Holding

The Court held that the respondent, being a non‑public servant and with no demonstrable benefit or participation in the money trail, could not be charged under Section 13 PCA nor under Sections 120B, 107, 109 IPC; the material did not establish a prima facie conspiracy, leading to dismissal of the appeal.

Summary

The CBI alleged that Uttamchand Bohra aided a senior income‑tax officer (A‑1) in acquiring a flat through a company, thereby helping the officer amass assets disproportionate to his known income. The prosecution’s case rested on Bohra’s custody of the sale deed and the fact that his employee witnessed its execution, along with references to an earlier case where Bohra was a co‑accused. The Supreme Court examined whether such circumstances established a prima facie case of criminal conspiracy, abetment under the IPC and an offence under Section 13(1)(e) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, noting that Bohra was not a public servant and received no benefit. The Court held that possession of the deed and employee testimony were insufficient to infer conspiracy or abetment, that the earlier case was irrelevant, and that the material did not meet the “grave suspicion” threshold required to frame charges. Consequently, the appeal against the High Court’s quashing of the charge‑sheet was dismissed.

Issues considered

Can a non‑public servant be prosecuted under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act for alleged involvement in a public servant’s disproportionate assets case?
Do the facts of possession of a sale deed and an employee’s witnessing constitute a prima facie case of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC and abetment under Sections 107/109 IPC?
Is evidence from an earlier FIR (CC No.3/2013) admissible to support charges in the present disproportionate assets proceeding (CC No.5/2015)?
What is the appropriate standard of proof (suspicion vs grave suspicion) for framing charges under Sections 227 and 228 of the CrPC?

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161, s. 173, s. 226, s. 227, s. 228, s. 239, s. 397, s. 401
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 107, s. 109, s. 120A, s. 120B
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13(1)(e), s. 13(2)

Subjects

Prevention of Corruption ActDisproportionate assetsConspiracyAbetmentPublic servantSection 13 PCASection 120B IPCSection 227 CrPCPrima facie caseSale deed

Judgment

[2021] 9 S.C.R. 821 821

THE STATE BY S.P. THROUGH THE SPE CBI A
v.
UTTAMCHAND BOHRA
(Criminal Appeal No. 1590 of 2021)
DECEMBER 09, 2021 B
[K. M. JOSEPH AND S. RAVINDRA BHAT, JJ.]
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – ss.13(1)(e), 13(2) –
A-1, a public servant was accused of accumulating assets
disproportionate to his known sources of income in collusion with
C
other accused – Respondent accused of abetting and/or conspiring
with A-1 – According to the prosecution, A-1 acquired a flat, through
a company – Respondent was alleged to be close associate and
financer of A-1 and his family – Chargesheet against the respondent
quashed by High Court – On appeal, held: Role attributed to the
respondent is that he helped in the execution of the sale deed of the D
property which was seized from his house and that his employee
witnessed the sale deed – The fact that the sale deed was in the
respondent’s residence cannot satisfy the ingredient of any of the
offences alleged against him – An allegation of the existence of
signatures of respondent’s employee, as a witness to the sale deed
E
cannot amount to his aiding or abetting A-1 to acquire
disproportionate assets – FIR in the present case names only A-1
and A-2 (A-1’s wife) as the accused – Respondent’s name was
included in the present case, although the sale deed was seized
during a search conducted in relation to another FIR (in an earlier
case wherein respondent was co-accused) and not in relation to the F
present case – The earlier case is irrelevant to the present case –
Further, respondent was not a public officer or public servant –
Therefore, he cannot be charged with committing an offence u/
s.13(1)(e) r/w s.13(2) – There is no allegation against the respondent
that he received any benefit or that he held the property in his name
G
for the benefit of A-1 – The property which the Company purchased
was in its name – Money trail for the property bought under the
sale deed, does not show respondent’s involvement – There is no
material prima facie supporting an inference that the respondent
was either a conspirator or had abetted the commission of the
H
821
822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A offences alleged against A-1 – Alleged offences u/ss.120-B, 109,
IPC against the respondent not made out from the chargesheet –
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.120B, 109 – Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 – ss.397, 401, 226-228, 239, 161.
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – ss.13(1)(e), 13(2) –
B Penal Code, 1860 – s.120B – Criminal misconduct by public servant
– Conspiracy – Standard of suspicion – Held: Material to implicate
someone as a conspirator acting in concert with a public servant,
alleged to have committed misconduct under the PCA or amassed
assets disproportionate to a public servant’s known sources of
income, has to be on firm ground.
C
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The respondent is accused of abetting and/or
conspiring with the principal accused, a public servant (A-1), so
as to permit him to accumulate assets disproportionate to his
D known sources of income. A-1 was a senior official of the Central
Government, working in the income tax department. According
to the prosecution, he acquired the flat, through the company
(M/s. Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd.). Two other accused, who
facilitated the acquisition, turned approver; they also deposed
during the trail. The role attributed to the respondent is that he
E helped in the execution of the sale deed of the property, and
kept custody of the title deed to it. The document was in fact
seized from his house. The seizure took place over a year before
the present case was initiated; in fact, the CBI had initiated
another criminal proceeding, in which A- 1 too was implicated. In
F that case, the CBI had seized ` 50 lakhs from him. In the present
case, the recovery from respondent’s custody of the sale deed of
the property, owned by the Company led to initiation of separate
proceeding; inter alia, respondent was charged with criminal
conspiracy, defined under Section 120A, IPC and punishable under
Section 120B IPC and abetment, defined by Section 107 IPC and
G punishable under Section 109 IPC. [Para 22][838-D-G; 839-A]
1.2 Section 13 (1) (e) and Section 13 (2) of the PCA, are
relevant because the respondent was sought to be charged under
those provisions. The respondent, was not a public officer or public

H
THE STATE BY S.P. THROUGH THE SPE CBI v. 823
UTTAMCHAND BOHRA

servant. He cannot therefore, be charged with committing an A
offence under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the PCA.
There is no allegation against respondent, that he received any
monetary or other benefit, or that he held the property in his
name for the benefit of A-1. This assumes significance, because
the property which the Company purchased, was in its name.
B
There is no evidence against the respondent linking him to the
transaction relating to the execution of the sale deed, or alleging
that he had an agreement with A-1 and others to commit an illegal
act. Further, there is no allegation of a legal act being done in an
illegal manner. Therefore, the alleged offence under Section 120-
B IPC against the respondent is also not made out from the C
charge-sheet. The chargesheet further does not contain any
allegation which can amount to an offence under Section 109 IPC.
The prosecution has not suggested that he abetted A-1 to acquire
disproportionate assets in any manner; the only allegation is that
the title deeds to the flat, which is in the name of the Company
D
was seized from his custody and that he had instructed his
employee to witness the document. An allegation of the existence
of signatures of the respondent’s employee, as a witness to the
sale deed cannot amount to his aiding or abetting A-1 to acquire
disproportionate assets. Witnessing a sale deed is a formal
requirement. Likewise, the fact that the sale deed was in the E
respondent’s residence cannot satisfy the ingredient of any of
the offences alleged against him. The statements of the approvers,
A-3 and A-4, who were tendered pardon by the Court, do not
reveal any involvement by respondent in commission of the
alleged offence. During the pendency of the present proceedings
F
the recording of depositions of 74 witnesses was completed. Those
were part of this Court’s record; they do not show any
incriminating material as far as respondent is concerned.
Furthermore, crucially, the money trail for the property bought
under the sale deed, does not show the respondent’s involvement.
It may implicate A-3 and A-4, however, the Court has granted a G
pardon to them, for which they have turned approvers. The money
trail for the purchase of flat, under the chargesheet - which is
also discussed in the impugned judgment, is that (a) the property
was purchased by M/s. Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. through
sources alleged arranged by A-1 through his friend A-7; (b) A-1
H
824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A had official dealings with two companies M/s. A.S. Shipping
Agencies and M/s. Aban Offshore Ltd., Chennai; (c) At A-1’s
reference, a company (in which A-7 is a director (M/s. Tidal Data
Solutions, Bangalore)) had supplied data storage servers to the
said two companies (M/s. A.S. Shipping Agencies and M/s. Aban
Offshore Ltd.); (d) The latter two companies [M/s. A.S. Shipping
B
Agencies and M/s. Aban Offshore Ltd.] had made a payment of
about ` 1 crore in excess (over and above the invoice amount) to
A-7; (e) A-7 had collected the payments through cheques and
deposited them in current accounts of A-6’s companies (Utkarsh
lnfotech Pvt. Ltd., and Utkarsh Staffings Pvt. Ltd.); (f) On A-7’s
C direction, A-6’s companies transferred `94,82,300/- to the account
of M/s. Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd, of which `80,00,000/- was
used by the Company (represented by approver A-4 to purchase
the property at the directions of A-1. Two demand drafts of `50
lakhs and `30 lakhs were drawn by A-4. [Paras 22-25][839-A;
840-C-H; 841-A-E]
D
1.3 It is clear that in terms of both the chargesheet and the
final report, respondent is not involved with the money trail or
the transaction for the purchase of the property which was acquired
by A-1, according to the prosecution. It is a fact that not only is
the investigation complete, depositions of prosecution witnesses
E too have been recorded. There cannot be any question of
introducing any further evidence. CBI cannot deny that the
respondent’s name was included in the present case, although
the sale deed was seized during a search conducted in relation to
another FIR (the earlier case- CC No. 3/2013 wherein respondent
F was a co-accused and according to the prosecution his vehicle
was intercepted when he had attempted to help A-1 in transporting
a bribe amount of `50 lakhs received by A-1 to a safe place)- and
not in relation to the present case, which relates to the
disproportionate assets case. The FIR in the present case names
only A-1 and A-2 as the accused. The sale deed had already been
G seized from respondent’s house by then. The CBI had urged that
the allegations against respondent in the earlier case can be used
against him in the present case although the final report in the
present case does not make any reference to them. The final
report in the present case was filed after the registration of FIR
H in CC No. 3/2013 and after the seizure of the sale deed from
THE STATE BY S.P. THROUGH THE SPE CBI v. 825
UTTAMCHAND BOHRA

respondent’s house. The final report makes a mention of the FIR A
dated 29.08.2011. There is, however, no allegation against
respondent in the chargesheet in the present case [CC No. 5/
2015] on the basis of or adopting the allegations against him in
CC No. 3/2013. Thus, the two cases are separate. The allegations
against respondent in CC No. 3/2013 does not relate to
B
disproportionate assets. Therefore, CC No. 3/2013 is irrelevant
to the present case. [Paras 9, 26-28][841-E-H; 829-E-F;
842-A-C, F]
State of J&K v. Sudershan Chakkar 1995) 4 SCC 181
: [1995] 1 Suppl. SCR 294 – relied on.
1.4 The material to implicate someone as a conspirator C
acting in concert with a public servant, alleged to have committed
misconduct, under the PCA, or amassed assets disproportionate
to a public servant’s known sources of income, thus, has to be on
firm ground. In the present case, only two circumstances - the
custody of the sale deed (of the property allegedly belonging to D
A-1) and the fact that it was witnessed by respondent’s employee
- are alleged against the respondent. These are wholly insufficient
to raise a reasonable suspicion, or make out a prima case against
him, for conspiracy. As far as the respondent is concerned, the
initial burden of showing that a conspiracy existed, cannot even
be alleged against him, given the nature of the material presented E
along with the charge sheet. An entire overview of the material
produced before the trial court, with the charge sheet and final
report, as well as deposition of the 74 witnesses who were
examined during the trial, does not support CBI’s allegation of
the respondent. He did not directly or indirectly finance the
transaction by which property was sold to M/s Raviteja Trading F
Co. Pvt. Ltd, which, according to that prosecution, was in fact by
A-1. The respondent also is not alleged to have facilitated the
flow of money to fund acquisition of the flat. The material put
against him is that the sale deed was seized, prior to the present
case.The other circumstance put against him is that his employee G
witnessed the sale deed. The respondent is concededly neither
the owner, nor has any links with M/s Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt.
Ltd. There is no material which can prima facie support an
inference that respondent was either a conspirator or had abetted
the commission of the offences alleged against the accused A-1.
[Paras 29, 30, 32][843-D-F; 844-B-H; 845-A-C] H
826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A Deepak Surana vs. State of M.P Decision of Supreme
Court dtd. 08.02.2016 in Criminal Appeal No. 128 of
2016; Central Bureau of Investigation v. K. Narayana
Rao (2012) 9 SCC 512 : [2012] 9 SCR 54; P. Nallammal
v. State (1999) 6 SCC 559 : [1999] 1 Suppl. SCR 135 –
relied on.
B
Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal (1973) 3
SCC 753: [1973] 2 SCR 66
State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) 4 SCC 39 : [1978]
1 SCR 257; Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal
C & Ors 1979 (3) SCC 4 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1973] 2 SCR 66 referred to Para 17
[1978] 1 SCR 257 referred to Para 17
D [2012] 9 SCR 54 relied on Para 21
[1995] 1 Suppl. SCR 294 relied on Para 28
[1999] 1 Suppl. SCR 135 relied on Para 30
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
E No.1590 of 2021.
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.05.2017 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in Criminal Revision Case No.73 of 2017.
Vikramjit Banerjee, ASG, Ms. Ranjana Narayan, Sachin Sharma,
Ms. Swarupama Chaturvedi, Sugosh Subramanyam, Arvind Kumar
F Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.
R. Basant, Sr. Adv., Ramesh Allanki, Ms. Aruna Gupta, Siddhant
Buxy, D. V. Raghu Vamsy, Syed Ahmad Naqvi, Akshay Sahay, Dasari
Muraleemohan, Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. This special leave petition was filed after a delay of 447 days.
The successful respondent (Uttamchand Bohra, hereinafter
“Uttamchand/respondent”), who was issued notice as to why delay in
H filing the petition should not be condoned, objected to the Court’s
THE STATE BY S.P. THROUGH THE SPE CBI v. 827
UTTAMCHAND BOHRA [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

entertaining the petition, urging that the certified copy of the impugned A
order (delivered on 25.05.2017), was applied for on 13.03.2018 and
eventually the petition was filed on 13.11.2018. Thus, total delay of 447
days occurred in filing of the petition, which is inordinate. It was urged
that the application for condonation should not be countenanced, as no
sufficient cause was shown.
B
2. On behalf of the Central Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter
“CBI / prosecution”), Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, learned Additional Solicitor
General (hereinafter “ASG”) pointed to averments in the affidavit and
supported the application seeking condonation of delay on the ground
that the certified copy which had been originally applied for, could not be
collected since the receipt was misplaced and as a result, the second C
certified copy was applied for. The matter had to be processed and
official approvals obtained, which took some time. The final clearance
for filing the petition was given in mid-June 2018 after which it was
drafted and eventually filed. The ASG contended that having regard to
these facts, this Court should condone the delay for filing the petition. D
3. After hearing the rival arguments, this Court is of the opinion
that though the delay of over 447 days is considerable, nevertheless
explanation given by the petitioner that it lost the original receipt and had
to apply for a fresh certified copy, has to be taken note of. The delay
which occurred after the receipt of the certified copy in the opinion of E
the Court is not of such magnitude as to warrant dismissal of the
application i.e., I.A. No. 178754/ 2018. The application is allowed and
the delay in filing the petition, condoned.
4. Special leave granted. With the consent of counsel for the
parties, the appeal was heard finally. F
5. The CBI is, in this appeal, aggrieved by a judgment of the
Madras High Court1 by which, exercising jurisdiction under Section 397
and Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter “CrPC”)
it quashed the charge sheet against the respondent (who was arrayed as
fifth accused in C.C. No.5 of 2015, before the Special Judge for CBI G
cases (XII Addl. Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai (hereinafter “trial
court”). The trial court had, by its order dated 29.12.2015, rejected
Crl.M.P.No.6873/2015, which was an application under Section 239
CrPC seeking Uttamchand’s discharge.
1
Dated 25.05.2017 in CRP 73/2017. H
828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A 6. The CBI, through its Investigating Officer (hereinafter “IO”),
after completing investigation, filed a final report on 20.02.2012 under
Section 173 CrPC against five (out of seven) accused. Badhe Rathnam
Mahesh, s/o B. S. Rathnam (A-3) and Badhe Anandh Chaitanya, s/o
B.R. Mahesh (A-4) were pardoned and became approvers; they were
not sent for trial. Those sent up for trial were: (i) Andasu Ravindar, (A-
B
1); (ii) Kavitha Andasu, wife of A-1 (A-2); (iii) Uttamchand (A-5); (iv)
Uday K. Agarwal, (A-6); and (v) Pothapragada Srinivas, (A-7). CBI
alleged that the accused committed offences punishable under Section
120B and Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter “IPC”) and
Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption
C Act, 1988 (hereinafter “PCA”).
7. It was alleged in the final report that A-1, in collusion with the
other accused, during the period of 01.01.2005 to 29.08.2011 amassed
wealth in his name, as well as in the name of his wife (A-2) to the tune
of ` 2,32,20,296/- which was disproportionate to his known sources of
D income for which he was not able to account satisfactorily. It was alleged
that A-2 was a house wife. She had filed her income tax returns for the
assessment years 2005-06, 2006-07, 2007-08, 2009-10 and 2011 through
the approver (A-4), a chartered accountant who had acted on behalf of
A-1 and received money from him. That money was returned to A-2 to
show as if she had earned the income through job contracts and business.
E It was further alleged that A-1 also purchased properties on several
occasions and the income tax returns did not reflect those properties.
They were purchased in Chennai in the name of M/s Raviteja Trading
Co. Pvt. Ltd., Hyderabad (hereinafter also “Company”). They were
purchased only through sources arranged by A-1. On the directions of
F A-7, ` 94,82,300/- was transferred by cheques by A-6 through his
companies’ accounts (i.e., M/s. Utkarsh Infotech Pvt. Ltd., and M/s.
Utkarsh Staffing Pvt. Ltd., Secunderabad) to the current account of M/
s. Raviteja Trading Company Pvt. Ltd., Hyderabad with Standard
Chartered Bank, Secunderabad. After receiving that amount, M/s.
Raviteja Trading Co., Pvt. Ltd., represented by approver (A-4), acquired
G the property at Chennai on the directions of A-1. The sale consideration
of ` 80,00,000/- was paid through two demand drafts each for the value
of ` 50,00,000/- and ` 30,00,000/- respectively and these two demand
drafts were purchased by the approver A-4, director of M/s. Raviteja
Trading Co., Pvt. Ltd., Hyderabad through its current account and the
H amount was handed over to the vendor Mr. Badruzman Khan.
THE STATE BY S.P. THROUGH THE SPE CBI v. 829
UTTAMCHAND BOHRA [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

8. The prosecution alleged further that the sale deed (dated A
13.07.2011) of the property, Flat No.4/3 (old No.28/3), measuring 2108
sq. ft. in second floor at AIL-Ahad Apartment No.28 (present No.4)
Nageswara Rao Road (Old No.13, Krishnamcahari Road,
Nungambakkam, Chennai-34) was executed and registered under
Document No.669/2011, (hereinafter “the sale deed”) in the name of
B
M/s. Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. Though the said property was
purchased in the name of the company, its original sale deed was seized
from the possession of Uttamchand who was the financier and close
associate of A-1.
9. The prosecution case, as regards Uttamchand, had two aspects:
the first, relating to the seizure of the sale deed in (C.C. No.5/ 2015), C
and the second relating to the case in C.C. No.3/ 2013. In the present
case, the allegation against Uttamchand is that he was a close associate
and financer of A-1 and his family. The original sale deed was executed
in the name of the Company. The sale deed was in his custody as per
the directions of A-1. Uttamchand thereby had rendered his active D
assistance to A-1 to acquire assets in his name as well as in the name of
his wife A-2 and in the name of the Company, during the period of
01.01.2005 to 29.08.2011 which, as stated above, was disproportionate
to the known sources of income of A-1 to the tune of ` 2,32,20,296/-.
The percentage of disproportionate assets is calculated at 171.41% for
the total income of A-1 and A-2, which they could not satisfactorily E
account for. The second case (hereafter called “the earlier case”) was
that Uttamchand was a co-accused (A-3) in R.C. No. 33(A)/2011 (CC.
No. 3/2013) and was facing trial in that case. According to the prosecution,
his vehicle was intercepted when he had attempted to help A-1 in
transporting a bribe amount of ` 50 lakhs received by him A-1 to a safe F
place. That case was registered on 20.02.2012 with CBI, ACB, Chennai
under Section 13(1)(e) PCA and Section 109 IPC.
10. Uttamchand’s complaint before the High Court was that the
only evidence relied upon by the prosecution against him was possession
of the sale deed. His argument was that even if the CBI were to prove G
what it alleged - which is that his employee (V. Sridhar / PW-45) had
witnessed the execution of the document, per se that circumstance could
not make him criminally liable. It was also urged that since Uttamchand’s
relationship with A-1 and A-2 was known to the prosecution and admitted
by it, i.e. as a financer, (which was borne out by the fact that he had
H
830 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A advanced monies to A-2 and had disclosed these in the income tax returns),
the sale deed, belonging to a third party, with him in no way implicated
him. It was also urged that the deposition of V. Sridhar, or even those of
the approvers established in any manner that Uttamchand had links with
the company which purchased the flat. That Uttamchand was to face
trial in the earlier case could not have been an incriminating circumstance
B
for him to be joined in the second case against A-1, A-2 and other accused.
11. On the other hand, the CBI urged that Uttamchand’s role as
the holder of title documents of property clearly pointed to a conspiracy
between him and A-1, the public servant. He was a facilitator for the
purchase of benami property by A-1 in the name of the company. It
C was argued that the Court, while examining whether to frame charges
or otherwise against an accused sent up for trial, is not concerned with
the probability of truth but whether there is a reasonable suspicion of the
accused having committed an offence. Viewed from this perspective,
the role attributed to Uttamchand at the stage of framing of charges,
D i.e., of being in possession of the sale deed, the real owner of the property
being A-1, was probable reasonable cause, sufficient for the trial court
to frame charges. In any event, it was sufficient for the trial court to
reject his application for discharge which it correctly did.
12. The High Court accepted the arguments on behalf of
E Uttamchand Bohra. After an overall examination of the statements made
by the witnesses relied upon by the prosecution under Section 161 CrPC,
the High Court concluded that the mere possession of the registered
sale deed which was witnessed by Uttamchand’s employee, could not
incriminate him. It could not amount to satisfying the prescribed standard,
i.e., of reasonable suspicion of commission of the crime, of being
F attributable to him, i.e., of abetment and conspiracy with a public servant
to enable the latter to amass wealth which was disproportionate to his
known sources of income. The High Court also noticed that the approver’s
evidence, i.e., the statements under Section 161 CrPC, in no manner
tended to implicate Uttamchand. Those statements merely pointed to
G the acquisition of property by the Company i.e., M/s.Raviteja Trading
Co. Pvt. Ltd., Hyderabad.
Contentions of the prosecution
13. On behalf of the CBI, it was argued by the learned ASG that
the chargesheet contained clear allegations of collusion which amounted
H
THE STATE BY S.P. THROUGH THE SPE CBI v. 831
UTTAMCHAND BOHRA [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

to criminal conspiracy on the part of Uttamchand with A-1. It was pointed A
out that the consideration of ` 80,00,000/- paid for the property was
never disclosed. Although A-1 contended that the property belonged to
the Company, nevertheless it was a mere front. The property was
purchased through A-1’s friend P. Srinivas, director of M/s. Tidal Data
Solutions, Bangalore. A-1 had official dealings with two entities (M/s.
B
A.S. Shipping Agencies and M/s. Aban Offshore Ltd., Chennai) to whom
M/s. Tidal Data Solutions had approved unified storage servers. The
said P. Srinivas received payments from those companies in excess of
the invoice value which were deposited in the account of the companies
of A-6, Udhay K. Agarwal. Those amounts were then diverted to the
Company i.e., M/s. Raviteja Trading Pvt. Ltd. which ultimately bought C
the flat.
14. It was submitted that the original sale deed purchased by the
said companies was seized from the possession of Uttamchand. He had
no explanation as to how the sale deed was in his possession. Uttamchand
was the financer to lend money to A-2. Uttamchand’s acquiescence to D
the close dealings with A-1 and A-2, the manner in which the property
was purchased after routing the money into the account of the Company,
from entities which had official dealings with A-1, and the further
circumstances that Uttamchand’s employee was witness to the sale deed,
pointed to his complicity and guilt. Therefore, the trial court correctly
framed charges against him. It was further argued that during pendency E
of the present proceedings, the trial went ahead, and statements of most
witnesses were recorded. In this context, the depositions of PW-70 and
PW-71 were relied on, to say that A-1 amassed wealth illicitly and was
aided by others like Uttamchand.
15. It was urged that Uttamchand aided and assisted in the F
execution of the sale deed and abetted the benami purchase made by
A-1 by making his employee (PW-45) sign as a witness to the sale deed.
It was also urged that during the search on 30.08.2011, at the residence
of Uttamchand, the original sale deed was seized, in addition to
` 48,20,000/-. Counsel also submitted that it was clear from the statement G
of the chartered accountant, Siddharth Mehta (PW-73) that the sale
deed was handed over to A-1 by Siddharth Mehta. The sale deed
eventually was recovered from Uttamchand’s residence. This clearly
showed the sale deed was given by A-1 himself to Uttamchand only to
protect A-1 from any legal pursuit.
H
832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A 16. The ASG also alluded to the facts of the earlier case, in R.C.
No. 33(A)/2011 (CC. No. 3/2013) (registered on 29.08.2011 u/s 120B
IPC r/w 7 of PCA, 1988. He submitted that A-1 organized survey
proceedings in the premises of M/S Everonn Education Ltd., Chennai
and concealed taxable income of ` 100 crore. He demanded and accepted
` 50 lakhs from Shri P. Kishore on 29.08.2011 for showing undue favor
B
and concealing income tax liability. He further urged that the CBI team
intercepted Uttamchand going to A-1’s residence about 9.00 p.m., and
assisting A-1 in transferring the money to a safe place by driving the car
in which A-1 was seated. A-1 had a carton, containing ` 50 lakhs. Thus,
Uttamchand colluded in transporting the bribe amount received by A-1
C to a safe place for which he arrived at the latter’s residence, which was
also proved by telephonic surveillance.
17. Learned ASG urged that this Court, in Nirmaljit Singh Hoon
v. State of West Bengal2 held that in a criminal trial, the test was whether
there was sufficient grounds for proceeding prevalent, and not whether
D there was sufficient ground for conviction. When there was prima facie
evidence, even though person accused may have a defense, the case
had to be relegated to be decided by appropriate forum at the right stage.
He also urged that strong suspicion was sufficient for framing charges
and relied on State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh3.
E 18. Mr. R. Basant, learned Senior Counsel submitted that prima
facie the prosecution failed to produce any material to implicate the
respondent in the crime of conspiracy. It was submitted that most of the
witnesses had already deposed. The only other evidence available to the
prosecution to connect the respondent with the crime was a confession
of the co-accused which according to the learned counsel was
F inadmissible in evidence. However, the depositions of PW-70 and PW-
71 did not inculpate Uttamchand. Therefore, he contended that the High
Court was justified in allowing his discharge application since the
prosecution failed to establish even a prima facie case against the
respondent.
G 19. It was argued, by referring to Union of India vs. Prafulla
Kumar Samal & Ors4 that the test to determine a prima facie case
depends upon the facts of each case. However, if two views are equally
2
(1973) 3 SCC 753.
3
(1977) 4 SCC 39.
4
H 1979 (3) SCC 04
THE STATE BY S.P. THROUGH THE SPE CBI v. 833
UTTAMCHAND BOHRA [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

possible and the judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him A
may give rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the
accused, the judge would be justified in discharging the accused. Counsel
also pointed out that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 of
CrPC, the Court could not merely act as a Post Office or a mouth-piece
of the prosecution, but had to consider the broad probabilities of the
B
case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before
it, if any basic infirmities appear in the case, etc.
20. Mr. Basant urged that the High Court correctly held that mere
presence of the sale deed in the respondent’s residence and other
allegations did not constitute any of the offences charged against him.
The allegations against Uttamchand in the charge-sheet / final report C
prima facie did not constitute any of the offences for which he was
being prosecuted. It was submitted that Uttamchand was not a public
servant, and could not commit an offence under Section 13(1)(e) read
with Section 13(2) of the PCA. There was no allegation that he received
any monetary benefit, or profited from A-1’s amassing assets D
disproportionate to his income. Furthermore, there was no evidence linking
the transaction of sale of the flat, with Uttamchand. Further, no allegation
against Uttamchand was made in the chargesheet that may amount to
an offence under Section 109, IPC.
Analysis and Findings E
21. In Central Bureau of Investigation v. K. Narayana Rao5
this Court, after reviewing the previous decisions that dealt with the
question of the applicable standard relating to discharge of accused in a
criminal case, summarized the principles in the following terms:
“13. Discharge of the accused under Section 227 of the Code F
was extensively considered by this Court in P. Vijayan [(2010)
2 SCC 398 wherein it was held as under: (SCC pp. 401-02,
paras 10-11)
“10. … If two views are possible and one of them gives
rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave G
suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge
the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the
trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words
‘not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused’
5
(2012) 9 SCC 512 H
834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to
frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has
to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in
order to determine whether a case for trial has been made
out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not
necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of
B
the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence
and probabilities which is really the function of the court,
after the trial starts.
11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to
sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there
C is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within
its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police
or the documents produced before the court which ex facie
disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against
D the accused so as to frame a charge against him.”
12. The first decision in Ramesh Singh [(1977) 4 SCC 39]
relates to interpretation of Sections 227 and 228 of the
Code for the considerations as to discharge the accused
or to proceed with trial. Para 4 of the said judgment is
E pressed into service which reads as under: (SCC pp. 41-
42)
“4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case
for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the
charge against the accused and state by what evidence he
F proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes
at the initial stage the duty of the Court to consider the record
of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear
the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that
behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under
Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If ‘the Judge
G considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record
his reasons for so doing’, as enjoined by Section 227. If, on
the other hand, ‘the Judge is of opinion that there is ground
for presuming that the accused has committed an offence
H which— … (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall
THE STATE BY S.P. THROUGH THE SPE CBI v. 835
UTTAMCHAND BOHRA [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

frame in writing a charge against the accused’, as provided A
in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in
juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at
the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity
and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to
adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight
B
to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is
not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to
consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance
whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the
innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and
judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a C
finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not
exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under
Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the
Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for
conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end
D
in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the
matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the
place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at
the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the
Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the
accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the E
Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the
accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the
sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France
where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary
F
is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima
facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not.
If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to
prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it
is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence
evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the G
offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding
with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate
as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither
possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference
of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the
H
836 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at
the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of
doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other
hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under
Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily
and generally the order which will have to be made will be
B
one under Section 228 and not under Section 227.
14. While considering the very same provisions i.e. framing
of charges and discharge of the accused, again in Sajjan
Kumar [(2010) 9 SCC 368] , this Court held thus: (SCC pp.
375-77, paras 19-21)
C
“19. It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong
suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground
for presuming that the accused has committed an offence,
then it is not open to the court to say that there is no
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The
D presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn
at the initial stage is only for the purpose of deciding prima
facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or
not. If the evidence which the prosecution proposes to
adduce proves the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted
E before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by
the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused
committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient
ground for proceeding with the trial.
20. A Magistrate enquiring into a case under Section 209
F CrPC is not to act as a mere post office and has to come to
a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for
commitment of the accused to the Court of Session. He is
entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only
for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for
commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence
G for conviction. If there is no prima facie evidence or the
evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is the duty of the
Magistrate to discharge the accused, on the other hand, if
there is some evidence on which the conviction may
reasonably be based, he must commit the case. It is also
H clear that in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227
THE STATE BY S.P. THROUGH THE SPE CBI v. 837
UTTAMCHAND BOHRA [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

CrPC, the Magistrate should not make a roving enquiry A
into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence
as if he was conducting a trial.
Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 and 228 CrPC
21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope
of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following B
principles emerge:
(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing
the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted
power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose
of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against C
the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima
facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose
grave suspicion against the accused which has not been
properly explained, the court will be fully justified in D
framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad
probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence
and the documents produced before the court, any basic E
infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a
roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and
weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court
could form an opinion that the accused might have F
committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for
conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the
offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative G
value of the material on record cannot be gone into but
before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial
mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied
that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.
H
838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is
required to evaluate the material and documents on record
with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken
at their face value disclose the existence of all the
ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited
purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at
B
that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states
as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or
the broad probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise
to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion,
C the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused
and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end
in conviction or acquittal.”
22. As is evident from the discussion of the facts, Uttamchand is
accused of abetting and/or conspiring with the principal accused, a public
D servant (A-1), so as to permit him to accumulate assets disproportionate
to his known sources of income. A-1 was a senior official of the Central
Government, working in the income tax department. According to the
prosecution, he acquired the flat, through the company. Two other
accused, who facilitated the acquisition, turned approver; they also deposed
E during the trail. The role attributed to the respondent is that he helped in
the execution of the sale deed of the property, and kept custody of the
title deed to it. The document was in fact seized from his house. The
seizure took place over a year before the present case was initiated; in
fact, the CBI had initiated another criminal proceeding, in which A-1 too
was implicated. In that case, the CBI had seized ` 50 lakhs from him. In
F the present case, the recovery from Uttamchand’s custody of the sale
deed of the property, owned by the Company led to initiation of separate
proceeding; inter alia, Uttamchand was charged with criminal
conspiracy, defined under Section 120A, IPC6 and punishable under
6
“120A. Definition of criminal conspiracy.— When two or more persons agree to do,
G or cause to be done,—
(1) an illegal act, or
2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a
criminal conspiracy:
Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to
a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more
parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.
H
THE STATE BY S.P. THROUGH THE SPE CBI v. 839
UTTAMCHAND BOHRA [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

Section 120B IPC and abetment, defined by Section 107 IPC7 and A
punishable under Section 109 IPC8. Section 13 (1) (e) and Section 13
(2), which are relevant, because the respondent Uttamchand was sought
to be charged under those provisions, read as follows:
“13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.—
(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal B
misconduct,—
********* **********
(e) if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has,
at any time during the period of his office, been in possession C
for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account,
of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his
known sources of income.
Explanation. —For the purposes of this section, “known
sources of income” means income received from any lawful D
Explanation—It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such
agreement, or is merely incidental to that object.”
7
“107. Abetment of a thing.—A person abets the doing of a thing, who—
First.—Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for
the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that E
conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or
Thirdly.—Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.
Explanation 1.—A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of
a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts
to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing.
Illustration A, a public officer, is authorised by a warrant from a Court of Justice to
apprehend Z, B, knowing that fact and also that C is not Z, wilfully represents to A that F
C is Z, and thereby intentionally causes A to apprehend C. Here B abets by instigation
the apprehension of C.
Explanation 2.—Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does
anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the
commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.”
8
“ 109. Punishment of abetment if the act abetted is committed in consequence and
where no express provision is made for its punishment—Whoever abets any offence G
shall, if the act abetted is committed in consequence of the abetment, and no express
provision is made by this Code for the punishment of such abetment, be punished with
the punishment provided for the offence.
Explanation.—An act or offence is said to be committed in consequence of abetment,
when it is committed in consequence of the instigation, or in pursuance of the conspiracy,
or with the aid which constitutes the abetment.”
H
840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance
with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time
being applicable to a public servant.
(2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall
be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be
B not less than 3 [four years] but which may extend to 4 [ten
years] and shall also be liable to fine.”
23. The factual narration in this case would reveal that Uttamchand,
the respondent, was not a public officer or public servant. He cannot
therefore, be charged with committing an offence under Section 13(1)(e)
C read with Section 13(2) of the PCA. There is no allegation against
Uttamchand, that he received any monetary or other benefit, or that he
held the property in his name for the benefit of A-1. This assumes
significance, because the property which the Company purchased, was
in its name. There is no evidence against the respondent linking him to
the transaction relating to the execution of the sale deed, or alleging that
D he had an agreement with A-1 and others to commit an illegal act. Further,
there is no allegation of a legal act being done in an illegal manner.
Therefore, the alleged offence under Section 120-B IPC against the
respondent is also not made out from the charge-sheet.
24. The chargesheet further does not contain any allegation which
E can amount to an offence under Section 109 IPC. The prosecution has
not suggested that he abetted A-1 to acquire disproportionate assets in
any manner; the only allegation is that the title deeds to the flat, which is
in the name of M/s. Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. was seized from his
custody and that he had instructed his employee to witness the document.
F An allegation of the existence of signatures of Uttamchand’s employee,
as a witness to the sale deed cannot amount to his aiding or abetting A-
1 to acquire disproportionate assets. Witnessing a sale deed is a formal
requirement. Likewise, the fact that the sale deed was in Uttamchand’s
residence cannot satisfy the ingredient of any of the offences alleged
against him.
G
25. The statements of the approvers, A-3 and A-4, who were
tendered pardon by the Court, do not reveal any involvement by
Uttamchand in commission of the alleged offence. During the pendency
of the present proceedings the recording of depositions of 74 witnesses
was completed. Those were part of this Court’s record; they do not
H
THE STATE BY S.P. THROUGH THE SPE CBI v. 841
UTTAMCHAND BOHRA [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

show any incriminating material as far as Uttamchand is concerned. A
Furthermore, crucially, the money trail for the property bought under the
sale deed, does not show Uttamchand’s involvement. It may implicate
A-3 and A-4, however as stated before, the Court has granted a pardon
to them, for which they have turned approvers. The money trail for the
purchase of flat, under the chargesheet - which is also discussed in the
B
impugned judgment, is that (a) the property was purchased by M/s.
Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. through sources alleged arranged by A-1
through his friend A-7; (b) A-1 had official dealings with two companies
M/s. A.S. Shipping Agencies and M/s. Aban Offshore Ltd., Chennai;
(c) At A-1’s reference, a company (in which A-7 is a director (M/s.
Tidal Data Solutions, Bangalore)) had supplied data storage servers to C
the said two companies (M/s. A.S. Shipping Agencies and M/s. Aban
Offshore Ltd.); (d) Th latter two companies [M/s. A.S. Shipping Agencies
and M/s. Aban Offshore Ltd.] had made a payment of about ` 1 crore
in excess (over and above the invoice amount) to A-7; (e) A-7 had
collected the payments through cheques and deposited them in current
D
accounts of A-6’s companies (Utkarsh lnfotech Pvt. Ltd., and Utkarsh
Staffings Pvt. Ltd.); (f) On A-7’s direction, A-6’s companies transferred
` 94,82,300/- to the account of M/s. Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd, of
which ` 80,00,000/- was used by the Company (represented by approver
A-4 to purchase the property at the directions of A-1. Two demand
drafts of ` 50 lakhs and ` 30 lakhs were drawn by A-4. E
26. It is clear from the above details that in terms of both the
chargesheet and the final report, Uttamchand is not involved with the
money trail or the transaction for the purchase of the property which
was acquired by A-1, according to the prosecution. It is a fact that not
only is the investigation complete, depositions of prosecution witnesses F
too have been recorded. There cannot be any question of introducing
any further evidence.
27. CBI cannot deny that Uttamchand’s name was included in
the present case, although the sale deed was seized during a search
conducted in relation to another FIR (the earlier case)- and not in relation G
to the present case, which relates to the disproportionate assets case.
The FIR in the present case names only A-1 and A-2 as the accused.
The sale deed had already been seized from Uttamchand’s house by
then.

H
842 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A 28. The CBI had urged that the allegations against Uttamchand in
the earlier case [CC No. 3/2013] can be used against him in the present
case although the final report in the present case does not make any
reference to them. The final report in the present case was filed after
the registration of FIR in CC No. 3/2013 and after the seizure of the sale
deed from Uttamchand’s house. The final report makes a mention of
B
the FIR dated 29.08.2011. There is, however, no allegation against
Uttamchand in the chargesheet in the present case [CC No. 5/2015] on
the basis of or adopting the allegations against him in CC No. 3/2013.
Thus, the two cases are separate. The allegations against Uttamchand
in CC No. 3/2013 does not relate to disproportionate assets. This Court,
C in State of J&K v. Sudershan Chakkar9, stated that the law required
the Court to consider only the chargesheet and materials adduced with
it. It was observed that:
“In our considered view, the learned Courts below erred in
basing their respective orders on the above findings. The
D question whether the respondents omitted to do their
mandatory duties for months together designedly or
negligently can be inferred only on an over all view of all the
materials collected during investigation and not in isolation
as has been done by the learned Courts below. That apart in
a case instituted upon a Police Report the Court is required,
E at the time of framing of the charges, to confine its attention
to documents referred to under Section 173 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure only. In that context the Court was not
justified in referring to, much less, relying upon the letters
purportedly written by the accused when, their authenticity
F and veracity are yet to be gone into.”
Therefore, CC No. 3/2013 is irrelevant to the present case.
29. This Court explained the essence of conspiracy in the context
of acts or omissions, and allegations relating to conspiracy along with
offences under the PCA, in K. Narayana Rao (supra), and observed
G that:
“24. The ingredients of the offence of criminal conspiracy
are that there should be an agreement between the persons
who are alleged to conspire and the said agreement should
9
H (1995) 4 SCC 181.
THE STATE BY S.P. THROUGH THE SPE CBI v. 843
UTTAMCHAND BOHRA [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

be for doing of an illegal act or for doing, by illegal means, A
an act which by itself may not be illegal. In other words, the
essence of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal
act and such an agreement can be proved either by direct
evidence or by circumstantial evidence or by both and in a
matter of common experience that direct evidence to prove
B
conspiracy is rarely available. Accordingly, the circumstances
proved before and after the occurrence have to be considered
to decide about the complicity of the accused. Even if some
acts are proved to have been committed, it must be clear that
they were so committed in pursuance of an agreement made
between the accused persons who were parties to the alleged C
conspiracy. Inferences from such proved circumstances
regarding the guilt may be drawn only when such
circumstances are incapable of any other reasonable
explanation. In other words, an offence of conspiracy cannot
be deemed to have been established on mere suspicion and
D
surmises or inference which are not supported by cogent and
acceptable evidence.”
The material to implicate someone as a conspirator acting in concert
with a public servant, alleged to have committed misconduct, under the
PCA, or amassed assets disproportionate to a public servant’s known
sources of income, thus, has to be on firm ground. In the present case, E
only two circumstances - the custody of the sale deed (of the property
allegedly belonging to A-1) and the fact that it was witnessed by
Uttamchand’s employee - are alleged against the respondent. These are
wholly insufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion, or make out a prima
case against him, for conspiracy. F
30. It would be useful, in the context of the present case, to recollect
the decision of this Court, in P. Nallammal v. State10 which observed, as
follows:
“Thus, the two postulates must combine together for
crystallization into the offence, namely, possession of property G
or resources disproportionate to the known sources of income
of public servant and the inability of the public servant to
account for it. Burden of proof regarding the first limb is on
the prosecution whereas the onus is on the public servant to
10
(1999) 6 SCC 559 H
844 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A prove the second limb. So it is contended that a non-public
servant has no role in the trial of the said offence and hence
he cannot conceivably be tagged with the public servant for
the offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act.”
As far as the respondent Uttamchand is concerned, the initial
B burden of showing that a conspiracy existed, cannot even be alleged
against him, given the nature of the material presented along with the
charge sheet.
31. In a recent decision, Deepak Surana v. State of M.P. – where
the facts were somewhat, if not entirely, similar to the facts of this case
C – the Court emphasized again that suspicion is not sufficient to enable
framing of a charge. It was observed, inter alia, that:
“10. In the present case, the agreements relied upon by the
prosecution do not bear the signatures of the appellants. It is
undoubtedly true that in Aloka Bose v. Parmatma Devi [Aloka
D Bose v. Parmatma Devi, (2009) 2 SCC 582 : AIR 2009 SC
1527] it has been observed that an agreement of sale signed
by the vendor alone is enforceable by the purchaser named
in the agreement. But the question here is whether the
appellants could be said to be involved in the conspiracy.
The agreements in question were not even recovered from the
E custody of the appellants and were recovered from the vendors
themselves. The agreements being unilateral and not bearing
the signatures of the appellants, mere execution of such
agreements cannot be considered as a relevant circumstance
against the appellants. There is nothing on record to indicate
F that the consideration mentioned in the agreement could be
traced to the appellants, nor is there any statement by any of
the witnesses suggesting even proximity or meeting of minds
between the appellants and any of the other accused. In the
circumstances, the view that weighed with the Special Judge
was quite correct. The High Court was not justified in setting
G aside the order passed by the Special Judge. In our
considered view, the material on record completely falls short
of and cannot justify framing of charges against the
appellants.”
32. An entire overview of the material produced before the trial
H court, with the charge sheet and final report, as well as deposition of the
THE STATE BY S.P. THROUGH THE SPE CBI v. 845
UTTAMCHAND BOHRA [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

74 witnesses who were examined during the trial, does not support CBI’s A
allegation of Uttamchand. He did not directly or indirectly finance the
transaction by which property was sold to M/s Raviteja Trading Co.
Pvt. Ltd, which, according to that prosecution, was in fact by A-1. The
respondent also is not alleged to have facilitated the flow of money to
fund acquisition of the flat. The material put against him is that the sale
B
deed was seized, prior to the present case. The other circumstance put
against him is that his employee witnessed the sale deed. The respondent
is concededly neither the owner, nor has any links with M/s Raviteja
Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. In these circumstances, this Court is of the opinion
that no material which can prima facie support an inference that
Uttamchand was either a conspirator or had abetted the commission of C
the offences alleged against the accused A-1 is made out.
33. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the opinion that the
present appeal lacks merit. It is therefore dismissed with no costs.

Divya Pandey Appeal dismissed. D

E

F

G

H