THIRUNAGALINGAMversusLINGESWARAN & ANR.

                 [2025] 6 S.C.R. 253 : 2025 INSC 672

                            Thirunagalingam
                                   v.
                           Lingeswaran & Anr.
                       (Civil Appeal No. 6843 of 2025)
                                 13 May 2025
       [B.V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma,* JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       An appeal suit along with the application for condonation of delay
       of 1116 days was preferred. The High Court allowed the application
       for condonation of delay of 1116 days. Whether the delay is to be
       condoned or not, and if the delay is justifiable, then whether the
       case should be allowed to proceed on merits, or be dismissed on
       procedural grounds.

                                  Headnotes†
       Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or. XLI, r.3A and s.151 – In
       the first round of litigation, respondents could not succeed in
       setting aside the ex-parte decree passed by the Trial Court in
       the suit, and hence they preferred the appeal suit along with
       the application for condonation of delay of 1116 days – The
       said application for condonation of delay of 1116 days was
       dismissed by the First Appellate Court – However, the High
       Court allowed the application for condonation of delay of 1116
       days and directed the First Appellate Court to proceed with
       the appeal suit on merits – Correctness:
       Held: In the present case, from the perusal of the record, it can be
       observed that in the first round of litigation, the respondents were
       duly served with the summons after institution of the aforesaid
       suit – In response, they entered an appearance and filed their
       written statement, thereby submitting themselves to the jurisdiction
       of the Trial Court – However, despite being present in the initial
       stage of proceedings, respondents choose not to further appear
       before the Trial Court continuously – Consequently, the Trial Court
       was constrained to proceed ex-parte against them – Further,
       the High Court has relied upon N. Mohan, while passing the
       impugned order, however, on comparison, the facts of the said
       case are different from the case at hand – Consequently, the
* Author
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       impugned order passed by the High Court is perverse in nature
       and is not in conformity with the legal principles – Accordingly, the
       impugned order is set aside – Proceeding further on the issue of
       condonation of delay of 1116 days in filing the appeal suit, since
       the respondents assigned the very same reasons in I.A. No. 1 of
       2022 in Unnumbered A.S. No. of 2022 as raised in I.A. Nos. 462
       of 2018 and 119 of 2019 that had already been dismissed by this
       Court vide S.L.P. (C) Nos. 2054 & 2055 of 2022, the application
       for condonation of delay of 1116 days cannot be sustained – This
       Court in S.L.P. (C) Nos. 2054 & 2055 of 2022, after going through
       the evidence placed on record, rightly held that the delay has not
       been properly explained – An order of this Court, passed upon
       judicial consideration, attains finality unless set aside through
       appropriate appellate or review mechanisms – In the present
       appeal, the respondents seek to raise the very same reason to
       condone the delay as were previously canvassed, without placing
       any fresh or additional material to distinguish the current reason
       from the one already discussed and dismissed – This Court is
       of the considered view that such a repetition of grounds already
       scrutinized and held untenable amounts to an abuse of the process
       of law. [Paras 25, 26, 28, 29, 30]

       Condonation of delay – Plea for – Duty of the Court:
       Held: It is a well-settled law that while considering the plea for
       condonation of delay, the first and foremost duty of the court is
       to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the
       party seeking condonation rather than starting with the merits of
       the main matter – Only when sufficient cause or reasons given
       for the delay by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is
       equally balanced or stand on equal footing, the court may consider
       the merits of the main matter for the purpose of condoning the
       delay. [Para 31]

       Condonation of delay – Condoning delay not an act of
       generosity:
       Held: Delay should not be condoned merely as an act of
       generosity – The pursuit of substantial justice must not come at
       the cost of causing prejudice to the opposing party – In the present
       case, the respondents/defendants have failed to demonstrate
       reasonable grounds of delay in pursuing the matter, and this crucial
       requirement for condoning the delay remains unmet. [Para 32]
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                       255

                    Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran & Anr.


                              Case Law Cited
     N. Mohan v. R. Madhu [2019] 14 SCR 156 : (2020) 20 SCC
     302 – distinguished.
     Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar [2004] Supp. 6 SCR 1104 :
     (2005) 1 SCC 787 – referred to.

                                List of Acts
     Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Limitation Act, 1963.

                              List of Keywords
     Delay; Condonation of delay; Duty of Court; Justice; Reasonable
     grounds of delay; Judicial mind; Abuse of process of law.

                             Case Arising From
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6843 of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 25.04.2023 of the High Court
     of Judicature at Madras at Madurai in CRPMD No. 1113 of 2023

                          Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Appellant:
     S. Nagamuthu, Sr. Adv., M.p. Parthiban, Ms. Priyaranjani
     Nagamuthu, Ankur Prakash, Mrs. Priyanka Singh, Bilal Mansoor,
     Shreyas Kaushal, S. Geyolin Selvam, Alagiri K.
     Advs. for the Respondents:
     A.Velan , Navpreet Kaur, Prince Singh, Nilay Rai.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                   Judgment

     Satish Chandra Sharma, J.

1.   Leave granted.
2.   The present appeal is arising out of order dated 25.04.2023 passed
     by the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court in C.R.P.(MD) No. 1113
     of 2023 and CMP (MD) No. 5363 of 2023 (hereinafter “Impugned
     Order”).
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3.     The aforesaid order was arising out of order dated 08.02.2023 passed
       by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Ramanathapuram
       (hereinafter “Trial Judge”), by which the Trial Judge has dismissed
       I.A. No. 1 of 2022 in unnumbered A.S. No. _______ of 2022 on the
       file of the Court.
4.     The facts of the case reveal that a sale agreement was executed
       on 17.08.2015 between the plaintiff (hereinafter “Appellant”) and
       defendant (hereinafter “Respondent No. 1”) for a consideration of
       Rs. 3 lakhs in respect of the suit property situated at Nainarkoil @
       Naganathasamoothiram Village. The Respondent No. 1 in the present
       case failed to execute the sale deed pursuant to the sale agreement
       dated 17.08.2015 and in those circumstances, the Appellant preferred
       a civil suit before the Sub Court, Paramakudi, on 21.09.2015 i.e.
       O.S. No. 110/2015, praying for relief of specific performance of sale
       agreement dated 17.08.2015. The facts further reveal that during
       the pendency of the aforesaid suit, the Respondent No. 1 executed
       a sale deed in favour of defendant no. 2 (hereinafter “Respondent
       No. 2”) on 26.11.2015. In the civil suit i.e. O.S. No. 110/2015, both
       the defendants filed their written statement; however, at a later stage,
       stopped appearing in the matter and in those circumstances, the
       defendants were proceeded against ex-parte on 07.02.2017. The
       trial court finally passed an ex-parte decree on 07.02.2017 and the
       Appellant thereafter preferred an Execution Petition i.e. E.P. No.
       10/2017. On account of execution proceedings, the sale deed was
       also executed in favour of the Appellant.
5.     The Respondent No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 preferred two separate
       applications under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure
       (hereinafter “CPC”) i.e. I.A. No. 119/2015 and I.A. No. 462 of 2018
       along with applications for condonation of delay of 712 and 467 days
       respectively, and the trial court allowed both the applications i.e. I.A.
       No. 462 of 2018 and I.A. No. 119/2018 vide order dated 19.08.2019,
       setting aside ex-parte decree order and condoned the delay.
6.     The Appellant preferred a revision before the High Court by filing
       CRP(MD) No. 1688 and 1689 of 2019 and the same was allowed
       by the High Court vide order dated 09.11.2021. The Respondents
       being aggrieved by the order of the High Court, dated 09.11.2021
       preferred Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 2054-55 of 2022 and this
       Court dismissed the said Special Leave Petitions by an order dated
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                          257

                    Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran & Anr.


     25.02.2022 meaning thereby that the ex-parte judgment and decree
     came to be affirmed by this Court.
7.   The Respondents, after the matter attained finality, on account of
     dismissal of Special Leave Petitions vide order dated 25.02.2022,
     initiated the second round of litigation by preferring an appeal
     against the ex-parte judgment and decree. The appeal was barred
     by limitation and, therefore, an application was also filed for
     condoning the delay of 1116 days in filing appeal under Order XLI
     Rule 3A read with Section 151 of the CPC before the First Appellate
     Court. The First Appellate Court by an order dated 08.02.2023
     dismissed the I.A. No. 1 of 2022 in unnumbered A.S. No. ______
     of 2022 which was for condonation of delay of 1116 days and being
     aggrieved by the order passed by the first Appellate Court, dated
     08.02.2023, a revision was preferred before the High Court i.e.
     C.R.P.(MD) No. 1113 of 2023. The High Court, after hearing the
     parties has set aside the order dated 08.02.2023 vide Impugned
     Order dated 25.04.2023 upon a payment of costs of Rs. 1 lakh,
     meaning thereby a delay of 1116 days was condoned by the High
     Court. The operative paragraph of the order passed by the High
     Court reads as under:
           “19. Considering the fact that the respondent has been
           put to inconvenience by the petitioners and since the
           respondent has deposited the balance sale consideration
           and also invested the balance amount together with the
           stamp duty, I am inclined to intervene in favour of the
           petitioners by directing the petitioners to pay a sum of
           Rs. 1 lakh to the respondent. This amount shall be paid
           directly to the respondent on or before 07.06.2023. Subject
           to such payment, the application filed by the petitioners in
           I.A. No. 1 of 2022 to condone the delay before the Principal
           District and Sessions Court, Ramanathapuram, shall stand
           allowed. The learned Principal District and Sessions Judge,
           Ramanathapuram, shall number the appeal and dispose it
           on merits as expeditiously as possible, preferably, within
           a period of nine months in accordance with law. The
           petitioners shall report compliance by filing a suitable
           memo before the learned Principal District and Sessions
           Judge, Ramanathapuram.”
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8.     The appellant/plaintiff being aggrieved by the order dated 25.04.2023
       passed by the High Court allowing the civil revision has preferred
       the present appeal.

       SUBMISSIONS MADE BY THE APPELLANT/ PLAINTIFF
9.     The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that no clear
       explanation is forthcoming for the delay that was caused in the first
       round of litigation while filing the application under Section 5 of the
       Limitation Act, 1963, to condone the delay under Order IX Rule 13
       of the CPC. Furthermore, the High Court failed to appreciate that
       the delay caused in filing the appeal under Section 96(2) read with
       Order XLI Rule 1 of CPC alone can be excluded by applying the
       principle in Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The delay of 467
       days and 712 days that was caused after the Respondents were
       set ex-parte, was found to be unsatisfactory as held by the High
       Court in earlier C.R.P (MD) Nos.1688 & 1689 of 2019, vide order
       dated 09.11.2021, which has been affirmed by this Hon’ble Court
       while dismissing the Special Leave Petitions of the respondents/
       defendants in SLP Nos. 2054 and 2055 of 2022. It was submitted
       that the Respondents cannot reagitate the very same question which
       has attained finality in the earlier proceedings.
10. Moreover, it has been argued that the High Court erred in applying
    the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in N. Mohan v. R. Madhu
    (2020) 20 SCC 302 in the facts of the present case. In that case,
    the Respondents were never served with the suit summons, but in
    the present case, the respondents/defendants were properly served
    with the suit summons, they appeared and filed a Vakalatnama, and
    also filed their written statement. Moreover, in N. Mohan’s case
    (supra), the issue dealt with was the maintainability of the appeal
    filed under Section 96(2) of CPC against the ex-parte decree. The
    same is not disputed by the appellant/plaintiff herein, as an appeal
    under Section 96(2) of the CPC is maintainable. The question is
    whether the enormous delay of 1116 days can be condoned without
    any proper explanation.
11. That apart, it was submitted that the Court has not laid down any
    ratio to be followed in the above case relied upon. It was further
    submitted that the Court has taken note of the bona fide conduct of
    the parties (the defendants therein) and condoned the delay, and that
    the said order was not based on any legal principle. It was further
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                       259

                    Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran & Anr.


     submitted that the High Court ought not to have interfered with the
     order of the First Appellate Court, as the respondents/defendants
     were negligent in not filing the appeal in time and the delay has not
     been properly explained.
12. It was further submitted that the order of the First Appellate Court is
    well-reasoned and called for no interference. Further, after dismissal
    of the application filed under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC for
    condonation of delay, even though the appeal filed under Section
    96(2) of the CPC against the ex-parte decree dated 7.2.2017 was
    maintainable, the huge delay of 1116 days of filing the said appeal
    cannot be condoned without proper explanations.
13. Further, it was submitted that the High Court failed to appreciate the
    conduct of the respondents/defendants. There is no bar for them to
    file the Appeal under Section 96(2) of the CPC against the ex-parte
    decree while pursuing the application filed under Order IX Rule 13
    of the CPC for condonation of delay. Therefore, in any case, the
    impugned judgment is erroneous, perverse, and warrants interference;
    it ought to be set aside by this Hon’ble Court.

     SUBMISSIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENTS/ DEFENDANTS
14. Learned counsel for respondents/defendants vehemently argued that
    the non-representation before the Trial Court by respondent no. 1/
    defendant no. 1 and respondent no. 2/defendant no. 2 was neither
    wilful nor wanton.
15. It was further submitted that a plausible explanation has been given
    by the Respondents for the delay in preferring the said petition,
    and the High Court was convinced with the reasonable explanation
    given by the Respondents, and thereafter was pleased to pass the
    Impugned Order dated 25.04.2023 in favour of the Respondents.
16. It was further submitted that the High Court correctly relied upon the
    judgment of N. Mohan (supra) while passing the impugned order
    dated 25.04.2023, as it squarely applies to the instant case. The
    High Court, in its judicial wisdom, was of the considered opinion
    that the facts and circumstances of the instant case are similar to
    the aforesaid judgment.
17. Moreover, the learned counsel for Respondents argued that it is trite
    law that the application filed under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC and
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       the application filed under Order 41 Rule 3(A) of the CPC stand on
       a different footing. Further, in a similar case, the Hon’ble Supreme
       Court has laid down the dictum in Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana
       Kumar (2005) 1 SCC 787, and has postulated as follows:
            “38. The dichotomy, in our opinion, can be resolved by
            holding that whereas the defendant would not be permitted
            to raise a contention as regards the correctness or
            otherwise of the order posting the suit for ex parte hearing
            by the trial court and/or existence of a sufficient case for
            non-appearance of the defendant before it, it would be
            open to him to argue in the first appeal filed by him under
            Section 96(2) of the Code on the merits of the suit to enable
            him to contend that the materials brought on record by
            the plaintiffs were not sufficient for passing a decree in his
            favour or the suit was otherwise not maintainable. Lack
            of jurisdiction of the court can also be a possible plea in
            such an appeal. We, however, agree with Mr Chaudhari
            that the “Explanation” appended to Order 9 Rule 13 of the
            Code shall receive a strict construction as was held by
            this Court in Rani Choudhury [(1982) 2 SCC 596], P. Kiran
            Kumar [(2002) 5 SCC 161] and Shyam Sundar Sarma v.
            Pannalal Jaiswal [(2005) 1 SCC 436 : (2004) 9 Scale 270].”
       Hence, in the light of the ratio laid down in the hereinabove judgment,
       it is manifestly implied that the Respondents are entitled to prefer
       the first appeal before the Hon’ble District & Session Judge,
       Ramanathapurarn, Tamil Nadu and there is no bar due to the dismissal
       of their earlier petition filed under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC.
18. Further, regarding the delay of 1116 days in filing the condonation
    of delay petition, the learned counsel referred to Section 14 of the
    Limitation Act and argued that in the instant case, the Respondents
    after exhausting their legal rights under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC
    with informed legal counselling decided to exercise their legal right to
    refer the first appeal as against the final decretal order and judgment
    passed by the Trial Court. The time taken during the pendency of
    the Petition under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC and also the revision
    petitions before the various judicial forums necessarily have to be
    excluded. A bare reading of Section 14 of the Limitation Act enjoins
    upon the adjudicating authorities to exclude the time thus taken
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                         261

                    Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran & Anr.


     during the pendency of petition filed under Order IX Rule 13 of the
     CPC needs to be taken into consideration for condoning the delay in
     filing the first appeal and, therefore, the High Court rightly cited and
     discussed the said provision and was pleased to pass the impugned
     order dated 25.04.2023 in favour of the Respondents.
19. It is further submitted that the High Court vide impugned order
    directed the Respondents to pay a sum of Rs. 1 lakh to the
    Appellant. Accordingly, the Respondents paid a sum of Rs. 1 lakh
    to the Appellant, but he refused to receive the same. Hence, the
    Respondents deposited the said amount with the court on 05.06.2023
    and thereby complied with the order of the High Court. The said
    conduct of the Respondents proves his bona fide credentials.
20. It was submitted that the Respondent No. 2 holds a valid title as
    bona fide purchaser in respect of the Suit Schedule property vide
    registered Sale Deed dated 26.11.2015 executed by Respondent No.
    1 in favour of the Respondent No.2 at the Sub-Registrar’s Office.
    Since then, to date, the Respondent No. 2 is in possession and
    enjoyment of the disputed property.
21. Further, it was submitted that since Respondents are having the valid
    title and are also in possession and enjoyment of the Suit Schedule
    Property, the balance of convenience is in their favour only.
22. Moreover, learned counsel argued that irreparable damage, loss, and
    hardships would be caused to the Respondents if the instant appeal
    is allowed. At the same time, no loss or hardships could happen to
    the Appellant if the instant appeal is dismissed.

     DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
23. We have carefully considered the submissions and perused the
    impugned judgment and materials on record. The point at issue for
    consideration is whether the delay is to be condoned or not, and if
    the delay is justifiable, then whether the case should be allowed to
    proceed on merits, or be dismissed on procedural grounds.
24. The facts of the present case are not in dispute. In the first round of
    litigation, Respondents could not succeed in setting aside the ex-parte
    decree passed by the Trial Court in the aforesaid suit, and hence they
    preferred the appeal suit along with the application for condonation
    of delay of 1116 days. The said application for condonation of delay
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       of 1116 days was dismissed by the First Appellate Court vide order
       dated 08.02.2023. However, the High Court, while passing the
       impugned order dated 25.04.2023, relied upon the judgment of this
       Court passed in N. Mohan (supra) and allowed the application for
       condonation of delay of 1116 days and directed the First Appellate
       Court to proceed with the appeal suit on merits.
25. In the present case, from the perusal of the record, it can be observed
    that in the first round of litigation, the Respondents were duly served
    with the summons after institution of the aforesaid suit. In response,
    they entered an appearance and filed their written statement, thereby
    submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the Trial Court. However,
    despite being present in the initial stage of proceedings, Respondents
    choose not to further appear before the Trial Court continuously.
    Consequently, the Trial Court was constrained to proceed ex-parte
    against them. Further, it is pertinent to note that the High Court has
    relied upon N. Mohan (supra), while passing the impugned order,
    however, on comparison, the facts of the said case are different from
    the case at hand. In the said case, the summons to the Respondents
    was sent to their old address, and the same was returned unserved,
    and subsequently, the ex-parte decree was passed. In stark contrast,
    the present case is distinguishable since the summons was duly
    served and the respondents/defendants not only appeared but
    actively participated by filing their written statement.
26. Therefore, the dictum in N. Mohan (supra) cannot be applied to
    the instant matter but the High Court placed reliance upon the
    aforementioned judgment leading to the misappreciation of the facts.
    Consequently, the impugned order dated 25.04.2023 passed by the
    High Court is perverse in nature and is not in conformity with the
    legal principles. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 25.04.2023
    is hereby set aside.
27. Proceeding further on the issue of condonation of delay of 1116 days in
    filing the appeal suit, we concur with the findings of the First Appellate
    Court passed in order dated 08.02.2023, that the Respondents raised
    the very same grounds in the present application for condonation of
    delay of 1116 days, that were raised in the applications (I.A. Nos.
    462 of 2018 and 119 of 2019) filed under Order IX Rule 13 of the
    CPC in the earlier round of litigation; that is, the delay was neither
    wilful nor wanton. It is an admitted fact that the said applications (I.A.
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                    Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran & Anr.


     Nos. 462 of 2018 and 119 of 2019) were allowed by the Trial Court,
     which by way of civil revision petitions (C.R.P. (MD) Nos. 1688 &
     1689 of 2019) were challenged before the High Court and the High
     Court reversed the order of the Trial Court. It is not in dispute that
     subsequently the order of the High Court was also affirmed by this
     Court vide order passed in S.L.P. (C) Nos. 2054 & 2055 of 2022,
     thereby dismissing the condonation of delay petitions filed by the
     Respondents.
28. Since the Respondents assigned the very same reasons in I.A. No. 1
    of 2022 in Unnumbered A.S. No… of 2022 as raised in I.A. Nos. 462
    of 2018 and 119 of 2019 that had already been dismissed by this
    Court vide S.L.P. (C) Nos. 2054 & 2055 of 2022, the application for
    condonation of delay of 1116 days cannot be sustained. This Court in
    S.L.P. (C) Nos. 2054 & 2055 of 2022, after going through the evidence
    placed on record, rightly held that the delay has not been properly
    explained. The relevant portion of the order is reproduced hereunder:
           “5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by
           the High Court. Once it was found even by the learned
           trial Court that delay has not been properly explained, and
           even there are no merits in the application for condonation
           of delay, thereafter, the matter should rest there and
           the condonation of delay application was required to be
           dismissed. The approach adopted by the learned trial
           Court that, even after finding that, in absence of any
           material evidence it cannot be said that the delay has been
           explained and that there are no merits in the application,
           still to condone the delay would be giving a premium to a
           person who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty of
           delay and laches. At this stage, the decision of this Court in
           the case of Popat Bahiru Goverdhane v. Land Acquisition
           Officer, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 765 is required to be
           referred to. In the said decision, it is observed and held
           that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular
           party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the
           statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend
           the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory
           provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a
           particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce
           it giving full effect to the same.
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          5.1 In the case of Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal
          Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157, in
          paragraph 14, it is observed and held as under:
          “The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The
          Limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of
          destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they
          approach the court for vindication of their rights without
          unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of
          limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only
          till the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature. At the
          same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay
          provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant
          for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period
          of limitation.”
          6. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above,
          we are in complete agreement with the view taken by the
          High Court. The Special Leave Petitions stand dismissed.
          Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.”
29. Therefore, this Court, having previously adjudicated upon the
    application for condonation of delay filed in I.A. Nos. 462 of 2018
    and 119 of 2019, and having rendered a reasoned order passed in
    S.L.P. (C) Nos. 2054 & 2055 of 2022, after a thorough perusal of the
    evidence and materials on record, held that the grounds put forth
    were insufficient to constitute ‘sufficient cause’ under Section 5 of
    the Limitation Act, 1963. An order of this Court, passed upon judicial
    consideration, attains finality unless set aside through appropriate
    appellate or review mechanisms.
30. In the present appeal, the Respondents seek to raise the very same
    reason to condone the delay as were previously canvassed, without
    placing any fresh or additional material to distinguish the current
    reason from the one already discussed and dismissed. This Court
    is of the considered view that such a repetition of grounds already
    scrutinized and held untenable amounts to an abuse of the process
    of law. Although the applications for condonation of delay are filed
    under different provisions of the law but the said provisions provide
    for concurrent remedies through different mechanisms and if the
    application filed under one provision has already been dismissed by
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                        265

                    Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran & Anr.


     a court of competent jurisdiction, by applying its judicial mind and
     held that the reasons for delay were not sufficient, a subsequent
     application filed under different provision, reiterating the same
     contentions or grounds of delay, cannot be entertained.
31. It is a well-settled law that while considering the plea for condonation
    of delay, the first and foremost duty of the court is to first ascertain
    the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking
    condonation rather than starting with the merits of the main matter.
    Only when sufficient cause or reasons given for the delay by the
    litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced or
    stand on equal footing, the court may consider the merits of the main
    matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
32. Further, this Court has repeatedly emphasised in several cases that
    delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity. The
    pursuit of substantial justice must not come at the cost of causing
    prejudice to the opposing party. In the present case, the respondents/
    defendants have failed to demonstrate reasonable grounds of delay
    in pursuing the matter, and this crucial requirement for condoning
    the delay remains unmet.
33. Therefore, in the case at hand, once it has been established that
    the reasons provided for condoning the delay in the application filed
    are not sufficient, we are not inclined to go into the merits of the
    contentions raised by the learned counsel of Respondents regarding
    Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
34. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of
    the considered opinion that the Impugned Order dated 25.04.2023
    passed by the High Court is liable to be set aside and is, accordingly,
    set aside.
35. The appeal stands allowed.
36. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



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         Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan