Holding

The Municipal Corporation of Delhi was negligent and liable in tort for the death, Section 478 does not apply to the tort claim, the suit was within the limitation period under Article 82, and the compensation and interest awarded were reasonable.

Summary

The deceased was killed when a dead neem tree branch, standing on municipal property, fell on his scooter. The claimants sued the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) for negligence, seeking compensation. The High Court held MCD liable and awarded Rs. 90,000, which was later enhanced to Rs. 1,44,000 with interest by the Division Bench. MCD appealed, arguing that Section 478 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 required a two‑month notice and a six‑month limitation, rendering the suit time‑barred. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that the claim arose in tort, so Section 478 did not apply, and the suit was within the two‑year period prescribed by Article 82 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Court affirmed the lower courts' finding of negligence, upheld the compensation and interest award as reasonable, and dismissed both appeals.

Issues considered

Whether the Municipal Corporation of Delhi can be held liable in tort for death caused by the fall of a dead tree branch due to its negligence
Whether Section 478 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, requiring notice and a six‑month limitation, applies to a tort claim and whether the suit is barred by limitation
Whether the quantum of compensation and the award of interest by the Division Bench are proper and warrant interference

Legislation cited

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957s. 478
Limitation Act, 1963s. Article 82

Subjects

tortnegligencemunicipal liabilitydead treesection 478limitationcompensationinterestDelhi Municipal Corporation Act

Judgment

A THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI
v.
SMT. SUSHILA DEVI AND ORS.

MAY 7, 1999

B [A.P. MISRA AND R.C. LAHOTI, JJ.]

Torts-Negligence-Fall of a branch of a dead and dried tree on the
deceased while he was riding a scooter, crushing his head and resulting in
his death the next day-Horticulture department of the Corporation failing
C to carry out periodical inspections of the trees or taking safety precaution
t~ see that the road was safe for its users-Held, the Municipal Corporation
was negligent in performing its duty under the common law and therefore
liable in damages to the plaintifft for the injury caused to the deceased by
fall of the branch of tree.
D Tortous Liability-Claim by Legal heirs of the deceased-Deceased
aged 30 years and having net income of Rs. 1000 per month from family
business and commission on sales-Dependency assessed at Rs. 800 per
month after deducting Rs 200 expenses on self-Multiplier of 15 adopted and
quantum of compensation assessed at Rs 1,44,000 by Division Bench of High
E Court in supersession of Rs. 90, 000 assessed by the Trial Judge-Held, the
figure of compensation arrived at by Division Bench is a very reasonable
figure and calls for no interference-Additional interest-Award oj upheld
on consideration of totality of circumstances.

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957--Section 478-Provision for
F service of two months' notice before institution of a suit and limitation of ::ix
months from the date of accrual of cause of action for institution of a suit-
Applicabi/ity of-Held, the plaintifft' action was founded in tort and to such
an action Section 478 does not apply at all-Suit not vitiated by failure to
sever a two months' legal notice~uit filed within a period of two years from
G the date of accrual of cause of action was within limitation under Article 82
of the Limitation Act-Indian Limitation Act, 1963-Artic/e 82.

On 18th August, 1964, one S was going back home from his office in
the evening, on a scooter which he was driving, along with his brother R on
the pillion, when a branch ·Of a tree which was dead and dried, fell on the head
H of S. His head was crushed and he died the next day.
1198
M.C.D. y. SUSHILA DEVI 1199
The legal heirs of the deceased brought a suit for damages in which A
Single Judge of the High Court held the Municipal Corporation of Delhi
liable for damages in torts and granted a decree for Rs. 90,000 by way of
compensation payable to the widow and the children of the deceased. The
Corporation deposited the said amount of Rs. 90,000 in the Court on 17-9-
1970. Against the said order of the Single Judge, two Letters Patent Appeals B
were preferred before a Divi~on Bench of the High Court. The Division
Bench dismissed the appeal o_f the M.C.D. and partly allowed the appeal
preferred by the claimants enhancing the amount of compensation to Rs.
I
1,44,000 payable with interest calculated @ 6% p.a. from the date of suit
i.e. 5-8-1966 till 17-9-1970.. The Division Bench also allowed additional
interest @ 3% p.a. on Rs. 90,000 from the date of deposit in the Court till C
the date of actual withdrawal of the amount by the claimants and interest@
6% p.a. on Rs. 54,000 from 17-9-1970 till the date of payment. Against the
order of the Division Bench, both the parties preferred the present cross
appeals.

On behalf of the M.C.D., it was contended that the Municipal Corporation D
being an authority governed by the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957,
it was necessary for the claimants to have served a legal notice of two
months' duration under sub-section 1 of Section 478 of the Act and the suit
should have been instituted within a period of six months from the date of
accrual of cause of action which having not been done, the suit was barred E
by time.
-. Dismissing both the aljlpeals, this Court
·,
HELD: 1.1. The Municipal Corporation was negligent in performing
its duty under the common law and therefore liable in damages to the
plaintiffs for the injury caused to the deceased by fall of the branch of tree F
and the consequences flowing therefrom. Tbe tree in question was a dead
tree. It had no bark, foliage or buts. The Horticulture Department of the
Corporation should have carried out periodical inspections of the trees and
should have taken safety precaution to see that the road was safe for its
users and su~h adjoining fi·ees as were dried and dead and/or had projecting G
branches which could prove to be dangerous to the passers-by were removed.
This having not been done, the Municipal Corporation has been negligent in
discharging such duty as is owed to the road users by the adjoining property
owners, especially the Municipal Corporation. [1206-G; 1204-F-H; 1205-A]

1.2. Law in well settled that if is a tree standing on the defendant's land H
1200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [1999] 2 S.C.R.

A which is dried dead and for that reason may fall and the defect is one whiclt
is either known or should have been known to the defendant, then the
defendant is liable for any injury caused by the fall of the tree. The duty of
the owner/occupier of the premises by the side of the road whereon persons
l~wfully pass by, extends to guarding against what may happen just by the
B side of the premises 011 account of anything dangerous on the premises. The
premises must be maintained in a safe state of repair. The owner/occupier
cannot escape the liability for injury caused by any dangerous thing existing
on the premises by pleading that he had employed a competent person to keep
-
the premises in safe repairs. [1206-B-D]

C Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Subhagawanti and Ors., AIR (1966)
SC 1750, relied on.

2. Provisions of Section 478 of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957
have no application to the present case. The bundle of facts constituting the
cause of action which has accused to the claimants are the ownership and
D possession of the tree vesting in the Corporation, its maintenance by the
Corporation, fall of the branch of the tree over the deceased and the death
consequent to the injury sustained. The causa proxima, i.e., the immediate
cause of action is the fall of the branch of tree over the head of the deceased.
Th~ fall of the branch of tree cannot be attributed to any act done or
E purporting to have been done in pursuance of the Act etc. by the Municipal
Corporation or any officer or employee thereof. The liability has arisen and
has been sought to be enforced by the claimants under the law of torts. The
finding recorded in the suit and in the Letters patent Appeal is one of
negligence on the part of the Municipal corporation. To such an action
Section 478 does not apply at all. The suit filed within a period of two years
F from the date of accrual of cause of action was governed by Article 82 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 and was well within limitation. [1204-B-D]

3. The deceased was aged 30. He was employed in a family business
wherefrom he was drawing a salary of Rs. 650 per month. Apart from salary
G the deceased was also getting commission on sales. The net income of the
deceased was arrived at Rs. 1,000 per month by the Division Bench wherefrom
Rs. 200 were deducted as expenses on self. The dependency was assessed at
Rs. 800 per month. The Trial judge as well as the Division Bench have
adopted a multiplier of 15. Thus, the Division Bench has assessed the
quantum of compensation at Rs. 1,44,000 on supersession of Rs. 90,000
H assessed by the Trial Judge. The figure of compensation arrived at by the
M.C.D. v. SUSHILA DEVI 1201
.... Division bench is a very reasonable figure and calls for no interference. The A
multiplier has also been correctly adopted. [1206-H; 1207-A-C]

Susamma Thomas, [1994) 2 SCC 176, referred to.

4. The suit having been decreed by the Trial Judge, the Division ~ench
,__ directed the decretal amount to be deposited by the Municipal Corporation B
in the Court which was done on 17.9.1970. The amount so deposited was
available to be withdrawn by the claimants subject to furnishing security to
the satisfaction of the executing court. The claimants could not furnish the
security and hence could not withdraw the amount. The Division Bench in
the backdrop of such facts directed the amount to be deposited in fixed
deposit so as to earn interest. However, the Registry omitted to comply with
c
the order and therefore the amount continued 'to remain in deposit with the
Court. The Division Bench directed 3 per cent per annum additional interest
to be paid by the Municipal Corporation to the claimants and thereby made
an effort at adjusting the equities. The claimants have been allowed interest
on the decretal amount from the date of the decree though the amount of D
eompensation was quantified only from the date of the passing of decree. In
such circumstances, the direction of the Division Bench in the matter of
award of interest is al:m not liable to be interfered with on consideration of
totality of the circumstances. [1207-E-H; 1208-A)

Hale v. Hanis, [1947) 2 All England Reports 628, Referred to. E

Brown v. Harrison, [1947) 63 Law Times Reports 484; Quinn v. Scott,
[1965) 1 W.L.R. 1004 and Mackie v. Dumbartonshire County Cour.cil, [1927)
W.N. 247, cited.

Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (13th, 1989 Edition); Clerk and Lindsell F
on Torts (16th 1989 Edition); Charlesworth and Percy on Negligence (8th,
1990 Edition), referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 687 of
1986.
G
~
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.12.84 of the Delhi High Court
___..
in R.F.A. (OS) No. 23of1970.

Ranjit Kumar and Ms. Binu Tamata for the Appellant.

Raju Ramachandran and Ms. Biqa Gupta for the Respondents. H
120Z SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 2 S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

R.C. LAHOTI, J. On 18th August, 1964, in the evening, late Suresh
Chander and his brother Ramesh Chander were going on a s~ooter from their
offictf to their residence. The deceased was driving the scooter and his
brother was riding his pillion. When they were passing against Sant Permanand
B Blind Relief Mission Building situated at 20, Alipur Road, a branch of the
neem tree standing there suddenly broke down and fell on the head of the
deceased. His head was crushed. He was rushed to Irvin Hospital where in
-
spite of med~cal care and attendance, he died the next day at about 10 a.m.
A piece of wood was found embedded into his brain for which a surgery had
C also to be performed on the deceased.

The deceased was survived by a widow, three minor sons and a minor
daughter and his mother. All the six brought a suit for damages claiming Rs.3
lacs. A learned Single Judge sitting on the Original side of the High Court
held the Municipal Corporation of Delhi liable for damages in torts and
D granted a decree of Rs. 90,000 by way of compensation payable to the widow
and the children of the deceased. Two Letters Patent Appeals were preferred.
The Municipal Corporation sought for the. suit being dismissed while the
claimant~ sought for enhancement in the amount of compensation. The
Division Bench dismissed the appeal filed by the Corporation but at the same
time partly allowed the appeal preferred by the claimants enhancing the
E amount of compensation to Rs. 1,44,000 payable with interest calculated at the
rate of6 per cent per annum from the date of suit, i.e., 5.8.1966 till 17.9.1970
when the amount was deposited by the Corporation in the Court for payment
to the successful claimants. The Division Bench also allowed interest at the
rate of 3 per cent per annum on Rs. 90,000 from the date of deposit in the
p Court till the date of actual withdrawal of the amount by the claimants and
interest at the rate of6 per cent per annum on Rs. 54,000 from 17.9.1970 till
payment. The reasons for the award of additional interest calculated at the
rate of 3 per cent per annum on Rs. 90,000 and the legality thereof we shall
deal with separately.

G:; Both the parties have preferred further appeals to this Court. However,
after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we have found only three
contentions worth being dealt with and the same are noted and disposed of
hereinafter.

The incident took place on 18.8.1964 in consequence whereof late Suresh
H Chander died on 19.8.).%4. Suit for compensation was filed on 5.8.1966 after
,/
M.C.D. v. SUSHILA DEVI [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 1203
issuing a legal notice· in April, 1966. The learned counsel for the Municipal A
Corporation has submitted that Municipal Corporation is an authority governed
by the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (hereinafter the Act, for short)
and inasmuch as it was sought to be held liable for failure to perform its duty
to take care resulting into an accident, it was necessary for the claimants to
have served a legal notice of two months' duration under sub-section ( 1) of B
Section 478 of the Act and the suit should have been instituted within a
period of six months from the date of accrual of cause of action which having
not been done, the suit was barred by time.
,•
Section 478 reads as under :-

"478. Notice to be given of suit - (1) No suit shall be instituted against C
the Corporation or against any municipal authority or against any
municipal officer or other municipal employee or against any person
acting under the order or direction of any municipal authority or any
municipal officer or other municipal employee, in respect of any act
done, or purporting to have been done, in pursuance of this Act or D
any rule, regulation or bye-law made thereunder until the expiration of
two months after notice in writing has been left at the municipal
officer and in the case of such officer employee or person, unless
notice in writing has also been delivered to him or left at his office
or place of residence, and unless such notice states explicitly the
cause of action, the nature of the relief sought, the amount of E
compensation claimed and the name and places of residence of the
intending plaintiff, and unless the plain contains a statement that
such notice has been so left or delivered.

-- (2) No suit, such as is described in sub-section (1) shall unless
it is a suit for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration
of title thereto, be instituted after the expiry of six months from the
F

date on which the cause of action arises.

(3) Nothing in sub-section (I) shall be deemed to apply to a suit
in which the only relief claimed is an injunction of which the object G
would be defeated by the giving of the notice or the· postponement
of the institution of the suit."

A bare reading of Section 478 (1) shows that its applicability is attracted
to a suit filed 'in respect of any act done or purporting to have been done'
in pursuance of the Act or Rules, Regulations or Bye-laws made thereunder. H
1204 SUPREME CO_l]RT REPORTS [1999) 2 S.C.R.

A The learned counsel for the Corporation submitted that an act includes an ....-
omission as well. The Court has found an omission on· the part of the
Municipal Corporation in discharging its duty to take care and therefore
under sub-Section (2) the limitation for filing the suit was six months from the
date of accrual of cause of action, i.e., 18th and 19th August, 1964.

B The contention has to be rejected forthwith. The bundle of facts
constituting the cause of action which has accrued to the claimants are -the
ownership and possession of the tree vesting in the Corporation, its
maintenance by the Corporation, fall of the branch of the tree over the
deceased and the death consequent to the injury sustained. The causa proxima,
C i.e., the immediate cause of action is the fall of the branch of the tree over
the head of the deceased. The fall of the branch of the tree cannot be
attributed to any act done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of
the Act etc. by the Municipal Corporation or any officer or employee thereof.
The liability has arisen and has been sought to be enforced by the claimants
under the law of torts. The finding recorded in the suit and in the Letters
D Patent Appeal is one of negligence on the part of the Municipal Corporation.
To such an action Section 478 does not apply at all. The suit filed within a
period of two years from the date of accrual of cause of action was governed
by Article 82 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and was well within limitation. The
plaintiffs' action was founded in tort. The plaintiffs have not rested their case
E on any statutory duty on the part of the Corporation and failure or negligence
in performing such duty.

One of the findings recorded in the suit and upheld in the Letters Patent
Appeal by the Division Bench is that the tree in question was a dead tree.
It had no bark, foliage or buts. On behalf of the plaintiffs, a Botany Professor
F was examined as an expert witness who testified that a tree which had no bark
was dried up and dying. From the testimony of the Garden Superintendent
examined on behalf of the Corporation also it was found that the tree was
dead, dried and dangerous. The Deputy Commissioner, Horticulture examined
on behalf of the Corporation admitted that the tree looked like a partly worn
G out tree. The Division Bench has upheld the finding recorded by the learned
Trial Judge that the Horticulture Department of the Corporation should have
carried out periodical inspections of the trees and should have taken safety
precaution to see that the road was safe for its users and such adjoining trees
as were dried and dead and/or had projecting branches which could prove
to be dangerous to the passers-by were removed. This having not been done,
H the Municipal Corporation has been negligent in discharging such duty as is
M.C.D. v. SUSHILA DEVI [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 1205
owed to the road users by the adjoining property owners, especially the A
: ' Municipal Corporation. The finding has been arrived at on appreciation of
evidence by the learned Trial Judge as also by the Division Bench and we
find ourselves in entire agreement with the said finding.

The law is stated in Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (13th, 1989 ed., p.415)
in these words : B
"If damage is done owing to the collapse of the projection on the
highway or by some other mischief traceable to it, the occupier of the
premises on which it stood is liable if he knew of the defect or ought,
on investigation, to have known of it. At any rate this is the rule with
respect to a thing that is naturally on the premises e.g. a tree." C
In Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (16th, 1989 ed., at pages 546-547 para.
10.122) t~w on trees is summarised as follows :

"The fall of trees, branches and other forms of natural growth is
governed by the rules of negligence. When trees on land adjoining D
a public highway fall upon it, the owner is liable if he knew or ought
to have known that the falling tree was dangerous. He is not bound
to call in an expert to examine the trees, but he is bound to keep a
look out and to take notice of such signs as would indicate to a
prudent landowner that there. was a danger of a tree falling ..........the E
land-owner was held liable when the tree which fell had been dying
for some years before and had become a danger which should have
been apparent to an ordinary landowner."

In Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence (8th, 1990 ed., at page 668) the
law is stated in these terms : F
" ........ when a tree, which had been dying for some years and should
have been known to be dangerous by an ordinary landowner, fell and
caused damage, the owner was held liable. (Brown V. Harrison (1947)
W.N.191).
G
In Hale v. Hants, (1947) 2 All England Reports 628, which is a case of
branches of a tree having struck the windows of an omnibus and a piece of
glass having struck the plaintiff in the eye, it was held that in the absence
of any reason to suspect danger from an overhanging tree or some similar
obstruction a driver who is driving close to the kerb when his vehicle is struck
by the branch of the tree is not making an unreasonable use of the highway. H
1206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 2 S.C.R.

A It was further held that the county council should have known that trees grow
and throw out their branches· and therefore it was their obligation to see that
-
~ ~
the tree in its natural growth was curbed in such a way as not to hinder the
reasonable use of the highway .

By a catena of decisions, the law is well settled that if there is a tree
B standing on the defendant's land which is dried or dead and for that reason
may fall and the defect is one which is either known or should have been
known to the defendant, then the defendant is liable for any injury caused
by the fall of the tree (see Brown v. Harrison (1947) 63 Law Times Reports
484; Quinn v. Scott, (1965) 1 W.L.R. 1004, Mackie v. Dumbartonshire County
Council, (1927) W.N. 247. The duty of the owner/occupier of the premises by
c the side of the road whereon persons lawfully pass by, extends to guarding
against what may happen just by the side of the premises on account of
anything dangerous on the premises. The premises must be maintained in a
safe state of repair. The owner/occupier cannot escape the liability for injury
caused by any dangerous thing existing on the premises by pleading that he
D had employed a competent person to keep the premises in safe repairs. In
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Subhagwanti and Ors., AIR (1966) SC
1750 a clock tower which was 80 years old collapsed in Chandni Chowk Delhi
causing the death of a number of pwrsons. Their Lordships held that the
owner could not be permitted to take a defence that he neither knew nor
ought to have known the danger. "The owner is legally responsible irrespective
E of whether the damage is caused by a patent or a latent defect," - said their
Lordships. In our opinion the same principle is applicable to the owner of a -::
tree standing by the side of a road. If the tree is dangerous in the sense that
on account of any disease or being dead the tree or its branch is likely to
fall and thereby injure any passer-by then such tree or branch must be
F removed so as to avert the danger to life. It is pertinent to note that it is not
the defence of the Municipal Corporation that vis major or an act of God such
as storm, tempest, lightning or extraordinary heavy rain had occurred causing
the fall of the branch of the tree and hence the Corpotation was not liable.

In our opinion the High Court was right in holding the Municipal
G Corporation negligent in performing its duty under the common law and
therefore liable in damages to the plaintiffs for the injury caused to the
deceased by fall of the branch of the tree and the consequences flowing .......
therefrom.
The deceased was aged 30. He was employed in a family business
H wherefrcm he was drawing a salary of Rs. 650 per month. The learned Trial
M.C.D. v. SUSHILA DEVI [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 1207
Judge deducted an amount of Rs. 150 per month for expenses incurred on the A
t self and assessed the dependency at Rs. 500 per month. The Division Bench
found that apart from salary the deceased was also getting commission on
sales. The net income of the deceased was arrived at Rs. 1,000 per month
wherefrom Rs. 200 were deducted as expenses on the self. The dependency
was assessed at Rs. 800 per month. The learned Trial Judge as well as the B
Division Bench have adopted a multiplier of 15. Thus, the Division Bench has
assessed the quantum of compensation at Rs. 1,44,000 in supersession of Rs.
90,000 assessed by the learned Trial Judge. Though, the learned counsel for
the Municipal Corporation has assailed the assessment to be. on higher side
and the learned counsel for the claimants has submitted that keeping in view
the better future prospects of the deceased in the family business, coupled C
with the youth of the deceased, the monthly income should have been taken
at Rs.1826 but we are of the opinion that the figure of compensation arrived
at by the Division Bench is a very reasonable figure and calls for no
interference. The multiplier has also been correctly adopted. In the leading
case of Susamma Thomas, [1994] 2 SCC 176 this Court adopted a multiplier
of 12 when the deceased was aged 39. We do not find any fault with the figure D
of compensation having been arrived at Rs. 1,44,000. The same is upheld.

The last point of controversy centres around the award of interest. The
suit having been decreed by the learned Trial Judge, the Division Bench
directed the decretal amount to be deposited by the Municipal Corporation E
in the Court which was done on 17.9.1970. The amount so deposited was
r available to be withdrawn by the claimants subject to furnishing security to
the satisfaction of the executing court. The claimants could not furnish the
security and hence could not withdraw the amount. The Division Bench in
the backdrop of such facts directed the amount to be deposited in fixed
deposit so as to earn interest. However, the Registry omitted to comply with F
the order and therefore the amount continued to rem1tin in deposit with the
Court. The Division Bench observed that liability for default on the part of
the Registry in carrying out the order of the Court could not be fastened on
the judgment-debtor Municipal Corporation. Still the Division Bench has
directed 3 per cent per annum additional interest to be paid by the Municipal G
Corporation to the claimants and thereby made an effort at adjusting the
equities. It cannot be lost sight of that partly the delay in release of the
amount to the claimants is attributable to their failure to furnish the security
as directed by the Division Bench. The claimants have been allowed interest
on the decretal amount f ~m the date of the decree though the amount of
compensation was quantified only from the date of the passing of the decree. H
1208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 2 S.C.R.

A In such circumstances, the direction of the Division Bench in the matter of
award of interest is also not liable to be interfered with on consideration of
totality or' the circumstances.

For the foregoing reasons both the appeals are held liable to be dismissed.
Civil Appeal No. 687/86 filed by the Municipal Corporation' of Delhi is
B dismissed with costs payable by the appellant-Municipal Corporation to the
respondent-claimants. Civil Appeal No. 4242/86 filed by the claimants is
dismissed without any order as to costs.

M.P. Appeals dismissed.