Holding

Section 129‑A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is constitutionally valid and does not infringe Article 19(1)(g) when read with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined whether Section 129‑A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which authorises police or other state‑appointed persons to seize and detain a motor vehicle used without registration or permit, infringes the fundamental right to practice any trade or profession under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The Andhra Pradesh High Court had declared the provision unconstitutional for lacking procedural safeguards such as a prescribed period of detention, a mechanism for confiscation, an obligation to produce the vehicle before a court, and an appeal route. The Court held that the provision must be read in conjunction with the Code of Criminal Procedure, which supplies the necessary procedures for custody, disposal, and appeal, and that the seizure serves legitimate purposes of preventing repeat offences and preserving evidence. Consequently, no violation of Article 19(1)(g) exists and there is no lacuna in the law regarding the vehicle’s custody and disposal. The appeals were allowed and the writ petitions dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether Section 129‑A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is ultra vires the Constitution for violating Article 19(1)(g).
Whether the provision lacks adequate procedural safeguards such as a maximum period of detention, a mechanism for confiscation, and a right of appeal.
Whether there is a lacuna in the Act concerning the custody and disposal of a seized vehicle.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedures. 100, s. 4(2), s. 451, s. 452, s. 91, s. Chapter XIII, s. Chapter XXXIV
Constitution of Indias. Art 133, s. Art 145(3), s. Art 19(1)(g), s. Art 32
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939s. 123, s. 127-B, s. 129-A, s. 130, s. 132, s. 22, s. 42

Subjects

Motor Vehicles ActSection 129-Avehicle seizuretemporary custodyconstitutional validityArticle 19(1)(g)Code of Criminal Procedurefundamental rightsultra viresseizure and detention

Judgment

TRANSPORt COMMISSIONER, ANDHRA PRADESH
A
v.
SARDAR ALI, BUS OWNER

August 26, 1983
B
(0. A. DESAI AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ .]'

Motor Vehicles )Jct, 1939-S. 129-A-Seizure and detention of a motor
vehicle by·a police officer or any other person authorised by State Governmef!l-
Whether ultra·vires.as offending Art. 19(1) (g) of the Constitution 1
c
Section 129-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 authorises the seizure
and detention of a motor vehicle by a police officer or any other person autho..;
rised by the State oOvernment in that behalf if such officer or person has
reason to believe that the vehicle has been or is being used without a certificate
of registration as required under s. 22 or without a pern1it as required under
sub~s. (1) of s, 42 or in Contravention of any condition of such permiL The D
app-eals in this group of matters were directed against a judgment of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court striking down s. 129~A as an unreasonable restriction on
the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(1) (g) of the Constitution for the
reason that there was no discerriible purpose behind the seizure authorised by
the.section, that the seizure was based on the subjective satisfaction of the
police officer or the person authorised, tJ~at there was neither any obligation
On him to produce the vehicle in the court nor was any power conferred E
on the court either to confiscate the vehicle or to pa$s any orders rega.rding
its temporary custody, that there was no provisiol) in the Act indicating
as to what should be ·done after seizing and detaining the vehicle and that
there was also no provision prescribing any maximum.period for the detention
or t~e vehicle or providing _for an appeal against seizure. ·
F
Upholding the validity of s. 129~A and allowing the appeals,

HELD: There is no lacuna·in regard to the proper custody·and disposal
ofthemotorvehicle_seized under s.129~A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The
proVisions of the Act have to be read in conjunction with·the provisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. [739 A-BJ G
(i) Section 129-A contemplates three situations where the police officer
or the person authorised niay seize and detain the vehicle and. these.are precisely
the three situations made punishable under s. 123(1). The power given.to seize
and detain the vehicle under s-. 129-A has to be exercised by the police offiCer
or the person authorised when he has reason to believe that an offence punish- H
able under s. 123(1) has been" or is being committed. After detecting the
commission of;an . offence punishable under s. 123(1) the next step for him
would be to consider whether the offence should be compounded as provide4
SUPREME COUl\T REPOR'l'S [1983) ~ s.c.R..
under s. 127:.B and thereafter to lay a complaint before the Court competent
A to take cognizance of the offence. Section 4(2) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure provides that all offences under any law other than the Penal Code
shall also be investigated, inquired into, tried and 'otherwise dealt with in
accordance with the provisions of_ the Code subject to any enactn1ent for the
time being in force regulating the manrter or place _of investigating inquiring
into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. Chapter -XIII ~f the Code
deals with "Jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts in inquiries and trials". So.
B subject to s. 132 of the Act, the Court before which the complaint may be laid
has to be detCrniined in accordance with Chapter XUI of the Code and after
the complaint is laid before the appropriate court it has to be tried in accor-
dance with the provisions of the Code subject to s. 130 of the Act. This is how
th~ offender has to be dealt with. [733 D; H; 734 A·B; G-H; 735 A-BJ

c (ii) A pre.condition to the seizure of a vehicle unde.r s. 129-A is.that
the police officer or the person authorised must have reason to believe that one
or the other of the offences specified in s.123 has been Or is be~ng committed.
The seizure is expected to serve a manifold purpose such as to prevent repeti-
tion of the offence, to use the thing seized as material evidence in the prose-
cution and so on. Section 129-A itself provides that the detention of the
vehicle by the authorised officer or person is to be teHlporary, and obviriusly,
D until appropriate orders regarding its disposal are made. The vehicle may be
released if the owner satisfies the authorised officer_ of person that no offence
such as that mentioned ins. 129-A had been or was being committed. Again,
since the detention is for temporafy safe custody, the vehicle may be released
to. the owner subject to suitable securrity and an undertaking to produce it
when called upon to do so. If the offence is compounded under s. 127-B,
the vehicle has· naturally to be returned to the owner. If a complaint is laid
E before the appropriate court, the court acquires jurisdiction to pass appropriate
orders regarding the custody and the disposal of the vehicle under Chapier
XXXIV and ss. 451 and 452 of the Code 'of Criminal Procedure; '
[735 H; 736 C-H; 137 A]

2. The contention that s. 129-A should be held unreasonable as it does
F not provide any safeguard in regard to the several removable items which are
usuaUy found in tourist vehicles such as spare tyres, spare Parts, .radio, video,
etc., has no substance. Section JOO of the Code of Criminal Procedure which
was referred to in this context deals with searches and not seizures. In the
very nature of things when 'property is seized and not recovered during a search,
it is not possible to comply with the provision~ of sub-ss. (4) and (5) of s. 100,
. Cr. P.C. In the case of a seizure under the Motor Vehicles Act, there iS no
G provision for preparing a list of the things seized in· the course of seizure for
the obvious reaSon that all those things. are seized not separately but" as part
of the vChicle itself. But it is in the interests of the very officer or person
seizing the vehicle to prepare a list of detachable things which are ordinarily
not part of the vehicle and give a copy of the list to the person in charge of
the vehicle at the time of the seizure. [739 A-DJ
H
Civic APPELUTE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2546-2547
of 1983.
'
TRANSPORT COMMR. v. SARDAR ALI (Chinnoppa Reddy. J.) 731

From the judgment and Order dated the 13th February, 1981
of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 5458 and
5459 of 1980. · ·

WITH

Writ Petition Nos. 6051-64, 8226-28, 8284-97, 8321-37, 3952,
7569, 7572, 7574 and 7577of1983. B

(Under Article 32, of the Constitution of India)

T. V. S. N. Chari for the Appellant.
'' . c
, D.R. Gupta, B. R. Kapoor, S. R. Srivastava and N. N. Sharma
·for the Petitioners.

K. G. Bhagat, Additional Solicitor General, Shanti Bhushan,
P.R. Mridu/, Dr. Y. S. Chita/e, K. N. Bhatt, P. K. Pillai, R. N .
. Poddar, R. B. Datar, A. Subba Rao, N. Nettat, V. G. Mehta and Mrs. D
H. Wahi, for the appearing Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
"'°"... . CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. The Andhra Pradesh High Court has
declared sec. 129-A of the Motor Vehicles Act unconstitutional and ·E
void as offending Art.. 19 (I) (g) of the Constitution oflndia. We
may straight away say that the judgment of the High Court. suffers
from serious infirmities, not the least of which is the total failure to
notice and consider the applicability of the provisio'ns of the Co.de of
Criminal Procedure to the.situation.
F
On an oral application by the Advocate General, the High
Court granted leave to appeal to the .Supreme Court. Presumably,
by 'leave' the High Court meant a certificate as provided under the
· Const.itution. The order of the High Court regarding the·grant of
'leave' to appeal to this Court is· in the following terms: "An oral
application for leave to appeal to the Supreme . Court has been made
G

- by the Learned Advocate General. The question whether 129-A of
the Motor Vehicles Act is ultra-vires the Cons.titution on the ground
that it infringes ·Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution relates to the
interpretation of the Constitution and is also a· substantial question
H
oflaw of general importance, which requires· to be ·decided by the
Supreme Court Therefore, we srant leave to appeal to the Supreme
~Qurt",
732 SUPREME COURT REFO!l'rs ( 19831 3 s.c.it.

The order of the High Court ·states, (i) that the question relates
A to the interpretation of the Constitution; and,(ii) the question.is also
a substantial question of'Iaw of general importance. which requires to
be decided by the Supreme Court. The order of the High Court
while saying that the question relates to the interpretation of the
Constitution refrained from certifying that the case involved a sub-
B stlltitial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.
We cannot therefore, treat the certificate as one under Aft. 'J32 of
the Constitution. On the other hand the High Court has certified
that the case involves a substantial question of law of general impor•
--
tance and it requires to be decided by the Supreme Court, employing
the precise language used in clauses (a) and (b) respectively of Art.
c 133 {!)of the Constitution. The certificate, therefore, was clearly
one under Art. 133 of the Constitution. We are mentioning these
circumstances because at the very commencement, our attention was
invited to Art. 145 (3) of the Constitution which provides that the
minimurn number· of judges who are to ·sit for the purpose of deciding
any case involving a substantial question of law as to the interpreta-
D
tion ·of the Constitution or for the purpose of hearing any reference
under Art. 143 shall be five. The High Court had not certified that
the cases involved a substantial question of Jaw as to the interpretation.
of the Constitution and we are also satisfied that the cases do not
iiwolve a substautial question of law as to the interpretation of the
E Constitution. We proceeded to hear the appeals and writ petitions
after the position was clarified· when the cases were opened by the
le;rned counsel.
·~"
· Section 129 A of the Motor Vehicles Act may be extracted
F here. It is as follows :-

"129-A Power to detain vehicles·used without certi-
ficate of registratiou or permit. - Any police officer autho- · ·
tised in this behalf or other person authorised in this
behalf by the State Government rnay, if he has reason to
G believe that a motor vehicle has been or is being used in
contravention of the provisions of Sec. 22 or without the
permit required by sub-section (!) of Sec. 42 or in contra-
vention of any condition of such permit relating to the
route on which or the area in which or the purpose for
H
which· the vehicle may be used, seize and detain the
vehicle, and for this purpose take or cause to be taken any
steps he may consider proper for the temporary safe
TRANSPORT COMMR. v. SARDAR ALI (Chinnoppa Ready, J.) 733

custody of the v.ehicle. Provided that where any such,ofiicer
or person has reason to believe that .a motor vehicle has A
been or is being used without the permit required by sub-
section {I) ofSection. 42, he may, instead of seizing the
vehicle, seize the certificate of registration of the vehicle
and shall issue an acknowledgement in respect thereof.
'Provided further that where a motor vehicle has been B
~eized and detained under this section for contravention
of the provisions of Section 22, such ·vehicle shall not be
released to the owner unless and until he produces a valid-
certificate of registration under this Act in respect of that
vehicle."
c
It is seen that Section 129-A contemplates three situations where the
police officer or authorised person may seize and detain the vehicle.
The three situations.are, (i} where he has reason to ·believe that the
motor vehicle has been 'or is being used in contravention of the
provisions of Sec. 22, (ii) where he has reason to believe that the
motor vehicle has been or is being used without the permit reqnired D
by sec. 42 (!), and (iii) where ·he has reason to believe that the motor
vehicle has been or is being used in contravention of any condition
of such permit relating to the route on which or the area in which or
the purpose for which _the vehicle may be used. These are precisely
the three situations contemplated by Sec. 123 (I) of the Motor E
Vehicles Act' and made punishable under that provision. Section
123 (1), which may also be extracted, is as follows.:-

"S. 123. Using, vehicle without registration or permit.
(I) Whoever drives a motor vehicle or causes or allows a
motor vehicle to be used in contravention of the provisions F
of Section 22 or without the· permit required by sub-
. section (I) of Section 42 or in contravention of any
condition of such permit relating to the route on
which or the area in which or the purpose for which
the vehicle may be used or to the maximum number of G
passengers and maximum weight of luggage that may be
carried on the vehicle shall be punishable for a first
offence with fine which may extend to two thousand
rupees and for any second or subsequent offence with
imprisonment. H
.
Iti s, therefore, Clear that the power given to seize and detain the
vehicle under sec. 129-(A) is to be exercised by the police officer or
734 SUPREME CO!JRT REPORTS (t 9g3j 3 s.c.ll..
the authorised person when he has reason to believe that an offence
A punishable under sec. 123 (1) has been or is .being committed. Now,
after detecHng the commission of an offence punishable under sec.
123 (I) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the next appropriate step for the
police officer or the authorised person would be to consider the
question whether the offence should be compounded as provided by
Section 127-(B) of the Motor Vehicles Act and any notification
B issued by. the Government in that behalf. Section !27~B may also be
extracted here and it is as f<;>llows :-

"127-B (!) Any offence (whether committed before
or after the commencement of section 26 of the Motor
c vehicles (Amendment Act, 19821 punishable under section
112, section 113, section 113A, section 113B, section 114,
sub-section (I) and (2) or section 115,'section 116, section
118, section 120 section 122, section 123, section 124,
section 125 or section 127 may; either before or after the
institution of the prosecution, be compounded by such -
D officers.or authorities and for such amount as the State
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
specify in this behalf.

(2) Where an offence has been compounded under
sub-section (!), the offender, if in custody, shall be
discharged and no further proceedings shall be taken
against him in respect of such offence."

Thereafter the next logical and appropriate step for the police officer
or the auiliorised person would be to fay a complaint before the
F Court. competent to take congnizance of the offence, subject to the
over'.riding provisi~n of Section 132 of the Motor Vehicles Act which
prov\des that no. Court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate
or a. Magistrate of the second class shall try any offence punishable
under the Motor Vehicles· Act or any rule made thereunder. Section
4 (2}'ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure provides that all offences under
G any iaw Other than the Penal C9de shall also be investigated, inquired
into, tried, a_nd .otherwise dealt with according to the same
prov.isions that is, the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code,
subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the
manner or pface of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise
H dealing with such offences. Chapter XIII of the Code of Criminal
Procedure deals with "Jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts in inquiries
a11dtrials". So, subject to section 132 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
. . -
. TRANSPORT COMMR. '· SAitDAR ALI (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 735

the Court before which the complaint may be laid. has to. be deter•
mined in accordance with the provisions of chapter XIII of· the Code
of Criminal .Procedure. · After the complaint is laid the case has to
· betried in accordance with the
provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. ·This again is subject to one special prov1sion of the
Motor Vehicles Act, namely Section 130. Sec. 130 is in the foUowing
terms:-
B
· "The court taking c~gnizance of an offence under this
r Act, - (i} may, if the offence is an offence punishable
with imprisonment under this Act and· (ii) shall, in
any other case, state upon the summons to be served .
·on the ·accused person that he-(a) ·may appear by · c ..
. pleader and not in person, or (b) may . by a specified
: date prior to the hearing cif the charge plead guilty to the
charge by registered letter and remit to the court such
sum (not exceeding the maximum fine· that may be·
. ' .
imposed for the offence). as the court may specify:
D
. '
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall · apply
to any offence specified i.n Part A of the Fifth Schedule.

Where the offence dealt with in accordance with
sub-section (I) is an offence Specified in Part B of the E
Fifth Schedule, the accused. person shaU, 1 if he pleads.··
guilty to the charge, forward his licence to the Court
.with the letter containing his plea in order that· the con-
viction may lie endorsed on the licence.
- .· :: . . . . . . -

Where an accused person pleads guilty· and remits F
the sum specified and has complied with the provisions
of sub-section (2), no further .proceedings in respect of
the offence shall be taken against him, nor shall h~ be lia-
ble to be disqualified for holding or obtaining a licence by ·
reason of his having pleaded guilty."
G
r· That is how th~ offender is d~alt with. :

' But, what happens to the vehicle seized under the provisions of
S. 129-A? To bi:gin with, we notice .that a pre-condition to the
seizure arid detention of the vehicle is that the police officer or
H
·authorised person must have reason to believe that one or the other
of the offences specified, punishable as we have seen under s. 123,
736 · StJPRlMI! COU!tT lllORTS '· (1983) 3 S.C.R.

. has been or is being committed. · Whenever property' involved• in
A the commission of an ·offence is seized; the seizure is generally
expected to serve a manifold purpose such as to. prevent repetition
·of the offence, to use the thing seized as .material evidence in• the
prosecution, 'to pre~erve the property so as .to enable the court· to
pass· appropriate orders for its disposal by way. of ' destruction,·
B confiscation, or delivery to any person claimi.ng to be entitled to .
possession thereof or otherwise. There is no reason to assume that
the seizure under S. 129-A is any different and is not to serve any of
these purposes.or .·any purpose at all. We then. notice that the
·police officer or the authorised person may, "Seize. and· detain the -
•vehicle, and for this purpose take or cause to be taken any steps he
c may consider proper for the temporaiy safe custody of the vehicle".
Clearly, therefore, the detention by the authori,ed officer or· person·
is to be temporary; •·for how.long then ? . Obviously until appro-
priate orders regarding its disposal are made.. Quite obviously the .
vehicle may be released if the owner of the vehicle satisfies the ·
authorised officer or person, that rio offence such as that mentioned
D in S. 129-A had.been or was beini: committed. This is. subject to .
the second ·proviso· to S. 129-A which bars the release of a vehicle
•. _seized for a contravention of the provisions of S. 22 unless the owner
of the vehicle produces a valid certificate . of registration under· the · +
Act in respect of the vehicle. •Conversely,in the context, it implies '"'{
E a
that a vehicle seized for contravention of s. 22 is to be released if
. the certificate of registration is prc_duced. Again, since the detenti9it
· is for 'temporary safe custody, until appropriate orders are made,· the
police officer or authorised person · seizing the vehicle may' arrange.
for the 'temporary safe custody' of the vehicle with the owner of the
vehicle by releasing the vehicle to him subject to suitable security
. F · .and so undertaking to pro<luce the vehicle when called _upon to do so.
'We have indicated that the next step in the proce's of dealing with
the offender is to consider whether the offence may riot tie compound-
ed. If the offence is compounded,· the vehicle ' has naturally to be
returned to the owner.· If it is not' compounded, a complaint. has to
G be laid before the Court empowered t~ take. cognizance· of the case
and the case proceeded with. As soon as the complaint: is ·Jaid, the
Court acquires jurisdiction to pass appropriate .orders regarding 'the ··-'-\
·· ... custody'. and· the 'the disposal' of the. vehicle. \ye· have. already
noticed how Section 4 (2) of the Code of the .Criminal Procedure
H stipulates that offences under laws other than the Penal Code ·also are
be
to investigated, inquited into, tried and otherwise ·dealt with in
~~cordance with the. provisions o[the Code ·of Criminal P_rocedur,,
. TRANSPORT COMMR. v. SARDAR ALI (Chi1Tllappa Reddy, J.) 737

The provisions of Chapter XXXIV of the Code relating to 'Disposal
cif Property' are also therefore attracted· in dealing with offences A
under the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 452 of the Code enables the
Conrt, at the conclusion of an inquiry or trial to "make such order
as it thinks fit for the disposal, by de.struction, confiscation or
delivery to any person c1aiining to be entitled to· possession thereof
or otherwise, of any property or document proquced before it or in 8
its custody, or regarding which any offence appears to have been ·
committed, or which has been used for the commission of any
offence". The Court thus has the power at the conclusion of the
case to make appropriate orders regarding the disposal of the motor
vehicle regarding which an offence appears to have been committed.
So far as the custody of the vehicle pending the conclusion of the c
• case is concerned, the Court may either treat the arrangement made
by the officer or person acting under S. 129-A as sufficient or may
itself make further or other orders. Section 451 of· the Code of
Criminal Procedure empowers the Court,· when any property is
produced before it during any inquiry or trial, to make such order
D
as it thinks fit for the proper custody of such property pending the
conclusion of the inquiry or trial. We think that a motor vehicle
regarding whose temporary custody arrangements· have. been made ·
under sec. 129-A of the Motor Vehicles Act by the police· officer or
the authorised person seizing the vehicle must be considered to have
been produced befo.re the Criminal Court as soon as a complaint is · E
filed before the Court a!leging the commission of an offence under sec. ·
123 regarding the vehicle. In any case, the Court has ample power
under Chapter VII of the Code, Section 91 in particular, to compel
the production of the vehicle before the Court. Thus if the provisions
of the Motor Vehicles Act are read in conjunction with the provisions
of the Code of Criminal Procedure-and there is no getting .away from
the provisions of both the laws-it is seen that there is no lacuna what·
llover in regard to the proper custody and disposal of the motor
vehicle seized under sec. 129-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The custo·
dy of the vehicle in the hands the police officer or the authorised
person is but temporary and he is therefore, obliged to act and take 'G
all further steps in· the matter with all expedition. If he
releases the vehicle on being satisfied that no offence has been
committed or-if he releases the ·vehicle on the offence being com·
pounded, no Jurtber question arises. If, instead, be lays a com·
plaint before the Court, the court acquires instant jurisdiction over. H
the vehicle to ·pass suitable orders.. In the remote event of the police
officer or the autbOrised person not taking any further action after
73& SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1983] 3 S.C.R.

seizing and detaining the vehicle, the ·owner of the vehicle is not
A without remedy. Art. 226 is always available but one does not have
to presume that the police officer or the authorised person may not
act according to law.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court appeared to think that sec.
129-A of the Motor Vehicles Act was an unreasonable restriction on
.B
the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19 (I) (g) of the Constituion
because (i} there was no provision in the Act providing for
confiscation of the vehicle, (ii) there was no provision in the Act
indicating what should be done after seizing and detaining the
vehicle, (iii) th~ seizure by the police officer or the authorised person
c was based on his subjective satisfaction, (ivl there was no discernible
purpose behind the seizure, (v) there was no obligation on the seizing
authority to produce the vehicle in court, (vi) Nor was there any
purpose to be served by producing the vehicle b.efore the court. as
the court did not possess the power to confiscate the vehicle or to
D pass any orders regarding its temporary custody,(vii) no appeal was
provided against the seizure, and (viii) no maximum period was
prescribed for the detention. of the vehicle.

None of these reas0ns bears any scrutiny, if properly examined
in the light of the provisions of both the Motor Vehicles Act and
E the Code of Criminal Procdure, as we are bound· to. Indeed, when-
• '

· ever an offence under a law other than the Penal Code is committed
and thadaw
. does.... not. .itself regulate the procedure to be followed '
there is no option but to look to the provisions of the Criminal
Procedure Code for further action and to weave into a single texture
F the provisions of the code and the special law. .The High Court
has totally. ignored the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code
and the judgment stands vitiated on that account. It has therefore,
to be set aside. We have explained the context of Sec. 129-A in the
scheme emerging from the inter-lacing of the provisions of the Motor
Vehicles Act and the Criminal Procedure Code. ¥. e do not have
G the slightest hesitation in rejecting the contention that there is any
infringment of the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19 (I) (g)
of the Constitution and in upholding the vires of Sec. 129-A of the
Motor Vehicles Act.
H
One of the Learned Counsel submitted that when a tourisl
motor vehicle was seized under Sec. 129-A, there should be some
~afe~uard in regard to the sev~ral removal)le items whichJ:are usually
TRANSPORT COMMR. v. SARD.<R ALI (Chlnnappa Reddy, I.) 73,

found in tourist vehicles such as ipare tyres, spare parti, radio, video
etc. It was suggested that,in the abse~ce of a provision similar to A
that found in the Criminal Procedure Code, Sec. 129-A should be
held_ to be unreasonable. There is no substance in this contention.
Sec. 100 of the Criminal Procedure Code to which reference was
made by the Counsel deals with searches and not seizures. In the
very natur.e of things when property is seized and not recovered
during a search, it is not possible to comply with the provisions of B
Sub-Sections (4) and (5) of Sec. JOO of the Criminal Procedure
Code. In th case of a seizure under the Motor Vehicles Act, there
is no provision for preparing a list of the things seized in the .course
of the seizure for the obvious reason that all those things are seized
not separately but as part of the vehicle itself. But it is in the
interests \lf the very officer or person seizing the vehicle, so that they
c
may not be open to any charge being laid against them later, that
such officer or person· takes care to prepare a list of detachable things
which are ordinarily not part of the-vehicle and give a copy of the
list to the person in-charge of the vehicle at the time of the
seizure. D

In view of the discussion, the appeals are allowed with cosu
and the writ petitions filed in High Court aredismissed. Some- of the
operators have directly approached this Court under Art. 32 of the
Constitution. Thei_r writ petitions have been heard along with the E
civil appeals and for the same reasons they are dismissed with
costs.

H.L.C. Appea/a allowed.