THE PEERLESS GENERAL FINANCE AND INVESTMENT COMPANY LTD.versusCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

                        [2019] 18 S.C.R. 957                              957


              THE PEERLESS GENERAL FINANCE                                A
              AND INVESTMENT COMPANY LTD.
                                  v.
               COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
                   (Civil Appeal No. 1265 of 2007)                        B
                            JULY 09, 2019
        [R. F. NARIMAN AND SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.]
       Income Tax Act, 1961 – AYs 1985-86 and 1986-97 –
Subscriptions received from public at large under collective
                                                                          C
investment scheme – Difference between capital receipts and revenue
receipts – Assessee-company floated scheme which required
subscribers to deposit amounts by way of subscriptions, and, at the
end of the scheme, the subscribed amounts were repaid with interest
– Scheme also contained forfeiture clause – Dispute whether receipts
of subscriptions in the hands of assessee-company should be treated       D
as income or capital receipts – Held: The amount deposited with
the assessee-company by way of subscriptions are capital receipts
as they have to be repaid with interest to depositors as per the scheme
– If such subscriptions were treated to be income, this would violate
the Companies Act – However, the amount/ subscription forfeited
                                                                          E
mid-way will become income or revenue receipts in the hands of the
assessee-company.
      Income Tax Act, 1961 – AYs 1985-86 and 1986-97 –
Subscriptions received from public at large under collective
investment scheme floated by assessee-company – Treatment of
                                                                          F
subscription amounts as revenue receipts for the impugned
assessment years – Held: Not correct – The amounts received on
subscription being capital receipts and there being no forfeiture in
the impugned assessment years, the amounts in question had to be
treated as capital receipts.
       Income Tax – Account books – Nature of receipts – Book             G
keeping entries, whether decisive or determinative of the true nature
of the entries – Held: Mere book keeping entries will not determine
the true nature of the receipts / transactions – “Theoretical” and
“business” aspects of receipts/ transactions distinguished – On facts,
subscriptions were received from public at large under collective         H
                                 957
958            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2019] 18 S.C.R.


A     investment scheme floated by assessee-company – The “theoretical”
      aspect of the transaction was that the assessee treated the
      subscription receipts as income – The reality of the situation,
      however, is that the business aspect of the matter, when viewed as a
      whole, leads inevitably to the conclusion that the receipts in question
      were capital receipts and not income – In cases of this nature it
B
      would not be possible to go only by the treatment of such
      subscriptions in the hands of accounts of the assessee itself – The
      character of the transaction being clearly a capital receipt in the
      hands of the assessee cannot possibly be taxed as income in the
      assessee’s hands.
C           Doctrines/Principles – Doctrine of estoppel – Subscriptions
      received from public at large under collective investment scheme
      floated by assessee-company – Assessee in its books of accounts
      showed this sum as income – However, real position in law, qua
      deposits made by subscriptions, is that they are in the nature of
D     capital receipts – Held: There can be no estoppel against a settled
      position in law – In view thereof, assessee company could not be
      stopped from making a claim that the subscription amounts were in
      the nature of capital receipts – Income Tax.
            Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Limited
E           and Another v. Reserve Bank of India (Second Peerless
            case), (1992) 2 SCC 343 : [1992] 1 SCR 406; Poona
            Electric Supply Co. Ltd., Bombay v. Commissioner of
            Income-Tax, Bombay AIR 1966 SC 30 : [1965] 3 SCR
            818; Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay v. C. Parakh
            & Co. (India) Ltd. 29 ITR 661; Commissioner of
F           Income-Tax, Madras v. V.MR.P. Firm, Muar (1965) 56
            ITR 67; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sahara
            Investment India Ltd. Volume 266 ITR 641 –
            relied on.
            Ram Janki Devi and Another v. M/s Juggilal Kamlapat
G           (1971) 1 SCC 477 – distinguished.
            Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and
            Investment Co. Ltd. and Others (1987) 1 SCC 424 :
            [1987] 2 SCR 1 – referred to.

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THE PEERLESS GENERAL FINANCE AND INVESTMENT CO. LTD.                         959
           v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

                        Case Law Reference                                   A
[1992] 1 SCR 406                 relied on                  Para 3
(1971) 1 SCC 477                 distinguished              Para 6
[1965] 3 SCR 818                 relied on                  Para 6
[1987] 2 SCR 1                   referred to                Para 9           B
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1265
of 2007.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 06.10.2005 of the High Court
at Calcutta in ITR No. 1 of 2005.
                                                                             C
      S. Ganesh, Abhijit Chatterjee, Sr. Advs., S. Sukumaran, Anand
Sukumar, Sameer Rohatgi, Bhupesh Kumar Pathak, Ms. Meera Mathur,
K. Rajeev, Advs. for the Appellant.
      Arijit Prasad, Sr. Adv., S.A. Haseeb, B. V. Balaram Das,
Mrs. Anil Katiyar, Advs. for the Respondent.                                 D
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      R. F. NARIMAN, J.
        1. The question raised in this appeal is as to whether receipts of
subscriptions in the hands of the assessee-Company for the previous          E
years relevant to the assessment years 1985-86 and 1986-97 should be
treated as income and not capital receipts inasmuch as the assessee has
in its books of accounts shown this sum as income.
        2. The assessee-Company has floated various schemes which
require subscribers to deposit certain amounts by way of subscriptions       F
in its hands, and, depending upon the scheme in question, these subscribed
amounts at the end of the scheme are ultimately repaid with interest.
The scheme at hand also contains forfeiture clauses as a result of which
if, mid-way, a certain amount is forfeited, then the said amount would
immediately become income in the hands of the assessee. This is an
admitted position before us.                                                 G
       3. In the present case, the assessee was asked to bring to tax
such amounts as income for the two years in question, inasmuch as,
according to the Assessing Officer, it had treated the whole amount as
income, 3% of which is not disputed to be income before us for the
years in question. The Assessing Officer treated these amounts as income     H
960             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 18 S.C.R.


A     inasmuch as under the accounting system followed by the assessee,
      these amounts were credited to the profit and loss account for the years
      in question as income. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)
      dismissed the appeal from the original assessment orders and confirmed
      the same. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, on the other hand, allowed
      the appeals by relying upon the judgment of this Court in Peerless
B
      General Finance and Investment Co. Limited and Another vs.
      Reserve Bank of India, (1992) 2 SCC 343 in which, according to the
      Appellate Tribunal, this Court finally decided the question in the assessee’s
      own case stating that such amounts cannot be treated to be income but
      are in the nature of capital receipts. These were not only because of the
C     interpretation of an RBI Circular of 1987, but also because, on general
      principles, such amounts must be treated to be capital receipts or otherwise
      they would violate the provisions of the Companies Act. It further went
      through the various clauses contained in the scheme at hand, and found
      that in point of fact no subscription certificate had, in fact, been forfeited,
      as a result of which it was clear that there would be no income in the
D
      hands of the assessee for these two years. It also dealt with certificates
      that were surrendered prior to the stated time, and stated that in such
      cases as well whatever would remain as surplus in the hands of the
      assessee would be treated as income. It went on to state that there
      would be no estoppel in law against the assessee making a claim that
E     these amounts were in the nature of capital receipts and not income, and
      also relied upon certain judgments of this Court to buttress the proposition
      that this Court had also held that what is the true position in law cannot
      be deflected by what the assessee may or may not do in its treatment of
      the matter at hand in its accounts. So doing, the appeal against the
      Commissioner of Income Tax was allowed by the Income Tax Appellate
F
      Tribunal. In the first round, the High Court, by its judgment dated
      09.09.1999, stated that since no question of law arose, the reference
      applications before it were dismissed. This Court, by an order dated
      03.12.2002, set aside the High Court judgment and referred the following
      questions to the High Court:
G            “(a) Whether the judgment of the Supreme Court in Peerless
             General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. vs. Reserve Bank
             of India (1992) 2 SCC 343 lays down as an absolute proposition
             of law that all receipts of subscription in the hands of the assessee
             for the previous years relevant to the assessment years 1985-86
H            and 1986-87 must necessarily be treated as capital receipts?
THE PEERLESS GENERAL FINANCE AND INVESTMENT CO. LTD.                            961
  v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

       (b) If the answer to the first question is in the negative, on the       A
       facts and in the circumstances of the case, and having regard to
       the fact that the first year’s subscriptions were consciously offered
       as revenue receipt for taxation by the assessee in the returns of
       income filed in respect of assessment years 1985-86 and 1986-
       87, whether the Tribunal was justified in accepting the assessee’s
                                                                                B
       contention that the first years’ subscription was capital receipts
       and hence not taxable?
       (c) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case
       and having regard to the observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court
       to the effect that the directions of Reserve Bank of India dated
       15th May, 1987 had been made applicable from 15th May, 1987              C
       and would only apply to the deposits made on or after 15 th May,
       1987, the tribunal was justified in law as well as on the facts in
       holding that the said directions of the Reserve Bank of India were
       retrospective and must be applied in all pending proceedings?”
       4. When remanded to the High Court, by the impugned judgment             D
dated 06.10.2005, the High Court of Calcutta allowed the appeal against
the Appellate Tribunal holding that a perusal of the subscription scheme
of the appellant company would show that since forfeiture of the amounts
deposited is possible, this amount should be treated as income and not as
a capital receipt. Further, it relied heavily upon the fact that the assessee   E
had itself treated such amounts as income and credited them to its profit
and loss account for the years in question and would, therefore, be
estopped by the same. On going through the judgment of this Court,
namely, Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Limited (supra)
it went on to state that since the said judgment dealt with an RBI Circular
of 1987, which itself was only prospective, any law declared as to the          F
effect of Clause 12 of that Circular would be prospective in nature and
would, therefore, not apply to the assessment years in question.
       5. Mr. S. Ganesh, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the
appellant-Company has argued before us that the High Court is incorrect
on all counts. According to him, the fact that forfeiture may take place        G
under the clauses of the scheme has to be read with an interim order
which he has brought to our notice by way of a supplementary affidavit
dated 05.04.2017 in which it is made clear that, post the date of the
order i.e. 03.09.1979, no amount can be forfeited under any of the
schemes by the appellant-Company. He stated that, as a matter of fact,
                                                                                H
962             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 18 S.C.R.


A     the supplementary affidavit states that for the years in question and, in
      particular, for every year after 1979, no sum has in fact been forfeited
      by the Company under any of the schemes in question. He then argued
      that it was incorrect to go only by the accounting system of the assessee
      since it is well settled that the real position in law, qua deposits that are
      made by subscriptions, on first principle, would show that they are in the
B
      nature of capital receipts and cannot be possibly be said to be income, as
      they would enure to the benefit of the subscribers of the scheme and
      would have to be paid back at the end of the scheme together with
      interest thereof. He also argued that, in any event, that the judgment in
      Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Limited (supra) was
C     not merely grounded on an interpretation of Clause 12 of the RBI Circular
      of 1987 but it also specifically held that, as a general proposition, receipts
      of this nature would be capital and adverted to both the judgments of
      N.M. Kasliwal, J and K. Ramaswamy, J. in this behalf. He also argued
      that even for the period in question, this judgment would squarely apply
      as if such receipts were to be treated as income it would violate the
D
      Companies Act. He also argued that it would be incorrect to raise any
      question of estoppel against the appellant-Company and cited judgments
      of this Court to buttress this proposition.
              6. On the other hand, Mr. Arijit Prasad, learned Senior Counsel,
      appearing for the Revenue has countered Mr. Ganesh’s submissions.
E     He read copiously from the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)
      orders in order to buttress his submission that the ground reality of the
      situation in the facts of this case is that in point of fact the appellant-
      Company itself treated these amounts as income. Had it not done so, it
      would not have been able to face its subscribers for payments in future.
F     He also argued based on Ram Janki Devi and Another vs. M/s Juggilal
      Kamlapat, (1971) 1 SCC 477 that the true form of the transaction must
      be looked at. He also cited Poona Electric Supply Co. Ltd., Bombay
      vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay AIR 1966 SC 30 to the
      effect that the ground reality must govern and not mere theoretical
      considerations. Also, according to the learned Senior Advocate, the issue
G     at hand did not arise directly before this Court in the Peerless General
      Finance and Investment Co. Limited (supra) and, therefore, any
      observations made therein would not bind on the facts of this case.
      Further, in any event, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) was
      correct in stating that this judgment dealing only with an RBI circular
      1987, being prospective in nature, would not apply to the assessment
H
      years at hand.
THE PEERLESS GENERAL FINANCE AND INVESTMENT CO. LTD.                           963
  v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

        7. Having heard the learned counsel for both parties, we must          A
first set out the answers given to the three questions by the High Court,
in its judgment under appeal. The answers given are as follows:
      “10.1 The questions referred to us, therefore, having regard to
      the principles discussed above, are answered in the following
      manner:                                                                  B
      (a) that the decision of the Apex Court in Peerless General Finance
          and Investment Company Ltd. (supra) did not lay down any
          absolute proposition of law that all receipts of subscription at
          the hands of the assessee for the previous year relevant to
          the assessment years 1985-86 and 1986-87 must necessarily            C
          be treated as capital receipts.
      (b) Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case the
          learned Tribunal was wrong in treating the first year’s
          subscription relevant to the assessment years 1985-86 and
          1986-87 as capital receipts and hence not taxable; and               D
      (c) the decision of the Apex Court in the second Peerless case
          that the deposits made after 15th May 1987 were to be treated
          in the manner directed in the 1987 directions are applicable to
          all pending proceedings so far as such deposits relate to the
          period after 15th May 1987, particularly, in relation to the         E
          assessee.”
       8. What is clear, even on general principle, on the facts of this
case, is that subscriptions were received in the years in question from
the public at large under a collective investment scheme, and these
subscriptions were never at any point of time forfeited. Indeed, the           F
supplementary affidavit filed before this Court states this as a fact, being
based on an interim order of the High Court dated 03.09.1979 which
obtained during the assessment years in question. This being the case,
and surrendered certificates not being the subject-matter of the appeal
before us, it is clear that even on general principles, deposits by way of
amounts pursuant to these investment schemes made by subscribers               G
which have never been forfeited can only be stated to be capital receipts.
      9. This Court, in Peerless General Finance and Investment Co.
Limited (supra), was faced with a situation in which the RBI had,
pursuant to this Court’s earlier judgment in Reserve Bank of India vs.
Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. And Others (1987)             H
964            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 18 S.C.R.


A     1 SCC 424, taken steps to remedy the concerns raised by this Court in
      that judgment. The steps taken were under powers conferred by Section
      45 J & 45 K of the Reserve Bank of India Act, as a result of which
      directions were issued by the RBI dated 15.05.1987. These directions,
      in turn, were the subject matter of challenge by the Peerless General
      Finance and Investment Co. Limited (supra) i.e. the second Peerless
B
      case. The aforesaid directions are set out in full in para 9 of the said
      judgment. We are concerned with para 12 which states as follows:-
            “12. Every residuary non-banking company shall disclose as
            liabilities in its books of accounts and balance sheets the total
            amount of deposits received together with interest, bonus, premium
C           or other advantage, accrued or payable to the depositors.”
            It is true that the focus of this Court was a challenge, on various
      grounds, to the aforesaid directions. However, this Court did state,
      Kasliwal, J., in particular, holding:
D           “The amount contributed by the depositors being a capital receipt
            and not a revenue receipt cannot under any circumstances be
            shown in the balance sheet otherwise than at its full value.
            Moreover, being a capital receipt, it cannot be credited to the
            profit and loss account since Part II of Schedule VI to the
            Companies Act, 1956 requires that the amounts to be shown in
E           the profit and loss account should be confined to the income and
            expenditure of the company. Thus, crediting a part of the first and
            subsequent year’s deposit instalments to the profit and loss account
            and not showing them fully as a liability in the balance sheet would
            be a contravention of the provisions of the Companies Act.”
F           The learned Judge further went on to hold:
            “The method followed by the companies in carrying on the
            aforesaid business is that a certain portion of the subscriptions
            received by it is transferred to the profit and loss account, shown
            as income, and the same is used to defray inevitable working
G           capital requirements of the company, namely, payment of agent’s
            commission, management expenses, staff salaries and other
            overheads. However, the balance of the subscriptions (excluding
            the appropriated part) is transferred to a fund each year and the
            corpus of the fund is invested in turn in interest-bearing investment.
            The Peerless Company initially used to transfer approximately 95
H
THE PEERLESS GENERAL FINANCE AND INVESTMENT CO. LTD.                            965
  v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

       per cent of the first year’s subscriptions to the profit and loss        A
       account and used to invest the subscriptions received from the
       second year onwards.”
      K. Ramaswamy, J., in a separate concurring judgment, also turned
down the challenge to the said guidelines and, in doing so, held as follows:
       “The deposit or loan is a capital receipt but not a revenue receipt      B
       and its full value shall be shown in the account books or balance
       sheet as liability of the company. It cannot be credited to the profit
       and loss account. Part II of Schedule VI of the Companies Act,
       1956 requires that the amount shown in the profit and loss account
       should be confined to the income and expenditure of the company.         C
       Para (12) of the Directions is, thus, in consonance with the
       Companies Act.”
       10. While it is true that there was no direct focus of the Court on
whether subscriptions so received are capital or revenue in nature, we
may still advert to the fact that this Court has also, on general principles,   D
held that such subscriptions would be capital receipts, and if they were
treated to be income, this would violate the Companies Act. It is,
therefore, incorrect to state, as has been stated by the High Court, that
the decision in Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Limited
(supra) must be read as not having laid down any absolute proposition
of law that all receipts of subscription at the hands of the assessee for       E
these years must be treated as capital receipts. We reiterate that though
the Court’s focus was not directly on this, yet, a pronouncement by this
Court, even if it cannot be strictly called the ratio decidendi of the
judgment, would certainly be binding on the High Court. Even otherwise,
as we have stated, it is clear that on general principles also such             F
subscription cannot possibly be treated as income. Mr. Ganesh is right in
stating that in cases of this nature it would not be possible to go only by
the treatment of such subscriptions in the hands of accounts of the
assessee itself. In this behalf, he cited a decision of the Division Bench
of the Allahabad High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Sahara
Investment India Ltd., reported as Volume 266 ITR page 641 in which             G
the Division Bench followed Peerless General Finance and Investment
Co. Limited (supra), and then held as follows:
       “In Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. v. Reserve
       Bank of India (1992) 75 Comp Cas 12, the Supreme Court on
       similar facts held that the deposits were capital receipts and not       H
966      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 18 S.C.R.


A     revenue receipts (vide paragraphs 67 & 68 of the aforesaid
      judgment). That case also pertains to a finance company which
      used to collect deposits, and credited part of its deposits to the
      profit and loss account, as in the present case. Hence, the ratio of
      the said decision, in our opinion, applies to this case also.
B            It is well settled in income-tax law that book keeping entries
      are not decisive or determinative of the true nature of the entries
      as held by the Supreme Court in CIT vs. India Discount Co. Ltd.
      [1970] 75 ITR 191 and in Godhra Electricity Co. Ltd v.CIT [1997]
      225 ITR 746 (SC). It has been held in those decisions that the
      court has to see the true nature of the receipts and not go only by
C     the entry in the books of account.
             We agree with the Tribunal that these deposits are really
      capital receipts and not revenue receipts. In Chowringhee Sales
      Bureau P. Ltd. V. CIT [1973] 87 ITR 542 (SC) which was followed
      in Sinclair Murray and Co. P. Ltd. V. CIT [1974] 97 ITR 615,
D     the Supreme Court observed (page 619):
      “It is the true nature and quality of the receipt and not the head
      under which it is entered in the account books that would prove
      decisive. If a receipt is a trading receipt, the fact that it is not so
      shown in the account books of the assessee would not prevent
E     the assessing authority from treating it as trading receipt.
      It has been held by the Supreme court that the primary liability
      and onus is on the Department to prove that a certain receipt is
      liable to be taxed vide Parimisetti Seetharamamma v. CIT [1965]
      57 ITR 532 (SC).
F
             Sri Chopra then relied on the decision of the Supreme Court
      in CIT v. Lakshmi Vilas Bank Ltd. [1996] 220 ITR 305. In our
      opinion that decision is also distinguishable because in that case
      the deposit was forfeited and the result of the transaction was
      that the bank became full owner of the security and the amount
G     lying in deposit with it became its own money. In the present case
      there is no such finding that the deposit was forfeited or that at
      the end of the transaction the security deposit became the property
      of the assessee or that changed from a capital receipt to a revenue
      receipt. Hence, that decision is clearly distinguishable.”
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THE PEERLESS GENERAL FINANCE AND INVESTMENT CO. LTD.                           967
  v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

      This Court, on 21.07.2015, in appeal against the said judgment           A
held as under:
      “After reading of the decision of the High Court, we find that the
      High Court has rightly relied upon the judgment of this Court in
      “Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. & Anr. v.
      Reserve Bank of India” (1992) 2 SCC 343. Since the case is               B
      squarely covered by the judgment, we do not find any merit in
      these appeals and petitions which are accordingly, dismissed.”
       It is also correct to state that there can be no estoppel against a
settled position in law [See Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay vs.
C. Parakh & Co. (India) Ltd. 29 ITR 661 at 665 and Commissioner                C
of Income-Tax, Madras vs. V.MR.P. Firm, Muar (1965) 56 ITR 67].
       11. Shri Arijit Prasad, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf
of the Revenue, however, strongly relied upon the observations in Ram
Janki Devi and another v. M/s. Juggilal Kamlapat, (1971) 1 SCC
477. In particular, he relied upon paragraph 12 of the judgment which          D
reads as follows:-
      “The case of a deposit is something more than a mere loan of
      money. It will depend on the facts of each case whether the
      transaction is clothed with the character of a deposit of money.
      The surrounding circumstances, the relationship and character of         E
      the transaction and the manner in which parties treated the
      transaction will throw light on the true form of the transaction.”
       12. This judgment has no direct relevance to the facts of the present
case. The vexed question in that case was as to whether a particular
transaction in question was a loan or a deposit. It was in that context        F
that paragraph 12 laid down that whether a loan of money could be
called a deposit, would depend upon the facts of each case, having regard
to the surrounding circumstances etc. In the present case, there is no
such question raised by Revenue. The question raised is completely
different, and as has been held by us above, the character of the
transaction being clearly a capital receipt in the hands of the assessee       G
cannot possibly be taxed as income in the assessee’s hands.
     13. Shri Prasad then relied upon the judgment of this Court in
Poona Electric Supply Co. Ltd., Bombay v. Commissioner of
Income-tax, Bombay City I, Bombay, AIR 1966 SC 30. In particular,
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968             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 18 S.C.R.


A     he relied upon a quotation from a Bombay High Court judgment which
      was approved by this Court, as follows: -
             “The principle of real income is not to be subordinated as to amount
             virtually to a negation of it when a surrender or concession or
             rebate in respect of managing agency commission is made, agreed
B            to or given on grounds of commercial expediency, simply because
             it takes place some time after the close of an accounting year. In
             examining any transaction and situation of this nature the court
             would have more regard to the reality and specialty of the situation
             rather than the purely theoretical or doctrinaire aspect of it. It will
             lay greater emphasis on the business aspect of the matter viewed
C            as a whole when that can be done without disregarding statutory
             language.”
             The “theoretical” aspect of the present transaction is the fact that
      the assessee treated subscription receipts as income. The reality of the
      situation, however, is that the business aspect of the matter, when viewed
D     as a whole, leads inevitably to the conclusion that the receipts in question
      were capital receipts and not income.
             14. In the circumstances, we set aside the judgment of the High
      Court and restore that of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The appeal
      is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
E

      Bibhuti Bhushan Bose                                           Appeal allowed.




F




G




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