Holding

A conviction for simple assault under Section 324 IPC does not constitute an offence involving moral turpitude, so the employee is not disqualified from service under Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act.

Summary

P. Soupramian, a messenger employed by State Bank of India, stabbed two individuals with a broken soda bottle and was convicted under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code, receiving a three‑month imprisonment. The bank discharged him under Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, which bars persons convicted of offences involving moral turpitude from continuing employment. Soupramian challenged the discharge; the Madras High Court set aside the termination and ordered reinstatement, but the Supreme Court examined whether the assault constituted an offence involving moral turpitude. The Court held that simple assault causing only minor injuries, without a motive to kill, does not meet the test for moral turpitude, and that probation does not override the employer’s statutory duty to discharge. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision to uphold the discharge and dismissed the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether a conviction under Section 324 IPC for simple assault amounts to an offence involving moral turpitude under Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949.
Whether a criminal court's order of probation prevents the employer from terminating employment under the Banking Regulation Act.

Legislation cited

Banking Regulation Act, 1949s. 10(1)(b)(i)
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 360
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 307, s. 324

Subjects

moral turpitudeBanking Regulation Actemployment terminationassaultIPC 324service lawprobationcriminal convictionemployee discharge

Judgment

1064 [2019]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 6 S.C.R. 1064 [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A THE STATE BANK OF INDIA & OTHERS
v.
P. SOUPRAMANIANE
(Civil Appeal No. 7011 of 2009)
B APRIL 26, 2019
[L. NAGESWARA RAO AND M. R.SHAH, JJ.]
Banking Regulation Act, 1949 – s.10(1)(b)(i) – Respondent,
working as Messenger in the State Bank of India stabbed one ‘K’
and one ‘S’ with a broken soda bottle – Trial court convicted the
C
Respondent u/s.324, IPC – Conviction affirmed by the Appellate
Court – Respondent discharged from service – Respondent filed
Writ Petition in the High Court – Dismissed – Writ Appeal – Allowed
by the Division Bench – Held: s.10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation
Act, 1949 provides that conviction by criminal court of an offence
D involving moral turpitude shall disentitle a person from continuing
in employment of a banking company – Though every offence is a
crime against the society, discontinuance from service according to
the Banking Regulation Act can be only for committing an offence
involving moral turpitude – Acts which disclose depravity and
wickedness of character can be categorized as offences involving
E
moral turpitude – Whether an offence involves moral turpitude or
not depends upon the facts and the circumstances of the case –
Present case concerns an assault – There was no motive for the
Respondent to cause the death of the victims – Criminal courts below
found that the injuries caused to the victims were simple in nature –
F Crime committed by the Respondent does not involve moral turpitude
– Respondent not guilty of an offence involving moral turpitude –
Not liable to be discharged from service – Judgment of the High
Court, affirmed – Service Law – Penal Code, 1860 – s.324.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
G HELD: 1.1 Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation
Act, 1949 provides that conviction by a criminal court of an offence
involving moral turpitude shall disentitle a person from continuing
in employment of a banking company. The reasons given by the
High Court for setting aside the order of discharge and directing
H
1064
STATE BANK OF INDIA & OTHERS v. P. SOUPRAMANIANE 1065

the reinstatement of the Respondent in service are not agreed A
with. A show-cause notice was issued to the Respondent in which
it was categorically mentioned that the Respondent cannot
continue in service after his conviction in a criminal case involving
moral turpitude in view of Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking
Regulation Act, 1949. After considering the explanation of the
B
Respondent, an order of discharge was passed. The High Court
is not right in holding that no reasons had been given by the
bank for discontinuing the Respondent from service. The High
Court committed an error in holding that the order of discharge
should be set aside on the ground that the provision of law under
which the Respondent was discharged was not mentioned in the C
order. Yet another reason given by the High Court for
interference with the order of discharge is that the criminal court
released the Respondent on probation only to permit him to
continue in service. The release under probation does not entitle
an employee to claim a right to continue in service. In fact the
D
employer is under an obligation to discontinue the services of an
employee convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude. The
observations made by a criminal court are not binding on the
employer who has the liberty of dealing with his employees
suitably. [Paras 4, 5][1069-A; D-G]
1.2 Conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude E
disqualifies a person from continuing in service in a bank. Though
every offence is a crime against the society, discontinuance from
service according to the Banking Regulation Act can be only for
committing an offence involving moral turpitude. Acts which
disclose depravity and wickedness of character can be categorized F
as offences involving moral turpitude. Whether an offence
involves moral turpitude or not depends upon the facts and the
circumstances of the case. Ordinarily, the tests that can be applied
for judging an offence involving moral turpitude are: a) Whether
the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral
conscience or society in general; b) Whether the motive which G
led to the act was a base one, and c) Whether on account of the
act having been committed the perpetrators could be considered
to be of a depraved character or a person who was to be looked
down upon by the society. The other important factors that are
H
1066 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A to be kept in mind to conclude that an offence involves moral
turpitude are :– the person who commits the offence; the person
against whom it is committed; the manner and circumstances in
which it is alleged to have been committed; and the values of the
society. According to the National Incident – Based Reporting
System (NIBRS), a crime data collection system used in the United
B
States of America, each offence belongs to one of the three
categories which are: crimes against persons, crimes against
property, and crimes against society. Crimes against persons
include murder, rape, and assault where the victims are always
individuals. The object of crimes against property, for example,
C robbery and burglary is to obtain money, property, or some other
benefits. Crimes against society for example gambling,
prostitution, and drug violations, represent society’s prohibition
against engaging in certain types of activities.[Paras 6, 8]
[1070-B; G; 1071-G; 1072-A-F]
D 1.3 There can be no manner of doubt about certain offences
which can straightaway be termed as involving moral turpitude
e.g. offences under the Prevention of Corruption of Act, NDPS
Act, etc. This case concerns an assault. It is very difficult to
state that every assault is not an offence involving moral turpitude.
A simple assault is different from an aggravated assault. All cases
E of assault or simple hurt cannot be categorized as crimes
involving moral turpitude. On the other hand, the use of a
dangerous weapon which can cause the death of the victim may
result in an offence involving moral turpitude. In the instant case,
there was no motive for the Respondent to cause the death of
F the victims. The criminal courts below found that the injuries
caused to the victims were simple in nature. The crime committed
by the Respondent does not involve moral turpitude. As the
Respondent is not guilty of an offence involving moral turpitude,
he is not liable to be discharged from service. [Para 9]
[1072-A-D]
G
Sushil Kumar Singhal v. Punjab National Bank (2010)
8 SCC 573 : [2010] 9 SCR 796 ; Girraj Prasad Meena
v. State of Rajasthan (2014) 13 SCC 674 : [2013] 10
SCR 393; Allahabad Bank v. Deepak Kumar Bhola
[1997] 2 SCR 1055; Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana
H
STATE BANK OF INDIA & OTHERS v. P. SOUPRAMANIANE 1067

(1996) 4 SCC 17 : [1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 392; Mangali A
v. Chakki Lal AIR 1963 ALL 527 ; Jorabhai Hirabhai
Rabari v. District Development Officer, Mehsana
AIR 1996 Guj 3 – referred to.
Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Edition; Bouvier’s Law
Dictionary ‘Moral Turpitude’ - referred to. B
Cristoval Silva- Trevina 241 & N Dec 687 (AG 2008) –
referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2010] 9 SCR 796 referred to Para 5 C
[2013] 10 SCR 393 referred to Para 5
[1997] 2 SCR 1055 referred to Para 8
[1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 392 referred to Para 8
AIR 1963 ALL 527 referred to Para 8 D
AIR 1996 Guj 3 referred to Para 8
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.7011 of
2009
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.03.2008 of the High E
Court of Judicature at Madras in Writ Appeal No. 1117 of 2001
R. P. Bhatt, Sr. Adv., A. V. Rangam, Buddy A. Ranganadhan,
Ms. Stuti Krishna, Advs. for the Appellants.
Mrs. K. Sarada Devi, I. V. Kasyap, R. Vijaynandan Reddy, Advs.
for the Respondent. F
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
L. NAGESWARA RAO, J. 1. The Respondent who was
working as a Messenger in the State Bank of India at Puducherry was
discharged from service by an order dated 15.05.1986. The appeal filed
by the Respondent against the order of discharge was dismissed on G
03.07.1986. Later, the Staff Union took up the cause of the Respondent
and made a representation on his behalf which was also rejected on
04.05.1992. Challenging the aforementioned orders, the Respondent filed
a Writ Petition in the High Court of Judicature at Madras which was
dismissed by a learned Single Judge on 07.06.2000. Aggrieved thereby, H
1068 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A the Respondent filed a Writ Appeal which was allowed by the Division
Bench of the Madras High Court. The order of discharge of the
Respondent from service was set aside and the Appellants were directed
to reinstate the Respondent. The Appellants were directed to pay 1/4 th
of the salary from the date of discharge till the date of reinstatement as
back wages. Notice was issued by this Court in Special Leave Petition
B
filed by the Appellants on 01.09.2009 and the judgment of the High Court
was stayed. Thereafter, leave was granted on 19.10.2009 and the interim
order was made absolute. We are informed that the Respondent has
attained the age of superannuation on 31.12.2012.
2. Since the discharge of the Respondent from service is on the
C basis of conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude, it is necessary
to refer to the facts of the criminal case. A report was submitted by the
Station House Officer (SHO), Grand Bazaar Police Station, Puducherry
that on 17.06.1983 at 9.00 hours the Respondent voluntarily stabbed
Karthiban s/o Dharamssivam and Sivagurunathan s/o Brame
D Dhanabal with a broken soda bottle. On completion of investigation,
charge sheet was filed against the Respondent. Thereafter, charge was
framed under Section 307 IPC. After appreciation of the evidence on-
record, the trial court found that the Respondent had no intention to
cause murder of the victims who were examined as PWs-1 and 2. The
injuries were certified as simple by PW-5. The trial court was of the
E opinion that there was no material to convict the Respondent under
Section 307 IPC. However, the trial court convicted the Respondent
under Section 324 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for
three months. The motive for the crime was an earlier dispute between
two groups belonging to different political parties. The conviction was
F affirmed by the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court released the
Respondent on probation as it was of the opinion that the Respondent
was a fit person to be dealt with under Section 360 CrPC. One of the
reasons given by the Appellate Court to release the Respondent on
probation was that the Respondent was employed as a Messenger in a
Bank and any sentence of imprisonment would affect his career.
G
3. As stated earlier, discharge of the Respondent from service
was on the ground of his conviction by a criminal court for an offence
involving moral turpitude.

H
STATE BANK OF INDIA & OTHERS v. P. SOUPRAMANIANE 1069
[L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

4. Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 provides A
that conviction by a criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude
shall disentitle a person from continuing in employment of a banking
company. The Writ Appeal filed by the Respondent was allowed by a
Division Bench of the High Court on the ground that the criminal court
released the Respondent under probation in exercise of its power under
B
Section 360 CrPC to enable the Respondent to continue in service. The
High Court was of the opinion that the purpose of the order of the criminal
court would be defeated if the Respondent is discharged from service.
Another reason given by the High Court is that the provision of law
under which the bank discharged the Respondent from service was not
mentioned and no reasons were assigned by the bank in the order of C
discharge.
5. We do not agree with the reasons given by the High Court for
setting aside the order of discharge and directing the reinstatement of
the Respondent in service. A show-cause notice was issued to the
Respondent in which it was categorically mentioned that the Respondent D
cannot continue in service after his conviction in a criminal case involving
moral turpitude in view of Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation
Act, 1949. After considering the explanation of the Respondent, an
order of discharge was passed. The High Court is not right in holding
that no reasons had been given by the bank for discontinuing the
Respondent from service. The High Court committed an error in holding E
that the order of discharge should be set aside on the ground that the
provision of law under which the Respondent was discharged was not
mentioned in the order. Yet another reason given by the High Court for
interference with the order of discharge is that the criminal court released
the Respondent on probation only to permit him to continue in service. F
The release under probation does not entitle an employee to claim a
right to continue in service. In fact the employer is under an obligation
to discontinue the services of an employee convicted of an offence
involving moral turpitude.1 The observations made by a criminal court
are not binding2 on the employer who has the liberty of dealing with his
employees suitably. G

1
Sushil Kumar Singhal v. Punjab National Bank, (2010) 8 SCC 573
2
This Court has observed on multiple occasions that in criminal jurisdiction, Courts do
not have the power to pass a direction that the said conviction will not have any impact
on the convict’s services. See: Girraj Prasad Meena v. State of Rajasthan (2014) 13
SCC 674 H
1070 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A 6. Though we do not agree with the reasons given by the High
Court for setting aside the order of discharge of the Respondent from
service, it is necessary to examine whether Section 10 (1)(b)(i) of Banking
Regulation Act is applicable to the facts of the case. Conviction for an
offence involving moral turpitude disqualifies a person from continuing
in service in a bank. The conundrum that arises in this case is whether
B
the conviction of the Respondent under Section 324 IPC can be said to
be for an offence involving moral turpitude.
7. Moral Turpitude’ as defined in the Black’s Law Dictionary
th
(6 ed.) is as follows:
C “The Act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in the private
and social duties which man owes to his follow man, or to
society in general, contrary to accepted and customary rule
of right and duty between man and man.” 3
“implies something immoral in itself regardless of it being
D punishable by law”; “restricted to the gravest offences,
consisting of felonies, infamous crimes, and those that are
malum in se and disclose a depraved mind.” 4
According to Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, ‘Moral Turpitude’ is :
“An act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
E social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society
in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between man and man.”
Burton Legal Thesaurus defines ‘Moral Turpitude’ as :
“Bad faith, bad repute, corruption, defilement, delinquency,
F
discredit, dishonor, shame, guilt, knavery, misdoing,
perversion, shame, ice, wrong.”
8. There is no doubt that there is an obligation on the
Management of the Bank to discontinue the services of an employee
who has been convicted by a criminal court for an offence involving
G moral turpitude.5 Though every offence is a crime against the society,
discontinuance from service according to the Banking Regulation Act

3
p. 1008
4
p. 1517
5
Sushil Kumar Singhal (supra)
H
STATE BANK OF INDIA & OTHERS v. P. SOUPRAMANIANE 1071
[L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

can be only for committing an offence involving moral turpitude. Acts A
which disclose depravity and wickedness of character can be
categorized as offences involving moral turpitude. Whether an offence
involves moral turpitude or not depends upon the facts6 and the
circumstances7 of the case. Ordinarily, the tests that can be applied for
judging an offence involving moral turpitude are:
B
a) Whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could
shock the moral conscience or society in general;
b) Whether the motive which led to the act was a base one,
and
c) Whether on account of the act having been committed the C
perpetrators could be considered to be of a depraved char-
acter or a person who was to be looked down upon by the
society. 8
The other important factors that are to be kept in mind to
conclude that an offence involves moral turpitude are :– the person who D
commits the offence; the person against whom it is committed; the
manner and circumstances in which it is alleged to have been
committed; and the values of the society.9 According to the National
Incident – Based Reporting System (NIBRS), a crime data collection
system used in the United States of America, each offence belongs to E
one of the three categories which are: crimes against persons, crimes
against property, and crimes against society. Crimes against persons
include murder, rape, and assault where the victims are always
individuals. The object of crimes against property, for example, robbery
and burglary is to obtain money, property, or some other benefits. Crimes
against society for example gambling, prostitution, and drug violations, F
represent society’s prohibition against engaging in certain types of
activities. Conviction of any alien of a crime involving moral turpitude is
a ground for deportation under the Immigration Law in the United States
of America. To qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude for such
purpose, it requires both reprehensible conduct and scienter, whether G
with specific intent, deliberateness, willfulness or recklessness. 10
6
Allahabad Bank v. Deepak Kumar Bhola
7
Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1996) 4 SCC 17 ¶12
8
Mangali v. Chakki Lal, AIR 1963 ALL 527
9
Jorabhai Hirabhai Rabari v. District Development Officer, Mehsana, AIR 1996 Guj 3.
10
Cristoval Silva – Trevina 241 & N Dec 687 (AG 2008) H
1072 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A 9. There can be no manner of doubt about certain offences which
can straightaway be termed as involving moral turpitude e.g. offences
under the Prevention of Corruption of Act, NDPS Act, etc. The
question that arises for our consideration in this case is whether an
offence involving bodily injury can be categorized as a crime involving
moral turpitude. In this case, we are concerned with an assault. It is
B
very difficult to state that every assault is not an offence involving moral
turpitude. A simple assault is different from an aggravated assault. All
cases of assault or simple hurt cannot be categorized as crimes
involving moral turpitude. On the other hand, the use of a dangerous
weapon which can cause the death of the victim may may result in an
C offence involving moral turpitude. In the instant case, there was no
motive for the Respondent to cause the death of the victims. The
criminal courts below found that the injuries caused to the victims were
simple in nature. On an overall consideration of the facts of this case,
we are of the opinion that the crime committed by the Respondent does
not involve moral turpitude. As the Respondent is not guilty of an
D
offence involving moral turpitude, he is not liable to be discharged from
service.
10. For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the High Court. The Appeal is dismissed accordingly.
E
Divya Pandey Appeal dismissed.

F

G

H