Holding

The High Court was not justified in quashing the FIR; the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC may be exercised only in exceptional cases where the complaint fails to disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process.

Summary

The State of Andhra Pradesh appealed a High Court order that had quashed an FIR registered against Vangaveeti Nagaiah under Sections 7(A) and 8(e) of the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act, 1995 and Section 109 of the IPC. The appeal raised the question of whether the High Court correctly exercised its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to dismiss the proceeding. The Supreme Court reiterated that the power under s.482 is an exception, to be used only to prevent abuse of process or where the complaint does not disclose any offence. It held that the FIR did disclose a cognizable offence and that the High Court should not have examined the merits of the case at the pre‑trial stage. Consequently, the Court set aside the quashing order and allowed the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court was justified in exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR.
What is the proper scope and test for invoking the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC.
Whether the FIR under the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act and IPC disclosed a cognizable offence.
Whether a court may assess the merits of evidence at the pre‑trial stage when considering a petition under Section 482.

Legislation cited

Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act, 1995s. 7(A), s. 8(e)
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 155(2), s. 156(1), s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 109

Subjects

Section 482 CrPCinherent jurisdictionquashing FIRabuse of processProhibition Actcriminal procedurejudicial discretionprima facie casefrivolous complaint

Judgment

[2009] 6 S.C.R. 160
)

A THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
v.
VANGAVEETI NAGAIAH
(Criminal Appeal No.1190 of 2003)
APRIL 15, 2009
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA
AND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.482 - Quashing of
c proceedings - Inherent powers of High Court - Scope of -
Held: Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it
finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the
process of court or quashing of these proceedings would
otherwise serve the ends of justice - When no offence is
D disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the
question of fact - On facts, High Court was not justified in
quashing FIR - Penal Code, 1860 - s. 109 - Andhra Pradesh
Prohibition Act, 1995.

An FIR was registered against appellant under
E Section 7(A) r.w. Section 8(e) of A.P. Prohibition Act, 1995
r.w. Section 109 IPC. Appellants filed petition under s.482
Cr.P.C. praying for quashing of FIR which was allowed.
Hence the instant appeal.

F Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD:1.1. Exercise of power under s.482 CrPC in a
case of this nature is an exception and not the rule. The
section does not confer any new powers on the High
Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court
G possessed before the enactment of the Code. It
envisages three circumstances under which the inherent
jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to
an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the

H 160
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. VANGAVEETI 161
NAGAI AH
process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends A
of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down
any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of
inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing
with procedure can provide for all cases that may
possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have i.nherent powers B
apart from express provisions of law which are
necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties
imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which
finds expression in the section which merely recognizes
and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All c
courts, whether civil or criminal, possess, in the absence
of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution,
all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to
undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice
on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, 0
concedere videtur id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when
the law gives a person anything it gives him that without
which it cannot exist). [Para 4] [165-G-H; 166-A-E]

1.2. While exercising powers under the section, the
Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. E
Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has
to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and
only when such exercise is justified by the tests
specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be
exercised ex debitojustitiae to do real and substantial F
justice for the administration of which alone courts exist.
Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice
and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as
to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such
abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to G .
allow any action which would result in injustice and
prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers,
court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it
finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of
the process of court or quashing of these proceedings H
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no
offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may
examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought
to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials
to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether
B any offence is made out even if the allegations are
accepted in toto. [Para 4) [166-E-H; 166-A]

R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR (1960) SC 866, relied •
on.
c 2.1. When exercising jurisdiction under s.482 CrPC,
the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an
enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or
not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it
accusation would not be sustained. That is the function
D of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt, should not
be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment.
Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising
discretion and should take all relevant facts and
circumstances into consideration before issuing process,
E lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private
complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person
needlessly. At the same time the section is not an
instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a
prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The power •
F should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest
of the rare cases. Where a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala tides and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with
a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
G
[Para 6] [167-E-H; 168-A-B; 169-C-D]

2.2. The powers possessed by the High Court under
s.482 CrPC are very wide and the very plenitude of the
power requires great caution in its exercise. The High
H Court being the highest court of a State should normally .
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. VANGAVEETI 163
NAGAIAH
refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where A
-l. the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so, when
the evidence has not been collected and produced before
the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or
legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true
perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no B
hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in
which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary
jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage. It
would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the
case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in c
order to determine whether a conviction would be
sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion
that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be
erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude
that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In D
proceedings instituted on complaint, exercise of the
inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for
only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any
offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. [Para 7]
[169-D-H; 170-A-B]
E

.. 2.3. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not
constitute the offence of which cognizance has been
taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to
quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under
s.482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there F
should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial
to find out whether the case would end in conviction or
acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it
appears that on consideration of the allegations in the
light of the statement made on oath of the complainant G
that the ingredients of the offence or offences are
disclosed and there is no material to show that the
complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that
event there would be no justification for interference by
the High Court. When an information is lodged at the H
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 6 S.C.R.

A police station and an offence is registered, then the mala •
}
tides of the informant would be of secondary importance.
It is the material collected during the investigation and
evidence led in the court which decides the fate of the
accused person. The allegations of mala tides against the
B informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be
the basis for quashing the proceedings. [Para 7] [170-8-
F]
•
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992) Supp 1 SCC 335, .
relied on.
c
3. Whether the material already in existence or to be
collected during investigation would be sufficient for
holding the concerned accused persons guilty has to be
considered at the time of trial. At the time of framing the
D charge it can be decided whether prima facie case has
been made out showing commission of an offence and
involvement of the charged persons. At that stage also
evidence cannot be gone into meticulously. It is immaterial
whether the case is based on direct or circumstantial
E evidence. Charge can be framed, if there are materials
showing possibility about the commission of the crime
as against certainty. That being so, the interference at the
threshold with the F.l.R. is to be in very exceptional
circumstances. Ultimately, the acceptability of the
-
F materials to fasten culpability on the accused persons is
a matter of trial. These are not the cases where it can be
said that the FIR did not disclose commission of an
offence. Therefore, the High Court was not justified in
quashing the FIR. [Paras 9 and 10] [170-G-H; 171-A-B]
G Case Law Reference:
~
AIR (1960) SC 866 relied on Para 5
(1992) Supp 1 SCC 335 relied on Para 6

H
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. VANGAVEETI 165
NAGAIAH
•
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal A
~
No. 1190 of 2003. ...--~

From the Judgment & Order dated 21.11.2002 of the High
Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Crl.
Petition No. 5034/2002. B
D. Bharathi for the Appellants.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is c
to the order passed by learned Single Judge of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court allowing the prayer made by the appellant -
to quash the FIR in Crime No. 433/2002-2003 of Prohibition
, and Excise Station, Mahabubabad, Warangal District
registered under Section 7(A) read with Section 8(e) of A.P.
D
Prohibition Act, 1995 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'). The Petition was filed under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short
the 'Code').

2. In support of the appeals, learned counsel appearing for E
the State of Andhra Pradesh submitted that the High Court's
approach is clearly erroneous. These are not cases where there
was no material to show the commission of a crime. Whether
there was adequate material already in existence or which could
have been collected during investigation and their relevance is F
essentially a matter of trial The High Court was not therefore
justified in quashing the FIR. The exercise of power under
Section 482 of the Code is clearly indefensible.

3. There is no appearance on behalf of the respondent-
accused. G

4. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a
case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The Section
does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves
H
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A the inherent power which the Court possessed before the
•
enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under
which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to
give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of
the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of
B justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any
inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can
provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, •
have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law
c which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and
duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which
finds expression in the Section which merely recognizes and
preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts,
whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express
provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as
0
are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of
administration of justice on the principle quando lex a liquid
aliquot concedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non
potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that
without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under
E the Section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal
or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the Section though wide
has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and
only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid
down in the Section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae .
F to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which
alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement
of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so
as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such
abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow
G any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion
of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to
quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance
of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of
these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.
H When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. VANGAVEETI 167
NAGAIAH [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.J.
examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to A
be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to
assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any
offence is made out even if the allega:ions are accepted in toto.

5. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (AIR 1960 SC 866) B
this Court summarized some categories of cases where
inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the
proceedings.

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; C

(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or
complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their
entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;

(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there D
• is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced
clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.

6. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear
in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal E
evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly
inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where
there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not
• support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily F
embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is
reliable. or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it
accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the
trial Judge. Judicial process no doubt should not be an
instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court G
should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion
~
and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into
consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an
instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash
vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time H
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A the Section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to •
,
short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death.
The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code
and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise
its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent
B abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [ 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335]. A note of
caution was, however, added that the power should be
exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The
c illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows:
"(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
D accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and •
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
E by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.l.R.
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the •
F same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the F.l.R. do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
G offence, no investigation is permitted by a Police Officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
•
Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are
so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which
H
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. VANGAVEETI 169
NAGAIAH [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
" A
no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that
~
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under B
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is
v
a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act!
providing efficacious redress for the grievance ofthe
aggrieved party.
c
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
-;.
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge . D
•
7. As noted. above, the powers possessed by the High
- Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the
very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its
· exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in E
exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The
inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate
prosecution. High Court being the highest Court of a State
I ~ should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a
case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so
F
when the evidence has not been collected and produce9 before
the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are
of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective
~ without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can
be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will
exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the G
I.
proceeding at any stage. It would not be proper for the High
Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all
probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would
be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion
that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 6 S.C.R.

A to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint
cannot be proceeded with. In proceeding instituted on
complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the
proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint
does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or
B oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not
constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by
the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same
in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the
Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be
c meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out
whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The
complaint/F.l.R. has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on
consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement
made on oath of the complainant or disclosed in the F. l.R. that
D the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and
there is no material to show that the complaint/F.l.R. is mala fide, •
frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no
justification for interference by the High Court. When an
information is lodged at the police station and an offence is
registered, then the mala tides of the informant would be of
E secondary importance. It is the material collected during the •
investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate
of the accused person. The allegations of mala fjdes against
the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be
the basis for quashing the proceeding.
F
8. Keeping in view the principles of law as enunciated
above, the action of the High Court in quashing the FIR cannot
be maintained so far as Criminal Appeal No. 1190 of 2003 is
concerned.
G
9. Whether the material already i11 existence or to be
collected during investigation would be suffL,,ent for holding the
concerned accused persons guilty has to be considered at the
time of trial. At the time of framing the charge it can be decided
H whether prima facie case has been made out showing
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. VANGAVEETI 171
NAGAIAH [DR. ARl,llT PASAYAT, J.]
commission of an offence and involvement of the charged A
persons. At that stage also evidence cannot be gone into
meticulously. It is immaterial whether the case is based on
direct or circumstantial evidence. Charge can be framed, if
there are materials showing possibility about the commission
of the crime as against certainty. That being so, the interference B
at the threshold with the F.l.R. is to be in very exceptional
circumstances as held in R.P. Kapoor's case (supra).
y

10. Ultimately, the acceptability of the materials to fasten
.. culpability on the accused persons is a matter of trial. These C .
are not the cases where it can be said that the FIR did not
disclose commission of an offence. Therefore, the High Court
was not justified in quashing the FIR in the concerned cases.

11. The appeal is allowed.
D
D.G. Appeal Allowed.

y