Holding

Rule 9A's term "immediately" requires reasonable promptness; a delay of 18 days does not invalidate the prosecution, and mixing cottonseed oil with soybean oil is adulteration punishable under the Act.

Summary

Tulsi Ram, a vendor of edible oil, was charged under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act after a public analyst found cottonseed oil mixed in his soybean oil. The analyst's report was forwarded to him 18 days after the prosecution was instituted, contrary to Rule 9A which requires the report to be sent "immediately". He did not apply for further analysis by the Central Food Laboratory and was convicted under section 16(1)(a)(i). The Supreme Court examined whether the delay violated the statutory requirement and whether non‑compliance with Rule 9A is fatal to the prosecution. It held that "immediately" means reasonable promptness, not strict immediacy, and that a delay is not fatal unless prejudice is shown; the 18‑day delay did not vitiate the trial. The Court also affirmed that mixing cottonseed oil with soybean oil constitutes adulteration under the Act and Rule 44(e). Consequently, the petition was dismissed and the conviction upheld.

Issues considered

The meaning of "immediately" in Rule 9A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules and whether an 18‑day delay violates it
Whether non‑compliance with Rule 9A is mandatory or directory and if such non‑compliance vitiates the prosecution
Whether mixing cottonseed oil with soybean oil amounts to adulteration under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and Rule 44(e)

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 272, s. 273, s. 274, s. 275, s. 276
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (as amended 1976)s. 11, s. 13(2), s. 14A, s. 16(1)(a)(i)

Subjects

Prevention of Food Adulteration ActRule 9Aimmediateadulterationcottonseed oilsoybean oilmandatory vs directoryspecial leave petitionconviction

Judgment

949

TULSI RAM

v.
B
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
October /l, 1984

[0, CHINNAPPA REDDY A1'D V. KHALID, JJ.]

Prevention of Food Adulleration A.et, sections 13 (2) (as amended by Act of
c
1976) read with Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules 9A. scope of-lnterpreta·
tion of Rules 9A.
0
Words and Phrases : meaning of ihe word immediate/y" in Rule 9A-
Whether delay of 18 days ln supplying the report of the Public Analyst vitiate!
the trial-Whether n1ixing cotton seed oil with soyabean oil, adulteration of soya·
D
bean oil-Prevention of Adulteration Rule 44(e) read with section 2(ia) (m).

On the basis of the report of the Public Analyst that the sample of soya.
bean oil purchased by the Food Inspector, Sorar on J7. 8. 79 from the shop of
the accused petitioner was found adulterated, a complaint was filed on 29. 11. 79
in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Balod. On 17. tt. 79 a copy of the
report of the Public Analyst was forwarded to the petitioner as required by Rule E
9A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. The accused petitioner
inade no application to the trial Court to have one of the samples sent to the
Central Food Laboratory for further analysis, but was content mereJy to deny
-· offence. After due trial, he was convicted by the Magistrate on 8. 9. 82 under
section 16 (1) (a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and sentenced
to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000.
The appeal preferred by the petitioner to the Session Judge, Durg and the F
Revision Petition preferred thereafter to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
were dismissed, Hence the Special leave petition.

Dismissing the petition, the Court,

HELD : 1: 1. The expression "immediately" in Rule 9A is intended to
convey a sense of continuity rather than urgency. What must be done is to G
- forward the report at the earliest opportunity, so as to facilitate the exercise of
the statutory right under section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration
Act in sood and sufficient time before the prosecution commences leading
evidence. [961C-D]

1:2. Non-compliance with Rule 9A is not fatal. It is a question of pre~
jl;ldice. Ap?lring this princirle, in th~ insta1;1t case, the triaJ cannot Qe said to p
950 5UPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 1 S.C.R.

A be vitiated by the delay of eighteen days in forwarding the report of the Public
Anayst to the petitioner.

1 : 3. Rule 9A has to be interpreted so as to keep it in tune with, and
-
within the bounds of section 13(2). The amended section 13(2) does not pres~
cribe any point of time before which the report of the Public Analyst is to be
forwarded to the accused vendor. But, the very basis of a prosecution for
B adulteration of food is the report of the Public Analyst that the article of food
is adulterated, The accused is given the right to dispute the Public Analyst's
report by applying to the court for an analysis by the Central food Laboratory.
If the report of the Central Food Laboratory is to the effect that the article of
food is not adulterated the very basis of the prosecution will disappear. In
such an event the further pursuit of the prosecution will be needless and the
accused will have to be discharged or acquitted as the case may be. It is
C therefore to be assumed that the report of the Public Analyst is to be made
available to the accused vendor at the commencement of the rrosecution, that
is to say, before the prosecution starts leading evidence in the case, and in
good and sufficient time to enable the accused to exercise his right of having
the sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory if he so desires it. There-
fore Rule 9A carefully refrains from mentioning any definite limit of time and
the expression ''immediately" is not to be understood to mean the very next
D instant, the very next hour, that very day or the very next day. Construej in
its setting, the expression "immediately" is only meant to convey 'reasonable
despatch and promptitude' and no more. The idea is to avoid dilatoriness on
the part of official dom and prevention of unnecessary harassment to the
accused. But the idea is not to penalise the prosecution and to provide a
technical defence. If after receiving the Public Analyst's report the accused
never sought to apply to the court to have the sample sent to the Central Food
E Laboratory, as in the present case, he may not be heard to complain of the
delay in the receipt of the report by him, unless, of course, he is able to
establish some other prejudice. [960E-H; 961A-B]

Dal Chand v. Municipal Corporation, Bhopal AIR 1983 SC 303 ; Kashmir/
Lal v. State of Haryana 1981 (2) AIPFC 167, Kanda Swami v. Food Inspector
1982 (1) AIPFAC 322, Perumal v. Kumbakonam Municipality 1982 (2) AIPFAC
F !06 and Food Inspector v. Prabhkaran 1983 (1) AIPFAC 84; considered.
2. The mixing of cotton seed oil with soyabean oil is adulteration of
soyabean oil incurring liability to be convicted under section 16 (1) (a) {i) of
the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The sale of an article of food the
sale of which is prohibited by any rule made under the Act also renders the
G person selling the article of food liable to punishment under s. 16 {I) (i).
Rule 44 (e) prohibits the sale of a mixture of two or more edible oils as an
edible oil. A mixture of soyabean oil and cotton seed oil cannot therefore be
sold as soyabcan oil irrespective of whether the mixture bas affected the soya~
bean oil injuriously or not. [961E-G]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDIC'nON Special Leave Petition
(Criminal No. 3038 of 1983.
From the Judjlment and Order date\! the 16th August, 1983
H
TULSI RAM v. M.P. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 951

- of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Criminal Revision No. 260
of 1983.
S.K.Gambhir, Ashok Mahajan and S.S. Kirpalani for the peti·
A

tioner.
The Order of the Court was delivered by
CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. On 17.8.1979 the Food Inspector, Sorar,
purchased 375 grams ofSoyabean oi!'from the shop of the petitioners, B
Tulsiram. The Soyabean oil purchased was divided into three
parts; each part was filled in a bottle ; each bottle was sealed ; and, •
one of the bottles was sent to the Public Analyst, Raipur for
analysis. The Public Analyst found that the sample was adultera·
ted as it contained traces of cotton seed oil. On 29.11.1979 a
complaint was filed on the bassis of the report of the Public c
Analyst, in the court of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Balod.
On 17.12.1979 a copy of the report of the Public Analyst was for·
warded to the petitioner as required by Rule 9-A of Prevention of
Food Adulteration Rules. The accused-petitioner however made
no application to the Trial Court to have one of the samples sent
D
to the Central Food Laboratory for further analysis. He was
content merely to deny offence. After due trial he was convicted by
the Magistrate on 8.9.1982, under s. 16(l)(a)(il of the Prevention
Food Adulteration Act and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprison-
ment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000. The Appeal
preferred by the petitioner to the Sessions Judge, Durg and the E
Revision Petition preferred thereafter to the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh were rejected. The petitioner now seeks special leave
to appeal to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.
The learned counsel· for the petitioner urged before us that
Rule 9-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, which
F
has been substituted for Rule 9(j) in 1977, now prescribes that the
Local (Health) Authority shall immediately after the institution of
the prosecution forward a copy of the report of the Public Analyst
by registered post or by hand to the person from whom the sample
was taken by the Food Inspector, that the word 'immediately' occur-
ring in Rule 9-A showed that it brooked no delay and that as G
there was a delay of 18 days, in the present case, in ~orwar
ding the report to the petitioner, the prosecution was vitiated and the
petitioner was entitled to be acquitted. He argued that the
scheme of the Act was changed by the amendments introduced in
!?76 ang that in consonance with the revised schellle of the Act
ff
952

-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 1 s.c.R

the rules were also amended. He invited our attention to the
A departure in the language of the present Rule 9-A from the
language of old Rule 9(j). The learned counsel also argued that
cotton seed oil was more nutritive and consumable than Soyabean
oil and, therefore, a person mixing cotton seed oil with Soyabean oil
could not be said to have adulterated soyabean oil. He invited our
attention to Dal Chand v. Munic1j1al Corporation, Bhopal(') Kashmir!
B
Lal v. State of Haryana ;<2l Kanda Swami v. Food Inspector:(•) State of
Maharashtra v. Tukaram Babu Rao Mane;(') Perumal v. Kumbakonam
Municipality ;(6) and Food Inspector v. Prabhkaran.(') We have con-
sidered all of them and we do not think ii necessary to launch into
a discussion of the cases, one by one. We would rather refer to
-
c and construe the relevant statutory provisions and rules ourselves.
Suffice to say here that we do not agree with the submissions of the
learned counsel.
It is true, in 1976 important changes were made in some of
the procedural provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration
Act. We are concerned in this case with some of the changes made
D in ss. 11 and 13 of the Act and the new Rules made as a con-
sequence. Before the 1976 amendment, s. 11 required the Food
Inspector taking a sample for analysis to separate the sample into
three parts, seal or fasten up each part and to deliver one of the
parts to the person from whom the sample was taken, send another
E part for analysis to the Public Analyst and retain the third part for
production in case legal proceedings were taken or for analysis by
the Director of the Central Food Laboratory under sub-section 2
of s. 13 as the case might be. Sub-section (1) of olds. 13 (as it
stood before 1976) required the Public Analyst to deliever to the
Food Inspector a report of the analysis of any article of food sub-
F mitted to him for such analysis. Sub-section (2) enabled the accus-
ed vendor, after the institution of the prosecution under the Act,
to apply to the Court to send the part given to him or the part
retained with the Food Inspector for production in case of legal
proceedings, to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory for a
certificate specifying the result of the analysis to be made by him.
G The certificate issued by the Director of the Central Food Labora-
(1) AIR 1983 S.C. 303.
(2) 1981 2 A.I.P.F.A.C. 167.
(3) 1982 I A.I.P.F.A.C. 322.
(4) 1982 1 A.I.P.F.A.C. 398.
(5) 1982 2 A.I.P.F.A.C. 106.
(6) 1983 I A.I.P.F.A,.C. 84,
TULSI RAM v. M.P. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 953
tory was to supersede the report given by the Public Analyst and
was to be final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. A
Rule 9 (j) of the 1955 Rules prescribed that it shall be the duty of
the Food Inspector to send by registered post, a copy of the report
of the Public Analyst to the person from whom the sample was
taken within ten days of the receipt ·of the said report.
It is obvious thats. 13 (2) was intended to secure to the B
accused vendor the right to have the report of the Public Analyst
tested if he so wanted, by obtaining the final and conclusive report
of the Director of the Central Food Laboratory. In order to enable
the accused vendor to exercise this right it was necessary to first
make available to him the report of the Public Analyst. So Rule
9 (j) provided that a copy of the report of the Public Analyist should
c
be sent to the person from whom the sample was taken within ten
days of the receipt of the report by the Food Inspector. The men-
tion of ten days as the period· within which the Food Inspector was
to send the report of the Public Analyst to the person from whom
the sample was taken led to considerable controversy whether Rule D
9 (j) was mandatory or directory. Some High Courts took the
view that Rule 9 (j) was mandatory and that failure to strictly
comply with the rule was fatal to the prosecution. The matter was
finally set at rest by this Court in Dalchand v. Municipal Corporation
Bhopal (supra) where it was held that Rule 9 (j) was directory. It
was observed :- K
"There are no ready tests or invariable formulae to
determine whether a provision is mandatory or directory.
The broad purpose of the statute is important. The object
of the particular provision must be considered. The link
between the two is most important. The weighing of the F
consequence of holding a provision to be mandatory or
directory is vital and, more often than not, determinative
of the very question whether the provision is mandatory or
directory. Where the design of the statute is the avoidance
or prevention of public mis-chief, but the enforcement of a
particular provision literally to its letter wil! tend to defeat G

- that design, the provision must be held to be directory, so
that proof of prejudice in addition to non-compliance of
the provision is necessary to invalidate the act complained
of. It is well to remember that quite often many rules,
though couched in language which appears to be impera-
tive, are no more than mere instructions to those entruste<l ff
954 SUPllEMB COURT llEPORTS [1985] 1 s.c.R.
with the task of discharging statutory duties for public
A
benefit. The negligence of those to whom public duties
are entrusted cannot by statutory interpretation be allowed
to promote public mischief and cause public inconvenience
and defeat the main object of the statute. It is as well to
realise that every prescription of a period within which an
B act must be done, is not the prescription of a period of
limitation with painful consequences if the act is not done
within that period. Rule 9 (j) of the Prevention of ·Food
Adulteration Act, as it then stood, merely instructed the
Food Inspector to send by registered post copy of the
Public Analyst's Report to the person from when the
c sample was taken within 10 days of the receipt of the
Report. Quite obviously the period of 10 days was not a
period of limitation within which an action was to be
initiated or on the expiry of which a vested right accrued.
The period of 10 days was prescribed with a view to ex-
pedition and with the object of giving sufficient time to the
D person from whom the sample was taken to make such
arrangements as he might like to challenge the Report of
the Public Analyst ; for example, by making a request to
the Magistrate to send the other sample to the Director
of the Central Food Laboratory for analysis. Where the
effect of non-compliance with the rule was such as to
E
wholly deprive the right of the person to challenge the
Public Analyst's Report by obtaining the report of the
Director of the Central Food Laboratory, there might be
just cause for complaint, as prejudice would then be writ
large. Where no prejudice was caused there could be no
F cause for complaint. I am clearly of the view that R. 9 (j)
of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules were
directory and not mandatory".
As already mentioned by us, some High Courts had earlier
taken the view that the Rule was mandatory and that non-compli-
ance with the Rule was fatal to the prosecution. The working of
G the Act also revealed that often enough the accused vendor would
adopt dilatory tactics by waiting till the last minute to exercise his
right to apply to the Court to send the sample to the Director of
-
Central Food Laboratory. This statutory right could not be denied
to the accused vendor even when made at the very last stages of the
case. The result was not merely undue and unnecessary delay in
H the disposal of the case but fairly frequently, it would be discovered
TULsi ll.AM v. M.P. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 955

.. that the sample had disintegrated due to lapse of time, thns A
disabling the Director, Central Food Laboratoryjfrom analysing the
sample. With a view to overcome the difficulties encountered in
the working of the Act, ss. 11 and 13 were recast by the !Amending
Act of 1976 and new rules were made in 1977, new Rule 9-A repla-
cing old Rule .9 (j). Sub-section (!) of amended s. 11 and the whole
of amended s. 13 may be usefully extracted here. Section 11 sub- B
section (1) is as follows :- ·

"When a food inspector takes a sample of food for
analysis, he shall :-

(a) give notice in writing then and there of his intention c
to have it so analysed to the person ifrom whom he has
taken the sample and to the person,!if any, whose name,
address and other particulars have been disclosed
under section 14A.
(b) except in special cases provided by rules under this . D
Act, divide the sample then and there into ; three parts
and mark and seal or fasten np each part in such a
manner as its nature premits and take the signature or
thumb impression of the person from whom the
sample has been taken in such place and in such
manner as may be prescribed ; E
Provided that where such person refuses to sign or put
his thumb impression the food jnspector shall call upon one
or more witnesses and take his or their .signature or thumb
impressions, of such person :- ·· ·
F
(a) (i) send one of the parts for analysis to the public analyst
under intimation, to the Local (Health) Authority ;
and
(ii) send the remaining two parts to the Local (Health)
Authority : for the purposes of sub,section (2) of this
section and sub-sections (2A) and (2E) of section 13".
- Section 13 is as follows :-

"(1) The public analyst shall deliver, i·~ such form ~s may
G

be prescribed, a report to the Local (Health) Authority
of the result of the analysis of any article of food sub-
!llittect to~him for~analysis. ft

•
956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 1 s.c.R.

(2) On receipt of the report of the result of the analysis
A under sub-section (I) to the effect that the article of
'• food is adulterated, the local (Health) Authority shall,
after the institution of prosecution against the person
,,. from whom the sample of the article of food was taken
and the person, if any, whose name, address and parti-
culars have been disclosed under section 14A, forward,
B
in such manner as may be prescribed, a copy of the
report of the result of the analysis to such person or
persons, as the case may be, informing such person or
persons that if it is so desired, either or both of them
c may make an application to the court within a period
}
.. , often days from the date of receipt of the copy of the
report to get the sample of the article of food kept by
., the Local (Health) Authority analysed by the Central
Food Laboratory.

D (2A) When an application is made to the Court under sub·
,J section (2), t.he court shall require the Local (Health)
f J
• Authority to forward the part or parts of the sample
kept by the said Authority and upon such requisition
being made, by said Authority shall forward the part
or parts of sample to the court with in a period of five
days from the date of receipt of such requisit on.
E
(2B) On receipt of the part or parts of the sample from the
Local (Health) Authority under sub-section (2A), the
court shall first ascertion that mark and seal or fasten·
.,, ing as provided in clause (b) of sub-section (I) of sec-
tion 11 are intact and the signature or thumb impres·
sion, as the case may be, is not tampered with, and
F' despatch the part or, as the case may be, one of the
parts of the sample under its own seal to the Director
of the Central Food Laboratory who shall thereupon
send a certificate to the court in the prescribed orm
within one month from the date of receipt of the part
of the sample specifying the result of the analysis.
G1
(2C) Where two parts of the sample have been sent to the
court and only one part of the sample has been sent by
-
';.. the court to the Director of the Central Food Labora-
H .tory under sub-sectiou (2B), the court shall, as soon as
IULSI RAM v. M.P. STATE (Chinna~pa Reddy, J.) 957

practicable, return the remaining part to the Local A
(Health) Authority and the Loe~! (Health) Aut~ority
shall destroy that part after the certificate from the
Director of the Central Food Laboratory has been
received by the court ;

Provided that where the part of the sall)ple sent B
by the court to the Director of Central Food Labora-
tory is lost or damaged, the court shall require the
Local (Health) Authority to forward the part of the
sample, if any, retained by it to the court.and on re-
ceipt thereof the court shall proceed in the manner
provided in sub-section (2B). c
(2D) Until the receipt of the certificate oftheTesult of the
analysis from the Director of Central Food Laboratory
the court shall not continue with the proceedings pen-
ding before it in relation to the prosecution.
D
(2E) It after considering the report, if any, of the Food Ins-
pector or otherwise, the Local (Health) Authority is of
the opinion that the report delivered by the public
analyst under sub-section (1) is erroneo~s. the said
Authority shall forward one of the parts of the sample E
kept by it to any other public analyst for analysis an'd
if the report of the result of the analysis of that part of
the sample by that public analyst is to the effect that.
the article of food is adulterated. the provisions of sub- ''
section (2) to (2D) shall, so far as may·be apply.•
I .. . L• Ii F
(3) The certificate issued by the Director of the Central · "
Food Laboratory under sub-section '(2B) shall super- _, ·
sede the report given by the public analyst under sub;
section (I).

- (4) Where a certificate obtained from the Director of the .r ;•
Central Food Laboratory under sub-section (23) is pro- ·1 G
duced in any proceeding under tbis Act, or under sec-
tions 272 to 276 of the Indian Penal Code, 45 of 1860 . ,. ·
it shall not be necessary in such proceeding to producer-
any part of the sample of food taken for analysis.
(5) Any document purporting to be a report signed by a '· H I
958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ,1985) l S.C.R.
'
public analyst, unless it has been supersede under sub-
section (3) or any document purporting to be a certifi-
cate signed by the Director of the Central Food
Laboratory, may be used as evidence of the facts stated
therein in any proceeding under this Act or under sec-
tions 272 to 276 of the lndiar. Penal Code 45 of 1980.
B (Provided that any document purporting to be a certi-
ficate signed by the Director of the Central Food
Laboratory) (not being a certificate lwith respect to the
analysis of the part of the sample of any article of food
referred to in the proviso to sub-section (IA) of sec-
tion (16) shall be final and conclusive evidence of the
--
facts stated therein).
c
,. Explanation-In this section, and in clause (f) of
sub-section (1) of section 16, "Director of the Central
Food Laboratory" shall include the officer for the time
being in charge of any Food Laboratory (by whatever
designation he is known) recognised by the Central
D Government for the purpose of this section)".

It will be noticed .t.hat amended s. 11 does not require a part
of the sample to be given to the person from whom the sample

-
was taken. While one part is required to be sent to the public
£ Analyst for analysis, the other two parts are required to be sent to
the Local (Health) Authority. The amended s. 13 requires the
Public Analyst to deliver to the Local (Health) Anthority a report
of the result of his. analysis. Section 13(2) requires the Local
(Health) Authority lo forward to the person from whom the sample
was taken a copy of the report of the Public Analyst, if the report
F is to the effect that the article of food is adulterated. The report
is to be forwarded in such manner as may be prescribed, after the
institution of the prosecution. Thereafter the person from whom
the sample was taken is given the right to apply to the court with-
in ten days of the receipt by him of the copy of the Public Ana-
lyst's report to get the sample kept by the Local (H~alth)
-
G Authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory. It ts no
longer open to the accused vender to wait till the very last minute
to apply to the court to have the sample analysed by the Central
Laboratory. If he wants to exercise the statutory right of having
the sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory he has to
H
TULSi RAM v. M.P. STATB (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 959J'
exercise that right by applying to the court within ten days of re-
ceipt, by him of the Public Analyst's Report. It is also to be
A I
noticed that amended s. 13(2) does not prescribe any point of time
before which the report of the Public Analyst is to be forwarded
to the accused-vendor. But, the very basis of a prosec1:1tion for
adulteration of food is the report of the Public Analyst that the B
article of food is adulterated. The accused is given the right to
dispute the Public Analyst's report by applying to the court for an
analysis by the Central Food Laboratory. If the report of the
.. Central Food Laboratory is to the effect that the article of food
is not adulterated the very basis of the prosecution will disappear.
In such an event the further pursuit of the prosecution will be c
needless and the accused will have to be discharged or acquitted
as the case may be. It is therefore to be assumed that the report
of the Public Analyst is to be made available to the accused vender
at the commencement of the prosecution, that is to say, before
the prosecution starts leading evidence in the case, and in good
and sufficient time to enable the accused to exercise his right of D
having the sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory if
he so desires it. We have seen that s. 13(2) provides that the "
Public Analyst's Report, shall be forwarded to the person from
whom the sample was taken 'in such manner as may be prescribed'.
Now, Rule 9-A of the Rules as amended in 1977 which replaces
Rule 9(j) of the old Rules prescribes the manner in which the E
Public Analyst's Report may be forwarded to the person from the
sample was taken. lt reads as follows :-

"The Local (Health) Authority shall immediately
after the institution of prosecution forward a COP,Y of the
report of the result of analysis in Form Ill delivered to F
him under sub-rule (3) of Rule 7, by registered post or by
hand, as may be appropriate, to the person from whom
the sample of the article was taken by the Food Inspec-
tor, and simultaneously also to the person, if any, whose.
name, address and other particulars has been disclosed

- under Section 14A of the Act ;
Provided that where the sample conforms to the pro-
visions of the Act of the Rules made thereunder, and no
G

prosecution is intended under sub-section (2), or no
action is intended under sub-section (2E) of section 13
of the Act, the Local (Health) Authority shall intimate the H
960 SUPRE!.iE COURT REPORTS (1985] 1 s.c.R..

result to the vendor from whom the sample has been taken
A
and ruso to. the person, whose name, address and other
particnlars have been disclosed under Section 14A of the
Act, within 10 days from the receipt of the report from
the Public Analyst." .

The first thing to he noticed is that Rule 9-A carefully ref-
B rains from mentioning any definite limit of time such as that found T

in old Rule 90) which gave rise to the controvesy whether the Rule
was mandatory or directory, and instead uses the general ,expres-
sion 'immedfately.' The_ Local (Health) Authority is now required
to forward to the person from whom the sample was taken in the
c · manner prescribed, . a copy. of the report of the Public Analyst
immediately after the institution of the prosecution. While pres-.
cribing the manner in which the Report may be forwarded the
opening words of Rule 9-A . "The Local (Health) Authority shall
(immediately) after the institution of the prosecution forward"
(bracket in ours), are borrowed verbatin from s. 13(2) ·with the
D word 'immediately' · inserted •·in between. The Rule making
authority ·could never have . intended to amend the statute by
super-adding ·the word 'immediately' as indeed it was not compe-
tent to do. Rule 9·A has to be interpreted so as to keep it in tune
with and within the bounds of s. 13(2). The departure from the
previous rule by refraining from mentioning ,;, definite period of
E time as was done in the old rule . makes it evident that the expres-
- sion -'immediately' is used to convey a sense of continuity rather
than a sense of urgency. It is not to be understood to mean the
very next instant, the very next hour,. that very day or the very next
day•. It must be construed in its setting. It is no use turning to
dictionaries. Dictionaries . give • variegated meanings to words .
. F... What meaning is to be· adopted depends on the context. Rule 9-A
'is made in the context of the amended s. 13(2) which provides for
the forwarding of_the Public Analyst's Report to the person from
whom_ the sample was taken after the institution of prosecution ·and
enables' that person to apply io the ·court·. to have analysed by the
,
Central Food Laboratory the sample kept with the Local (Health)
G Authority. In the' context the expression 'immediately' is only
meant to convey 'reasonable· des path and pr~mptitude' and no more.
-
• The idea is to avoid · diliatoriness . on the part of officialdom and ·
. ' ..
prevention of unnecessary harrassment to the accused. But the
idea is not.to penalise the prosecution and to provide a t~chnical
H defence. First to construe 'immediately' as meaning 'at once' or
TtJLSt RAM v. M.P. STATE (Chinnappa Raddy, J.) 961
'forthwith' and next to hold delay to be fatal to the prosecution
would perhaps be to make Rule 9-A ultravires s. 13(2). We do not
think it is permissible to interpret Rule 9-A in such a way. The real
question is, was the Public Analyst's Report sent to the accused
sufficiently early to enable him to properly defend himself by
giving him an opportunity at the outset to apply to the court to
send one of the samples to the Central Food Laboratory for ana- B
lysis. If after receiving the Public Analyst's Report he never
sought to apply to the court to have the sample sent to the
Central Food Laboratory, as in the present case' he may not be
heard to complain of the delay in the receipt of the report by him,
unless, of course, he is able to establish some other prejudice.
Our conclusions on this question are ; The expression 'immedi- c
ately' in Rule 9-A is intended to convey a sense of continuity
rather than urgency. What must be done is to forward the report
at the earliest opportunity, so as to facilitate the exercise of the
statutory right under s. 13(2) in good and sufficient time before
the prosecution commences leading evi<lence. Non-compliance
with Rule 9-A is not fatal. It is a question of prejudice. Apply- D
ing these principles. We find no merit in the submissions based on
Rule 9-A. The second submission of the learned counsel, namely,
that mixing cotton seed oil with Soyabean oil cannot be considered
to be adulteration of Soyabean oil and therefore the petitioner
was not liable to be convicted under s. .16 (I) (a) (i) is equally
E
without any merit. Section 16 (I) (a) (i) makes a person liable to
punishment if whether by himself or by any other person on his
behalf, he imports into India or manufactures for sale, or stores,
sells or distributes any article of food which is adulterated within
the meaning of sub-clause (m) of clause (ia) of section (2) or mis-
branded within the meaning of clause (ix) of that section or the F
sale of which is prohibited under any provision of this Act or any
rule made thereunder or by an order of the Food (Health) Autho-
rity. It is therefore seen that the sale of an article of food the
sale of which is prohibited by any rule made under the Act also
renders the person selling the article of food liable to punishment
under s. (16) (I) (a) (i). Rule 44 (e) prohibits the sale of a mix-
G
ture of two or more edible oils as an edible oil. A mixture of Soya-
bean oil and cotton seed oil cannot therefore be sold as Soyabean
oil irrespective of whether the mixture has affected the Soyabean
: oil injuriously or not. The special leave petition is therefore
dismissed.
S.R. Petition dismissed. H