibited from transferring their lands in favour of persons
other than tribals. Only partitions and devolution by succes-
sion of lands held by them shall be permitted; and

(iv) Where a tribal or non-tribal is unable to sell his land to a E
tribal on reasonable terms, it shall be open to him to sur-
render the land to Government who shall thereupon be
obliged to acquire it on payment of appropriate compensa-
tion.

Clause (a) of substituted section 3(1) rendered all the transfers made F
except those in favour of a tribal, to be null and void. Clause (b) of
sub-section (1) of Section 3 raises a presumption that any immovable
property in possession of a non-tribal would be presumed to have been
acquired by such person through a tribal. Clause (c) of sub-section (1) of
Section 3 provides for payment of compensation to the non-tribal at the
rate specified in Section 10 of Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural G
Holdings Act, 1961. The Andhra Pradesh Regulation No. 1 of 1970 inserts
sub-section (4) in Section 3 whereby 'transfer' has been defined to include
a sale in execution of a decree including a benami transaction. The only
species of transfer which has been excluded from the operation of the
regulation is partition or devolution by succession. Provision has been H
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A made for the ejectment of persons who came into possession of such lands
as a result of such transfers and for the restoration of land to the original
transferor or his heirs. By Regulation 1 of 1971 Section 3-A was introduced
whereby a mortgage without possession in favour of a Bank or institution
approved by the Government was permitted subject to certain conditions.
-
The Governor further framed a regulation to amend the Andhra Pradesh
B Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation, 1959, being A.P. Regulation
No. 1 of 1978 which came into force with effect from October 24, 1978.
Regulation No. I of 1978 inserted sections 3-B and 6-A. Section 3-B
prohibited registration of documents of transfer while sections 6-A and 6-B
respectively provided for punishment for acquiring any immovable proper-
c ty after a decree for ejectment was passed. The punishment is to the extent
of rigours imprisonment of one year or fine of Rs. 2000 or both. Section
6-B makes such an offence cognizable.

It may be stated that a Division Bench of this Court consisting of
M.P. Thakkar and B.C. Ray, JJ., by their decision dated 14th July 1988 in
D Civil Appeal Nos. 2299-2300 of 1972 upheld the validity of the provisions
of the Regulation in so far as they sought to declare as void any transfer
of immovable property in the agency tracts entered into even by a non-
tribal in favour of another non-tribal.

E Even though the aforesaid provisions of the Regulations represent a
species of welfare legislation for protecting the illiterate tribals from ex-
ploitation at the hands of non-tribals the short question which arises for
our consideration is as to whether these beneficial provisions have any
retrospective effect.

F Our conclusion and the reasons for the same

Having given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions can-
vassed for our consideration by the learned counsel appearing for the
respective parties we have reached the conclusion that the Full Bench of
G the High Court was perfectly justified in taking the view that on the express
language of the Regulation, it was prospective in nature and even by
necessary intendment it could not be posited that the framer of the
Regulation wanted to give it any retrospective effect. Reasons for our
aforesaid conclusion are obvious. The Regulation I of 1959 originally
applied only to scheduled areas of East Godavari, West Godavari, Vis-
H kahapatham and Srikakulam Districts. By amending Regulation II of 1963,
PY. COLLECTOR v. S.V. RAMANAIAH [S.B. MATMUDAR, J.) 761

it was extended to Telengana region comprising of Adilabad, Warangal, A
Khammam and Mahbubnagar Districts of Andhra Pradesh. That extension
to districts in Telengana area became effective from 1.12.1963. Clause
·(2)(a) of the Regulation defines 'Agency Tracts' to mean, 'the areas in the
districts of East Godavari, West Godavari, Viskhapatham, Srikakulam, (I)
Adilabad, Warangal, Khammam and Mahbubnagar declared, from time to B
-" time, as Scheduled Area by the President under sub-paragraphs (I) of
paragraph 6 of the Fifth Schedule to the constitution'. The term 'transfer'
is defined by Clause (2)(g) of ~he Regulation to mean, 'mortgage with or
without possession, lease, sale, gift, exchange or any other dealing with
immovable property, not being a testamentary disposition and includes a
charge on such property or a contract relating to such property in respect C
of such mortgage, lease sale, gift, exchange or other dealing'. Then follows
Section 3(1)(a) which is material for our present purpose. It is as under :

"3. (l)(a) - Notwithstanding any thing contained in any enactment,
rule or law in force in the Agency tracts, any transfer of immovable D
property situated in the Agency tracts by a person, whether or not
such person is a member of a Schedule Tribe, shall be absolutely
null and void, unless such transfer is made in favour of a person,
who is a member of a Scheduled Tribe or a society registered or
deemed to be registered under the AP. Cooperative Societies Act,
,._ 1964, which is composed solely of members of the Scheduled E
Tribes."

It may be noted that the words 'whether or not such person is a member
of a Scheduled Tribe' as found in Section 3(1)(a) were inserted by Regula-
tion I of 1970 meaning thereby prior to the amending Regulation coming F
into force Section 3(1)(a) hit transfers of immovable property situated in
agency tracts by only a member of a schedule tribe and if such transfer was
made by a non-tribal such transaction was outside the sweep of Section
3(1)(a). A close reading of Section 3(1)(a) indicates that after coming into
force of the said provision any tr an sfer of immovable property which is in G
the sweep of Section 3(1)(a) would be absolutely null and void unless the
transfer falls within the excluded category as mentioned in the said
provision. This Section nowhere indicates either expressly or even impliedly
that it is meant to adversely affect completed transactions of transfer which
might have taken place prior to the coming into force of Section 3(1)(a)
of the Regulation. Mrs. Amareshwari, learned senior counsel could not H
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A effectively urge that there was any such express indication of retrospectivity
in the said provision or any other part of the Regulation. It is obvious that
if Section 3(1)(a) was to apply retrospectively to hit even past transfers it
would have mentioned with reference to transfer of immovable property as
under:
B "Whether effected before or after coming into operation of this
Regulation."

Such or similar words are conspicuoosly absent. Therefore, Section 3(1)(a)
as it stands cannot be said to have any express retrospective effect. In this
c connection we may also mention one submission canvassed by learned
senior counsel for the authorities. She contended that Section 3 sub-section
(l)(b) indicates such a retrospective effect. The said provision which 1s
noted earlier reads as under :

"3(1)(b). Until the contrary is proved, any immovable property
D situated in the Agency tracts and in the possession of a person
who is not a member of a Scheduled Tribe, shall be presumed to
have been acquired by such person or his predecessor in. posses-
sion through a transfer made to him by a member of a Scheduled
Tribe."
E It is difficult to appreciate how this provision can be of any assistance to
the learned senior counsel, for urging any retrospective operation of Sec-
tion 3. Section 3(1)(b) enacts a rule of evidence which may be pressed in
service in a properly constituted enquiry in cases where the main provision
of Section 3(1)(a) gets attracted meaning thereby if in connection with any
F transfers of immovable property situated in Agency tracts effected after the
coming into operation of Section 3(l)(a), a question arises whether the
transfer was made by a transferor who was a member of a Scheduled Tribe
and if it is shown that such transferred land was in possession of a
non-tribal, a rebuttable presumption would arise under Section 3(1)(b),
G that such transferor was a member of Scheduled Tribe. This provision has
nothing to do with any retrospective effect of Section 3(1)(a) itself does it
even remotely indicate that because of the rule of evidence enacted in
Section 3(1)(b), even prior completed transfers would also be covered by
the sweep of Section 3(1)(a).

H Next Mrs. Amareshwari submitted that at least by necessary implica-
DY. COLLECTOR v. S.V. RAMANAIAH [S.B. MATMUDAR, J.] 763

tion such retrospectivity can be culled out and for that purpose she invited A
our attention to Sections 9 and (10(1) of the Regulation. The said
provisions read as under :

"9. The Agency Tracts Interest and Land Transfer Act, 1917
(Madras Act I of 1917) is hereby repealed to the extent to which
any of the provisions contained therein correspond, or are repug- B
nant, to any of the provisions contained in this Regulation.

10. (1) The provisions contained in this Regulation shall not effect-

(a) Any transfer made or sale effected in execution of a decree C
before the commencement of the Agency Tracts Interest and
Land Transfer Act, 1917 (Madras Act 1 of 1917), or

(b) Any transfer made or sale effected in execution of a decree
after the commencement of the said Act and before the commen-
cement of this Regulation, if such transfer or sale was valid under D
the provisions of the said Act."

·we fail to appreciate how the said Sections can be of any avail to the
learned senior counsel for establishing the case of implied retrospective
effect of the Regulation. Section 9 deals with the repeal of the erstwhile E
Agency Tracts Interest and Land Transfer Act, 1917. It is not in dispute
between the parties that the said Act of 1917 did not apply to Telengana
area. Consequently reference to Section 9 in connection with lands situated
in Telengana area becomes irrelevant. Similarly Section 10 which effect
savings in cases where the earlier Act of 1917 which had applied stood
repealed by Section 9, also becomes irrelevant. However, so far as areas
F
which were earlier governed by the Act of 1917 are concerned, even for
them, we fail to appreciate, how Section 9 can be pressed in service by
learned senior counsel for the appellant authorities to cull out an implied
retro~pective effect of the Regulation. In order to show that Section 3 of
the Regulation had any implied retrospective effect provisions pertaining G
to rep1.:a1 and savings contained in Sections 9 and 10 would be of no
a'ssistance. No other provisions of the Regulation could be pressed in
service by learned senior counsel for supporting her contention that Sec-
tion 3(1)(a) was retrospective by any necessary implication. It is obvious
that transactions which have taken place years back prior to the very parent H
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Regulation No. 1 of 1959 seeing the light of the day, and which had created
vested rights in favour of the transferees could not be adversely affected
by the sweep of Section 3(1). It cannot be said to have any implied
retrospective effect which would nullify and confiscate pre-existing vested
rights in favour of the concerned transferees, transfers in whose favour had
become final and binding and were not hit by the then· existing provisions
B
of any nullifying statutes. In this connection we may usefully refer to
Francis Bennion's Statutory Interpretation, Second Edition at page 214
wherein the learned author, in Section 97, deals with retrospective opera-
tion of Acts. The learned author has commented on this aspect as under :

c "The essential idea of a legal system is that current law should
govern current activities. Elsewhere in this work a particular Act
is likened to a floodlight switched on or off, and the general body
of law to the circumambient air'. Clumsy though these images are,
they show the inappropriateness of retrospective laws. If we do
D something today, we feel that the law applying to it should be the
law in force today, not tomorrow's backward adjustment of it. Such,
we believe, is the nature of law. Dislike of ex post facto law is
enshrined in the United States Constitution and in the constitutions
of many American states, which forbid it. The true principle is that
E lex prospicit non respicit (law looks forward not back). As Willes
J said, retrospective legislation is 'contrary to the general principle
that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated
ought, when introduced for the first time, to deal with future acts,
and ought not to change the character of past transactions carried
F on upon the faith of the then existing law."

Retrospectivity is artificial, deeming a thing to be what it was
not. Artificiality and make-believe are generally repugnant to law
as the servant of human welfare. So it follows that the courts apply
the general presumption that an enactment is not intended to have
G retrospective effect. As always, the power of Parliament to produce
such an effect where it wishes to do so is nevertheless undoubted.
The general presumption, which therefore applies only unless the
contrary intention appears, is stated in Maxwell on the Interpreta-
tion of Statutes in the following emphatic terms: 'It is a fundamental
H rule of English law that no statute shall be construed to have a
DY. COLLECTOR v. S.V. RAMANAIAH [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 765

retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very A
clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct
implication.'

Maxwell's statement has received frequent judicial approval. It
is however too dogmatically framed, and describes as a rule what
(for reasons stated in Code s 180) is really no more than a B
presumption which, in the instant case, may be outweighed by other
factors. Where, on a weighing of the factors, it seems that some
retrospective effect was intended, the general presumption against
1 etrospectivity indicates that this should be kept to as narrow a
compass as will accord with the legislative intention." c
Mr. Bobde, learned counsel appearing for the respondents as amicus
curiae at of request, invited our attention to a decision of this Court in the
case of R. Rajagopal Reddy (Dead) by Lrs. and Others v. Padmini
Chandrasekharan (Dead) by Lrs., (1995) 2 SCC 630 wherein one of us
(Majmudar, J.) speaking for a Three Judge Bench on the question of D
retrospective effect of a statutory provision observed as under :

"...... Even otherwise, it is now well settled that where a statutory
provision which is not expressly made retrospective by the legisla-
ture seeks to affect vested rights and corresponding obligations of E
parties, such provision cannot be said to have any retrospective
effect by necessary implication. In. Maxwell on the Interpretation of
Statutes, 12th Edn. (1969), the learned author has made the follow-
ing observations based on various decisions of different courts,
specially in Re: Athlunmey, (1898) 2 Q.B. at pp.551, 552:
F
"Perhaps no rule of construction is more firmly established
than this - that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a
statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise
than as regards matters of procedure, unless that effect cannot be
avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment.
If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable G
of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective
only. ' The rule has , in fact, two aspects, for it, 'involves another
and subordinate rule, to the effect that a statute is not to be
construed so as to have a greater retrospective operation than its
language renders necessary." H
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A In the case of Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhary, AIR
(1957) SC 540 at p.553, para 25) Chief Justice S.R. Das speak;ing
for this Court has made the following pertinent observations in this
connection :

'The golden rule of construction is that, in the absence of anyi:hing
B
in the enactment to show that it is to have retrospective operation,
it cannot be so construed as to have the effect of altering the law
applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the Act was
passed."'

c Therefore, we agree with the submission of Mr. Bobde learned counsel for
respondents, that the provisions of Section 3(1) of the Regulation are
purely prospective it). nature and do not affect past transactions of transfers
effected between tribals and non-tribals or between non-tribals and non-
tribals themselves in the Agency Tracts at a time when neither Regula!ion
D I of 1959 nor Regulation II of 1963 or Regulation I of 1970 was in force.
Such ·past transaction remained untouched by the sweep of the aforesaid
subsequently enacted Regulations.

Mrs. Amareshwari, learned senior counsel in the alternative con-
tended that even assuming that all these Regulations do not adversely affect
E past transactions even then, after the coming into force of these Regula-
tions in the concerned Agency Tracts, the possession of erstwhile trans-
ferees would become illegal and get hit by Section 3(1) of the Regulation.
It is not possible to agree with this contention for the simple reason that
before the continued possession is found fault with, it must be shown that
F the initial entry of the transferee was violative of any provision of law or
that by any subsequent statute such continuance of possession under an
originally valid .transaction, would get adversely affected. Section 3(1)
nowhere whispers about such an eventuality. On the contrary, employment
of terminology to the effect, "transfer of immovable property situated in
the Agency tracts by a person, whether or not such person is a member of
G a Scheduled Tribe, shall be absolutely null and void, unless such transfer
is made in favour of a person who is a member of a Scheduled tribe" clearly
indicates that Section 3(1)(a) seeks to hit only those transfers which take
place after the coming into force of that provision and when such transfers
are found to be absolutely null and void then only the question of continued
H illegal possession of such transferee and of evicting such transferee from'
DY. COLLECTOR v. S.V. RAMANAIAH [S.B. MATMUDAR, J.] 767

the land and restoration of such land to the transferor would arise under A
.....-Section 3(2)(a). The said provision reads as under :

"3. (2)(a). Where a transfer of immovable property is made in
contravention of sub-section (I), the Agent, the Agency Divisional
Officer or any other prescribed officer may, on application by any B
one interested, or on information given in writing by a public
servant, or suo-motu decree ejectment against any person in pos-
session of the property claiming under the transfer after due notice
to him in the manner prescribed and may restore it to the trans-
feror or his heirs."
c
On a conjoint reading of Section 3(1)(a) and Section 3(2)(a), it becomes
clear that the Section seeks to hit the transfers effected after the Section
came into force and possession only under such invalid transfers is sought
to be dealt with for the purpose of eviction of transferees and restoration
of possession to transferors, as the case may be, under Section 3(2)(a) of D
the Regulation. Consequently, the alternative submission of learned senior
counsel for the authorities that even though transfer of immovable property
in the Agency tracts may not be hit by Section 3(1)(a) still possession under
such transfers could be restored to the original transferor under Section
3(2)(a), cannot be countenanced. Section 3(2)(a) is a corollary to Section
3(1)(a) and cannot have any independent role to play. Nor can it cover any E
area which is not encompassed by the sweep of Section 3(1)(a). In this
connection Mrs. Amareshwari, learned senior counsel also invited our
attention to two decisions of this Court. Mrs. Amareshwari, learned senior
counsel for the appellant authorities invited our attention to a Constitution
Bench judgment of this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and Another v. F
The State of Vindhya Pradesh, [1953] SCR 1188. In that case the Constitu-
tion Bench of this Court speaking through Jagannadhadas J ., had to
consider whether prohibition of Article 20 of the Constitution against
convictions and subjections to penalty would cover ex post facto laws
passed before the Constitution was promulgated. Answering the question
in the affirmative it was observed that the prohibition contained in Article G
20 of the Constitution against convictions and subjections to penalty u~der
ex post facto laws is not confined in its·operation to post-Constitution laws
but applied also to ex post facto laws passed before the Constitution in
their application to pending proceedings. We fail to appreciate how this
decision can be of any avail to the learned senior counsel for the appellant H
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A authorities. On the wording of Article 20 the aforesaid view was taken by
the Constitution Bench. The wordings of Section 3(1)(a) read with Section
3(2)(a) of the Regulation are entirely different and they have to be con-
strued in their own light. The learned senior counsel Mrs. Amareshwari
then invited our attention to another decision of the Constitution Bench of
this Court in Bishun Narain Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others,
B [1965] 1 SCR 693. In that case Wanchoo J., speaking for the Constitution
Bench had to examine the effect of a rule promulgated by Government of
Uttar Pradesh under Article 309 of the Constitution reducing the age of
superannuation of Government servants from 58 years to 55 years. The
appellant before this Court who got hit by the said rule raised various
c contentions one of which was that the rule was retrospective in character·
and, therefore, bad as no notification promulgating the rule could be made
with retrospective effect. Repelling this contention it was held by the
Constitution Bench that there was no retrospectivity of the rule. All that it
provided was that from the date it came into force the age of retirement
D would be 55 years. The rule would operate only for the period after it came
into force. Nor did the proviso make it retrospective. It only provided as
to how the period of service beyond 55 years should be treated in view of
the earlier rule of 1957 which was being changed by the rule of 1961. The
second order issued on the same day clearly showed that there was no
retrospective operation of the rule for in actual fact no Government servant
E below 58 years was retired before the date of the new rule i.e. May 25,
1961. Thus the new rule reducing the age of retirement from 58 years to
55 years could not be held to be retrospective. It is difficult to appreciate
how this judgment can be of any avail to learned senior counsel for the
appellant authorities, because the appellant in that case continued in
F Government service and at that time the new rule reducing the age of
superannuation came into force his superannuation was governed by the
new rule reducing the age of superannuation from 58 to 55 years. There
was no question of any retrospective effect of the said rule. But the new
rule clearly covered the then existing service conditions of Government
servants who were still in service. Section 3(1) of the Regulation cannot be
G supported on the ratio of that judgment to nullify vested rights under past
completed transactions. As we have already discussed earlier, Section
3(1)(a) read with Section 3(2)(a) of the Regulation seeks to hit only those
transfers of lands in Agency tracts which take place after the advent of
Section 3(1)(a) of the Regulation. Possessions under transfers which are
H
DY. COLLECTOR v. S.V. RAMANAIAH [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 769

beyond the sweep of Section 3(1)(a) cannot be said to have continued A
under any invalid transfers as invested by Section 3(1)(a). Such possessions
obtained under the then existing old and valid transfers would be outside
the ken of the Regulation itself. The alternative submission canvassed by
learned senior counsel for the authorities, therefore, also has no substance
and has got to be rejected.
B
These were the only contentions canvassed in support of the appeals
preferled by the authorities under the Regulation. There is no substance
in these contentions. It must be held that as the transfers in these cases
were effected years back, prior to the coming into force of the Regulations
in question, they could not be covered by these Regulations. The c
authorities acting under the Regulations had no jurisdiction to deal with
them. In the result the Civil Appeal Nos. 2909 of 1977; 6 of 1991; Civil
Appeal No. 8422/95 arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 10746 of 1981 and Civil
Appeal No. 8423/95 arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 1041of1986 will have to
be dismissed.
D
Before parting with these appeals we have to place on record our
appreciation for the assistance rendered by Mr. Bobde, learned counsel
who on our request was good enough to appear amicus curiae for the
respondents in these cases.
E
So far as Civil Appeal No. 8424/95 arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 2407
of 1986 is concerned, though the High Court had dismissed the writ
petition on the ground of alternative remedy, in view of our decision on
the main controversy and our finding that the provisions of the Regulation
would not hit transaction of transfers entered into prior to coming into F
force of the Regulation this appeal is required to be allowed on merits. In
the present case even though the sale was of the land situated in Adilabad
District of Telengana region which was forming a part and parcel of the
Agency tracts, as the transaction was of 3.6.1951, much prior to the coming
into force of the Regulation I of 1959 as amended by regulation II of 1963
which become effective in Adilabad from 31.12.1963, this transaction was G
outside the sweep of Section 3(1) of the Regulation. Consequently no
useful purpose would be served by relegating the appellant to the remedy
of revision before the State authorities when this question is concluded by
our present judgment. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgments
of the Division Bench of the High Court and that of learned Single Judge H
770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A are set aside. Writ Petition filed by the appellant before the High Court is
allowed. The orders of the authorities below against the appellant passed
under Section 3(1)(a) read with Section 3(2)(a) of the Regulation will stand
quashed and set aside. As these appeals are being disposed of on a
question of law and keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the
cases, even though the appeals by the authorities are dismissed and the last
B
appeal moved by T. Rajaiah arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 2407 of 1986 is
allowed, there will be no order as to costs in all these appeals. •

R.A. Appeals dismissed.