Holding

The High Court could not extend the Supreme Court's Article 142 directions to other employees; the order was limited to the original appellants and the High Court lacked jurisdiction to broaden it.

Summary

The respondents were appointed on an ad‑hoc basis as Technical Assistants in the Frozen Semen Bank Project of the Bihar Animal Husbandry Department in 1992 and were terminated in 1997 after the Fodder Scam. They filed writ petitions challenging their termination, which were dismissed by the High Court, and later sought relief under a Supreme Court order dated 23 July 2003 that, under Article 142, directed a one‑time relaxation of age and weightage for re‑appointment, limited to the specific appellants before the Court. The Jharkhand High Court subsequently issued a direction extending the same relaxation to other former ad‑hoc employees, including the respondents. The Supreme Court was asked whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction to broaden the Supreme Court's Article 142 directions to persons who were not parties to the original case. The Court held that the Supreme Court's order was expressly confined to the original appellants and could not be extended by the High Court, which lacks the special jurisdiction conferred by Article 142. Consequently, the High Court's impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed. No costs were awarded.

Issues considered

The scope of the Supreme Court's power under Article 142 of the Constitution and whether it can be extended by a High Court to persons not before the Supreme Court.
Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to issue directions that effectively modify or expand a Supreme Court order issued under Article 142.
Whether extending the relaxation of age and weightage to other ad‑hoc employees violates the principle of equality under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 136, s. Article 14, s. Article 141, s. Article 142, s. Article 16

Subjects

Service lawAd‑hoc appointmentTermination of servicesJudicial reviewArticle 142EqualityArticles 14 and 16Public employmentRelaxation of ageSelection committee

Judgment

t
[2008] 2 S.C.R. 888

A THE STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS.
v.
BIJAY KUMAR & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 1270 of 2008)
FEBRUARY 14, 2008
B
(S.8. SINHA AND V.S. SIRPURKAR, JJ.)

Service Law:
Termination of services of ad-hoc employees - Claims
C in subsequent appointments - Review jurisdiction of High
Court - Held: Respondent-employees did not question order
terminating their ad-hoc services - Employees other than
respondents questioning order of termination of services
approached upto Supreme Court, when Supreme· Court in
D exercise of its power u/A. 142 of the Constitution of India
directed the State authorities to provide certain relaxation to
the incumbents in future appointments - Order of the Supreme
Court kept confined to appellants thereof - High Court, in the
petition filed later, could not grant such benefit to others -
E Constitution confers special jurisdiction on Supreme Court in
terms of Article 142 of the Constitution - No s_uch power
specifically conferred on High Court- Order of Supreme Court
providing relaxation attained finality- Hence High Court could
not issue the impugned direction - Constitution of India, 1950
F - Article 142 - Power of Judicial Review.
Equality in terms of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
- Duty of the Courts in protecting rights of citizens in the matter
of public appointments - Discussed.
G Judicial Review - Scope of in the context of Article 142
of the Constitution of India, 1950.
Respondents were appointed as Technical
Assistants on ad hoc basis in a project of Animal
Husbandry of the Government of Bihar. In the year 1996, _,,
I

H 888
THE STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. v. BIJAY KUMAR 889
& ORS.

when 'Fodder Scam' came to light, the State Government A
had declared all unauthorized appointments as illegal.
Pursuant thereto, the services of the respondents were
terminated. They filed writ petitions before the High Court,
which were dismissed by the High Court. Letters Patent
Appeals preferred thereagainst were also dismissed by B
the High Court directing that relaxation in respect of age
·~ -.\ · and weightage of incumbents could be considered in the
future appointment. Hence the present appeal.
Earlier, some of the aggrieved employees
approached this Court, when this Court directed that ad C
hoc appointees have no right to claim regularization; that
the State Government to fill up the vacancies of Technical
Assistants in the project; to constitute a Selection
Committee; and that the Committee shall consider the
case of eligible aggrieved employees for relaxation of age, D
weightage over outsiders in terms of High Court's
direction.
Appellant contended that the direction of the High
Court, if implemented, would run contrary to and
inconsistent with the directions contained in earlier E
orders of this Court; that since this Court having directed
not to treat the relaxation as directed to be given to
incumbents as one time exercise and not to be followed
as precedent, the directions issued by the High Court are
clearly violative thereof. F
Respondents submitted that one time exercise
directed to be carried out by this Court had not been fully
complied with and, thus, the High Court was entitled to
pass the impugned order; that this Court, in any event, in G
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India, can issue necessary directions so
as to extend the benefits also to those who had not
approached this Court earlier; and that advertisement
having been issued in July 2006 and the impugned order H
-+
890 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

A having been passed by the High Court in June 2006 and ·>
furthermore in view of the fact that the respondents have
appeared in the examination, this Court should not
exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of
the Constitution of India.
B Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Respondents were appointed in 1992. . +. v
They were removed from service in 1997. They did not
question the said orders of termination. However, they
c had questioned the orders of their termination from service
before the High Court. This Court in its order dated
23.7.2003, in that matter, although opined that they had
no right to continue in service, issued some directions
evidently in exercise of its power under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India. The said order was to be kept
D
confined only to the appellants thereof, was reiterated by
this Court in its subsequent order. Indisputably,
Respondents were not parties to the said orders. No
benefit thereof, thus, could be extended in their favour.
The High Court, therefore, could not have issued such
E directions. (Paras - 8, 9 & 10) [896-D, E & F; 897-B]

1.2 Although power of judicial review has been
conferred on the High Courts, it had· not been given any
special jurisdiction as has been done on the Supreme
F Court in terms of Article 142 of the Constitution of India. It .,.
is, therefore, very difficult to comprehend that the High
Court could issue the impugned direction which, in effect
and substance, would be violative thereof. Moreover, this
Court intended to pass a final order. The said order should
have been allowed to attain finality. If a third order can be
G
issued, others who are waiting on the fence may be held
to be entitled to file a fourth application. The process, thus, ~ .
would go on unendingly and relaxation given for a limited
:i-
purpose would become a rule and not the exception.
(Paras - 11 & 12) [897-C & D; 898-A & B]
H '""
THE STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. v. BIJAY KUMAR 891
& ORS.

Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Ors. v. Sajal Kumar A
Roy & Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 671 - referred to.
Amrit Lal Berry v. Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi
& Ors. (1975) 3 SCR 960 and B.N. Nagarajan & Ors. v. State
of Mysore & Ors. (1966) 3 SCR 682 - held inapplicable.
B
2.1 There is a sea change in the situation in the field ,
... ~. of public employment. Ten years have passed. A new State
has come into being. Thousands of persons have acquired
similar or higher qualifications. They have got their names
registered in the employment exchanges. The job c
opportunities in a specialized field being limited, those
who are now entitled to be considered, may not be
considered at all, if the order of the High Court is allowed
to operate. (Para - 13) [898-F & G]
2.2 Constitutional guarantee of equality as envisaged D
under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India must
be protected. While passing one order or the other, the
interest of those who are not before the Court, should not
be forgotten. Citizens have human right of development
and offer of appointment on such posts should be E
directed to be made only on merit. Only because some
persons had approached this Court and obtained an
order, the same should not be extended to others to which
they are not otherwise entitled to, namely, weightage in
service over the new applicants. Hence, the impugned F
judgment cannot be sustained and is set aside
accordingly. (Para - 14 & 15) [898-H; 899-A, 8 & C]
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.1270
of 2008.
G
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.06.2006 of the
...... High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, in W.P.(S) No. 1599 of
2005.
', B.B. Singh, Kumar Rajesh and Rajesh Kr. Pathak for the
Appellants. H
i
892 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

A P.P. Rao, Guntur Prabhakar for the Respondents. ~

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. Leave granted.
1 . Respondents herein were appointed on ad hoc basis
B
in Frozen Semen Bank Project as Technical Assistants in the
Department of Animal Husbandry of the Government of Bihar.
The said appointments were made by the Regional Director, • +.-..
Animal Husbandry, Ranchi.

c 2. In the year 1996, a scam known as 'Fodder Scam' came
to light and all unauthorized appointments were declared illegal
by the State, inter alia, on the premise :
"1. The Regional Director, Animal Husbandry, Ranchi
was not competent to make any such appointment.
D
2. No advertisement was issued before making such
appointment.
3. No reservation policy was followed.

E 4. The number of persons appointed, were much more
than the sanctioned post and
5. Besides these many other rules and norms of
appointment were also flouted."
Pursuant thereto or in furtherance thereof, the services of
F
the respondents were terminated in 1997. Services of some
other employees were also terminated on 23.10.1998. They filed
writ petitions before the then Ranchi Bench of the Patna High
Court, which were dismissed.
G Letters Patent Appeals preferred thereagainst were also
dismissed observing that in the event their cases are considered
'1"
for appointment, relaxation in respect of age and weightage in
the future appointment should be given.
1~

3. One Umakant Sinha and others approached this Court.
H
L
t
THE STATE OF -JHARKHAND & ORS. v. BIJAY KUMAR 893
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
)._ By a judgment and order dated 23.7.2003, this Court while A
opining that ad hoc appointees have no right to claim
regularization in the service, directed :
" "In this view of the matter, we direct the State of Jharkhand
to consider at the earliest for recruiting Technical Assistant
for the Semen Bank Project and ti fill up the existing B
vacancies within a period of three months from today. For
" ~.
that purpose the Respondent-State is directed to constitute
a Selection Committee as per the existing Rules within a
period of three months from today.

- (ii) The appellants whose services are terminated may
apply to the Secretary of the Animal Husbandry
c

Department within a period of one month for being re-
appointed or for regularization of their services. The
Committee shall consider the eligibility, suitability, past D
record as well as the educational qualifications of the
appellants as per the rules as on today.
(iii) The Committee shall give relaxation of age and
weightage over outsiders as directed by the High Court.
However, if the appellants are found unsuitable for some E
reasons, it would be open to the Committee to reject their
applications.

' Appropriate authority shall issue orders for appointment
after considering the roster and the merit list, on available
)' F
vacancies.

The appeals stand disposed of accordingly. There shall
be no order as to costs. We, however, make it clear that
this case shall not be treated as precedent as Vi(e have
decided it purely on the facts and in the peculiar G
');
circumstances of this case."
(Emphasis supplied)
---t 4. An interlocutory application was filed for extension of
time to comply with the said order and by an order dated H
-+
894 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

A 2.12.2003, three months' time was granted for constitution of ~ ~
.
the Committee. It was clarified that directions by this Court were
in relation to the appellants in the said appeals. r\:_
r;-
Another writ petition, however, was filed in the High Court
of Jharkhand which came into being in November 2000 by Bijay
B Kumar and others. The said writ petition was also dismissed
by an order dated 6.2.2004. Special Leave Petitions were also
filed thereagainst and by a judgment and order dated 10.4.2006, • i>-- ...
a Bench of this Court directed :

c "We are of the view that the issue should be resolved
finally and should not be kept pending. The earlier order ·~-
·~
''.
of this Court was passed on 23.7.2003. The right to be
selected thereunder cannot continue indefinitely. Therefore,
we direct : (1) that the Respondent-Authority shall advertise
in the local newspapers having wide circulation of the
D
holding of selections for the purpose of filling of those
vacancies which according to the Rules, are to be filled by ~·

direct appointment. (2) Applications should be asked for
from these ad hoc.employees who were appointed in the
Frozen Semen Bank Project between 1988 to 1992 and
E whose services were terminated in 1998. No such
employee who has already been considered by the
Selection Committee under the order dated 23.7.2003
shall apply. (3) No appointment already made either in the .i
normal course or pursuant to the earlier order of this Court
F shall be disturbed. (4)The advertisement shall specify the "f'
last date with which the candidate concerned shall apply
· for consideration including thereon proof that the candidate
had served with the Respondents. (5) The selection shall
be made by the Selection Committee only against the
G available vacancies. Preference shall be given to those
who have longer tenure of service over those who have
~
shorter tenure of service, other things being equal. (6) All
other conditions in the order dated 23. 7 .2003 shall be
operative as far as the procedure to be followed by the r-
H Selection Committee to be set up pursuant to this order
THE STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. v. BIJAY KUMAR 895
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

..... is concerned. (7) This shall be a one time exercise. No A
further application shall be entertained by such ad hoc
employees. This fact should also be mentioned in the
advertisement."
(Emphasis supplied)
B
5. An advertisement by the appellant was issued.
... -\ . Questioning the legality of the said advertisement, a writ petition
was filed before the Jharkhand High Court which was marked
as Writ Petition (S) No.156 of 2005. A direction was issued
therein that the process of selection should be completed within c
four months.
Respondents, however, filed another writ petition before
the High Court which by reason of the impugned judgment dated
30.6.2006 was disposed of, directing :
D
"In view of the judgment rendered by the Division Bench
on 23rd June, 2006 in W.P.(S) No.156 of 2005 (Chandra
Kant and ors. vs. State of Jharkhand and ors.) Supreme
Court decision dated 1oth April, 2006 and earlier decision
dated 23rd July, 2003 passed in Civil Appeal no.5342-
5343 of 2003 and analogous cases, this application is E
disposed of with liberty to the petitioners to apply (those
who have not applied in pursuance of the advertisement
to the post of Technical Assistant), if any advertisement is
issued in future."
F
6. Mr. B.B. Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant, would submit that the aforementioned direction
of the High Court, if implemented, would run contrary to and
inconsistent with the directions contained in this Court's orders
dated 23. 7 .2003, 2.122003 and 10.4.2006. It was urged that
G
this Court, in the aforementioned orders, having directed not to
~-
treat the same as precedent as also one time exercise, the
directions issued by the High Court are clearly violative thereof.

7. Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of the respondents, on the other hand, urged that one time H
896 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

A exercise directed to be carried out by this Court had not been ,a..
fully complied with and, thus, the High Court was entitled to pass
the impugned order. It was submitted that this Court, in any event,
in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution
of India, can issue necessary directions so as to extend the
s benefits also to those who had not approached this Court earlier.
Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on Amrit Lal Berry
v. Collector of Central Excise, New Delh & Ors. [(1975) 3 SCR . +. ...
960] and RN. Nagarajan & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Ors.
[(1966) 3 SCR 682]. It was contended that advertisement having
c been issued in July 2006 and the impugned order having been
passed by the High Court in June 2006 and furthermore in view ,i-

of the fact. that the respondents have appeared in the
examination, this Court should not exercise its discretionary
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
D 8. Respondents herein were appointed in 1992. They were
removed from service in 1997. They did not question the said
orders of termination. We have noticed hereinbefore thatAbhay
Kumar, Uma Kant Sinha and others had questioned the orders
of their termination from service before the Patna High Court.
E 9. This Court in its order dated 23. 7.2003, although opined
that they had no right to continue in service, issued some
directions evidently in exercise of its power under Article 142 of
the Constitution of India.

F The said order was to be kept confined only to the
appellants thereof, was reiterated by this Court in its order dated
2.12.2003.
It may be true that while Abhay Kumar and others
approached this Court aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the
G judgment and order dated 16.2.2004 of the learned Single
Judge of the High Court, this Court, in its order dated 10.4.2006
intended to resolve the issue finally. It was in that situation opined
that the right to be selected cannot continue indefinitely. This
Court dealt with the grievances of those employees whose
H services have been terminated in the year 1998.
THE STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. v. BIJAY KUMAR 897
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

..l..
.
10. The core question, therefore, which arises for our A
consideration is as to whether the High Court had any jurisdiction
to issue a similar direction relying on or on the basis of the orders
of this Court which had been passed in terms of Article 142 of
the Constitution and confined only to the appellants of those
cases. B
Indisputably, Respondents were not parties to the said
.. A · orders. No benefit thereof, thus, could be extended in their favour.
The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, could not have issued
the aforementioned directions.
c
11. Constitution of India conferred a special jurisdiction in
this Court only. Although power of judicial review has been
conferred on the High Courts, it had not been given any special
jurisdiction as has been done on the Supreme Court in terms of
Article 142 of the Constitution of India. It is, therefore, very difficult
0
to comprehend that the High Court could issue the impugned
_. direction which, in effect and substance, would be violative
thereof.
Reliance placed by Mr. Rao on Amrit Lal Berry (supra) is
not apposite. When a law is declared by this Court, it becomes E
the law of land in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution of India.
Indisputably, therefore, such law would enure to the benefit of
the persons similarly situated but it is incomprehensible that
when this Court grants some special benefits to the parties who
are before it and confined the relief only to them, such a benefit F
~ can be extended by the High Court relying on or on the basis
thereof. The matter might have been different if this Court had
not issued such .directions, namely, the said order should be
kept confined to the parties before it. When this Court declared
that no further application should be entertained at the instance G
of other ad hoc employees in the name of parity or otherwise,
l': the High Court could not have issued a direction which would
run counter to the spirit of the said order.

12. Submission of Mr. Rao that notwithstanding the orders
dated 23.7.2003 and 10.4.2006, the High Court have committed H
898 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

A no mistake in issuing the impugned directions, is stated to be )..

rejected. This Court intended to pass a final order. The said
order should have been allowed to attain finality. If a third order
can be issued, others who are waiting on the fence may be held
to be entitled to file a fourth application. The process, thus, would
B go on unendingly. Relaxation given for a limited purpose would
become a rule and not the exception.
In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Ors. v. Sajal Kumar -~ .
Roy & Ors. ((2006) 8 SCC 671), dealing with the question of
age relaxation, it was held:
c
'The appointing authorities are required to apply their mind
while exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to relax the ·
age-limits. Discretion of the authorities is required to be
exercised only for deserving candidates and upon
recommendations of the Appointing Committee/Selection
D
Committee. The requirements to comply with the rules, it
is trite, were required to be complied with fairly. and ,,_.
reasonably. They were bound by the rules. The
discretionary jurisdiction could be exercised for relaxation
of age provided for in the rules and within the four corners
E thereof. As the respondents do not come within the purview
of the exception contained in Article 45 of the Education
''
Code, in our opinion, the Tribunal and consequently, the
High Court committed a manifest error in issuing the
aforementioned directions."
F
13. There is a sea change in the situation in the field of 1'
public employment. Ten years have passed. A new State has
come into being. Thousands of persons have acquired similar
or higher qualifications. They have got their names registered
G
in the employment exchanges. The job opportunities in a
specialized field being limited, those who are now entitled to
be considered, may not be considered at all, if the order of the
High Court is allowed to operate.
14. Constitutional guarantee of equality as envisaged under
H Articles 14 and 16.of the Constitution of India must be protected.
t
THE STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. v. BIJAY KUMAR 899
& ORS. [S.S. SINHA, J.]

While passing one order or the other, we should not forget the A
interest of those who are not before us. Citizens have human
right of development and offer of appointment on such posts
should be directed to be made only on merit. Only because
some persons had approached this Court and obtained an
order, the same should not be extended to others to which they 8
are not otherwise entitled to, namely, weightage in service over
.... ~ - the new applicants.
15. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned
judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The
appeal is allowed with no order as to costs. C
S.K.S. Appeals allowed.

0

-