THE MANAGEMENT OF STATE BANK OF LNDIAversusSMITA SHARAD DESHMUKH AND ANOTHER
- Citation
- 2017 INSC 195
- Decided
- 1 March 2017
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- KURIAN JOSEPH
Holding
A High Court cannot re‑appreciate evidence, and where a departmental enquiry and the Industrial Tribunal have, on the basis of evidence, established that an employee knowingly produced a forged document, the employer need not separately prove the employee’s knowledge; thus the High Court’s reinstatement order was set aside.
Summary
Smita Sharad Deshmukh, an employee of State Bank of India, submitted a forged CAIIB Part‑II certificate to obtain additional salary. A domestic enquiry found the certificate forged and dismissed her; the dismissal was upheld by the Appellate Authority and the Industrial Tribunal. The High Court, exercising its writ jurisdiction under Art. 226, set aside the dismissal, ordering reinstatement with 50% back wages, on the ground that the management had not proved the employee’s knowledge of the forgery. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that a High Court cannot re‑appreciate evidence and that the Tribunal’s finding, based on the material before it, that the employee knowingly produced a forged document was sufficient; the management therefore need not independently establish her knowledge. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court order, refusing reinstatement and back wages, and dismissed the appeal without costs.
Issues considered
- Whether a High Court under Art. 226 can re‑appreciate evidence in service matters.
- Whether the employer must prove the employee’s knowledge of a forged document to justify dismissal.
- Whether the findings of a departmental enquiry and Industrial Tribunal can be interfered with on the ground of alleged lack of proof of knowledge.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Art. 226
Subjects
Judgment
[2017] 2 S.C.R. 33
THE MANAGEMENT OF STATE BANK OF lNDIA A
v.
SMITA SHARAD DESHMUKH AND ANOTHER
(Civil Appeal No. 3423 of2017)
MARCHOJ,2017 B
[KURIAN JOSEPH AND A. M. KHANWILKAR, JJ.]
Service Law:
Dismissal from service - On finding in domestic enquiry that
the certificate of having passed CAIIB Part-II Examination, on the c
basis of which the employee was drawing additional salary, was
forged - Appellate authority as well as the Industrial Tr.ibunal
affirmed the.finding - High Court in writ petition ordered
reinstatement with 50% backwages holding that the management
had not established, that the employee was mvare of the fact that
D
the certificate was forged - On appeal; held: Evidence led by
employee, clearly shows that the certificate was forged - Therefore,
the management was not required. to establish whether thf! employee
had the knowledge that the certificate was forged - High Court
had a limited jurisdiction to examine whether the conclusion could
have been arrived at, on available evidence - It did not have power E
to re-appreciate the evidence.
Constitution of India:
Art. 226 - Jurisdiction under - Scope of - Held: High Court
does not have jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence.
F
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. It is a well-settled principle that the High Court
will not re~appreciate the evidence but will only see whether there
is evidence in support of the impugned conclusion. The court
has to take the evidence as it stands and its only limited G
jurisdiction is to examine, whether on the evidence, the
conclusion could have been arrived at. [Para 6] [37-D-E]
Union of India v. H.C. Goel [1964] 4 SCR 718; Bank
of India and another v. Degala Suryanarayana (1999)
5 SCC 762: [1999) 3 SCR 824 - relied on.
H
33
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.
A 2. The Labour Court had clearly analysed the entire
evidence and had come to the conclusion that the employee was
fully aware of the forgery. The evidence led by the employee, as
rightly appreciated by the Industrial Tribunal, would clearly show
that she had the knowledge that the document she produced was
a forged one. There was no requirement on the part of the
B
Management to establish whether she had known, at the time of
submission of the document, that it was a forged one. Therefore,
there is no basis at all for the stand taken by the High Court that
the Management did not establish that the employee had
knowledge about the certificate being a forged one. [Para 4, 5, 9]
c [35-F-G; 37-C; 38-D)
Case Law Reference
[1964] 4 SCR 718 ~elied on Para6
[1999) 3 SCR 824 relied on Para7
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3423
D
of2017.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.08.2013 of the High Court
of Bombay at Nagpur in WPC No. l:l70 of 2012.
H. P. Raval, Sr. Adv., Sanjay Kapur, Anmol Chandan, Ms. Priyanka
E Das, Ms. Megha Kamwal, Advs. for the Appellant.
L. D. Joshi, Dr. M. S. Verma, S. Manda!, (For Rabin.Majumder),
Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KURIAN, J.: I. Leave granted.
F
2. The appellant (hereinafter referred to as "the Management")
is aggrieved by the impugned judgment of the High Court whereby the
first respondent (hereinafter referred to as "the employee") was directed
to be reinstated in service with 50 per cent back wages, reversing the
order passed by the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court. The employee,
G while working with the Management, submitted a certificate purportedly
issued by the Indian Institute of Bankers claiming that she had passed
the CAIIB Part.-II Examination, and on that basis, started drawing
additional monetary benefits. The Disciplinary Authority, based on the
finding in a domestic enquiry that the certificate was a forged one,
H dismissed her from service on 01.08.2003. The punishment was upheld
'THE MANAGEMENT OF STATE BANK OF INDIA v. SMITA 35
SHARAD DESHMUKH AND ANOTHER [KURIAN, J.]
by the Appellate Authority vide order dated I 0.06.2006. The Industrial A
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court declined to grant any relief. However, the
High Court ordered reinstatement with 50 per cent back wages, and
thus aggrieved, the Management has filed the appeal.
3. The only ground on which the High Court interfered with the
award was thatthe Management had not established, by leading evidence, B
that the employee was aware of the fact that the certificate produced
before the Management-Bank was forged. To quote. from impugned
judgpient:
"6. The question, therefore, before the Enquiry Officer was
whether the petitioner knew at the time of submission of the c
forged document that it was forged one. The Presenting Officer
in the domestic enquiry did not lead any evidence to prove the
knowledge and it appears that everyone went on presuming that
the petitioner knew about theforgery since prior to its production
before the employer. Due to the fact that she produced it on the
· employer's record and that she received monetary benefits D
because of such production, every one believed that she ought
to know that it was a forgery. This conclusion of the Enquiry
Officer is grossly incorrect because it is based on guess work.
He could have said that there is strong doubt in his mind that the
petitioner knew before hand that the certificate was a forgery. E
But, he ought to have asked the Presenting Officer to lead further
evidence to prove that the petitioner knew that the document
she produced was forgery. Neither the Presenting Officer realised
this gross lacuna in their case. On the basis of this guess and
doubt, the enquiry officer held the petitioner guilty of misconduct.
This, in my view was grossly incorrect decision." F
4. We find it difficult to appreciate the strange stand taken by
the High Court. The Labour Court had clearly analysed the entire evidence
and had come to the conclusion that the employee was fully aware of
the forgery. The Tribunal took note of the fact that she had produced a
copy of the postal receipt of dispatching the certificate from the Institute G
of Bankers in her evidence but failed to explain the source of the postal
receipt. It also took note of the fact that the alleged certificate of having
passed the examination is dated 04.09.2000. Ifthat be so, there was no
occasion for asking for any re-verification of the marks by filing an
application dated 08.09.2000. Still further, the Court extensively referred
H
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.
A to the reply furnished by the Institute of Bankers and came to the
conclusion that the certificate was a forged one. To quote from
paragraph- I 0 of the award dated 30.08.2011 passed by the Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court:
"10..... The workman has claimed that she received.the pass
B certificates from the Indian Institute of Bankers by registered
speed post in her home address and filed the same before the
authority. In support of her claim, she filed an envelope to show
that the certificate in question was sent to her in the said envelop
by the Indian Institute of Bankers. However, from by merely
filing of the envelope, it cannot be held that the certificate in
c question was sent by the Institute in question to the workman in
the said envelope. Moreover, there are other suspicious
circumstances which create doubt regarding the said claim of
the workman. If the certificate was actually sent in the said
envelop by the Indian Institute of Bankers by registered speed
D post from Mumbai to the workman in her home address, then
the receipt granted by the post office for sending the envelop by
registered speed post must have been granted to the institute
and the, institute should have in possession of the same in the
office, to keep account of.the same, but the workman has also
filed the zerox copy of the receipt.alongwith of the envelope, to
E show the date of dispatch of the envelope, but she did not say
how she was in possession of the said postal receipt. It is also
pleaded by the workman in the statement of claim that she failed
in part II of CAIIB examination and applied for verification of
marks visiting in person to CAIIB office at Mumbai and on
F verification and revaluation, she was declared pass. In the
statement of claim she had not mentioned the date of her visit to
CAIIB office. However, she has filed the zerox copy of the
letter, Exhibit W-17 to show that she applied for revaluation of
her answer paper and the said letter shows that it was submitted
on 18.9.2000. However, Exhibit W-15, filed by the workman
G shows that by letter dated 4.9.2000, she was intimated by the
Indian Institute of Bankers that she had completed the Associate
examination of the Institute and is entitled to receive the relevant
certificate. If the workman had received the intimation of
completion of the examination, then there was no question of
H her applying for revaluation of the examination paper and if she
THE MANAGEMENT OF STATE BANK OF INDIA v. SMITA 37
SHARAD DESHMUKH AND ANOTHER [KURIAN, J.]
had failed in the examination and she approached the Institute A
for revaluation of her answer paper on 18.09.2000, then there
was no question of the Institute intimating her by letter dated
04.09.2000 regarding her completion of the examination and
issuance of the certificate. So it is clear from the materials
produced by the parties in the departmental proceedings that the
B
workman knowingly produced the pass certificate of part JI
CAlIB examination, whi~h was a fabricated one, for monetary
gain on ongoing basis and the findings of the enquiry officer are
based on the materials on record and are not perverse ....."
5. The evidence ied by the employee, as rightly appreciated by
the Industrial Tribunal, would clearly show that she had the knowledge c
that the document she produced was a forged one. Therefore, there
was no requirement on the part of the Management to establish whether
she had known, at the time of submission of the document, that it was a
forged one.
6. It is a well-settled principle that the High Court will not re- D
appreciate the evidence but will only see whether there is evidence in
support of the impugned conclusion. The court has to take the evidence
as it stands and its only limited jurisdiction is to examine, whether on the
evidence, the conclusion could have been arrived at. (See - Union of
!l!fil! v. H.C. GoeJl) . E
7. In the case of Bank of India and another v. Degala
Suryanarayana', after referring to H.C. Goel case (supra), this Court
held at paragraph- I I :-
"11. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental
enquiry proceedings. The only requirement of law is that the F
allegation against the delinquent officer must be established by
such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting
reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding
the gravamen of the charge against the delinquent officer. Mere
conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in
G
departmental enquiry proceedings. The court exercising the
jurisdiction ofjudicial review would not interfere with the findings
of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings
excepting in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there
I (1964)4SCR 718
'(1999)5SCC762 H
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.
A is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that
no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived
at that finding. The court cannot embark upon reappreciating
the evidence or weighing the same like an appellate authority.
So long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion
arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be
B
sustained . ... "
8. We do not think it necessary to refer to any other judgments
on the same point, since the same principle has been only followed and
reiterated in all those decisions.
9. In the case before us, it is an admitted position that the
c certificate produced by the employee is a forned one. It has been
categorically found by the Industrial Tribunal, on the basis of evidence,
that the employee was fully aware of the fact that the document was a
forged one. In such circumstances, there is no basis at all for the stand
taken by the High Court that the Management did not establish that the
D employee had knowledge about the certificate being a forged one.
10. Despite the factual and legal position as above, we had made
one more attempt for the verification of the certificate from the Institute
of Bankers. Thus, on 08.08.2016, this Court passed the following order:
"The Deputy Director (Examinations) ofThe Indian Institute of
E Bankers shall inform this Court as to whether the candidate Mrs.
S.S. Deshmukh (Membership No. 5880536) had actually applied
for revaluation of Part II ofCAIIB Examination in the year 2000
and what is the action taken on that application and also whether
the action thus taken, was informed to Mrs. Deshmukh.
Needless to say that in the report, it would be made clear that
F
whether Mrs. Deshmukh had actually passed in the revaluation.
The report shall be submitted.to the Registrar of this Court within
four weeks from today.
The Registry shall communicate a copy of this order tq the Deputy
Director, Indian Institute of Bankers forthwith.
G
In addition, a copy of this order be given Dasti to the parties for
communication.
Poston 21.09.2016."
11. The Institute has, by its letter dated 03.09.2016, informed this
Court that:
H
THE MANAGEMENT OF STATE BANK OF INDIA v. SMITA 39
SHARAD DESHMUKH AND ANOTHER [KURIAN, J.]
"Ref: IIBF/CO/EXAM/4832/2016 3'' September, 2016 A
The Registrar
Supreme Court oflndia,
TilakMarg,
NewDelhi-110201
B
(India)
Sir,
Re: SLP (C) No. 33070/2013
In the matter of - c
The Management of State Bank of India
vis
Smita Sharad Deshmukh & Another.
This has reference to order date the 8•h August, 2016 by the D
Hon'ble Court in the captioned matter interalia seeking details
from the Institute as to whether the candidate Mrs. S.S.
Deshmukh (Membership No. 5880536) had actually applied for
revaluation of part II ofCAIIB Examination.
In this connection this is to inform that Mrs. Deshmukh had
appeared for following 2 subjects in May/June 2000 Examination E
conducted by the Institute and has secured the marks shown
against each of the subjects.
I. Practice & Law of Banking - 45 Marks
2. Indian Economics Problem - 23 Marks
F
This is to inform further that the Institute has provision only for
verification of marks and no request was received from Mrs.
Deshmukh for verification of marks in connection with above
said examination.
Thanking you, G
Yours faithfully,
(Joint Director)
Examination"
H
- 40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.
A 12. Despite the clear position as above, the employee filed a
response on 13 .0 l .2017 reiterating that she had " ... actually applied for
revaluation of Part II of CAIIB Examination in the year 2000 ...". A
copy of the application also was produced along with reply as
Annexure-RJ. It is a handwritten letter by the Management-Bank to
the Institute of Bankers on 08.09.2000 but enclosing a draft dated
B
14.09.2000. There is also an alleged endorsement of receipt of the
letter by the Institute on 18.09.2000 on hand. delivery. It may be noted
that the forged certificate of pass in the examination and the memorandum
accompanying it are dated 04.09.2000. One wonders as to what was
the need for revaluation once a candidate had been declared successful
c on 04.09.2000, leave alone the anachronic error on the dates on the
application and the draft! We reluctantly refrain from making any further
observations in this regard.
13. Though learned counsel forthe employee made a persuasive
attempt for modification of punishment on the ground ofdisproportionality,
D in view of the conduct of the employee which we have referred to above,
we are not inclined to take a different view from that taken by the
' Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority and the Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court.
14. The impugned judgme~fof the High Court is set aside and the
E appeal is allowed. However, we make it clear that there shall be no
recovery of the wages and benefits already paid to her.
15. There shall be no order as to costs.
Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal allowed.
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