THE DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, KSRTCversusM.G. VITTAL RAO

              [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 1089


         THE DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, KSRTC                     A
                             v.
                     M.G. VITTAL RAO
             (Civil Appeal No. 9933 of 2011)
                   NOVEMBER 18, 2011
                                                              B
     [DR. 8.5. CHAUHAN AND T.S. THAKUR, JJ.]

    Labour laws:

      Dismissal from service - Theft committed by the c
respondent-workman - Domestic enquiry found the workman
guilty - Labour Court held that the enquiry was conducted
strictly in accordance with law in a fair manner a.nd charges
were rightly proved against the workman and imposed
punishment of dismissal - Workman filed writ petition praying 0
 that he stood acquitted in the criminal case and, therefore, he
 was entitled for all reliefs including re-instatement and back
 wages - Single Judge of High Court modified the order of the
dismissal into an order of termination and directed the
employer to pay the terminal benefits - Writ appeal by E
workman - Division Bench of the High Court quashed the
award of the Labour Court and held that the respondent was
entitled to reinstatement into service with all consequential
benefits - On appeal, held: The Single Judge as well as the
Division Bench simply decided the case taking into
consideration the acquittal of delinquent employee and F
nothing else - There was no finding by the High Court that
the charges leveled in the domestic enquiry had been the
same which were in the criminal trial - Single Judge had
granted relief to the respondent-workman which was not
challenged by the employer by filing writ appeal - The · G
workman shall be entitled only to the relief granted by the writ
court and the judgment and order of the court in writ appeal
is set aside.

                           1089                               H
    1090 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 14 (ADDL.} S.C.R.


A      Dismissal from service - Workman found guilty of theft
  and imposed punishment of dismissal - However in the
  criminal case he was acquitted of all the charges - Plea of
  reinstatement - Held: The question of considering
  reinstatement after the decision of acquittal or discharge by
B a competent Criminal Court would arise only and only if the
  dismissal from services was based on conviction by the
  criminal court in view of the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of
  the Constitution of India or analogous provisions in the
  statutory rules applicable in a case - In a case where enquiry
c has been held independently of the criminal proceedings,
  acquittal in a criminal court is of no help - Constitution of India,
  1950 - Article 311(2)(b).
     I

        Misconduct - Theft - Loss of confidence - Plea of
  reinstatement - Held: Once the employe; has lost confidence
D in the employee and the bona fide loss of confidence is
  affirmed, the order of punishment must be considered to be
  immune from challenge, for the reason that discharging the
  office of trust and confidence requires absolute integrity, and
  in a case of loss of confidence, reinstatement cannot be
E directed - In case of theft, the quantum of theft is not important
  and what is important is the loss of confidence of employer
  in employee.
        Departmental proceedings vis-8-vis criminal proceedings
  - Standard of proof - Held: While in departmental
F proceedings, the standard of 'proof is one of preponderance
  of probabilities, in a criminal case, the charge has to be
  proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt - As the
  standard of proof in both the proceedings is quite different,
  and termination is not based on mere conviction of an
G employee in a criminal case, the acquittal of the employee
  in criminal case cannot be the basis of taking away the effect
  of departmental proceedings - Nor can such an action of the ·
  departmeat be termed as double jeopardy - Facts, charges
  and nature of evidence etc. involved in an individual case
H would determine as to whether decision of acquittal would
  DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, KSRTC v. M.G VITIAL 1091
                    RAO

have any bearing on the findings recorded in the domestic   A
enquiry - Evidence.

    The case of the appellant-employer company was
that the respondent-employee was caught red handed
while he was committing theft from cash chest of the
                                                            8
appellant company. The Inquiry Officer found that
charges against the respondent were proved. ·The
Disciplinary Authority concurred with the findings
recorded by the Inquiry Officer and imposed the
punishment of dismissal of the respondent w.e.f.
14.2.1997. On reference, the Labour Court held that the     C
departmental enquiry was fair and proper and charges
were rightly held to be proved against the respondent.

      While the respondent-workman was facing
disciplinary proceedings, he was also facing the criminal   D
trial for the offences punishable under Sections 457, 381
read with Section 34, IPC. He was ultimately acquitted in
the criminal case.

     The respondent filed a writ petition before the High E
Court challenging the award of the Labour Court. The
Single Judge of the High Court modified the order of the
dismissal into an order of termination and the appellant
company was directed to pay the terminal benefits.
However respondent was held to be not entitled to any
wages or other monetary benefits till the date of his F
termination. On appeal, the Division Bench of the High
Court quashed the award of the Labour Court and held
that the respondent was entitled to be reinstated into
service with all consequential benefits, however, since
the respondent had retired from service, he was entitled G
to 50% of the back wages. The instant appeal was filed
challenging the order of the High Court.
    Disposing of the appeal, the Court
                                                            H
    1092 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A     HELD: 1.1. The question of considering reinstatement
  after the decision of acquittal or discharge by a
  competent Criminal Court would arise only and only if the
  dismissal from services was based on conviction by the
  Criminal Court in view of the provisions of Article 311 (2)
B (b) of the Constitution of India, 1950, or analogous
  provisions in the statutory rules applicable in a case. In
  a case where enquiry has been held independently of the
  criminal proceedings, acquittal in a Criminal Court is of
  no help. The law is otherwise. Even if a person stood
c acquitted by a criminal Court, domestic enquiry can be
  held, the reason being that the standard of proof required
  in a domestic enquiry and that in a criminal case are
  altogether different. In a criminal case, standard of proof
  required is beyond reasonable doubt while in a domestic
  enquiry, it is the preponderance of probabilities that
0
  constitutes the test to be applied. [Para 8] [1102-C-F]
       Nelson Motis v. Union of India & Anr. AIR 1992 SC
  1981: 1992 (1)Suppl. SCR 325; State of Karnataka & Anr.
  v. T. Venkataramanappa (1996) 6 SCC 455: 1996 (6) Suppl.
E SCR 607; State of Andhra Pradesh v. K. A/labaksh (2000)
  10 SCC 177; Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ) Indian
  Oil Corporation Ltd. (2005) 7 SCC 764: 2005 (3) Suppl. SCR
  314; State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena & Ors. AIR 1997 SC
  13: 1996 (7) Suppl. SCR 68; Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat
F Gold Mines Ltd. AIR 1999 SC 1416; Delhi Cloth and General
  Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan AIR 1960 SC 806; Tata Oil Mills
  Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen AIR 1965 SC 155: 1964 SCR 555;
  Jang Bahadur Singh v. Baij Nath Tiwari AIR 1969 SC 30:
  1969 SCR 134; Kusheshwar Dubey v. Mis. Bharat Coking
G Goa/Ltd. & Ors1 AIR 1988 SC 2118: 1988 (2) Suppl. SCR
    579 - relied on.
       1.2. In departmental proceedings, factors prevailing
  in the mind of the disciplinary authority may be many,
  such as enforcement of discipline or to investigate level
H of integrity of delinquent or other staff. While in
 DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, KSRTC v. M.G. VITTAL 1093
                   RAO

 departmental proceedings, the standard of proof is one       A
 of preponderance of probabilities, in a criminal case, the
 charge has to be proved by the prosecution beyond
 reasonable doubt .. Where the charge against the
delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves
complicated questions of law and fact, it is desirable to     B
stay the departmental proceedings till conclusion of the
criminal case. In case the criminal case does not proceed
expeditiously, the departmental proceedings cannot be
kept in abeyance forever and may be resumed and
proceeded with so as to conclude the same at an early         c
date. The purpose is that if the employee is found not
guilty his cause may be vindicated, and in case he is
found guilty, administration may get rid of him at the
earliest. As the standard of proof in both the proceedings
is quite different, and the termination is not based on
                                                              0
mere conviction of an employee in a criminal case, the
acquittal of the employee in criminal case cannot be the
basis of taking away the effect of departmental
proceedings. Nor can such an action of the department
IJe termed as double jeopardy. Facts, charges and nature
of evidence etc. involved in an individual case would         E
determine as to whether decision of acquittal would have
any bearing on the findings recorded in the domestic
enquiry. [Paras 13, 19] [1105-H; 1106-A-D]

     State Bank of India & Ors. v. R.B. Sharma AIR 2004 SC    F
4144; Depot Manager, Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport
Corporation v. Mohd Yousuf Miya & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 2232:
1996 (8) Suppl. SCR 941; Senior Superintendent of Post
Offices v. A Gopalan AIR 1999 SC 1514: 1997 (11) SCC
239; Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Ors. v. T. Srinivas AIR   F
2004 SC 4127; Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bhartiya Chah
Mazdoor Sangh & Anr. (2004) 8 SCC 200; Commissioner of
Police Delhi v. Narendra Singh AIR 2006 SC 1800: 2006 (3)
SCR 872; South Bengal State Transport Corporation v. Span
Kumar Mitra & Ors. (2006) 2 SCC 584: 2006 (2) SCR 30;         H
    1094 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A Punjab Water s·upply & Sewerage Board v. Ram Sajivan
  (2007) 9 SCC 86: 2007 (5) SCR 684 Union of India & Ors. v.
  Naman Singh Shekhawat (2008) 4 SCC 1: 2008 (5) SCR 137
  Pandiyan Roadways Corpn. Ltd. v. N. Balakrishnan (2007) 9
  SCC 755: 2007 (6) SCR 873; Ram Tawekya Sharma v. State
B of Bihar & Ors. (2008) 8 SCC 261: 2008 (12) SCR 452; Roop
  Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank & Ors. (2009) 2 SCC
  570: 2008 (17) SCR 1476 - relied on.

    2. LOSS OF CONFIDENCE

C      Once the employer has lost the confidence in the
  employee and the bona fide loss of confidence is
  affirmed, the order of punishment must be considered to
  be immune from challenge, for the reason that
  discharging the office of trust and confidence requires
D absolute integrity, and in a case of loss of confidence,
  reinstatement cannot be directed. In case of theft, the
  quantum of theft is not important and what is important
  is the loss of confidence of employer in employee. The
  instant case is examined in the light of the said settled
E legal proposition and keeping in view that judicial review
  is concerned primarily with the decision making process
  and not the decision itself. More so, it is a settled legal
  proposition that in a case of misconduct of grave nature
  like corruption, theft, no punishment other than the
F dismissal may be appropriate. [Paras 20-23] [1109-D-E;
  1110-D-H; 1111-A-C]

       Air India. Corpqration Bombay v. V.A. Ravel/ow AIR 1972
  SC 1343: 1972 (3) SCR 606; Francis Kalein & c.o. Pvt. Ltd.
  v. Their Workmen AIR 1971 SC 2414; Bharat Heavy
G Electricals Ltd. v. M. Chandrashekhar Reddy & Ors. AIR 2005
  SC 2769: 2005 (2) SCC 481; Kanhaiyalal Agrawal & Ors. v.
  Faetory Manager, Gwa/iar Sugar Co. Ltd. AIR 2001 SC 3645:
  2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 8; Sudhir Vishnu Panvalkar v. Bank of
  India AIR 1997 SC 2249: 1997 (6) SCC 271; State Bank of
H India & Anr. v. Bela Bagchi & Ors. AIR 2005 SC 3272: 2005
    DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, KSRTC v. M.G. VITIAL 1095
                      RAO
  (2) Suppl. SCR 1084; Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional A
  Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (1996) 9 SCC 69: 1996
  (1) Suppl. SCR 314; Binny Ltd. v. Their Workmen & Anr. AIR
  1972 SC1975: 1972 (3) SCR 518; The Binny Ltd. v. Their
  Workmen AIR 1973 SC 1403: 1974 (3) SCC 152; Anil
  Kumar Chakraborty & Anr. v. Mis. Saraswatipur Tea B
  Company Ltd. & Ors. AIR 1982 SC 1062: 1982 (2) SCC 328;
  Chandu Lal v. The Management of Mis. Pan American World
  Airways Inc. AIR 1985 SC 1128: 1985 (2) SCC 727; Kamal
  Kishore Lakshman v. Management of Mis. Pan American
  World Airways Inc. & Ors. AIR 1987 SC 229: 1987 (1) SCC c
  146; Mis. Pear/ite Liners Pvt. Ltd. v. Manorama Sirsi, AIR 2004
  SC 1373: 2004 (1) SCR 266; Indian Airlines Ltd. v. Prabha
  D.Kanan AIR 2007 SC 548: 2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 1027; A.P.
  SRTC v. Raghuda Shiva Sankar Prasad AIR 2007 SC 152:
  2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 625; U.P. State Road Transport
                                                                  0
  Corporation v. Suresh Chand Sharma (2010) 6 SCC 555:
  2010 (7) SCR 239 - relied on.

         3. The domestic enquiry found the respondent-
    workman guilty of all the charges. The Labour Court after
    reconsidering the whole case came to the conclusion that     E
    the enquiry was conducted strictly in accordance with
    law in a fair manner and charges were rightly proved
  · against the delinquent employee. However, considering
    the difference in the standard of proof required in
    domestic enquiry, vis-a-vis "that applicable to a criminal   F
    case, the Labour Court repelled the argument of
    respondent-workman that once he stood acquitted, he
  . was entitled for all reliefs including re-instatement and
  . back wages. The Single Judge as well as the Division
0
    Bench had simply decided the case taking into                G
    consideration the acquittal of delinquent employee and
    nothing else. There was no finding by the High Court that
    the charges leveled in the domestic enquiry had been the
    same which were in the criminal trial; the witnesses had
    been the same; there were no additional or extra             H
    1096 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A witnesses; and without considering the gravity of the
  charge, the award of the Labour Court did not warrant
  any interference. The Single Judge had granted relief to
  the respondent-workman which was not challenged by
  the present appellant by filing writ appeal. Therefore, the
B respondent-workman was entitled for the said relief. The
  respondent-workman shall be entitled only tc the relief
  granted by the writ court and the judgment and order of
  the court in writ appeal is set aside. [Paras 24-26) [1111-
  D-H; 1112-A-C]
c                      Case Law Reference:
     1992 (1) Suppl. SCR 325     relied on       Para 8
     1996 (6) Suppl. SCR 607     relied on       Para 9
D    (2000) 1o sec 111           relied on       Para 10
     2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 314     relied on       Para 11
     1996 (7) Suppl. SCR 68      relied on       Para 12
     AIR 1999 SC 1416            relied on       Para 13, 19
E
    AIR 1960 SC BOG              relied on       Para 13
     1964 SCR 555                relied on       Para 13
    1969 SCR 134                 relied on       Para 13
F
    1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 579      relied on       Para 13
    AIR 2004 SC 4144             relied on       Para 14
    1996 (8) Suppl. SCR 941      relied on       Para 15
G   1997 (11) sec 239            relied on       Para 16
    AIR 2004 SC 4127             relied on       Para 16
    (2004) 8 sec 200             relied· on      Para 16

H   2006 (3) SCR 872             relied on       Para 16
 DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, KSRTC v. M.G. VITTAL 1097
                   RAO

 2006 (2) SCR 30            relied on    Para 16      A

 2007 (5) SCR 684           relied on    Para 16

 2008 (5) SCR 137           relied on    Para 17

 2007 (6) SCR 873           relied on    Para 18      B
 2008 (12) SCR 452          relied. on   Para 18

 2008 (17) SCR 1476         relied on    Para 18

 1972 (3) SCR 606           relied on    Para 20
                                                      c
 AIR 1971 SC 2414           relied on    Para 20

 2005 (2) sec 481           relied on    Para 20

 2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 8      relied on    Para 20
                                                      D
 1997 (6) sec 211           relied on    Para 20

 2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 1084   relied on    Para 21

 1996 (1) Suppl. SCR 314    relied on    Para 21

 1972 (3) SCR 518           relied on    Para 22      E
 1974 (3) sec 152           relied on    Para 22

 1982 (2) sec 328           relied on    Para 22

 1985 (2) sec 121           relied on    Para 22
                                                      F
 1987 (1) sec 146           relied on    Para 22

 2004 (1) SCR 266           relied on    Para 22

 2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 1027   relied on    Para 22
                                                      G
 2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 625    relied on    Para 22

 2010 (7) SCR 239           relied on    Para 23

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
9933 of 2011.                                         H
                     ,

    1098 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A       From the Judgment & Order dated 27 .10.2009 of the High
    Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in W.A.No. 702 of 2009 (L-
    KSRTC).
        S.N. Bhat for the Appellant. ·
B       V.N. Raghupathy for the Respondent.

        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. Leave granted.
c      2. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment
  and order dated 27.10.2009 passed by the High Court of
  Karnataka at Bangalore in Writ Appeal No. 702 of 2009, by
  which it has dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant
  against the judgment and order dated 27.1.2009 passed by the
D learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition No. 14354 of
  2007 of the respondent-workman against the Award of the
  Labour Court dated 17.2.2005.

        3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are:-
E
         (A)   The respondent employee while working as helper
               in the appellant-Corporation in 1986 was subjected
               to disciplinary proceedings vide charge-sheet
               dated 4.2.1987 which contained the article of
               charges mainly on the allegations that on 3.10.1986
F              the respondent stayed away beyond his duty hours
               at his place of employment i.e., Divisional
               Workshop and opened the door of the blacksmith
               Section with the aid of a duplicate key and pulled
               the gas cylinder trolley and equipment from
G              blacksmith Section to the cash room alongwith four
               other employees of the appellant-Corporation and
               opened the inner door of the cash room by cutting
               the padlock and used the gas cylinder equipment
               for committing the theft from cash chest.
H
DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, KSRTC v. M.G. VITIAL 1099
         RAO [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

   (B)   The Divisional Traffic Officer was appointed as the       A
         enquiry officer by the Disciplinary Authority vide
         order dated 11.11.1993 to enquire into the charges
         leveled against the respondent in the disciplinary
         proceedings. During the course of enquiry, the
         management witnesses clearly stated that the              B
         respondent was present at the place of incident. On
         the basis of the material produced on behalf of the
         management, the enquiry officer found the charges
         leveled against the respondent proved and
         accordingly the enquiry report was filed.                 c
   (C)   The Disciplinary Authority after considering the
         material on record concurred with the findings
         recorded by the Inquiry Officer and after completing
         the legal formalities imposed the punishment of
         dismissal of the respondent from service w.e.f..          D
         14.2.1997.

   (D)   The respondent raised the industrial dispute. Thus,
         the State Government made a Reference to the
         Principal Labour Court for adjudication of the            E
         dispute and the same came to be registered as
         Reference No.6 of 1999. On the basis of pleadings,
         the Labour Court framed various issues for its
         consideration, inter-alia, as to whether the
         departmental enquiry conducted against the                F
         respondent was fair and proper.

  (E)    The Labour Court by its order dated 20.11.2004
         arrived at the conclusion that the departmental
         enquiry conducted against the respondent was fair
         and proper. By its award dated 17.2.2005, the             G
         Court answered the reference in negative holding
         that there was sufficient evidence before the enquiry
         officer to hold that the ·respondent with his colludsrs
         had active!~ involved in breaking and opening .the
         door of the cash room and drilling the cash chest         H
    1100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A                    to commit the theft. The respondent was caught red
                     handed and hence the charges were rightly held to
                     be proved.

               (F)   Being aggrieved by the said award of the Labour
                     Court, the respondent filed W.P. No.14354 of
B
                     2007(LK) before the High Court which stood
                     allowed by the learned Single Judge vide order
                                                                '
                     dated 27 .1.2009 to the extent that the order of the
                     dismissal was modified into an order of
                     termination. The management was directed to pay
c    ' •. J

                     the terminal benefits since the respondent had
                     retired from service. However, the learned Single
                     Judge arrived at the conclusion that the respondent
                     was not entitled to any wages or other monetary
                     benefits till the date of his termination.
D
               (G)   Being aggrieved by the said order of the learned
                     Single Judge, the respondent filed a Writ Appeal
                     No.702 of 2009 (L-KSRTC) under Section 4 of the
                     Karnataka High Court Act. The Division Bench vide
E                    impugned judgment and order dated 27.10.2009
                     allowed the appeal filed by the respondent
                     quashing the award of the Labour Court and
                     reversing the order of the learned Single Judge. The
                     Division Bench proceeded to hold that the
F                    respondent was entitled to be reinstated into
                     service with all consequential benefits. However,
                     since the respondent had retired from service, he
                     was entitled to 50% of the backwages for the
                     periods from 14.2.1997 (i.e. the date of dismissal)
                     till the date of his retirement (i.e. 31. 7.2007). He
G
                     was also entitled to consequential benefits of
                     retirement.

              Hence, this appeal.

H             4. Mr. S.N. Bhat, learned counsel appearing for the
  DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, KSRTC v. M.G. VITTAL 1101
           RAO [DR. B,S. CHAUHAN, J.]

appellant has submitted that the Labour Court rejected the           A
contention on behalf of the respondent-workman that he was
entitled for re-instatement and all other consequential reliefs in
view of the fact that he stood acquitted by the Criminal Court.
However, the learned Single Judge as well as the Division
Bench in appeal have accepted his contention and granted the         B
reliefs. The standard of proof in domestic enquiry and criminal
proceedings are different and mere acquittal by the Criminal
Court does not entitle the delinquent for exonerating in the
disciplinary proceedings. Thus, the appeal deserves to be
allowed.                                                             c
      5. On. the contrary, Mr. V.N. Raghupathy, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent-workman has made all attempts
to defend the judgments of the learned Single Judge as well
as the Division Bench contending that as the workman has
been acquitted in the criminal proceedings, the order of             D
dismissal as a consequence of domestic enquiry deserves to
be set aside. In the facts and circumstances of the case, no
interference is warranted.

    6. We have considered the rival submissions advanced on          E
behalf of the parties and perused the record.

     7. It is evident from the record that when the respondent-
workman was facing disciplinary proceedings at the same time
 he had also faced the criminal trial for the offences punishable
                                                                     F
 under Sections 457 , 381 read with Section 34 oft~e Indian
 Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called as 'IPC'). The
Metropolitan Magistrate convicted the delinquent employee
holding him guilty of the said charges and sentenced him with
a simple imprisonment for a period of six months and a fine of
Rs. 500/-. The respondent-workman filed appeal against the           G
said order of conviction. However, the appeal was also
dismissed by the Appellate Court vide judgment and order
dated 5.4: 1994. The delinquent employee along with other co-
accused preferred Criminal Revision No. 299 of 1994 before
the High Court which was allowed vide judgment and order             H
    1102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A dated 9. 7 .1997. Thus, the High Court acquitted the said
  delinquent employee of all the charges leveled against him.

        Thus, the question does arise as to whether in this
    backdrop the respondent-employee is entitled _for the relief
    granted by the High Court.
8
    DEPARTMENTAL           ENQUIRY AND          ACQUITTAL IN
    CRIMINAL CASE

        8. The question of considering reinstatement after decision
c of acquittal or discharge by a competent criminal Court arises
  only and only if the dismissal from services was based on
  conviction by the criminal Court in view of the provisions of
  Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India, 1950, or
  analogous provisions in the statutory rules applicable in a case.
o In a case where enquiry has been held independently of the
  criminal proceedings, acquittal in a criminal Court is of no help.
  The law is otherwise. Even if a person stood acquitted by a
  criminal Court, domestic enquiry can be held, the reason being
  that the standard of proof required in a domestic enquiry and
E that in a criminal case are altogether different. In a criminal
  case, standard of proof required is beyond reasonable doubt
  while in a domestic enquiry it is the preponderance of
  probabilities that constitutes the test to be applied. In Nelson
  Motis v. Union of India & Anr., AIR 1992 SC 1981, this Court
  held:
F
         "The nature and scope of a criminal case are very different
       . from those of a departmental disciplinary proceeding and
         an order of acquittal, therefore, cannot conclude the
         departmental proceeding."
G
        9. In State of Karnataka & Anr. v. T. Venkataramanappa,
  (1996) 6 SCC 455; this Court held that acquittal in a criminal
  case cannot be held to be a bar to hold departmental enquiry
  for the same misconduct for the reason that in a criminal trial,
H standard of proof is different as the case is to be proved beyond
  DlVISIONAL CONTROLLER, KSRTC v. M.G. VITIAL 1103
           RAO [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

reasonable doubt but in the departmental proceeding, such a         A
strict proof of misconduct is not required.

     10. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Allabaksh, (2000)
10 sec 177, while dismissing the appeal against acquittal by
the High Court, this Court observed as under:~.
                                                                    B
     "That acquittal of the respondent shall not be construed as
     a clear exoneration of the respondent, for the allegations
   · call for departmental proceedings, if not already initiated,
     against him."
                                                                    c
     11. While dealing with a similar issue, a three-Judges
Bench of this Court in Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ)
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., (2005) 7 SCC 764, held as
under:-

    "ln our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by D
    a criminal Court would not debar an employer from
    exercising power in accordance with the Rules and
    Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and
    departmental, are entirely different. They operate in
   different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the E
    object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punist1ment
   on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to
   deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose
   penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal
   trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in . F
   certain
         .
             circumstances
                  I
                              or before certain officers is totally
   inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and
   procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings.
   The degree of proof which is necessary to order a
   conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary G
   to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating
   to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also ·
   not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the
   prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove
                                                                    H
    1104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A       the guilt of the accused "beyond reasonable doubt", he
        cannot be convicted by a Court of law. In a departmental
        enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the
        delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of
        "preponderance of probability."
B
         12. The issue as to whether disciplinary proceedings can
    be held at the time when the delinquent employee is facing the
    criminal trial, has also been considered from time to time. In
    State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 13,
    this Court while dealing with the issue observed as under:-
C
        "It would be evident from the above decisions that each of
        them starts with the indisputable proposition that there is
        no legal bar for both proceedings to go on simultaneously
        and then say that in certain situations, it may not be
D       'desirable', 'advisable' or 'appropriate' to proceed with the
        disciplinary enquiry when a criminal case is pending on
        identical charges ...........The only ground suggested in the
        above decisions as constituting a valid ground for staying
        the disciplinary proceedings is that 'the defence of the
E       ~mployee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced'. This
        ground has, however, been hedged in by providing further
        that this may be done in cases of grave nature involving
        questions of fact and law. In our respectful opinion, it
        means that not only the charges must be grave but that the
F       case must involve complicated questions of law and fact.
        Moreover, 'advisability', 'desirability' or 'propriety', as the
        case may be, has to be determined in each case taking
        into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the
        case............ One of the contending considerations is that
        the disciplinary enquiry cannot be - and should not be -
G
        delayed unduly. So far a~ criminal cases are concerned,
        it is well known that they drag on endlessly where high
        officials or persons holding high public offices are involved.
        They get bogged down on one or the other ground. They
        hardly ever reach a prompt conclusion .......... lf a criminal
H
  DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, KSRTC v. M.G. VITTAL 1105
           RAO [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

   case is unduly delayed that may itself be a good ground A
   for going ahead with the disciplinary enquiry even where
   the disciplinary proceedings are held over at an earlier
   stage. The interests of administration and good
   government demand that t.hese. proceedings are ·
   concluded expeditiously. It must be remembered that B
   interests of administration demand that undesirable
 _ elements are thrown out and any charge of misdemeanour
   is en·quired into promptly. The disciplinary proceedings
   are meant not really to punish the guilty but to keep the
   administrative machinery unsullied by getting rid of bad c
   elements. The interest of delinquent officer also lies in a
   prompt conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. If he is
   not guilty of the charges, his honour should be vindicated
   at the earliest possible moment and if he is guilty, he
   should be dealt with promptly according to law. It is not 0
   also in the interest of administratio~ that persons accused
   of serious misdemeanour should be continued in office
   indefinitely, i.e., for long periods awaiting the result of
   criminal proceedings. It is not in the interest of
   administration. It only serves the interest of the guilty and
                                                                 E
   dishonest.. ...... " (Emphasis added)

     13. In Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd.,
AIR 1999 SC 1416, this Court held that there can be no bar
for continuing both the proceedings simultaneously. The Court
placed reliance upon a large number of its earlier judgments,   F
including Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan,
AIR 1960 SC 806; Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen,
AIR 1965 SC 155; Jang Bahadur Singh v. Baij Nath Tiwari,
AIR 1969 SC 30; Kusheshwar Dubey v. Mis. Bharat Coking
Coal Ltd. & Ors., AIR 1988 SC 2118; Nelson Motis (Supra);       G
and B.K. Meena (Supra), and held that proceedings in a
criminal case and departmental proceedings can go on
simultaneously except where both the proceedings are based
on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the
proceedings is common. In departmental proceedings, factors     H _
      1106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201.1'] 14 (ADDL) S.C.R.


 A prevailing in the mind of the disciplinary authority may be many,
   such as enforcement of discipline or to investigate level
   of integ(ity of delinquent or other staff. The standard of
   proof required in those proceedings is also different from
   that required in a criminal case.. While in departmental
 B proceedings, the standard of proof is one of preponderance
   of probabilities, in a criminal case, the charge has to be proved
   by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Where the charge
   against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which
   involves complicated questions of law and fact, it is desirable
 c to stay the departmental proceedings till conclusion of the
      criminal case. In case the criminal case does not proceed
      expeditiously, the departmental proceedings cannot be kept in
      abeyance for ever and may be resumed and proceeded wit~
      so as to conclude the same at an early date. The purpose is
 0    that if the employee is found not guilty his cause may be
      vindicated, and in case he is found guilty, administration may
      get rid of him at the earliest.     ·

           However, while deciding the case, taking into consideration
      the facts involved therein, the Court held:
 E
          "Since the facts and the evidence in both the proceedings,
          namely, the departmental proceedings and the criminal
          case were the same without there being any iota of
          difference, the distinction, which is usually drawn as
 F        between th~ departmental proceedings and the criminal
          case on the basis of approach and burden of proof, would
          not be applicable to the instant case."

        14. In State Bank of India & Ors. v. R.B. Shanna, AIR 2004
   SC 4144, same view has been reiterated observing that both
 G proceedings can be held simultaneously, except where
   departmental proceedings in criminal case are based on same
   set of facts and evidence in both the proceedings is common.
   The Court observed as under:...:

. H       'The purpose of departmental inquiry and of prosecution
   DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, KSRTC v. M.G. VITTAL: 1107
            RAO [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

      are to put a distinct aspect. Criminal prosecution is           A
      launched for an offence for violation of duty. The offender
      owes to the society, or for breach of which law has
      provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the
      public. So crime is an act of commission in violation of law
      or of omission of a public duty. The departmental inquiry       B
      is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of
      public service." .

      15. While deciding the said case a very heavy reliance has
 been placed upon the earlier judgment of this Court in Depot         C
 Manager, Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation
 v. Mohd Yousuf Miya & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2232, wherein it
 has been held that both proceedings can be held simultaneously
 unless the gravity of the charges demand staying the disciplinary
 proceedings till the trial is concluded as complicated questions
 of fact and law are involved in that case.                           D

     16. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in
 Senior Superintendent of Post Offices v. A. Gopalan, AIR 1999
 SC 1514; Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Ors. v. T Srinivas,
 AIR 2004 SC 4127; Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bhartiya           E
 Chah Mazdoor Sangh & Anr., (2004) 8 SCC 200;
 Commissioner of Police Delhi v. Narendra Singh, AIR 2006
 SC 1800; South Bengal State Transport Corporation v. Span
 Kumar Mitra & Ors., (2006) 2 SCC 584; and Punjab Water
 Supply & Sewerage Board v. Ram Sajivan, (2007) 9 SCC 86.             F

        17. In Union of India & Ors. v. Naman Singh Shekhawat,
  (2008) 4 SCC 1, this Court held that departmental proceeding
  can be initiated after acquittal by the Criminal Court. However,
, the departmental proceeding should be initiated provided the
  department intended to adduce any evidence which could prove        G
  the charges against the delinquent officer. Therefore, initiation
  of proceeding should be bona fide and must be reasonable and
  fair.

      18. In Pandiyan Roadways Corpn.                Ltd.   y. N.     H
        1108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


    A Balakrishnan, (2007) 9 SCC 755, this Court re-considered the
      issue taking into account all earlier judgments and observed
      as under:

            'There are evidently two lines of decisions of this Court
            operating in the field. One being the cases which would
    B
            come within the purview of Capt. M. Paul Anthony v.
            Bharat Gold Mines Ltd (supra), and G.M. Tank v. State
            of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC C446. However, the second line
            of decisions show that an honourable acquittal in the
            criminal case itself may not be held to be determinative in
    c       respect of order of punishment meted out to the delinquent
            officer, inter alia, when: (i) the order of acquittal has not
            been passed on the same set of facts or same set of
            evidence; (ii) the effect of difference in the standard of proof
            in a criminal trial and disciplinary proceeding has not been
.   D
            considered (See: Commr. of Police v. Narender Singh,
            (supra) or; where the delinquent officer was charged with
            something more than the subject-matter of the criminal
            case and/or covered by a decision of the civil court (See:
            G.M. Tank, (supra), Jasbir Singh v. Punjab & Sind Bank,
    E       (2007) 1 SCC 566; and Naida Entrepreneurs' Assn. v.
            Naida, (2007) 10 SCC 385, para 1~) ........... We may not
            be understood to have laid down a law that in all such
            circumstances the decision of the civil court or the criminal
            court would be binding on the disciplinary authorities as
    F       this Court in a large number of decisions points out that
            the same would depend upon other factors as well. (See:
            e.g. Krishnakali Tea Estate (supra); and Manager,
            ReseNe Bank of India v. S. Mani, (2005) 5 SCC 100) ..
            Each case is, therefore, required to be considered on its
    G       own facts."
            (See also: Ram Tawekya Sharma v. State of Bihar & Ors.,
        (2008) 8 SCC 261; and Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National
        Bank & Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 570).

    H       19. Thus, there can be no doubt regarding the settled legal
   DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, KSRTC v. M.G. VITIAL 1109
            RAO [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

  proposition that as the standard of proof in both the                A
  proceedings is quite different, and the termination is not based
 on mere conviction of an employee in a criminal case, the
 acquittal of the employee in criminal case cannot be the basis
 of taking away the effect of departmental proceedings. Nor ~an
 such an action of the department be termed as double                  B
 jeopardy. The judgment of this Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony
 (supra) does not lay down the law of universal ClPPlication.
 Facts, charges and nature of evidence etc. involved in an
 individual case would determine as to whether decision of
 acquittal would have any bearing on the findings recorded in          c
 the domestic enquiry.

 LOSS OF CONFIDENCE

       20. Once the employer has lost the confidence in the
  employee and the bona fide loss of confidence is affirmed, the       D
  order of punishment must be considered to be immune from
  challrmge, for the reason that discharging the office of trust and
  confidence requires absolute integrity, and in a case of loss of
  confidence, reinstatement cannot be directed. (Vide: Air India
  Corporation Bombay v. V.A. Ravel/ow, AIR 1972 SC 1343;               E
  Francis Kalein & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1971
  SC 2414; and Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. v. M.
· Chandrashekhar Reddy & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 2769).

       In Kanhaiyalal Agrawal & Ors. v. Factory Manager,
                                                                       F
  Gwaliar Sugar Co. Ltd., AIR 2001 SC 3645, this Court laid
  down the test for loss of confidence to find out as to whether
  there was bona fide loss of confidence in the employee,
  observing that, (i) the workman is holding the position of trust
  and confidence; (ii) by abusing such position, he commits act
  which results in forfeiting the same; and (iii) to continue him in   G
  service/establishment would be embarrassing and inconvenient
. to the employer, or would be detrimental to the discipline or
  security of the establishment. Loss of confidence cannot be
  subjective, based upon the mind of the management. Objective
  facts which would lead to a definite inference of apprehension       H
    1110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A   in the mind of the management, regarding trustworthiness or
    reliability of the employee, must be alleged and proved.

        (See also: Sudhir Vishnu Panvalkar v. Bank of India, AIR
    1997 SC 2249).
B      21. In State Bank of India & Anr. v. Bela Bagchi & Ors.,
  AIR 2005 SC 3272, this Court repelled the contention that even
  if by the misconduct of the employee the employer does not
  suffer any financial loss, he can be removed from service in a
  case of loss of confidence. While deCiding the said case,
C reliance has been placed upon its earlier judgment in
  Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja
  Bihari Patnaik, (1996) 9 SCC 69.

       22. An employer is not bound to keep an employee in
0 service  with whom relations have reached the point of
  complete loss of confidence/faith between the two. (Vide: Binny
  Ltd. v. Their Workmen & Anr., AIR 1972 SC 1975; The Binny
  Ltd. v. Their Wor}<men, AIR 1973 SC 1403; Anil Kumar
  Chakraborty & Anr. v. Mis. Saraswatipur Tea Company Ltd.
E & Ors., AIR 1982 SC 1062; Chandu Lal v. The Management
  of Mis. Pan American World Airways Inc., AIR 1985 SC 1128;
  Kamal Kishore Lakshman v. Management of Mis. Pan
  American World Airways Inc. & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 229; and
  Mis. Pearlite Liners Pvt. Ltd. v. Manorama Sirsi, AIR 2004 SC
F 1373).

       In Indian Airlines Ltd. v. Prabha D. Kanan, AIR 2007 SC
  548, while dealing with the similar issue this Court held tha~
  "loss of confidence cannot be subjective but there must be
  objective facts which would lead to a definite inference of
G apprehension in the mind of the employer regarding
  trustworthiness of the employee and which must be alleged and
  proved."

         In case of theft, the quantum of theft is not important and
H what is important is the loss of confidence of employer in
  DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, KSRTC v. M.G. VITTAL 1111
           RAO [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

employee. (Vide: A. P. SRTC v. Raghuda Shiva Sankar                 A
Prasad, AIR 2007 SC 152).

      23. The instant case requires to be examined in the light
of the aforesaid settled legal ·proposition and keeping in view
that judicial review is concerned. primarily with the decision
                                                                    B
making process and not the decision itself. More so, it is a
settled legal proposition that in a case of misconduct of grave
nature like corruption, theft, no punishment other than the
dismissal may be appropriate. (Vide: Pandiyan Roadways
Corpn. Ltd. (supra); and U.P: State Road Transport                  C
Corporation v. Suresh Chand Sharma, (2010) 6 SCC 555).

      24. The domestic enquiry found the delinquent employee
 guilty of all the charges. The enquiry report was accepted by
 the Disciplinary Authority and there is no grievance on behalf
 of the respondent-workman that statutory provisions/principles D
 of natural justice have not been observed while conducting the
enquiry. The Disciplinary Authority imposed the punishment of
dismissal from service which cannot be held to be
disproportionate or non-commensurate to the delinquency. The
Labour Court after reconsidering the whole case came to the E
conclusion that the enquiry has been conducted strictly in
accordance with law in a fair manner and charges have rightly
been proved against the delinquent employee. However,
considering the difference in the standard of proof required in
domestic enquiry, vis-a-vis that applicable to a criminal case, F
the Labour Court repelled the argument of respondent-workman
that once he stood acquitted he was entitled for all reliefs
including re-instatement and back wages. The learned Single
Judge as well as the Division Bench had simply decided the
case taking into consideration the acquittal of delinquent G
employee and nothing else.

     25. In view of the aforesaid settled legal propositions that
there is no finding by the High Court that the charges leveled
in the domestic enquiry had been the same which were in the
criminal trial: the witnesses had been the same; there were no      H
    1112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A additional or extra witnesses; and without considering the
  gravity of the charge, we are of the view that the award of the
  Labour Court did not warrant any interference.

          Be that as it may, the learned Single Judge had granted
    relief to the delinquent employee which was not challenged by
8
    the present appellant by filing writ appeal. Th~refore, the
    delinquent employee is entitled for the said relief.

        26. In view of the above, we dispose of the appeal holding
   that the delinquent employee shall be entitled only to the relief
C granted by the writ court and the judgment and order of the court
   in writ appeal is set aside. The benefit of the judgment of the
   learned Single Judge may be ma~e available to the delinquent
   employee within a period of 4 months from the date of
   production of the certified copy of the order before the
D .appellant. There shall be no order as to costs.

    D.G.                                     Appeal disposed of.