Supreme Court of India
TRIMBAKversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA
- Citation
- 2008 INSC 292
- Decided
- 4 March 2008
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
The killing, though caused by an axe blow, occurred in a sudden fight without pre‑meditation, undue advantage or cruelty, so the proper conviction is under Section 304 Part I IPC, not Section 302.
Summary
The appellant was convicted of murder under Section 302 IPC and assault under Section 324 IPC for striking the deceased with an axe during a verbal altercation, which also injured the deceased's wife. The appellant argued that the killing occurred in a sudden fight without pre‑meditation, undue advantage, or cruelty, invoking Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, and that only a single blow was delivered, rendering Section 302 inapplicable. The Supreme Court examined the meaning of "sudden fight", "undue advantage" and the relevance of the weapon, force and body part struck, holding that the factual matrix did not satisfy the criteria for Exception 4 and that a single blow does not automatically exclude Section 302. Considering the circumstances, the Court concluded that the appropriate charge was culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I IPC, and altered the conviction accordingly, imposing a ten‑year imprisonment. The appeal was therefore partly allowed.
Issues considered
- The applicability of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC to the facts of the case
- Whether Section 302 IPC applies when a single blow is delivered with an axe
- Whether the accused took undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner
- The correct conviction: Section 302/324 IPC versus Section 304 Part I IPC
- The interpretation of "sudden fight" and related terms under IPC
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 357
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 300 Exception 4, s. 302, s. 304 Part I, s. 307, s. 324
Subjects
murderculpable homicideSection 300 Exception 4sudden fightpremeditationundue advantagecruel or unusual mannersingle blowconviction alterationIndian Penal Code
Judgment
[2008] 3 S.C.R. 804
A TRIM BAK
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
(Criminal Appeal No. 438 of 2008)
MARCH 4, 2008
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860:
s.300 Exception 4, s.302 and s.304 Part I- Sudden fight
C between accused and deceased - Accused assaulted
deceased with axe lying nearby- Wife of deceased intervened
and she was a/so given blow with axe on head - Courts below
held accused guilty under ss. 302 and 324 -Accused pleading
applicability of Exception 4 of s.300 - Held: Considering
D factual background, appropriate conviction would be under
s. 304 Part-I and not under s. 302 - Conviction altered t ~
accordingly.
s.302-App/icability of, when single blow given - Held: It
E is not rule of universal application that whenever one blow is
given, s. 302 is ruled out - It would depend upon the weapon
used, the size and force with which blow was given, part of body
on which it was given and several other factors.
s. 300 Exception 4 - Invocation of- Essential ingredients.
F Words and phrases:
'fight', 'sudden fight', 'undue advantage' - Meaning of -
In the context of Exception 4 to s.300 /PC.
The prosecution case was that the accused and
· G deceased were present in the field. There were verbal
exchanges between the accused and deceased.
Thereafter accused picked up the axe which was lying
nearby and he assaulted deceased with the said axe on ~·
the head. When wife of deceased rushed forward to
H 804
TRIMBAK v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 805
•• ' intervene, the accused gave a blow with the axe on her A
head. On account of assault, deceased died on the spot
and his wife sustained bleeding injuries. The trial court
convicted the accused for the offences under ss.302 and
324 IPC, however acquitted him of the offence under s.307
IPC. High Court affirmed the judgment of trial court. B
In appeal to this Court, appellant contended that the
~ deceased lost his life in the course of sudden quarrel and
"" ' that there was no premeditation and that the accused had
not taken advantage and had also not acted in a cruel
. manner; that only one blow was allegedly given after c
picking up the axe; that prior to that he was not armed
and in any event only one blow was given. In essence it
was submitted that s.302 IPC would not apply and
Exception 4 of s.300 IPC applied.
D
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
~ ~·
HELD : 1. For bringing in operation of Exception 4 to
s.300 IPC, it has to be established that the act was
committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight in the
heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel without the E
offender having taken undue advantage and not having
acted in a cruel or unusual manner. [Para 9) [810-B]
2. The fourth exception to s, 300 IPC covers acts done
.;-'t in a sudden fight. The said exception deals with a case of
F
prosecution not covered by the first exception, after which
• its place would have been more appropriate. The
exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both
there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case
of Exception 1 there is total deprivation of self-control, in
G
.
case of. E~eption 4, there is only that heat .
of passion
which clouds men's sober reason and urges them to do
.. ~
deeds which they would not otherwise do. There is
provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1; but the
injury done is not the direct consequence of that
H
806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.
A provocation. In fact Exception 4 deals with cases in which
/
•·
lo
notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or
some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in
whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the
subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect
B of guilt upon equal footing. A "sudden fight" implies mutual
provocation and blows on each side. The homicide <
committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral r
1
provocation, nor in such cases could the whole blame be
placed on one side. For if it were so, the exception more
c appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is
no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight
suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or
less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but
if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it
would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then
D
mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to
t- ".-
apportion the share of blame which attaches to each
fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is
caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight;
(c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage
E or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight
must have been with the person killed. To bring a case
within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must
be found. It is to be noted that the "fight" occurring in
r~
Exception 4 to s.300 IPC is not defined in IPC. It takes two
F to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must
be no time for the passions to cool down. In this case, the
parties have worked themselves into a fury on account
of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a
combat between two and more persons whether with or
G without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any
general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden
quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is
sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proven -r-~·
facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4 to
H s.300 IPC, it is not sufficient to show that there was a
TRIMBAK v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 807
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
' sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must A
further be shown that the offender has not taken undue
advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The
expression "undue advantage" as used in the provision
means "unfair advantage". [Para 10] [810-C-H; 811-A-E]
3. It cannot be laid down as a rule of universal B
application that whenever one blow is given, s.302 IPC is
> ruled out. It would depend upon the weapon used, the
size of it in some c~ses, force with which the blow was
given, part of the body on which it was given and several
such relevant factors. [Para 11] [811-E, F] c
4. Considering the factual background of the case,
the appropriate conviction would be under s.304 (I) IPC
and custodial sentence of ten years would meet the ends
of justice. [Para 12] [811-F, G]
D
~
CRIMINALAPPELLATEJURISDICTION: CriminalAppeal
· No. 438 of 2008.
From the final Order and Judgment dated 15.9.2005 of
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur
in Criminal Appeal No. 58/2002. E
Bimal Roy Jad and Sunita Pandit for the Appellant.
-"'!'
Ravindra Keshav~ao Adsure for the Respondent.
The Judgment ofthe Court was delivered by F
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division
Bench of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench, dismissing
the appeal filed before it by the appellant. The appellant was
G
convicted for allegedly having committed an offence punishable
under Section 302 of the Indian Pe.nal Code, 1860 (in short the
~ .. 'IPC') and was sentenced to imprisonment for life by learned
Sessions Judge Akola in Sessions Trial No. 58 of 2001. He
was also found guilty of offence punishable under Section 324
H
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 3 S.C.R.
/
A IPC. Sentences of imprisonment for life and fine With default
.."
stipulation and sentence of 6 months and fine with default
stipulation were imposed for the two offences. It was further
ordered that if the fine amount is deposited then a sum of
Rs.2,000/-was to be paid to the complainant as a compensation
B in terms of Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (in short the 'Cr.P.C.').
-r ''
3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
Narmadabai (PW2) is the widow of Shamrao Telgote
c (hereinafter referred to as 'deceased') who was working in the
field of one S. K. Majid, situated near village Gaigaon. Shamrao
was living in the field in a hut and the accused was working in
the field and living there in a hut. The house of owner of the field
S.K. Masjid was also situated in the field and S.K. Majid was
residing with his mother Gulabbi in the said house.
D t ~
On 24.12.2000 at about 7.30 p.m. Narmadabai and
Gulabbi were sitting in front of the house of Gulabbi in the field.
The accused and deceased Shamrao were present there. There
were verbal exchanges between the accused and Shamrao.
E Thereafter· accused picked up the axe which was lying there
and he assaulted Shamrao with the said axe on the head of
Shamrao. When Narmadabai rushed forward to intervene, the
accused also gave a blow with the axe on her head. On account -r -
of assault, Shambrao died on the spot and his wife sustained
F bleeding injuries. Thereafter, the accused ran away from the
field. Since it was night time and as there was no conveyance
for going to the Police Station situated at Ural, Narmadabai did
not go to the Police Station. S~e lodged an oral report on the
next day i.e. 25.12.2000 in the morning. On the basis of this
report, F.l.R. under Sections 302 and 307 IPC was registered
G
by PSI Madhukar Bhoge (PW 8). The investigation was taken
up and the accused was arrested on 01.01.2001. After -t ~
completing the investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the.
accused under Sections 302 and 307 IPC. The case was
committed to the Court of Session. In the trial, the prosecution
H
TRIMBAK v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 809
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
,.. '
1
examined eight witnesses and also produced several A
documents to prove its case against the accused. The defence
of the accused was one of denial. After appreciating the
evidence led by the prosecution, the trial court convicted the
accused for the offences under Sections 302 and 324 IPC. The
accused was acquitted of the offence under Section 307 IPC. B
\ .....- The conv_iction and sentence as imposed by the trial Court
came to be challenged by the appellant before the High Court.
Primary stand was that the occurrence took place in course of
sudden quarrel and the evidence tendered does not inspire
confidence. The stand of the State, on the other hand, was that c
Narrnadabai (PW-1) whose evidence was vital for the
prosecution case herself had suffered injuries. The appeal was
dismissed.
4. In support of the appeal, the stand taken before the High
D
~
l Cou_rt was reiterated. Additionally, it was submitted by learned
counsel for the appellant that the factual scenario clearly
established that in course of su_dden quarrel the attack was made
and the deceased lost his life.
5. Learned counsel for the State submitted that E
considering the nature of the injury the appellant has been rightly
convicted for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.
.. -'"!- 6. The basic stand of the appellant appears to be that in
. course of a quarrel the occurrence took place. This fact has
also been accepted by Narmadabai (PW 1) stated that there F
were verbal exchanges between the accuse_d and the deceased
and thereafter accused picked up the axe which was lying there
and assaulted the deceased.
7. According to appellant background facts projected by G
the prosecution clearly show that the assault was given in the
. ~
course of a sudden quarrel. There was no premeditation and
the accused did not take advantage and had also not acted in a
cruel manner. Only one blow was allegedly given after picking
.up the axe. Prior to that he was not armed. In any event only one
H
810 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.
,, ..
A blow was given. In essence it was submitted that Section 302 •
IPC has no application and fourth exception of Section 300 IPC
applies.
8. The pivotal plea relates to the applicability of Exception
4 of Section 300 IPC.
B
9. For bringing in its operation it has to be established
(
that the act was committed without premeditation, in a sudden r
fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel without the
offender having taken undue advantage and not having acted
c in a cruel or unusual manner.
10. The fourth exception to Section 300 IPC covers acts
done in a sudden fight. The said exception deals with a case of
prosecution not covered by the first exception, after which its
place would have been more appropriate. The exception is
D founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence
of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is t '·
total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is
only that heat of passion which clouds men's sober reason and
urges them to do deeds which they would not otherwise do.
E There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1; but the
injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In
fact Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that
a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the
origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have r '
F originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them
in respect of guilt upon equal footing. A "sudden fight" implies
mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide
committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation,
nor in such cases could the whole blame be placed on one side. ·
G For if it were so, the exception more appropriately applicable
would be Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation or
determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which
. both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one 1' ..
of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own
conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is
H
TRIMBAK v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 811
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to A
apportion the share of b1ame which attaches to each fighter.
The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a)
without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the
offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or
unusual manner; and (cl) the fight must have been with the persori a
killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients
.' mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the "fight"
--r-
occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in
IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that
there must be no time for the passions to cool down. In this 0
case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury on account
of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat
between two and more persons whether with or without
weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to
what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of
0
fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily
' "' depend upon the proven facts of each case. For the application
of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, it is not sufficient to show
that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation.
It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue
advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression 3
"undue advantage" as used in the provision means "unfair
advantage".
11. It cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application
that whenever one blow is given, Section 302 IPC is ruled out. It 4
would depend upon the weapon used, the size of it in some
cases, force with which the blow was given, part of the body on
which it was given and several such relevant factors.
12. Considering the factual background of the case, in our
considered view the appropriate conviction would be under 8
Section 304 (I) IPC, and custodial sentence often years would
meet the ends of justice.
13. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
D.G. 5:t8 Appeal partly allowed. H
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