Holding

The Supreme Court held that the dispute is an industrial dispute governed by the Industrial Disputes Act and the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, so the High Court should not have exercised its writ jurisdiction; its order quashing the termination is set aside.

Summary

The U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd. terminated the services of 168 muster‑roll employees after they remained absent for more than ten consecutive days, invoking Clause L‑2.12 of its Certified Standing Orders. The employees, represented by a union, filed writ petitions under Article 226 challenging the termination. The Allahabad High Court entertained the second petition, quashed the termination order and the Division Bench upheld that decision. The corporation appealed, arguing that the dispute was an industrial dispute governed by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that the High Court should not have exercised its writ jurisdiction because an alternative statutory remedy existed and factual issues remained unresolved. The Supreme Court held that the matter is indeed an industrial dispute and the appropriate forum is the machinery under the industrial statutes; consequently the High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition and its order quashing the termination was set aside. The Court also clarified that an illegal strike constitutes unauthorised absence, but termination under the standing orders requires compliance with natural‑justice requirements, and certified standing orders are not statutory provisions for writ jurisdiction.

Issues considered

The dispute whether it falls within the definition of an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, thereby mandating the use of the statutory adjudicatory forum.
Whether the High Court could entertain a writ petition under Article 226 despite the existence of an alternative remedy under the industrial statutes.
Whether the termination of service on the basis of Clause L‑2.12 of the Certified Standing Orders was valid, considering the adequacy of notice and principles of natural justice.
Whether an illegal strike amounts to unauthorised absence and can be treated as abandonment of service.
Whether the Certified Standing Orders constitute ‘statutory provisions’ for the purpose of invoking Article 226.
Whether delay and the presence of factual disputes justify dismissal of the writ petition.

Legislation cited

Companies Act, 1956s. 617
Constitution of Indias. Article 12, s. Article 226
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 22, s. 25-B
U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 65

Subjects

Industrial disputeArticle 226Alternative remedyTermination of serviceUnauthorised absenceIllegal strikeStanding ordersNatural justiceU.P. Industrial Disputes ActRes judicataDelay

Judgment

........
U.P. STATE BRIDGE CORPORATION LTD. AND ORS. A
v.
U.P. RAJY A SETU NIGAM S. KARAMCHARI SANGH

FEBRUARY 13, 2004

[RUMA PAL AND B.P. SINGH, JJ.] B

Constitution of India, 1950-Article 226--Exhaustion of alternative
remedy-Industrial dispute-Unauthorised absence-Termination order-Writ
Petition challenging the same-First writ petition dismissed on the ground of
availability of alternative remedy and the other one disposed of-Correctness
c
of-Held: High Court erred in disposing of the writ petition since the dispute
was an industrial dispute within the meaning of Industrial Dispute~ Act, 1947.
and U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Rights and obligations sought to be
enforced are created under the Industrial Disputes Act-Also disposal on the
ground of delay when disputed questions offact were involved and also when D
previous writ petition on the same issue dismissed on the ground of adequate
alternative remedy not correct-Res judicata-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-
U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 22-U.P. Industrial Disputes Act,
1947-Section 65-U.P. Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946- E
Clause L-2. I 2-Unauthorised absence-Issuance of notices but of no avail-
Termination of services in terms of the Standing Order-Writ Petition
challenging the termination order-Termination order quashed by High Court-
Correctness of-Held: Unauthorised absence of employees not due to strike-
Notice in compliance with the Standing Orders-Employees did not reply to
F
the notices as such the Management drew presumption against employees that
they had abandoned the services in terms of the Standing Order-Employee
did not rebut presumption by adducing evidence which being question offact
is to be determined by the appropriate forum-Hence, order of High Court set
aside.
G
Strike-Whether amounts to abandonment of service-Held: Person on
·. illegal strike abandons his job-However, cessation of work or refusal to
continue in case of legal strike is absence authorized in law.

Appellant-Government company employed muster roll employees at
391 H
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] 2 S.C.R.
........
A their bridge construction unit in various capacities. The employees were
governed by the terms and conditions of the Standing Orders certified
under the U.P. Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.
Clause L 2.12 provided that if any workman remained unathorisedly
absent from work for more than 10 consecutive,: days he would be deemed
to have abandoned the services of the Corporation without any notice. The
B workmen remained absent from duty. The appellants issued repeated
notices including notice in the newspaper asking them to return to work.
However, they remained absent. The appellant then issued termination
orders. AP workman challenged the termination order. The High Court
dismissed the writ petition on the ground that a workman could raise an
C. industrial dispute if he so desired. The respondent-Union represents the
cause of muster roll employees. The respondent filed second writ petition
challenging the termination order. The Single Judge of the High Court
allowed the writ petition and quashed the termination order. The Division
Bench dismissed the appeal filed by appellan~ upholding the order of the
Single Judge. Hence the present appeals.
D
Appellant-Government company contended that the matter should
have been decided by the fora provided under the Industrial Dispute Act,
1947; that the High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition since there
were disputed questions of fact; that the High Court acted contrary to its
previous decision in AP 's case; that Clause L-2.12 of the Standing Orders
E
had been properly invoked because the workmen had in fact
unauthorisedly absented themselves without any reason; and that it could
not be said that the workmen were on strike since they had not given any
notice of strike mandatorily required under the U.P. Industrial Disputes
Act.
F
Respondent-Union contended that the respondent should not be
relegated to its remedies under UPIDA as the matter had been pending
-
before the High Court for several years; that the Certified Standing Orders
had statutory force and as such Article 226 was properly invoked; that
the notice published in the newspaper was invalid for non-compliance with
G Clause L-2.12 of the Standing Orders; that illegal strike cannot amount
to abandonment of services; and that UPIDA specifically provided for
penalty after departmental enquiry for an employee going on an illegal
strike and as such services could not be terminated on account of illegal
strike.
H Allowing the appeals, the Court f-
U.P. STATE BRIDGE CORPORATION LTD. "· U.P. RAJY A SETU NIGAM S. KARAMCHARI SANGH 393
.......
HELD: 1.1. The High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition A
of the respondent-Union. It was not the appropriate forum for enforcement
of right. The Single Judge in AP 's case correctly refused to entertain the
writ petition for such relief. The dispute was an industrial dispute both
within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as well as the U.
P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The rights and obligations sought to be
enforced by the respondent-Union in the writ petition are those created B
by the Industrial Disputes Act. However, High Court may deviate from
this principle when a very strong case is made out. (399-F-G]

Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kemlekar Shantaram Wadke, (1976) 1 SCC
496, referred to. c
1.2. The High Court disposed of the dispute on the ground of delay.
Doubtless the issue of alternative remedy should be raised and decided at
the earliest opportunity so that a litigant is not prejudiced by the action
of the Court since the objection is one in the nature of a demurer.
Nevertheless even when there has been such a delay where the issue raised D
requires the resolution of factual controversies, the High Court while
exercising extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 should not, even
when there is a delay, short-circuit the process for effectively determining
the facts. The factual controversies arisen in the instant case remains
unresolved. It must be resolved in a manner which is just and fair to both
the parties. Furthermore when it was drawn to the attention of the High E
Court that a previous writ petition raising the same issue had been
dismissed on the ground of the existence of an adequate alternative
remedy, the High Court should not have continued to dispose of the matter
itself under Article 226 and in effect set aside the decision in the previous
writ petition. [402-D-H] F
2. The Certified Standing Orders do not constitute 'Statutory
provisions' in the sense that dismissal or removal of an employee in
contravention of the Certified Standing Orders would be contravention
of statutory provisions enabling the workman to file a writ petition for
their enforcement. [400-G] G
D.K. Yadav v. J.MA. Industries, (1993) 3 SCC 259 and Rajasthan State
Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Krishna Kant and Ors., [1995) 5 SCC
75, referred to.

..;. 3.1. A person on illegal strike abandons his job. An illegal 'strike' H
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] 2 _§.@!~~

A cannot by definition be "authorised absence". It would be a contradiction
in terms. Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 defines
--
"continuous service" as "uninterrupted service, including service which
I
may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an
accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of
B work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman". The
specific exclusion of persons on illegal strike plainly means that the period
a person is on illegal strike does not- amount to service. Different
considerations would prevail where the strike is legal. If the strike is legal,
cessation of work or refusal to continue would be absence authorised by
law and workers would continue to be in service. A person on illegal strike
C and a person on legal strike are both 'absent', but the absence of the first
is unauthorised and the second is not. [403-D-F]

Express Newspapers (P) Ltd v. Michael Mark and Anr., [1963) 3 SCR
405 and G.T. Lad and Ors. v. Chemical and Fibres of India Ltd, [1979) l
sec 590, distinguished.
D
3.2. The High Court incorrectly applied the provisions of Section 22
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to hold that no notice of strike was
necessary. It is conceded by the respondent that the operative Act was the
UPIDA which in this connection materially differs with the Industrial
Disputes Act. Under Section 22 a notice of strike is required to be given,
E as held by the High Court, only in the case of any public utility service
and the appellant Corporation is not a public utility service. However,
under Section 65 of the UPIDA notice of strike is required to be given in
respect of an industrial establishment. It is not argued on behalf of the
respondent that the appellant-Corporation is not an industrial
F establishment. Whatever be the legal consequences of not ~iving of such
notice may be, it cannot be said that the employees were admittedly on
strike as a matter of fact. [402-B-D]

3.3. Appellant had issued two notices calling upon the workmen
represented by the respondent to return to duty. The workmen did not
G respond to either of the notices. Further, it was not pleaded nor sufficiently
proved thitt the notice by advertisement did not sufficiently comply with
the principles olf natural justice. The notice was issued giving an
opportunity to the respondent to show cause why the presumption should
not be drawn under CSO L-2.12. The respondent did not show cause. In
H the circumstances, the Management drew the presumption against an
up STATE BRIDGE CORPORATION LTD. v. u.r. RAJ YA SETU NIGAM S. KARAMCHARI SANGH [PAL.l.] 395

employee in terms of the Certified Standing Order that he had abandoned A
the services of the Company. It is for the employee to rebut that
presumption by adducing the evidence. Therefore, it is imperative that the
factual basis is determined by the appropriate forum. Further, the issue
that the notice was invalid because it did not otherwise comply with the
CSO L-2.12 because of the shortening of the period of absence was not B
raised at any stage. Therefore, it cannot be said that the notice is not in
compliance with Certified Standing Orders. [404-G-H; 405-A-BJ

D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries, [1993) 3 SCC 259 and Lakshmi
Precision Screws Ltd. v. Ram Bhagat, [20~2) 6 SCC 552, relied on.

4. It cannot be accepted that the UPIDA provided for penalty after C
a departmental enquiry, in respect of the workman who may have gone
on illegal strike and as such there could be no termination of services on
account of illegal strike as there is no proof that the respondents were on
strike at all. Besides, merely because the action is punishable does not mean
that the consequence of an unauthorised absence is not available under D
the Certified Standing Orders if it so specifically provides. Therefore, the
order of High Court is set aside. However this order will not preclude the
respondent-Union if it is otherwise so entitled to raise an industrial dispute
under the UPIDA. [405-B-DJ

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 443 of E
2004.

From the Judgment and Order dated 27.9.2002 of the Allahabad High
Court in S.A. No. 498 of 1999.

WITH F
C.A.No. 442 of 2004.

Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, Lakshmi Raman Singh, Amitesh Kumar, Ravi
Prakash and Chandra Prakash for the Appellants.
G
Ranjit Kumar, Janardan and Praveen Jain for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RUMA PAL, J. The appellant is a Government Company within the
.. meaning of Section 617 of the Companies Act. It carries on construction H
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] 2 S.C.R.

A activities at various sites throughout the country and abroad. The respondent-
Union represents the cause of 168 muster roll employees. The respondents
were working at the bridge construction unit of the appellant at Kanpur in
various capacities. The terms and conditions of employees of the appellant
are governed by Standing Orders Certified under the U .P. Industrial
B Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, Clause L-2.12 of which reads:

"Any workman who remains absent from duty without leave or in
excess of the period of leave originally sanctioned or subsequently
extended for more than 10 consecutive days, shall be deemed to
have left the services of the corporation on his own accord, without
c notice, thereby terminating his contract of service with the corporation
and his name will accordingly be struck of the rolls."

From 12th October, 1995 the respondents-workmen did not attend their
jobs. On 18th October, 1995 the appellant issued an order which is quoted:

"Some of the workmen working at Betwa Bridge, Arichghat, Jhansi
D are absenting from duty since 12.10.1995. Direction for smooth
functioning of the work in the interest of the Corporation has already
been given vide this Office Notice No. l 102/1E/126 dated 16.10.1995
to such workmen.

In the light of the aforesaid, it is made clear that such of the workmen
E who do not present themselves for duty and do not perform work or·
discharge their duty, then in accordance with the provision contained
in Clause L-2.12 of the Certified Standing Order of the U.P. State
Bridge Corporation Ltd. [such of the workmen, who are continuously
absent for more than 10 days, in respect of them, it shall be presumed
F that they have left the services of the Corporation without any notice
and thus, their contract of service with the Corporation has come to
....
an end and accordingly, their names from the muster roll shall be
removed] action shall be taken in the interest of the Corporation."

On 22nd December, 1995 as amended on 28th December, 1995 a similar
G notice was published in a Hindi newspaper which also stated that if the
workmen whose names were appended to the notice did not report for duty
within a period of three days from the date of the publication of the notice,
it would be presumed that they had abandoned their services with the
Corporation without notice and their contract of servic.e would come to an
H end and their names would be removed from the muster roll. According to
U.P. STATE BRIDGE CORPORATION LTD. v. U.". RAJY A SETU NIGAM S. KARAMCHARI SANGH [PAL, J.] 397

the appellant despite the repeated notices the workmen continued to absent A
themselves and ultimately on 19th January, 1996 an order was issued putting
an end to the services of 168 workmen on the presumption that they had
abandoned their services with the Corporation on their own, On 9th May,
1996, one of the workmen whose services were so terminated, namely Anand
Prakash filed a writ pt-tition in the High Court before the Lucknow Bench

-- challenging the order of termination, The writ petition was dismissed on the
ground that the workman could raise an industrial dispute if he so desired.
A second writ petition was filed by the respondent-Union in the High Court
B

at Allahabad. This writ petition was allowed by orders which now are the
subject matter of challenge before us.

The learned Single Judge rejected the preliminary objections raised by
c
the appellant that the writ petition was not maintainable, inter-alia, on the
grounds that the Corporation was not a State within the meaning of Article
12 and that ari un-registered Union did not have the· locus to represent the
workmen's cause. It is not necessary to consider the reasoning of the learned
Single Judge as neither of these points were raised before us by the appellant. D
On the question of the alternative remedy which was available to the workmen
under the Industrial Disputes Act, the learned Single Judge was of the view
that the case did not involve any investigation into nor determination of
disputed questions of fact and that since the writ petition was moved in 1995
and a long time had lapsed the Court was justified in exercising its discretion E
under Article 226 to entertain and dispose of the dispute. It was also held
that although in Anand Prakash 's case, the writ petition raising the same
issue had been dismissed, the second writ petition challenging the same
order was not barred by the principles of res-judicata particularly when no
decision had been taken by the Court while dismissing Anand Prakash 's writ
petition. On the other. hand although the order in Anand Prakash should not F
be affected in these proceedings, nevertheless, the Learned Judge held, since
the decision of the High Court in the second writ petition would be binding,
it would be an "infructuous exercise and mere formality" if Anand Prakash
were driven to a Labour Court causing him to "suffer unnecessary agony".
On the merits, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the word G
"absence" did not by itself mean "abandonment of service" and when an
employee went on strike it was not the intention to abandon service. It was
·.
said that "Resorting to strike is neither misuse of leave nor over staying of
leave. . Standing order does not provide for any provision as to how the
question of strike is to be dealt with." It was further saiq that the strike was
not illegal as no notice was required to be given to the respondent under H
'
t

398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] 2 S.C.R.

A Section 22 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was also held that in any
event- whether a strike was illegal or legal ·· it did not amount to abandonment
of service justifying action under Clause L-2.12. At the highest, it would be
an action of misconduct for which a punishment was provided under the
Standing Orders after an inquiry. As there was admittedly no inquiry before
the services of the workmen were terminated, therefore, the impugned order
B of termination was also held to have been passed in violation of principles
of natural justice. Finally, it was held that the order was also bad because
it did not specify the period during which the workmen were supposed to be
absent and, therefore, the order was not an order within the meaning of
Clause L-2.12 and could not be sustained. The order terminating their services
C was accordingly quashed and it was directed that the workmen including the
said Anand Prakash, would be deemed to be in service and "be treated as on
continuous service with all notional service benefits, except however, that
they would not be entitled to any payment of arrears for the period during
which they did not work actually. Except that each of them would be entitled
to a compensation for the whole period assessed at Rs. 5000 each".
D
The appellants' appeal was rejected by the Division Bench. The Division
Bench has given brief reasons for upholding the decision of the learned
Single Judge. In addition, note was taken of the appellant's submission that
the project being completed, there was no question of appointing the
E respondents in any other project. This submission was however rejected on
the ground that there was no specific pleading to this effect and no details
had been given of the project nor of the employees engaged therein nor were
the appointment letters of the respondents produced.

An interim order granted by this Court on the special leave petitions
F filed by the appellants directing maintenance of status quo has been continuing
since 3rd March, 2003.

The appellants have submitted that the High Court should not have
entertained the writ petition at all not only because disputed questions of
fact were involved but also because the High Court had acted contrary to its
G previous decision in Anand Prakash 's case. It was argued that the reasons
given by the High Court for entertaining the writ petition by exercising
discretion under Article 226 were wrong and that the matter should have
been left for decision by the fora provided under the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947. On the merits, it is submitted that Clause L-2.12 of the Standing Orders
H had been properly invoked because the workmen had in fact unauthorisedly
...
U.P. STATE BRIDGE CORPORATION Lro. v. U.P. RAJYA SETU NIGAM S. KARAMCHARI SANGH [PAL, J] 399

absented themselves without any reason. According to the appellants, it A
could not also be said that the workmen were on strjke because they had not
.given any notice of strike as was mandatorily required under the U.P. Industrial
Act, 1947.

Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-Union contended
that the notice published in the newspaper was invalid as it did not comply B
with clause L-2.12 of the Standing Orders.. It is also submitted that on the
basis of the decisions of this Court reported in Express Newspapers (P) Ltd.
v. Michael Mark and Anr., [1963] 3 SCR 405 and G.T. Lad and Ors. v.
_.... Chemical and Fibres of India Ltd., [ 1979] 1 SCC 590 that even if the strike
was illegal it could not be deemed to be an abandonment of services. It is C
stated that U.P. Industrial Dispute Act (UPIDA) specifically provided for
punishment for an employee going on an illegal strike. This was on the
basis that the workmen continued in duty and that action could be taken in
the case of such abstention from work against the workman but only after
holding a proper inquiry. On the issue whether the High Court should have
entertained the writ petition, it is submitted that the respondent should not be D
relegated to its remedies under the UPIDA as the matter had been pending
before the High Court for several years. It is further submitted that the
appellant was a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution
and was answerable to Court for·any arbitrary action. The Certified Standing
Orders, according to the respondent, had statutory force and therefore Article E
226 was properly invoked.

We are of the firm opinion that the High Court erred in entertaining the
writ petition of the respondent-Union at all. The dispute was an industrial
dispute both within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as well
the UPIDA, 1947. The rights and obligations sought to be enforced by the F
respondent-Union in the writ petition are those created by the Industrial
Disputes Act. In The Premier Automobiles Ltd v. Kemlekar Shantaram
Wadke, [1976] 1 SCC 496, it was held that when the dispute relates to the
enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only
remedy available to the claimant is to get adjudication under the Act. This
was because the Industrial Disputes Act was made to provide " ..... a speeciy, G
inexpensive and effective forum for resolution of disputes arising between
workmen and their employers. The idea has been to ensure that the workmen
do not get caught in the labyrinth of civil courts with their layers upon layers
of appeals and revisions and the elaborate procedural laws, which the workmen
can ill afford. The procedure followed by civil courts, it was thought, would H
.......,
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) 2 S.C.R.

A not facilitate a prompt and effective disposal of these disputes. As against
this, the courts and tribunals created by the Industrial Disputes Act are not
shackled by these procedural laws nor is their award 'subject to any appeals
or revisions. Because of their informality, the workmen and their
representatives can themselves prosecute or defend their cases. These forums
B are empowered to grant such relief as they think just and appropriate. They
can even substitute the punishment in many cases. They can make and re-
make the contracts, settlement, wage structures and what not. Their awards
are no doubt amenable to jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 as
also to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32, but they are extraordinary
remedies subject to several self-imposed constraints. It is, therefore, always
C in the interest of the workmen that disputes concerning them are adjudicated
in the forums created by the Act and not in a civil court. That is the entire
policy underlying the vast array of enactments concerning workmen. This
legislative policy and intendment should necessarily weigh with the courts in
interpreting these enactments and the disputes arising under them".

D Although these observations were made in the context of the jurisdiction
of the Civil Court to entertain the proceedings relating to an industrial dispute
and may not be read as a limitation on the Court's powers under Article 226,
nevertheless it would need a very strong case indeed for the High Court to
deviate from the principle that where a specific remedy is given by the
E statute, the person who insists upon such remedy can avail of the process as
provided in that statute and in no other manner.

There is another aspect of the matter. Certified Standing Orders have
been held to constitute statutory terms and conditions of service - D. K. Yadav
v. J.MA Industries., (1993] 3 SCC 259. Although this statement of the law
F was doubted in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v.
Krishna Kant and Ors., [1995] 5 SCC 75, it was not deviated from. It was
however made clear that Certified Standing Orders do not constitute 'Statutory .,·
Provisions' in the sense that dismissal or removal of an employee in
contravention of the Certified Standing Orders would be a contravention of \
statutory provisions enabling the workman to file a writ petition for their
G enforcement. This is what was said by this Court in Rajasthan Transport
Corporation (supra):
r
'
"Indeed, if it is held that certified Standing Orders constitute statutory
provisions or have statutory force, a writ petition would also lie for
their enforcement just as in the case of violation of the Rules made
-
H
- U.P. STATE BRIDGE CORPORATION LTD. v. U.P. RAJY A SETU NIGAM S. KARAMCHARI SANGH [PAL. J.]

under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. Neither a suit
would be necessary nor a reference under Industrial Disputes Act.
401

A

We do not think the certified Standing Orders can be elevated to that
status. It is one thing to say that they are statutorily imposed conditions
of service and an altogether different thing to say that they constitute
statutory provisions themselves."
B
Finally, it is an established practice that the Court exercising extra-
ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 should have refused to do so where
there are disputed questions of fact. In the present case, the nature of the
employment of the workmen was in dispute. According to the appellant, the
workmen had been appointed in connection with a particular project and C
there was no question of absorbing them or their continuing in service once
the project was completed. Admittedly, when the matter was pending before
the High Court, there were 29 such projects under execution or awarded.
According to the respoqdent-workmen, they were appointed as regular
employees and they cited orders by which some of them were transferred to
various projects at various places. In answer to this the appellants; said that D
although the appellant Corporation tried to accommodate as many daily
,wagers as they could in any new project, they were always under compulsion
to engage local people of the locality where work was awarded. There was
as such no question of transfer of any workman from one project to another.

- This was an issue which should have been resolved on the basis of evidence E
led. The Division Bench erred in rejecting the appellants submission summarily
as also in placing the onus on the appellant to produce the appointment letters
of the respondent-workmen.

There was also a dispute as to the nature of the absence of the
respondent-workmen. Correspondence said to have been exchanged between F
the parties with regard to the demands raised by the respondent-Union has
been relied upon by the respondent in support of the submission that the
absence was really on account of a strike. It is also submitted that the
correspondence indicated that notice of the strike had been given. To counter
the statement made in the writ petition by the respondent that the workmen
were on strike, the appellants had said that no notice of strike had been G
given and, therefore, the strike, if any, was illegal. Significantly, the High
Court has not relied upon the correspondence nor has it come to any
decision on the question whether the strike was illegal or legal. In fact the
High Court has proceeded on the basis that it was the accepted case that there
was no notice given by the workmen that they were on strike. It cannot, H
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] 2 S.C.R.

A therefore, be said, without more, that the absence of the respondent-workmen
from work was because: they were on strike.

The High Court incorrectly applied the provisions of Section 22 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, I 947 to hold that no notice of strike was necessary.
It is conceded by the respondent that the operative Act was the UPIDA which
B differs materially, in this connection, with the Industrial Disputes Act. Under
Section 22 of the Industrial Disputes Act, a notice of strike is required to be
given, as held by the High Court, only in the case of any public utility service
and the appellant Corporation is not a public utility service. However, under
Section 65 of the UPiDA the notice of strike is required to be given in
C respect of an industrial establishment. It is not argued on behalf of the
respondent that the appellant-Corporation is not an industrial establishment.
Whatever the legal consequences of not giving of such notice may be, it
cannot be said in the circumstances that the employees were admittedly on
strike as a matter of fact.

D The only reason given by the High Court to finally dispose of the
issues in its writ jurisdiction which appears to be sustainable, is the factor of
delay, on the part of the High Court in disposing of the dispute. Doubtless
the issue of alternative remedy should be raised and decided at the earliest
opportunity so that a litigant is not prejudiced by the action of the Court since
the objection is one in the nature of a demurer. Nevertheless even when
E there has been such a delay where the issue raised requires the resolution of
\_.-
factual controversies, the High Court should not, even when there is a delay,
short-circuit the process for effectively determining the facts. Indeed the
factual controversies which have arisen in this case remain unresolved. They
must be resolved in a manner which is just and fair to both the parties. The
F High Court was not the appropriate forum for the enforcement of the right
and the learned Single Judge in Anand Prakash 's case had correctly refused
to entertain the writ petition for such relief.

Apart from this, there is an additional reason why the judgment of the
High Court cannot be sustained on the ground of alternative remedy. When
G it was drawn to the attention of the High Court that a previous writ petition
raising the same issue had been dismissed on the ground of the existence of
an adequate alternative remedy, the High Court should not have continued to
dispose of the matter itself under Article 226 and in effect set aside the
d~cision in the previous writ petition.

H It was argued before us by the respondent-Union that the notice issued !
- UP. STATE BRIDGE CORPORATION LID. v. U.P. RAJYA SETU NIGAM S. KARAMCHARI SANGH [PAL.!.]

by the appellant-Corporation to the workmen to rejoin duties did not
sufficiently comply with the principles of natural justice and that individual
notices were required to be given to each of the workmen. The submission
403

A

was not raised by the respondent at any stage. Besides, whether the notice
by advertisement was sufficient infonnation for the purposes of compliance
with the requirements of natural justice is again a question of fact the B
foundation of which should be pleaded and sufficiently proved.

The constitutional validity of CSO L-2.12 has not been questioned by
the respondent. The respondent has contended that the illegal strike cannot
amount to abandonment of service for the purpose of Clause L-2.12 of the
Standing Orders (CSO). But was there a strike at all? Or was it mass C
absenteeism unconnected with the tenns and conditions of service?

Besides the submission that a person on illegal strike does not abandon
his job is erroneous. An illegal 'strike' cannot by definition be "authorised
absence". It would be a contradiction iJ1 terms. We may also draw support
from Section 25-B which defines "continuous service" as "uninterrupted D
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness
or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-
out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the
workman". The specific exclusion of persons on illegal strike plainly means
that the period a person is on illegal strike does not amount to service.

-- Different considerations would no doubt prevail where the strike is legal.
Workers on strike continue .to be in service although they may have ceased
work. If the strike is a legal one such cessation of work or refusal to continue
would be absence authorised by law. Under CSO L-2.12 a presumption is
E

to be drawn against an employee if such employee is unauthorisedly absent.
Clearly, a person on illegal strike and a person on legal strike are both F
'absent', but the absence of the first is unauthorised and the second is not.
CSO L-2.12 raises a presumption against the employee and it is for the
employee. to rebut that presumption by adducing the evidence. It is, therefore,
imperative that the factual basis is detennined by the appropriate forum. In
any event the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the respondent as
noted earlier, are factually distinguishable. In Express Newspapers (supra), G
there was no condition of service similar to Certified Standing Order L-
2.12. The fact of strike was also not in dispute. The Managem_ent had issued
notice terming the strike as unauthorised abandonment. In other words,
abandonment was pleaded as a fact on the basis of the strike. The contention
of the employer was that there was no order of termination of service by the H
A
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) 2 S.C.R.

employer but a relinquishment of service by the workmen. The submission
was not accepted because "the respondents by going on strike clearly indicated
-
that they wanted to continue in their employment but were only demanding
better terms. Such an attitude, far from indicating abandonment of
employment, emphasised the fact that the employment c<fntinued as far as ..
B
they were concerned. The management could not, by imposing a new term
of employment, unilaterally convert the absence from duty of striking
'
_1
employees into abandonment of their employment". "'

The fact of strike was also admitted in G. t Lad (supra). Here again
there was no condition of service similar to CSO L-2.12. The Management
C had issued a notice calling upon the workmen to report within a specified
period otherwise it would be construed as an abandonment. The workmen
failed to report within the aforesaid period. The Management struck out the
names of the workers from the rolls on the ground that the workmen were
not interested in service and had totally abandoned it. This Court held that
the abandonment was not a question of fact which was required to be proved.
D Where the only evidence was absence because of strike, there was no
abandonment. It was also held, following Express Newspaper (supra) that it
was not open to the company to introduce such changed terms and conditions
of service pending an industrial dispute.

D.K. Yadav (supra) is an authority for the proposition that the principle
E of natural justice would have to be read in the Standing Orders. That was a
case where there was a standing order similar to CSO L-2.12 except that 8 ·--
days' margin was granted within which the workman was required to return
and satisfactorily explain the reasons for his absence or inability to return after
the expiry of leave. This view was reiterated in the later decision of this Court
p in Lakshmi Precision Screws Ltd v. Ram Bhagat, (2002] 6 SCC 552 where
it was held that the element of natural justice was an in-built requirement of
the Standing Orders.

In this case, the appellant- Corporation had issued two riotices calling
upon the workmen represented by the respondent to return to duty. The
G workmen did not respond to either of the notices. As we have noted it was
not pleaded that the advertisement did not sufficiently comply with the
principles of natural justice. The notice was issued giving an opportunity to
the respondent to show cause why the presumption should not be drawn
under CSO L-2.12. The respondent did not show cause. In the circumstances,
H the Management drew the presumption in terms of the CSO.
.
UP. STA1:E BRIDGE CORPORATION LTD. v. U.P. RAJYA SETU NIGAM S. KARAMCHARI SANGH [PAL ,J.] 405

The respondent said that the notice was invalid because it did not A
otherwise comply with the CSO L-2.12 because of the shortening of the
period of absence. This was not an issue raised at any stage. In any event,
we do not see how the notice is not in compliance with the Certified Standing
Orders as quoted earlier.

The final submission of the respondent was that the UPIDA provided B
for penalty after a departmental enquiry, in respect of the workman who may
have gone on illegal strike and, therefore, there could be no termination of
services on account of illegal strike. The submission is unacceptable as we
have said there is no proof that the respondents were on strike at all. Besides,
merely because the action is punishable does not mean that the consequence C
of an unauthorised absence is not available under the Certified Standing
Orders if it so specifically provides.

In the circumstances, we have no hesitation in setting aside the decision
of the High Court in dismissing the writ petition. This order will, however,
not preclude the respondent-Union if it is otherwise so entitled to raise an D
industrial dispute under the UPIDA.

The appeals are allowed but without any order as to costs.

N.J. Appeals allowed.
E