Supreme Court of India
UDAYKUMAR PANDHARINATH JADHAV @ MUNNAversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA
- Citation
- 2008 INSC 550
- Decided
- 29 April 2008
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- S B SINHA
Holding
The accused’s claim of private defence is recognized, but he exceeded its limits; thus the conviction under Section 302 IPC is replaced by a conviction under Section 304(1) IPC.
Summary
Udaykumar Pandharinath Jadav (Munna) was convicted under Section 302 IPC for the murder of Shivraj. Two eye‑witnesses testified, and one witness, in cross‑examination, stated that the deceased first attacked the accused with a knife, leading to a scuffle in which the accused disarmed and stabbed the deceased. The accused claimed the injuries were inflicted in private defence, but the trial and High Courts upheld a murder conviction. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that a plea of private defence can be inferred even if not expressly pleaded, but the evidence showed the accused exceeded the right of private defence by inflicting multiple injuries, including a fatal chest wound. Consequently, the murder conviction was set aside and substituted with culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304(1) IPC, with a sentence of seven years rigorous imprisonment.
Issues considered
- Whether a plea of private defence is available when not specifically raised but can be inferred from the evidence.
- Whether the accused exceeded the scope of private defence, thereby converting murder into culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
- Whether the conviction under Section 302 IPC should be set aside and replaced with a conviction under Section 304(1) IPC.
Legislation cited
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 304(1)
Subjects
private defencemurderculpable homicide not amounting to murderIPC Section 302IPC Section 304(1)excess of private defenceeye‑witness testimonyconviction modification
Judgment
[2008] 7 S.C.R. 189
"
UDAYKUMAR PANDHARINATH JADHAV @ MUNNA A
V.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
1 (.Criminal Appeal No. 255 of 2006)
., APRIL 29, 2008
B
[S.B. SINHA AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.]
Penal code, 1860 - s. 304 (Part I) - Murder - Two eye-
witnesses - One of the eye-witnesses stating that deceased
first attacked the accused - Accused taking the plea of private c
defence - Courts below convicting the accused uls 302 - On
appeal, held: Plea of private defence is available to the
accused - However, he exceeded the right of private defence
- Hence conviction altered to one uls 304 (Part I).
Appellant-accused was prosecuted uls 302 IPC for D
causing death of a person. The incident was seen by two
eye-witnesses. One of the eye-witnesses-<Ui his cross-
examination stated that the deceased had first attacked
the accused with a knife. Accused also took the defence
that he caused the injuries to the deceased in exercise of E
his private defence. Trial Court as well as High Court
' convicted the accused. Hence the present appeal.
•
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The case against the accused is proved F
by the evidence of the eye-witnesses whose presence
cannot be doubted and in addition, the fact that the
accused had caused the injuries, has also been admitted
though he has pleaded the right of private defence.
[Para 2] [191-F, G] G
., 1.2 The plea of private defence is available to the
appellant though it has not been specifically raised by
him. PW-4 an eye-witness, in his cross-examination stated
that the deceased had attacked the accused with knife.
189 H
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 7 S.C.R.
A The Public Prosecutor did not challenge the correctness
thereof in any manner. Thus the prosecution itself has
accepted this statement as being true. It is well settled
that in order to make out a case of private defence, the r;;
F
accused need not plead it in specific terms but if the
B circumstances justify an inference with regard to such a "
right, the Court must examine that possibility as well.
[Para 4] [192-D, E]
1.3 From the evidence it is clear that the deceased
was not only a karate expert but also armed with a knife
c and the appellant apprehended injury at his hands. At the
best that can be said for the prosecution is that the
appellant had exceeded the right of private defence.
Therefore the appellant is acquitted of the charge under
section 302 IPC and his conviction is modified to one
D under Section 304 (1) IPC in the background that the fatal
injury caused on the chest had penetrated deep into the
body. [Para 4] [192-G; 193-A]
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal ,_
No.255/2006.
E
From the final Judgment and Order dated 1.8.2005 of the
High Court of Judicature of Bombay Bench at Aurangabad in
Criminal A. No. 130of1999. •"·
A. Kanade and Aribam Gunseshwar Sharma for the
F Appellant.
Chinmoy Khaladkar and Ravindra Keshavrao for the
Respondent. •
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J. 1. This appeal by way of special
leave arises out of the following facts:
2. On 22.10.1997, at about 5 or 5.30 p.m., PW1 Rajesh,
the first informant along with Santosh Supekar and Shivraj,
H deceased were standing and talking outside the house of
UDAYKUMAR PANDHARINATH JADHAV@ MUNNA v. 191
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
Santosh Supekar. While they were so involved, the appellant, A
Udaikumar, who was known to Rajesh, accompanied by an
unknown person came there and holding Rajesh took him to
the side saying that he had been summoned by one Ram Hallele.
While going away Rajesh turned around in time to see that
•
~-
Shivraj was being stabbed by the appellant and while the victim B
was successful in warding off the first blow, the other blows stuck
home. Rajesh thereupon rushed towards the house of one
Babar Saheb and narrated the incident to him and information
was conveyed by Babar Saheb to the police. The police reached
the place shortly thereafter. In the meanwhile, Rajesh had c
returned to the scene and noticed that Shivraj was lying dead.
ASI Jukte recorded the statement of Rajesh, Ex.19 and on the
basis, a formal FIR was registered at the Police Station. The
dead body was also despatched for the post-mortem. The ASI
. also recorded the statement of PW2 Sunita, sister of the D
deceased and PW4 Santosh. He also arrested the accused
and on his interrogation, a knife was duly recovered. During the
course of the trial, the appellant put up a defence that the injuries
had been caused by him in the exercise of his right of private
defence as the deceased who was an expert in karate had first E
attacked him and caused him an injury on the neck. He also
stated that he had been able to disarm the deceased and had
caused some injuries to him thereafter. In the course of the
hearing before us, Mr. Kanade, the learned counsel for the
• appellant has first and foremost contended that the prosecution F
story was false and that the appellant had been roped in for
some unknown reasons. We have gone through the entire
evidence and are of the opinion that this argument has no merit
as the case against the accused is proved by the evidence of
the eye witnesses whose presence cannot be doubted and in G
; . addition the fact that the accused had caused the injuries, has
also been admitted though he has pleaded the right of private
defence. Mr. Kanade then fell back on the alternative argument
a that he had caused the injuries in his right of private defence
H
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008) 7 S.C.R.
A and therefore no case of murder could be spelt out.
3. Mr. Kanade's argument with regard to the right of private
defence flows from the cross-examination of PW4 Santosh, an
eye witness who deposed as under:
..
B "It is true that the deceased was a teacher of Karate. It
is true that the knife was taken out by the deceased and
there was scuffle between the accused and deceased.
It is true that the deceased was held by his collar of the
accused. It is true that the knife had fallen from the ;.
C hands of the deceased in the scuffle and the same was
taken by the accused and the deceased was stabbed
with it. It is true that first blow was inflicted on the thigh,
second was on hand and the third one was on the chest."
4. It is significant that despite the fact that this statement
0 •
had been made by Santosh in his cross-examination, the Public
Prosecutor did not challenge the correctness thereof in any
manner. In other words, it is clear that the prosecution itself has
accepted this statement as being true. It is well settled that in
E order tom~ out a case of private defence, the accused need
not plead"1t' in specific terms (as it would, indeed, be a very
courageous accused who would come out and take the risk of
•. admitting his presence) but if the circumstances justify an
inference with regard to such a right, the Court must examine
F that possibility as well. In this background, we are of the opinion
that the plea of private defence is available to the appellant
though it has not been specifically raised by him. The learned
Government counsel has, however, pointed out that three injuries
had been caused on the person of the deceased and as such
G the complete exoneration on the plea of right of private defence
was not available to the appellant. We observe from the evidence
that the deceased was not only a karate expert but also armed
..
with a knife and it is not surprising that the appellant
apprehended injury at his hands. We are therefore of the opinion
H that the best that can be said for the prosecution at this stage is
UDAYKUMAR PANDHARINATH JADHAV@ MUNNA v. 193
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
that the appellant had exceeded the right of private defence. A
We therefore partly allow the appeal, acquit the appellant of the
charge under section 302 of the IPC and modify his conviction
to one under Section 304 (Part 1) of the IPC in the background
that the fatal injury caused on the chest had penetrated deep
into the body. We also impose a sentence of 7 years rigorous B
imprisonment on the appellant; the other part of the sentence to
remain as it is
K.KT · Appeal partly allowed
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