Holding

A disciplinary proceeding is only initiated when a charge sheet is drawn under the 1976 Regulations; without such a charge sheet, no proceeding is pending, and the legal fiction in Regulation 20(3)(ii) does not create a pending disciplinary proceeding.

Summary

The respondent, a UCO Bank officer, was asked to show cause for disciplinary action just before his superannuation and a disciplinary proceeding was said to be initiated, but a charge sheet was only issued two years later. The bank dismissed him and the respondent challenged the dismissal. The Supreme Court examined whether a disciplinary proceeding can be said to have been initiated without a charge sheet, especially after the employee’s superannuation, and whether the legal fiction in Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the 1979 Regulations makes proceedings pending. The Court held that under the 1976 Regulations a charge sheet is the condition precedent for initiating disciplinary proceedings; without it, no proceeding is deemed to have started, and the legal fiction does not create a pending proceeding for the purpose of termination. Consequently, the review petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether disciplinary proceedings are deemed to be initiated in the absence of a charge sheet under the UCO Bank Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976.
Whether the legal fiction in Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the UCO Bank Officers' Service Regulations, 1979 makes disciplinary proceedings pending after superannuation.
Interpretation of the 1976 and 1979 Regulations and the applicability of purposive and harmonious construction principles.

Legislation cited

Subjects

disciplinary proceedingscharge sheetsuperannuationstatutory interpretationlegal fictionUCO Bank Regulationstermination of servicereview petition

Judgment

[2008] 5 S.C.R. 775

UCO BANK AND ANR. A
v.
RAJINDER LAL CAPOOR
(Review Petition (C) No. 748 of 2007
IN
Civil Appeal No. 2739 of 2007) B
•~ MARCH 31, 2008
[S.B. SINHA AND MARKANDEY KATJU, JJ.]

Service Jaw: c
Disciplinary proceedings - Initiation of, after employee
reached age of superannuation without drawing up of charge
sheet- Held: Not permissible - In terms of 1976 Regulation,
drawing up of charge sheet is the first step for initiation of a
disciplinary authority - Ordinarily no disciplinary proceedings D
can be continued in absence of any statutory rule after
employee reaches his age of superannuation - Although
employer may resort to preliminary inquiry, but the same has
a limited role to play - But, in absence of statutory rules
operating in field, resorting to preliminary enquiry would not
E
by itself be enough to hold that a departmental proceeding
has been initiated - UCO Bank (Officers? Service Regulation,
1979 - Regulation 20 - UCO Bank Officer Employees
(Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 - Regulation 24.
Interpretation of statutes: F
·1' Purposive construction - Applicability of - Court to give
effect to purport and effect of the statute.
Harmonious construction - If two or more provisions of a
statute appear to carry different meanings, a construction which
G
would give effect to all of them should be preferred.
Respondent was working with the appellant-Bank.
' -.. Almost immediately prior to his retirement, he was asked
to show cause as to why action under the UCO Bank
775 H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

A (Officers') Service Regulations, 1979 (for short "the 1979
Regulations") should not be taken against him by notices
dated 24.10.1996 and 30.10.1996. Respondent reached his
age of superannuation on 30.11.1996. A disciplinary
proceeding was initiated against him immediately
B thereafter. A charge sheet, however, was issued only on ,
13.11.1998. He was dismissed from service upon initiating '/-.
a departmental proceedings.
A writ petition filed by him was allowed. Petitioner-
Bank filed an appeal upon grant of special leave
c thereagainst. One of the questions which arose for
consideration before this Court was whether in absence
of any chargesheet having been issued, the disciplinary
proceedings could be said to have been initiated.
When the said question was raised, the 1979
D
Regulations were not before us. This Court asked the
learned counsel to handover the regulations by the next
day. It was not complied with. However, on 18.05.2007
when the judgment was to be delivered, a prayer was
made to defer the pronouncement of the judgment so as
E to enable the appellants to place the regulations. The said
prayer was declined and the judgment was pronounced.
It is in the aforementioned factual backdrop, this review
petition has been filed.

F Dismissing the review petition the Court
HELD: 1.1 Sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 20 of the
1979 Regulations, thus, deals with termination of service
where the performance of an officer is unsatisfactory or
inadequate or where there is a bona fide suspicion about
G his integrity or where his retention in the bank's service
is prejudicial to interests of the disciplinary procedure.
Other Sub-regulations of Regulation 20 provides for the
mode and manner in which such termination may be ).- '
effected as also his entitlement to prefer an appeal
H thereagainst and other benefits to which he would be
UCO BANK AND ANR. v. RAJINDER LAL CAPOOR 777

---r-
otherwise entitled to. Sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 20 A
of the 1979 Regulations places an embargo on an official
to leave or discontinue his service of the bank without
giving a notice in writing. It prescribes a period of notice.
Sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 20, however, places an
embargo on an officer to leave or discontinue or resign B
from service without the prior approval in writing of the
'I
competent authority and a notice or resignation given by
~
such an officer before or during the disciplinary
proceedings shall not take effect unless it is accepted by
the competent authority. Clause (ii) of Sub-regulation (3) c
of Regulation 20 must be considered from that asp~ct of ·
the matter. It raises a legal fiction. Such legal fiction has
been raised only for the purpose of "this Regulation" and
for no other, which would mean Regulation 20(1 ). The final
orders which are required to be passed by the competent
D
authority although indisputably would be in relation to the
discipliriary proceedings but evidently it is for the purpose
)< of accepting resignation or leaving or discontinuing of
the service by the employee concerned or grant of
approval thereof. Clause (ii) of Sub-regulation (3) of
Regulation 20 in effect and substance acts as a proviso E
to Clause (i) thereof. Clause (iii) of Sub-regulation (3) of
Regulation 20 is an independent provision. It provides for
continuation of the disciplinary proceedings. Such
dis~iplinary proceedings indisputably for the purpose of
applicability of Sub-regulation (3) must have been initiated F
in terms of the 1976 Regulations. [Paras 13,14,15] [786-D,
E, F, G & H; 787-A, B, C & D]
1
Union of India etc. etc. v. K. V Jankiraman, etc. etc.AIR
(1991) SC·2010; Union of India and Ors. v. Sangram Keshari
G
Nayak (2007) 6 SCALE 348; Coal India Ltd. and Ors. v. Saro/
Kumar Mishra (2007) 5 SCALE 724 - .referred to.
2. Clause (ii) of Sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 20
' _. defines what would be pending, viz., for the purpose of
attracting Clause (i) thereof. A disciplinary proceeding is H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

A initiated in terms of 1976 Regulations, which are applicable
only in a case where a proceeding is initiated for the
purpose of taking disciplinary action against a delinquent
officer for the purpose bf imposing a punishment on him.
Disciplinary proceedings, thus, are initiated only in terms
s of the 1976 Regulations and not in terms of the 1979
Regulations. It is worth noticing that the 1979 Regulations
would be attracted when no disciplinary proceeding is
possible to be initiated. The 1976 Regulations, however,
on the other hand, would be attracted when a disciplinary
C proceeding is initiated. Both operate in separate fields.
There does not seem to be any nexus between
Regulations 20(1) and 20(2) of the 1979 Regulations and
the 1976 Regulations. [Para 16] [787-E, F, G & H; 788-A]
3. The 1976 Regulations provide for the mode and
D manner in which a disciplinary proceeding is initiated. It
expressly provides for service of charge sheet. Service
of charge sheet is a necessary ingredient for initiation of
disciplinary proceeding. A preliminary enquiry is not
contemplated under the 1976 Regulations. If such an
E enquiry is held, the same is only for the purpose of arriving
at a satisfaction on the part of the disciplinary authority
to initiate a proceeding and not for any other purpose.
The 1976 Regulations would have to be taken, if not, the
1979 Regulations may be resorted to if the conditions
F precedent therefor are satisfied. It is only with a view to
put an embargo on the officer to leave his job, Clause (ii)
of Sub-Regulation (3) of Regulation 20 of the 1979
Regulations has been made. It's scope is limited. [Para 17
& 18] [788-8, C & D]
G 4. Each regulations operates in different fields.
When a proceeding is initiated for the purpose of taking
any disciplinary action on the ground of any
misconduct which might have been committed by the
officer concerned indisputably the procedures laid
H down in the 1976 Regulations are required to be
UCO BANK AND ANR. v. RAJINDER LAL CAPOOR 779

-
-r f resorted to. [Para 19] [788-E & F] A
5. The 1979 Regulations would be attracted only for
the purpose of termination of service. Had the intention
of the regulation making authority been that the legal
fiction created under Clause (ii) of Sub-regulation (3) of
Regulation 20 would cover both Claus~s (i) and (iii), the B
same should have been placed only after Clause (iii). In
"'--1: such an event, Clause (ii) of Sub-regulation (3) of
Regulation 20 should have been differently worded. Some
non-obstante clause would have been provided for
making an exception to the applicability of the 1976 c
Regulations when a legal fiction is created, although it is
required to be taken to the logical conclusion. [Para 20]
[788-G & H; 789-A]
East End Dwe.J/ings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council
D
(1951) 2 All.E.R 587;UCO Bank and Anr. v. Rajinder Lal
Capoor (2007) 6 SCC 694; /magic Creative Pvt. Ltd. v. The
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and Ors. JT (2008) 1
SC 496; New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Nus/i Neville
Wadia and Anr. JT (2008) 1 SC 31 - referred to.
E
6. It is now a well-settled principle of interpretation
of statutes that the court must give effect to the purport
and object of the Act. Rule of purposive construction
should, subject of course to the applicability of the other
principles of interpretation, be made applicable in a case F
of this nature. [Para 20] [789-G & H; 790-A]
't 7. All the regulations must be given a harmonious
interpretation. A Court of law should not presume a
'cassus omissus' but if there is any, it shall not supply the
same. If two or more provisions of a statute appear to carry G
different meanings, a construction which would give effect
to all of them should be preferred. [Para 20] [791-D, E & F]

.' '~. Gujarat Urja Vikash Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd., 2008
(3) SCALE 469 - relied on.
H
780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

A 8. In terms of the 1976 Regulations drawing up of a
charge sheet by the disciplinary authority is the first step
for initiation of a disciplinary authority. Unless and until,
therefore, a charge sheet is drawn up, a disciplinary
proceedings for the purpose of the 1976 Regulations
B cannot be initiated. Drawing up of a charge sheet,
therefore, is the condition precedent for initiation of a ,
disciplinary proceedings. We have noticed in paragraph ')'-

15 of our judgment that ordinarily no disciplinary
proceedings can be continued in absence of any rule after
c an employee reaches his age of superannuation. A rule
which would enable the disciplinary authority to -continue
a disciplinary proceedings despite the officers reaching
the age of superannuation must be a statutory rule. A'
fortiori it must be a rule applicable to a disciplinary
proceedings. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that
D
the employer may take resort to a preliminary inquiry, but
it will bear repetition to state that the same has a limited
role to play. But, in absence of the statutory rules
operating in the field, resorting to a preliminary enquiry
would not by itself be enough to hold that a departmental
E proceeding has been initiated. Initiation of a disciplinary
proceeding may lead to an evil or civil consequence. Thus,
in absence of clear words, the court must lean in favour
of an interpretation which has been applied by this Court
in the main judgment. [Paras 21-24] [791-F, G & H; 792-A,
F 8 & C]
Mis. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. v. ,,.
Management and Ors. (1973) 1 SCC 813; Haryana Urban
Development Authority v. Om Pal (2007) 5 SCC 742 - relied
on.
G
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Review Petition (C)
No. 748 of 2007.
IN ...... t

Civil Appeal No. 2739 of 2007.
H
UCO BANK AND ANR. v. RAJINDER LAL CAPOOR 781
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

S.B. Sanyal, Rajesh Singh for the Appellants. A
Deepak Sibal, Ejaz Maqbool, Vikas Singh, Taruna Singh
and Abhimeet Sinha for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
..
-."(
S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Review Petitioners herein have filed
this application for review of this Court's judgment and order
dated 18.05.2007 passed in Civil Appeal No. 2739 of 2007.

2. Respondent was working with the appellant - Bank.
Almost immediately prior to his retirement, he was asked to c
show cause as to why action under the UCO Bank (Officers')
Service Regulations, 1979 (for short "the 1979 Regulations")
should not be taken against him by notices dated 24.10.1996
and 30.10.1996.

3. Respondent reached his age of superannuation on D
30.11.1996. A disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him
).-
immediately thereafter. A charge sheet, however, was issued
only on 13.11.1998. He was dismissed from service upon
initiating a departmental proceedings.
E
4. A writ petition filed by him was allowed. Petitioner- Bank
filed an appeal upon grant of special leave thereagainst. One
of the questions which arose for consideration before this Court
was whether in absence of any chargesheet having been issued,
the disciplinary proceedings could be said to have been initiated ·
in view of the decisions of this Court in Union of India etc. etc. F
v. K. V Jankiraman, etc. etc. [AIR 1991 SC 2010], Union of
-t India and Ors. v. Sangram Keshari Nayak [2007 (6) SCALE
348) and Coal India Ltd. and Ors. v. Saroj Kumar Mishra [2007
(5) SCALE 724).
G
5. When the said question was raised, the 1979
Regulations were not before us. This Court asked the learned
counsel to handover the regulations by the next day. It was not
'f ~
complied with.
However, on 18.05.2007 when the judgment was to be H
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

A delivered, a prayer was made to defer the pronouncement of
the judgment so as to enable the appellants to place the
regulations. The said prayer was declined and the judgment
was pronounced. It is in the aforementioned factual backdrop,
this review petition has been filed.
B 6. In the review application, the petitioner inter alia seeks
to bring to our notice the relevant provisions of the 1979 -,.
..
Regulations so as to contend that by reason thereof, a legal
fiction has been created to the effect that a disciplinary
proceedings shall be deemed to be pending, if the delinquent
c officer was placed under suspension or any notice was issued
to him to show cause why any disciplinary proceedings shall
not be initiated against him and will be deemed to be pending
until! the final orders are passed by the competent authority.
7. Indisputably, the appellants have framed three different
D
regulations governing the conditions of service of its employees.
8. The UCO Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and
.,.
Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (for short "the 1976 Regulations)
have been framed by reason of Section 19 of the Banking
E Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act,
1970 in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India and with
the previous sanction of the Central Government.

Regulation 4 of the 1976 Regulations provides for the
penalties. Regulation 6 provides for the procedure for imposing
F major penalties. Sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 provides that
no proceeding for imposing major penalties shall be initiated
except after an inquiry is held in accordance with the provisions
thereof. Sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 6 provides that when
the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there were grounds
G for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct, an
inquiry officer is to be appointed. Sub-Regulations (3), (4) and
(5) of Regulation 6 read as under:
"(3) Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry, the Disciplinary ~·
Authority shall frame definite and distinct charges on the
H
UCO BANK AND ANR. v. RAJINDER LAL CAPOOR 783
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

basis of the allegations against the officer employee and A
the articles of charge, together with a statement of the
allegations, on which they are based, shall be
communicated in writing to the officer employee, who shall
be required to submit within such time as may be specified
by the Disciplinary Authority (not exceeding 15 days) or B
... within such extended time as may be granted by the said
-1' Authority, a written statement of his defence.

(4) On receipt of the written statement of the officer
employee, or if no such statement is received within the
time specified, an enquiry may be held by the Disciplinary c
Authority itself, or if it considers it necessary so to do
appoint under sub-regulation (2) an Inquiring Authority for
the purpose:
Provided that it may not be necessary to hold an inquiry
D
in respect of the articles of charge admitted by the officer
employee in his written statement but shall be necessary
"': to record its findings on each such charge.
(5) The Disciplinary Authority shall, where it is not the
inquiring authority, forward to the inquiring authority: E
(i) a copy of the articles of charges and statement
of imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour; ... "
9. In exercise of the same power, the Board of Directors
have also framed the UCO Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) F
Regulations, 1976 (for short "the 1976 Conduct Regulations")
i providing for the code of conduct for the bank officers. Any
breach in terms of Regulation 24 of the 1976 Conduct
Regulations is deemed to constitute a misconduct punishable
under the 1976 Regulations.
G
10. The 1979 Regulations were also framed under the
~.
same power by the Board of Directors of the Bank. The 1979
Regulations deal with different terms of the employment of
' ~-J
service. Chapter IV deals with appointments, probation,
confirmation, promotions, etc. Chapter V deals with allowances. H
784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

......
A Chapter VI deals with medical aid, residential accommodation,
etc. Chapter VII provides for the kinds of leave to which an
employee is entitled to. Chapter VIII provides for traveling
allowances, etc. Chapter IX provides for provident fund and
pension. Chapter X provides for transfer of employees from one
B branch to another. Chapter XI provides for power to implement
,..
regulations. ·~

11. We are concerned herein with Regulation 20 of the
1979 Regulations which finds place in Chapter IV. As noticed
hereinbefore, the heading of the said Regulation is 'termination
c of service'. Regulation 20 ex facie does not deal with termination
of service by way of misconduct which is governed by the 1976
Regulations and the 1976 Conduct Regulations.

12. Regulation 20 of the 1979 Regulations reads as under:
D "20(1 )(a) Subject to sub-regulation 3 of regulation 16 where
the Bank is satisfied that the performance of an officer is
unsatisfactory or inadequate or there is a bonafide
suspicion about his integrity or his retention in the Bank's
"
service would be prejudicial to interests of the Bank, and
E where it is not possible or expedient to proceed against
him as per the disciplinary procedure, the Bank may
terminate his services on giving him three months' notice
or emoluments in lieu thereof in accordance with the
guidance issued by the Government from time to time.
F (b) Order of termination under this sub-regulation shall
not be made unless such officer has been given a +-
reasonable opportunity of making a representation to the
Bank against the proposed order.
(c) The decision to terminate the services of an officer
G
employee under sub-regulation (a) above will be taken ,,.
only by the Chairman and Managing Director.
(d) The officer employee shall be entitled to appeal against )r• •

any order passed under sub-regulation (a) above by
H preferring an appeal within 15 days to the Board of
UCO BANK AND ANR. v. RAJINDER LAL CAPOOR 785
(S.B. SINHA, J.]

Directors of the Bank. If the appeal is allowed, the order A
under sub-regulation (a) shall stand cancelled.
(e) Where an officer employee whose services have been
terminated and who has been paid an amount of three
months emoluments in lieu of notice and on appeal his
termination is cancelled, the amount paid to him in lieu of B
... notice shall be adjusted against the salary that he would
....(
have earned, had his services not been terminated and
he shall continue the Bank's employment on same terms
and conditions as if the order of termination had not been
passed at all. c
(f) An officer employee whose services are terminated
under sub-regulation (a) above shall be paid Gratuity,
Provident Fund including employer's contribution and all
other dues that may be admissible to him as per rules not
D
withstanding the years of service rendered.
(g) Nothing contained hereinabove will affect the Bank's
right to retire an officer employee under Regulation 19(1 ).
2. An officer shall not leave or discontinue his service in
the Bank without first giving a notice in writing of his E
intention to leave or discontinue his service or resign. The
period of notice required shall be 3 months and shall be
submitted to the competent authority as prescribed in these
regulations.
F
Provided further that the competent authority may reduce
the period of 3 months or remit the requirement of notice.
~-
3(i) An officer against whom disciplinary proceedings are
pending shall not leave/ discontinue or resign from his
service in the bank without the prior approval in writing of G
competent authority and any noti~e or resignation given
by such an officer before or during the disciplinary
proceedings shall not take effect unless it is accepted by
' _,,_,. the competent authority.
H
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

A (ii) Disciplinary proceedings shall be deemed to be ,......
pending against any employee for the purpose of this
regulation if he has been placed under suspension or any
notice has been issued to him to show cause why
disciplinary proceedings shall not be instituted against
s him and will be deemed to be pending until final orders
are passed by the competent authority.
(iii) The officer against whom disciplinary proceedings
have been initiated will cease to be in service on the date
of superannuation but the disciplinary proceedings will
C continue as if he was in service until the proceedings are
concluded and final order is passed in respect thereof.
The concerned officer will not receive any pay and/ or
allowance after the date of superannuation. He will also
not be entitled for the payment of retirement benefits till
D the proceedings are completed and final order is passed
thereon except his own contributions to CPF."
13. Sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 20 of the 1979
Regulations, thus, deals with termination of service where the
"'
performance of an officer is unsatisfactory or inadequate or
E where there is a bona fide suspicion about his integrity or where
his retention in the bank's service is prejudicial to interests of
the disciplinary procedure. Other Sub-regulations of Regulation
20 provides for the mode and manner in which such termination
may be effected as also his entitlement to prefer an appeal
F thereagainst and other benefits to which he would be otherwise
entitled to.
14. Sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 20 of the 1979
Regulations places an embargo on an official to leave or
G discontinue his service of the bank without giving a notice in
writing. It prescribes a period of notice. Sub-regulation (3) of
Regulation 20, however, places an embargo on an officer to
leave or discontinue or resign from service without the prior
approval in writing of the competent authority and a notice or K· •
resignation given by such an officer before or during the
H
UCO BANK AND ANR. v. RAJINDER LAL CAPOOR 787
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

-t disciplinary proceedings shall not take effect unless it is A
accepted by the competent authority.
Clause (ii) of Sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 20 must be
considered from that aspect of the matter. It raises a legal fiction.
Such legal fiction has been raised only for the purpose of "this
B
..
-....f
Regulation" and for no other, which would mean Regulation
20(1 ). The final orders which are required to be passed by the
competent authority although indisputably would be in relation
to the disciplinary proceedings but evidently it is for the purpose
of accepting resignation or leaving or discontinuing of the
service by the employee concerned or grant of approval thereof. c
Clause (ii) of Sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 20 in effect and
substance acts as a proviso to Clause (i) thereof.
15. Clause (iii) of Sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 20 is
an independent provision. It provides for continuation of the
D
disciplinary proceedings. Such disciplinary proceedings
indisputably for the purpose of applicability of Sub-regulation
(3) must have been initiated in terms of the 1976 Regulations.
16. It is worth noticing the distinction between terminologies
"proceeding pending"_ or "proceeding initiated". Clause (ii) of E
Sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 20 defines what would be
pending, viz., for the purpose of attracting Clause (i) thereof.
A disciplinary proceeding is initiated in terms of 1976
Regulations, which are applicable only in a case where a
proceeding is initiated for the purpose of taking disciplinary F
action against a delinquent officer for the purpose of imposing
~ a punishment on him.
Disciplinary proceedings, thus, are initiated only in terms
of the 1976 Regulations and not in terms of the 1979
G
Regulations.
It is worth noticing that the 1979 Regulations would be
\ ... attracted when no disciplinary proceeding is possible to be
initiated. The 1976 Regulations, however, on the other hand,
would be attracted when a disciplinary proceeding is initiated. H
'
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

A Both operate in separate fields. We do not see any nexus
between Regulations 20(1) and 20(2) of the 1979 Regulations
and the 1976 Regulations.
17. The 1976 Regulations provide for the mode and
manner in which a disciplinary proceeding is initiated. It
8 expressly provides for service of charge sheet. Service of charge
sheet is a necessary ingredient for initiation of disciplinary ...
proceeding. A preliminary enquiry is not contemplated under
the 1976 Regulations. If such an enquiry is held, the same is
only for the purpose of arriving at a satisfaction on the part of
C the disciplinary authority to initiate a proceeding and not for any
other purpose.

18. If it is found that a disciplinary proceeding can be and
should be initiated, recourse to the 1976 Regulations would have
to be taken, if not, the 1979 Regulations may be resorted to if
0
the conditions precedent therefor are satisfied. It is only with a
view to put an embargo on the officer to leave his job, Clause
(ii) of Sub-Regulation (3) of Regulation 20 of the 1979
Regulations has been made. It's scope is limited.
E 19. We have noticed hereinbefore that each regulations
operates in different fields. When a proceeding is initiated for
the purpose of taking any disciplinary action on the ground of
any misconduct which might have been committed by the officer
concerned indisputably the procedures laid down in the 1976
F Regulations are required to be resorted to.
20. The 1979 Regulations would be attracted only for the
purpose of termination of service. Had the intention of the +-
regulation making authority been that the legal fiction created
under Clause (ii) of Sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 20 would
G cover both Clauses (i) and (iii), the same should have been
placed only after Clause (iii). In such an event, Clause (ii) of
Sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 20 should have been differently
worded.
Some non-obstante clause would have been provided for
H
•
UCO BANK AND ANR. v. RAJINDER LAL CAPOOR 789
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

-t making an exception to the applicability of the 1976 Regulations A
when a legal fiction is created, although it is required to be taken
.. to the logical conclusion [See East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v.
Finsbury Borough Council, [(1951) 2All.E.R 587], but the same
would not mean that the effect thereof would be extended so as
to transgress the scope and purport for which it is created. B
~· In UCO Bank and Anr. v. Rajinder Lal Capoor [(2007) 6
-{
sec 694] it has been held:
"We are not oblivious of the legal principle that a legal
fiction must be given full effect but it is equally well-settled c
that the scope and ambit of a legal fiction should be
confined to the object and purport for which the same has
been created."

In /magic Creative Pvt. Ltd. v. The Commissioner of
Commercial Taxes and Ors. [JT 2008 (1) SC 496], this Court D
opined:
~ "26. We have noticed hereinbefore that a legal fiction is
created by reason of the said provision. Such a legal
fiction, as is well known, should be applied only to the
E
extent for which it was enacted. It, although must be given
its full effect but the same would not mean that it should be
applied beyond a point which was not contemplated by
the legislature or which would lead to an anomaly or
absurdity.
F
27. The Court, while interpreting a statute, must bear in
mind that the legislature was supposed to know law and
the legislation enacted is a reasonable one. The Court
must also bear in mind that where the application of a
Parliamentary and a Legislative Act comes up for
G
consideration; endeavours shall be made to see that
provisions of both the acts are made applicable."
It is now a well-settled principle of interpretation of statutes
' ....... that the court must give effect to the purport and object of the
Act. Rule of purposive construction should, subject of course to H
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

A the applicability of the other principles of interpretation, be made r
applicable in a case of this nature.
In New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Nusli Neville
Wadia and Anr. [JT 2008 (1) SC 31], this Court held:

B "50 ... With a view to read the provisions of the Act in a
proper and effective manner, we are of the opinion that ..
literal interpretation, if given, may give rise to an anomaly ~·

or absurdity which must be avoided. So as to enable a
superior court to interpret a statute in a reasonable manner,
c the court must place itself in the chair of a reasonable
legislator/ author. So done, the rules of purposive
construction have to be resorted to which would require
the construction of the Act in such a manner so as to see
that the object of the Act fulfilled; which in turn would lead
the beneficiary under the statutory scheme to fulfill its
D
constitutional obligations as held by the court inter alia in
Ashoka Marketing Ltd (supra).
--1
51. Barak in his exhaustive work on 'Purposive
Construction' explains various meanings attributed to the
E term "purpose''. It would be in the fitness of discussion to
refer to Purposive Construction in Barak's words:
"Hart and Sachs also appear to treat "purpose" as a
subjective concept. I say "appear" because, although Hart
and Sachs claim that the interpreter should imagine himself
F or herself in the legislator's shoes, they introduce two
elements of objectivity: First, the interpreter should assume
that the legislature is composed of reasonable people ~

seeking to achieve reasonable goals in a reasonable
manner; and second, the interpreter should accept the
G non-rebuttable presumption that members of the
legislative body sought to fulfill their constitutional duties
in good faith. This formulation allows the interpreter to
inquire not into the subjective intent of the author, but rather
the intent the author would have had, had he or she acted :.- .
H reasonably."
UCO BANK AND ANR. v. RAJINDER LAL CAPOOR 791
[S.B. SINHA, J]

(Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law, (2007) A
at pg. 87)
52. In Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Maddula Ratnavalli
and Ors., (2007) 6 SCC 81, this Court held:
"The Parliament moreover is presumed to have enacted B
.. a reasonable statute (see Breyer, Stephen (2005): Active
~ Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution, Knopf
(Chapter on Statutory Interpretation - pg. 99 for
"Reasonable Legislator Presumption" )."
53. The provisions of the Act and the Rules in this case, c
are, thus required to be construed in the light of the action
of the State as envisaged under Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. With a view to give effect thereto, the
doctrine of purposive construction may have to be taken
recourse to. [See 2007 (7) Scale 753: Oriental Insurance D
Co. Ltd. vs. Brij Mohan and others.]"
~
All the regulations must be given a harmonious
interpretation. A Court of law should not presume a 'cassus
omissus' but if there is any, it shall not supply the same.
E
If two or more provisions of a statute appear to carry
different meanings, a construction which would give effect to all
of them should be preferred. [See Gujarat Urja Vikash Nigam
Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd., 2008 (3) SCALE 469]
21. In terms of the 1976 Regulations drawing up of a F
charge sheet by the disciplinary authority is the first step for
~ initiation of a disciplinary authority. Unless and until, therefore,
a charge sheet is drawn up, a disciplinary proceedings for the
purpose of the 1976 Regulations cannot be initiated.
G
22. Drawing up of a charge sheet, therefore, is the
condition precedent for initiation of a disciplinary proceedings.

..... We have noticed in paragraph 15 of our judgment that ordinarily
no disciplinary proceedings can be continued in absence of
any rule after an employee reaches his age of superannuation.
H
792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

A A rule which would enable the disciplinary authority to continue
a disciplinary proceedings despite the officers reaching the age
of superannuation must be a statutory rule. A' fortiori it must be
a rule applicable to a disciplinary proceedings.
23. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the
B employer may take resort to a preliminary inquiry, but it will bear
repetition to state that the same has a limited role to play. But, •
~
in absence of the statutory rules operating in the field, resorting
to a preliminary enquiry would not by itself be enough to hold
that a departmental proceeding has been initiated.
c
24. Initiation of a disciplinary proceeding may lead to an
evil or civil consequence. Thus, in absence of clear words, the
court must lean in favour of an interpretation which has been
applied by this Court in the main judgment.
D In Workmen of Mis. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of
India (P) Ltd. v. Management and Others [(1973) 1 SCC 813],
this Court held that Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act 7'
must be interpreted in the light of the legal principles operating
in the field. [See also Haryana Urban Development Authority
E v. om Pal (2007) 5 sec 742]
25. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion
that it is not a fit case where we should exercise our jurlsdiction.
26. This petition is dismissed. In the facts and
F circumstances of this case, however, there shall be no order as
to costs.
D.G. Review Petition dismissed. ~·

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