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Supreme Court of India

U. SUVETHAversusSTATE BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE AND ANOTHER

Citation
2009 INSC 740
Decided
6 May 2009
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

A girlfriend or concubine of the husband is not a "relative" within the meaning of Section 498A IPC; therefore the appellant cannot be convicted under that provision.

Summary

An FIR was lodged against U. Suvetha, describing her as the "girl friend"/"concubine" of the husband of the complainant. Suvetha sought discharge on the ground that the allegation, even if true, did not constitute an offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The Madras High Court dismissed the application and the revision, prompting an appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court examined whether the phrase "relative of husband of a woman" in s.498A could be given a broader meaning to include a girlfriend or concubine. Relying on the principle of strict construction of penal statutes and the ordinary meaning of "relative" as a person related by blood, marriage or adoption, the Court held that a girlfriend or concubine does not fall within this term. Consequently, Suvetha could not be held liable under s.498A, and the High Court’s judgment was set aside.

Issues considered

  • Whether the expression "relative of husband of a woman" in Section 498A IPC includes a girlfriend or concubine of the husband.
  • Whether Section 498A IPC should be given an extended or purposive meaning beyond its literal terms.
  • Whether the penal provision requires strict construction in interpreting the term "relative".

Legislation cited

Subjects

Section 498Arelativegirlfriendconcubinestrict constructionpenal statute interpretationcrueltyIndian Penal Codedowrymarriage

Judgment

                           [2009] 7 S.C.R. 902


A                             U. SUVETHA
                                    V.
       STATE BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE AND ANOTHER
               Criminal Appeal No.938 of 2009

                             MAY 06, 2009
B
                (S.B. SINHA AND R.M. LODHA, JJ)
         PENAL CODE, 1860 :
           498-A, Explanation - 'Ret&iive' of husband - Connotation
c   of - FIR against girl friend of husband - HELD: Girl friend or
    concubine of husband would not be covered within the term
    'relative' - The word 'relative' brings within its purview a status
    conferred either by blood or marriage or adoption - If no
    marriage has taken place, the question of one being relative
    of another would not arise.
D
         INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES:
         Penal provision - Held: Deserves strict construction.
         WORDS AND PHRASES:
E        Expression 'relative of husband' as occurring in s.498-A,
    /PC - Connotation of
       An F.l.R. alleging commission of offence punishable
  u/s 498-A IPC was filed against the appellant describing
  her as 'girl friend'/'concubine' of the husband of the first
F
  informant. The appellant filed an application for discharge,
  inter alia, on the premise that the allegation made against
  her in the F.l.R., even if it be given face value, did not
  disclose an offence u/s 498A, IPC. The application was
  dismissed and so also the revision petition.
G
        In the instant appeal, the question for consideration
    before the Court was whether the term "relative of                    c   ~



    husband of a woman" within the meaning of s.498-A, IPC
    should be given an extended meaning.
H                                  902
                     U SUVETHA V. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE              903
                                   AND ANOTHER

                    Allowing the appeal, the Court                                 A
                     HELD: 1.1 An offence in terms of s.498-A, IPC is
               committed by the persons specified therein. They have
               to be the 'husband' or his 'relative'. Either the husband of
               the woman or his relative must have subjected her to
               cruelty within the provision. A girl friend or even a B
               concubine cannot be said to be a 'relative'. The word
               'relative' brings within its purview a status which must be
               conferred either by blood or marriage or adoption. In the
               absence of any statutory definition, the term 'relative' must
               be assigned a meaning as is commonly understood.                    c
               Ordinarily it would include father, mother, husband or wife,
               son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or niece, grandson
               or grand-daughter of an individual or the spouse of any
               person. If no marriage has taken place, the question of
               one being relative of another would not arise. Applying D
          •    the principles laid down in various decisions, the appellant
               is not a relative of the husband of the first informant. [para
               11, 12, 18 and 21] [909-D, H; 914-A; 916-F]
                     Shivcharan Lal Verma and another v. State of M. P, (2002
                                   =
               (?) Crimes 177 SC JT (2002) 2 SC 641; Rajeti Laxmi v. State         E
.,             of Andhra Pradesh 1 (2007) DMC 797; Ranjana Gopalrao
               Thorat v. State of Maharashtra 2007 CRI. L.J .3866; John ldicul/a
               v. State ofKerala 2005 M.l.J. (Crl.) 841; Vungarala Yedukondalu
     -~
               v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1988 CRl.L.J. 1538; and Reema
               Aggarwal v. Anupam (2004) 3SCC 199 - referred to.                   F
                      Advanced Law Lexicon by P Ramanatha Aiyar- Volume
              · 4, 3rd Edition; and Random House Webster's Concise College
                Dictionary p.691 - referred to.
                     2.1 The provision of s.498-A IPC is a penal one. It,
               thus, deserves strict construction. Ordinarily, save and G
      -'-.     except where a contextual meaning is required to be given
               to a statute, a penal provision is required to be construed
               strictly. [para 13] [911-F]
                    T. Ashok Pai v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore          H
    904       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2009] 7 S.C.R.


A 2007 (8) SCALE 354; Noor Aga v. State of Punjab 2008 (9)
  SCALE 681 - relied on.
       2.2 The word 'cruelty' having been defined in terms
  of Explanation to s.498-A of the Penal Code, 1860, no other
  meaning can be attributed thereto. Living with another
B woman may be an act of cruelty on the part of the
  husband for the purpose of judicial separation or
  dissolution of marriage but the same would not attract
  the wrath of s.498A of the Penal Code.[para 11) (909-C]
       2.3 In the instant case, relationship of the appellant
C with the husband of the first informant is said to have been
  existing from before the marriage. Indisputably they lived
  separately. For all intent and purport the husband was
  also living at a separate place. The purported torture is
  said to have been inflicted by the husband upon the first
D informant either at her in-law's place or at her parents'
  place. There is no allegation that appellant had any role
  to play in that regard. [para 17] [913-G-H]
     ' 3. The judgment of the High Court cannot be
E sustained and is accoridngly set aside. [para 22) (916-G]
                        Case Law Reference
          1988 CRl.L.J. 1538       referred to   para 8
                                                                   ..
          2007 (8) SCALE 354       relied on     para 13
F         2008 (9) SCALE 681       relied on     para 13
          JT (2002) 2 SC 641       referred to   para 14
          (2004) 3SCC 199          referred to   para 15

G         (2007) DMC 797           referred to   para 19
          2007 CRl.L.J.3866        referred to   para 19
          2005 M.l.J. (Crl.) 841   referred to   para 20
       CIVILAPPELALTE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
H 938 of 2009
               U. SUVETHA V STATE BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE               905
                             AND ANOTHER
 i,         From the Judgement and Order dated 01.08.2008 passed              A
       by the Madras High Court in Criminal R.C. No. 638 of 2008.
            A. Ramesh, R. Anand Padmanabhan, Pramod Dayal, for
       the Appellant.
              The Judgement of the Court was delivered by                     B
              S.B. SINHA, J.
               1. Leave granted.

            2. Whether the term "relativ~ of husband of a woman" within
       the meaning of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code should            c
       be given an extended meaning is the question involved herein.

            3. Respondent No.2 was married to one Tutus Gunaraj on
         1
       18 May, 2005. Allegedly, he had some connection with the
          h

       appellant. On coming to know about the same the first informant
                                                                              D
       asked her husband thereabout. She was allegedly ill treated.
 '+
       She was left by her husband to live with her mother-in-law at
       Cuddalore while he went to his place of work at Sivagangai.
            4. Allegedly dowry demands were again made, the details
       whereof are not necessary to be noticed. However, we may               E
       notice that portion of the allegations made in the first information
       report, which is relevant for our purpose. It reads as under :-

               "Even though properly advised my husband he has not cut
               the illegal relationship with the said Swetha. If I talk about
               her, my husband beat me and tortured me. My mother-in- F
               law also abetting him. If my husband received the salary,
               he gave the same with his aunt Thangam, then whenever
               required, at that time he get the money from her for his
               expenses. Even though my mother-in-law has known very
               well about the illegal intimacy of the husband with Swetha G
              ·wantonly given married me with him. The address of the
"'-·           said lover Swetha is D/o. Venka Takrishnan, No.167,
               Majestic Colony Valasaravakkam, Alwarthirunagar,
               Chennai-50, for not paying the money and jewellery my
               husband of my mother-in-law compelled me to get divorce H
    906       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2009] 7 S.C.R.


A         and tortured me. I am tolerating all these hardships. In the
          deepavali of the year 2006 my husband told me that he is
          going to his native and left me with my parents' house.
          Hence my father send/issued a legal notice to my husband
          and my mother-in-law on 13.11.2006, then even though
B         conciliation talks made, but the said conciliation failed on
          12.1.07. My husband filed petition for divorce. Hence I
          request you to take immediate action on my complaint
          and get back my dress and my TV Scooty NoTN05 C
          4971. My husband and my mother-in-law concealed the
c         true facts and married me and spoiled my life. Hence, I
          also request you to take action against them and file a
          case against them and get punished them in accordance
          with law. My husband and mother-in-law tortured and ill-
          treated me by demanding dowry. They have ~colded me
          with untoward and untolerable words and beat me so many
D
          times and treated me very badly. Hence, I pray to take
          action in accordance with law against them and punish
          them. My husband's aunt Tmt. Thangam, her son-in-law
          Utha, and his concubine Swetha all are inducing my husband
          and my mother-in-law to ill treat me and tortured me. Hence
E         I request you to take action against those persons and
          punish them in accordance in law after filing a case."
        5. Inter alia on the premise that the allegation made against
  the appellant in the first information report, even if it be given
F face value, does not disclose an offence under Section 498A of
  the Indian Penal Code, an application for discharge was filed
  by her. The same was dismissed on 25th March, 2008. A revision
  application filed thereagaisnt has been dismissed by the High
  Court by reason of the impugned judgment dated 1st August, 2008.
G        6. In the first information report except at one place the
    appellant has been described by the first informant as 'girl friend'
    of her husband and only at the end the word 'concubine' has
    been used.
          The core question which arises for consideration is as to
H
                U. SUVETHA V. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE               907
                        AND ANOTHER [S.B. SINHA, J]

          whether the 'girl friend' would be a 'relative of husband of a        A
          woman' in terms of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. -
               Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code reads as under:-
               "498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
               subjecting her to cruelty.                                       B
               Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband
               of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be
               punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend
               to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
                                                                                c
               Explanation-For the purpose of th is section, "cruelty" means-
               a)    Any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is
                     likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to
                     cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health
                     whether mental or physical) of the woman; or               D
      •        (b)   Harassment of the woman where such harassment
                     is with a view to coercing her.or any person related
                     to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property
                     or valuable security or is on account of failure by her
                                                                                E
                     or any person related to her meet such demand."
               7. The aforementioned provision was inserted in the Indian
          Penal Code by reason of The Criminal Law (Second
...       Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act No.45of1983). The statement of
          objects and reasons thereof reads as under :-                         F
               "The increasing number of Dowry Deaths is a matter of
               serious concern. The extent of the evil has been
               commented upon by the Joint Committee of the Houses
               to examine the working of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
               Cases of cruelty by the husband and the relatives of the G
 __,_          husband which culminate in suicide by, or murder of, the
               hapless woman concerned, constitute only a small fraction
               of the cases involving such cruelty. It is therefore proposed
               to amend the Indian Penal Code, the Code of Criminal
               Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act suitably to deal H
    908         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2009] 7 S.C.R.


A         effectively not only with cases of Dowry Death but also
          cases of cruelty to married woman by their in laws."
        8. The High Court opined that the word 'paramour' and
  the 'concubine' stand on the same footing. In arriving at the said
  opinion, it agreed with the decision of a Division Bench of Andhra
B Pradesh High in Vungarala Yedukonda/u v. State of Andhra
  Pradesh, [ 1988 CRI. L.j. 1538] and differed with the decision
  of the Bombay High Court, to opine :-
          "The term "relative" has not been defined in Indian Penal
c         Code and in the absence of any such definition, we have
          to go by the precedents. Assuming that the allegations
          made against the petitioner viz., that she is the concubine
          of A1 is true, then, it is to be held that there is a living
          relationship between the petitioner and A1 in the case
          and there are specific allegations to the fact that only at
D
          the instigation of the revision petitioner, A1 is harassing
          the second respondent and as such this Court is of the
          considered view that a charge under Section 498-A of
          IPC among other offence has also been rightly framed
          against the revision petitioner."
E
          9. Ingredients of 498A of the Indian Penal Code are :-
          a).   The woman must be married
          b)    She must be subjected to cruelty or harassment; and
F         c)    Such cruelty or harassment must have been shown
                either by husband of the woman or by the relative of
                her husband."
        10. Appellant herein had not been charged for abetment
G of a crime. Any conspiracy amongst the accused persons has
  also not been alleged. A woman in terms of the aforementioned
  provision must be subjected to cruelty by her husband and/or
  his relative. The word 'cruelty' has also been defined in the
  explanation appended thereto. It is in two parts. Clause (a) of
H the said explanation refers to a conduct which is likely to drive
                    U. SUVETHA V STATE BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE              909
                            AND ANOTHER [S.B. SINHA, J.)

              the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger A
              to her life, limb or health (whether mental or physical); clause (b)
              provides for harassment of the woman, where such harassment,
              is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to
              meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security.
                   It is not the case of the first informant that the appellant   B
              had any role to play with regard to demand of dowry.
                    11. The word 'cruelty" having been defined in terms of the
              aforesaid explanation, no other meaning can be attributed
              thereto. Living with another woman may be an act of cruelty on
              the part of the husband for the purpose of judicial separation or   c
              dissolution of marriage but the same, in our opinion, would not
              attract the wrath of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.
                    An offence in terms of the said provision is committed by
              the persons specified therein. They have to be the 'husband' or D
              his 'relative". Either the husband of the womah or his relative
        \     must have subjected to her cruelty within the aforementioned
              provision.
                     If the appellant had not been instigating the husband of the
              first informant to torture her, as has been noticed by the High E
              Court, the husband would be committing some offence
              punishable under the other provisions of the Indian Penal Code
              and appellant may be held guilty for abetment of commission of
              such an offence but not an offence under Section 498A of the
              Indian Penal Code.
                                                                                  F
                    12. In the absence of any statutory .definition, the term
              'relative' must be assigned a meaning as is commonly
              undersJood. Ordinarily it would include father, mother, husband
              or wife, son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or niece, grandson
              or grand-daughter of an individual or the spouse of any person. G
              The meaning of the word 'relative' would depeno upon the. nature
              of the statute. It principally includes a person related by blood,
....
       ,j -
              marriage or adoption .
                  The word 'relative' has been defined in P. Ramanatha Aiyar
              Advanced Law Lexicon - Volume 4, 3'd Edition as under:-·       H
    910        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2009] 7 S.C.R.


A         "Relative, "RELATIVE" includes any person related by
          blood, marriage or adoption. [Lunacy Act].
          The expression "REALTIVE" means a husband wife,
          ancestor, lineal descendant, brother or sister. [Estate Duty
          Act].
B
          "RELATIVE" means in relation to the deceased,
          a)   the wife or husband of the deceased;
          b)   the father, mother, children, uncles and aunts of the
c              deceased, and
          c)   any issue of any person falling, within either of the
               preceding sub-clauses and the other party to a marriage
               with any such person or issue [Estate Duty Act].
          A person shall be deemed to be a relative of another if,
D
          and only if, -
          a)   they are the members of a Hindu undivided family, or
          b)   they are husband and wife; or
E         c)   the one is related to the other in the manner indicated
               in Schedule I-A [Companies Act, 1956].
          "RELATIVE" in relation to an individual means -
          a)   The mother, father, husband or wife of the individual, or
F         b)   a son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or niece of
               the individual, or
          c)   a grandson or grand:daughter of the individual, or
          d)   the spouse of any person referred to in sub-clause
G              (b) [Income tax Act].
          "REALTIVE" means-
                                                                           - +-

          1)   spouse of the person ;
          2)   brother or sister of the person ;
H
              U. SUVETHA V STATE BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE               911
                      AND ANOTHER [S.B. SINHA, J]

             3)    brother or sister of the spouse of the person;            A
             4)    any lineal ascendant or descendant of the person;
             5)    any lineal ascendant or descendant.of the spouse of
                   the person;
             [Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act]."              B
             Random House Webster's Concise College Dictionary
        defines 'relative' at page 691 to mean :-
             "Relative n. 1. a person who is connected with another or
             others by blood or marriage.2. something having, or
             standing in, some relation to something else. 3. something C
             dependent upon external conditions for its specific nature,
             size, etc. (opposed to absolute). 4. a relative pronoun,
             adjective, or adverb. - adj. 5. considered in relation to
    r        something else; comparative: the relative merits of gas
             and electric heating. 6. existing or having its specific nature D
             only by relation to something else; not absolute or
             independent: Happiness is relative. 7. having relation or
             connection. 8. having reference: relevant; pertinent (usually
             fol. by to): two facts relative to the case. 9. correspondent;
             proportionate: 10. depending for significance upon E
             something else: "Better" is a relative term. 11. of or
             designating a word that introduces a subordinate clause
             and refers to an expressed or implied element of the
             principal clause: the relative pronoun who in "That was the
             woman who called." 12. (ofa musical key) having the same
             key signature as another key: a relative minor."                F
             13. Further more, the provision is a penal one. It, thus,
        deserves strict construction. Ordinarily, save and except where
        a contextual meaning is required to be given to a statute, a penal
        provision is required to be construed strictly.
                                                                             G
             This Court in T Ashok Pai v. Commissioner of Income
        Tax, Bangalore, [ 2007 (8) SCALE 354] held as under :-
             "19. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the more
             is the stringent law, more strict construction thereof would
             be necessary. Even when the burden is required to be            H

'
    912         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2009] 7 S.C.R.


A           discharged by an assessee, it would not be as heavy as
            the prosecution. [See P.N. Krishna Lal and Ors. v. Govt. of
            Kerala and Anr. 1995 Supp (2) SCC 187]."

            [See also Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, [ 2008 (9) SCALE
    681].
B
            14. A Three Judge Bench of this Court, however, in
    Shivcharan Lal Verma and another v. State of M.P, [2002 (2)
    Crimes 177 SC = JT (2002) 2 SC 641] while interpreting
    Sedction 498A of the Indian Penal Code, in a case where the
C   prosecution alleged that during the life of the first wife-Kalindi,
    appellant therein married for the second time, Mohini, but after
    marriage both Kalindi and Shiv Charan tortured Mohini as a
    result thereof, she ultimately committed suicide by burning
    herself, opined :-.

D           " .. One, whether the prosecution under Section 498A can
            at all be attracted since the marriage with Mohini itself
            was nuli and void, the same having been performed during
            the lifetime of Kalindi. Second, whether the conviction
            under Section 306 could at all be sustained in the absence
            of any positive material to hold that Mohini committed
E           suicide because of any positive act on the part of either
            Shiv Charan or Kalindi. There may be considerable force
            in the argument of Mr. Khanduja, learned counsel for the
            appellant so far as conviction under Section 498A. is
            concerned, inasmuch as the alleged marriage with Mohini
F           during the subsistence of valid marriage with Kalindi is
            null and void. We, therefore, set aside the conviction and
            sentence under Section 498A of the IPC."
        15. A Two Judge Bench of this Court, however, in Reema
    Aggarwal v. Anupam, [ (2004) 3 SCC 199 ], while construing
G the expression 'husband' opined that the word should not be
  given a restricted meaning to include those, who had married
  for the second time strictly in accordance with law, stating :-
            " ... If such restricted meaning is given, it would not further
            the legislative intent. On the contrary, it would be against
H
     U. SUVETHA V. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE               913
             AND ANOTHER [S.B. SINHA, J.]

     the concern shown by the legislature for avoiding                A
     harassment to a woman over demand of money in relation
     to marriages. The first exception to Section 494 has also
     some relevance. According to it, the offence of bigamy
     will not apply to "any person whose marriage with such
     husband or wife has been declared void by a court of             8
     competent jurisdiction". It would be appropriate to construe
     the expression "husband" to cover a person who enters
     into marital relationship and under the colour of such
     proclaimed or feigned status of husband subjects the
     woman concerned to cruelty or coerces her in any manner
      or for any of the purposes enumerated in the relevant           C
     provisions - Sections 304-8/498-A, whatever be the
      legitimacy of the marriage itself for the limited purpose of
      Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC. Such an interpretation,
      known and recognized as purposive construction has to
      come into play in a case of this nature. The absence of a       D
      definition of "husband" to specifically include such persons
      who contract marriages ostensibly and cohabit with such
      woman, in the purported exercise of their role and status
      as "husband" is no ground to exclude them from the purview
      of Section 304-B or 498-A IPC, viewed in the context of         E
      the very object and aim of the legislations introducing those
      provisions."
      16. It is not necessary to go into the controversy as to
whether Reena Agarwal (supra)_was correctly decided or not
as we are not faced with such a situation here. We would assume
that the term 'husband' would bring within its fold a person who      F
is said to have contracted a marriage with another woman and
subjected her to cruelty.
       17. Herein, as noticed hereinbefore, relationship of the
appellant with the husband of the first informant, is said to have
been existing from before the marriage. Indisputably they lived G
separately. For all intent and purport the husband was also living
at a separate place. The purported torture is said to have been
inflicted by the husband upon the first informant either at her in-
law's place or at her parents' place. There is no allegation that
appellant had any role to play in that regard.                      H
    914        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2009] 7 S.C.R.


A      18. By no stretch of imagination a girl friend or even a
  concubine in an etymological sense would be a 'relative'. The
  word 'relative' brings within its purview a status. Such a status
  must be conferred either by blood or marriage or adoption. If no
  marriage has taken place, the question of one being relative of
                                                                                   -
B another would not arise.
         19. We may notice that the Andhra Pradesh High Court in
    Rajeti Laxmi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [ 1 (2007) DMC 797],
    held as under:-
          "4. The entire reading of the charge-sheet and the
c         statements of L.Ws. 1 to 7, goes to show that it is nobody's
          case of the accused or the prosecution that A-6 is the
          relative of husband of L.W. 1. She is only concubine of A-
          1 and having illicit intimacy with him. Therefore, in the
          absence of any averment in the charge-sheet or any
D         statement that she is a relative of A 1, I am of the opinion
          that the offence under Section 498A, IPC do not attract to
          A-6. Even as per the dictionary meaning "relative" means
          a person connected by blood or marriage or 'a species'
          related to another by common origin". Simply because A-
E         6 is having illicit intimacy with A-1, it cannot be said that
          she is a relative of A-1. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition
                                                                               •
          is allowed quashing the proceedings in C.C. No.233 of
          2004 for the offence under Section 498-A, !PC, against
          the petitioner,A-6. Insofar as the other offences are
          concerned, it may go on."
F
         A learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, Bench
    at Aurangabad, in Swapnaja v. State of Maharashtra and
    another, [ Criminal Application No.388 of 2008 decided on
    21.4.2008 ], opined :-              ·
G          " .... Even assuming that due to her extramarital relation
          with husband of the respondent No.2, she is being ill-
          treated or subjected to harassment by her husband and
          his relatives, then also it is difficult to say that the applicant
          is accountable to answer the charge for offence punishable
H         under Section 498-Aofthe l.P.C. For, she is not related to
                      U. SUVETHA V. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE            915
                              AND ANOTHER [S.B. SINHA, J.]

          -;         husband of the respondent No.2 nor can be regarded as A
                     the person, who can fall within explanation (a) or (b) of
                     Section 498-A of the l.P.C."
                     To the similar effect is the law laid down by the same High
                Court in Ranjana Gopalrao Thorat v State of Maharasthra, [
                2007 CRl.L.J. 3866].                                               B

                      A learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, however,
                preferred to follow Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) in preference
                to Reena Aggarwal (supra) to hold that precedentially the former
                is binding on the High Court, stating :-
,.,                                                                                c
                     "Therefore the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra)
                     will clearly take precedence over the decision in Reema
                     Aggarwal (supra). That being the case, the arguments
                     advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners would
                     have to be accepted that the provisions of Section 498-
                                                                                   D
                     A IPC would not be attracted inasmuch as the marriage
          \.
                     between Mohit Gupta and Shalini was null and void and
                     Mohit Gupta could not be construed as a 'husband' for the
                     purposes of Section 498-A IPC. Clearly, therefore, the
                     charge under Section 498-A IPC cannot be framed and
                     the Metropolitan Magistrate had correctly declined to frame   E
                     any charges under Section 498-A IPC."
                     Similar view was taken by a learned Single Judge of the
                same High Court in Capt. Rajinder Tiwari v The State (NCT of
                Delhi), [ Criminal Revision P. No. 872 of 2006 decided on
                                                                                   F
                14.12.2006 ], stating:
                     "9. As already indicated above, insofar as the charge
                     under Section 498A IPC is concerned, that issue is no
                     longer open for debate. The same has been decided by
                     this Court in the case of Mohit Gupta & others (supra) G
                     applying the ratio of the Supreme Court decision in the
                     case of Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra). Since the marriage
      ~    ·•
                     between Rajidner and Meenakshi was a nullity in view of
                     the pendency of Rajinder's divorce proceedings qua his
                     first wife, the offence under Section 498A, which is specific
                                                                                   H
    916        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2009] 7 S.C.R.


A          to "husband", would not be maintainable, therefore, the
           impugned order needs to be corrected on this ground also."
       20. We are, however, not oblivious of the fact that a learned
  Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in John ldicul/a v. State
  of Kera/a, [ 2005 M.L.J. (Crl.) 841 ] relying on Reema Agarwal
B (supra) gave a wider meaning to the word "second wife" to hold :-
                                                                                   -
           "25. The test under SecUon 498A IPC is whether in the
           facts of each case, it is probable that a woman is treated
           by friends, relatives, husband or society as a "wife" or as

c          a mere "mistress". If from the pleadings and evidence the
           Court finds that the woman concerned is regarded as wife
           and not as a mere mistress, she can be considered to be
           a 'wife' and consequently as 'the relative of the husband'
                                                                                   -
           for purpose of Section 498A IPC. Proof of a legal marriage
           in the rigid sense as required under civil law is unnecessary
D          for establishing an offence under Section 498A IPC. The
           expression "marriage" or "relative" can be given only a ,
           diluted meaning which a common man or society may
           attribute to those concepts in the common parlance, for
           the purpose of Section 498A IPC. A second wife who is
E          treated as wife by the husband, relatives, friends or society
           can be considered to be 'the relative of the husband' for
           the purpose of Section 498A of IPC. If she inflicts cruelty
           on the legally-wedded wife of the husband, an offence
           under Section 498A IPC will not lie against her."
F         21. Applying the principles laid down in various decisions
    referred to above, we have no doubt, in our mind, that the
    appellant is not a relative of the husband of the first informant.
       22. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned
  judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The
G appeal is allowed.

    R.P.                                             Appeal allowed.       .   .


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