Holding

The High Court's reliance on the "sentence undergone" criterion was erroneous; the appropriate sentence for the accused (except those already serving more than five years) is five years rigorous imprisonment.

Summary

Eight persons were convicted for the death of Subhash and injuries to others, originally under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment plus additional terms. The High Court reduced the murder conviction to culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 304 Part II) and, relying on the "sentence undergone" principle, left each accused to serve the period they had already spent in custody, resulting in sentences ranging from 11 months to over nine years. The petitioner, Uggarsain, challenged this reduction, arguing that the High Court failed to consider the gravity of the offence and the principle of proportionality in sentencing. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in using the "sentence undergone" criterion without distinguishing the roles of the accused and that a uniform appropriate sentence of five years rigorous imprisonment was required for those who had not yet served that term. Consequently, the Court modified the sentences of six accused to five years rigorous imprisonment while leaving unchanged the sentences of the two who had already served more than five years, and partly allowed the appeals.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court erred in converting the conviction from murder (Section 302 r/w 149 IPC) to culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 304 Part II r/w 149 IPC).
Whether the "sentence undergone" principle is a valid basis for determining the appropriate sentence in cases of common intention offences.
Whether the principle of proportionality requires a uniform sentence reflecting the gravity of the offence despite differences in age or time already served.
What is the appropriate sentence for the accused under the facts of the case.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 319
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 148, s. 149, s. 302, s. 304, s. 323

Subjects

sentencingproportionalitycommon intentionIPC Section 149murderculpable homicide not amounting to murderlife imprisonmentsentence reductionappropriate sentence

Judgment

74 [2023] COURT
SUPREME 10 S.C.R. 74 : 2023 INSC 587
REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A UGGARSAIN
v.
THE STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No(s). 1378-1379 of 2023)
B
JULY 03, 2023
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.]
Sentence/Sentencing – Appropriateness of sentences – Eight
accused persons were charged with and tried for offences
C punishable u/ss. 148, 149, 302, 304 Part-II and 323 of IPC for
having causing death of deceased and causing injury on others –
Trial Court convicted all the accused persons and sentenced them
to rigorous imprisonment for life u/s. 302 r/w s.149 and one year
rigorous imprisonment u/s. 148 and six months rigorous imprisonment
u/s.323 r/w. s.149 – The High Court partially allowing the appeal
D by the accused persons converted their conviction u/s. 302 r/w. s.
149 IPC to s.304 Part II r/w. s.149 IPC and affirmed convictions u/
s.148 and s.323 r/w. s.149 IPC – High Court observed that the case
fell under Exception 4 to s.300 IPC – Appellants contended that
impugned judgment gravely erred in adopting the standard of
sentence undergone, which resulted in widely different and disparate
E results – On appeal, held: Appeals confined to the extent of
appropriateness of sentences undergone by different accused
persons for causing the same offence – All eight accused have
undergone different periods under imprisonment varying from 9
years to 11 months – Principle of proportionality should guide the
sentencing process – In the instant case, the sentencing was
F inexplicable – No rationale appeared from the reasoning of the
High Court for this wide disparity – The judgment of High Court
fell into error having not considered the gravity of the offence –
Having held all the accused criminally liable, u/s. 304 Part II r/w
s.149 IPC and also not having found any distinguishing feature in
the form of separate roles played by each of them, the imposition of
G
the “sentence undergone” criteria, amounted to aberration, and
the sentencing is for that reason, flawed – Considering totality of
circumstances, appropriate sentence of five years rigorous
imprisonment imposed – However, two accused (A-1 and A-6) having
served more than that period, the impugned judgment, as far as
H they are concerned is left undisturbed.
74
UGGARSAIN v. THE STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 75

Partly allowing the appeals, the Court A
HELD: 1. The sentencing in this case, to put it mildly, is
inexplicable (if not downright bizarre). On the one hand, A-1
underwent sentence for 9 years 4 months- at the other end of the
spectrum, accused A-8 underwent only 11 months. No rationale
appears from the reasoning of the High Court for this wide
B
disparity. It is not as though the court took note of the role
ascribed to the accused (such a course was not possible, given
the nature of the evidence). If it were assumed that the age of
the accused played a role, then A-1, at 61 years- who served 9
years and A-6, who had served in the army, and was detained for
over 8 years got the stiffest sentence. On the other end of the C
scale, younger persons were left relatively unscathed, having
served between 3 years and 11 months. [Para 15][81-G; 82-A, B]
2. The impugned judgment, in this court’s opinion, fell into
error in not considering the gravity of the offence. Having held
all the accused criminally liable, under Section 304 Part II read
with Section 149 IPC and also not having found any distinguishing D
feature in the form of separate roles played by each of them, the
imposition of the “sentence undergone” criteria, amounted to
an aberration, and the sentencing is for that reason, flawed. This
court is, therefore, of the view that given the totality of
circumstances (which includes the fact that the accused have been E
at large for the past four years), the appropriate sentence would
be five years rigorous imprisonment. However, at the same time,
the court is cognizant of the fact A-1 and A-6 served more than
that period. Therefore, the impugned judgment, as far as they
are concerned, is left undisturbed. [Para 16][82-C-E]
Jameel v. State of U. P. [2009] 15 SCR 712; Shyam F
Sunder v Puran & Anr [1990] Suppl 1 SCR 662 – relied
on.
Ahmed Hussein Vali Mohammed Saiyed v. State of
Gujarat [2009] 8 SCR 719; Guru Basavaraj v. State of
Karnataka [2012] 8 SCR 189; B.G. Goswami v. Delhi G
Administration [1974] 1 SCR 222; Ravda Sashikala v
State of Andhra Pradesh [2017] 2 SCR 379; M.P. v.
Bablu [2014] 9 SCR 467; Raj Kumar [2013] 5 SCR
979; State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi [2015] 3 SCR
590 – referred to.
H
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A Case Law Reference
[2009] 8 SCR 719 referred to Para 10
[2009] 15 SCR 712 relied on Para 10
[2012] 8 SCR 189 referred to Para 11
[1974] 1 SCR 222 referred to Para 11
B
[1990] Suppl 1 SCR 662 relied on Para 12
[2017] 2 SCR 379 referred to Para 12
[2014] 9 SCR 467 referred to Para 12
[2013] 5 SCR 979 referred to Para 12
C [2015 ] 3 SCR 590 referred to Para 12
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
Nos.1378-1379 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.08.2019 and 03.09.2019
of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CRAD
D No.249 of 2016.
Rakesh Mudgal, A.A.G., Himanshu Shekhar, M.L. Lahoty, Paban
K. Sharma, Anchit Sripat, Pranab Kumar Nayak, Arvind Kumar, Varinder
Kumar Sharma, Yugal Kishor Prasad, Parul Sharma, Shantanu Sharma,
Bishan Dass, Deeksha Gaur, Dr. Nirmal Chopra, C. Solomon, Dr. Monika
E Gusain, Advs. for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. These appeals, by special leave, arise from the judgment and
orders1 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana2, converting
F the decision of conviction given by the trial court from Section 302 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereafter “IPC”) to Section 304-Part II IPC.
These appeals have been preferred by the informant/complainant.
2. The prosecution alleged that on the eve of Holika Dahan, i.e.,
07.03.2012, Krishan (A-1) abused Subhash (the deceased). On the next
G day, Brahmjit, son of Krishan (A6), inflicted danda blows upon Subhash
at about 10.00/11.00 AM. Due to this, at about 3.00 PM, when
Pawan, Uggarsain and Subhash (deceased) were sitting in front of their
house, Brahmjit came near their house and started abusing them, which
1
Dated 27.08.2019 and 03.09.2019.
H 2
In Criminal Appeal bearing No. 249 DB of 2016
UGGARSAIN v. THE STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 77
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

aggravated the situation. Thereafter, all the accused, namely Raju, son A
of Krishan (A2), Krishan, Parveen (A3), Sunder- son of Amit
(A4), Sunder-son of Rajpal (A8), Nar Singh (A-7), Sandeep (A-5) and
others reached the spot, with weapons. Raju inflicted blow on the right
shoulder of Sita Ram (PW1). Krishan inflicted a blow at the back of Sita
Ram with an iron pipe and Brahmjit inflicted a farsa blow on the right of
B
Sita Ram’s head. Sunder was armed with a rod; Nar Singh and Sandeep
were carrying farsas with them. They caused injuries on Pawan,
Uggarsain and Subhash. The injured were taken to hospital.
3. On 09.03.2012, on the receipt of intimation, the police registered
the case under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 323 IPC. Subash, who was
gravely wounded, having received multiple injuries, was removed to the C
hospital; later, a surgery too was performed on him. However, he did not
survive and passed away on 12.3.2012. Thereupon, Section 302 IPC
was added in the FIR, on 13.3.2012. Postmortem was conducted, and
the doctor (PW5- Dr. Kunal Khanna) recorded in the post-mortem report
that the death was caused by injuries sustained by the deceased on the D
head and its attendant complications. The police arrested the accused.
Later, weapons were recovered on the basis of disclosure statements
made by them. On the statement of PW1-Sita Ram, the prosecution
moved an application under section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code
(hereafter “Cr.P.C.”) for summoning an additional accused, namely
E
Sunder.
4. All the eight accused persons were charged with and tried for
offences punishable under Sections 148, 323 and 302 read with section
149 IPC. The prosecution examined twenty-two witnesses and recorded
their deposition. PW.3- Dr. Sant Lal Beniwal did medico-legal examination
of Sita Ram (PW1), Uggarsain (PW2) and Pawan. He recorded different F
injuries caused on the complainants’ bodies and stated that the probable
duration of injuries was within six hours by blunt weapon. PW8- Dr.
Pradeep Kumar stated that Subash (deceased) had received only one
injury. PW4- Dharmender Singh prepared the site plan. The defence
examined two witnesses. DW1-Bikram Singh deposed that he was G
authorized to produce, and accordingly brought a computerized attendance
register stating that on 8.3.2012 (the day of the incident), one accused,
i.e., Parveen Parmar had performed his duties as a security guard from
7.00 AM to 7.00 PM. DW2- Dr. Naresh Kumar, who had medico legally
examined the accused Krishan and Brahmjit and recorded a fracture of
H
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A the right clavicle bone of Krishan and a nasal bone fracture of Brahmjit,
also deposed in favour of the defence.
5. The trial court held that all the accused persons reaching the
spot together armed with weapons and their attack on the victims,
including the deceased exhibited the intention of an unlawful assembly,
B to inflict deadly injuries. The nature of injuries found on the deceased
indicated common intention of the assembly extended to causing death,
which in fact, occurred. The trial court held that the prosecution’s inability
to explain the injuries on the accused did not absolve them of their role in
the attack and causing the death of Subhash, because the evidence relied
on was credible. The evidence of two witnesses consistently supported
C
the prosecution case in their statements before the police as well as in
court. Their testimonies were corroborated by medical evidence. The
trial court3 convicted all the accused as charged and sentenced them to
rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 302 r/w Section 149 IPC
and one-year’s rigorous imprisonment under Section 148 IPC; six months
D rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 323 read with Section
149 IPC.
6. The accused appealed to the High Court, which by the impugned
judgment, partly allowed their pleas and converted their convictions under
Section 302 read with 149 IPC to Section 304 Part II read with Section
E 149 IPC. It, however, affirmed the convictions under Section 148 and
Section 323 read with Section 149 IPC. The High Court observed that
the lack of explanation of injuries received by Krishan and Bharmjit
undermined the prosecution story and that Subash, the deceased, had
received only one injury, according to PW.8- Dr. Pardeep Kumar. Finally,
F the High Court held that the case fell under Exception 4 to Section 300
IPC, as tempers were running high between the parties, and a sudden
fight occurred when the complainant party reached in front of Krishan’s
house, which meant that the accused did not act in a pre-meditated
manner. Aggrieved, the informant Uggarsain appealed to this court,
against the conversion of conviction and corresponding reduction of
G sentence.
7. During the hearing, this court indicated that these appeals would
be confined to the extent of appropriateness of sentences undergone by
3
Judgment dated 11.02.2016 and order dated 17.02.2016, in Sessions Trials No. 160 of
H 30.07.2012, 275 of 04.12.2012 and 114 of 15.04.2013.
UGGARSAIN v. THE STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 79
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

different accused persons for causing the same offence. The different A
periods undergone by convicts are: Krishan had undergone 09 years, 05
months and 04 days of imprisonment with remissions; Raju underwent
03 years, 01 month and 01 day of imprisonment; Parveen had suffered
01 year, 11 months and 27 days of imprisonment; Sunder s/o Amit Lal
had undergone 02 years and 05 days of imprisonment; Sandeep had
B
undergone 01 year, 11 months and 12 days of imprisonment; Brahamjit
had undergone 08 years, 11 months and 19 days of imprisonment (including
remissions); Nar Singh had undergone 01 year and 04 months of
imprisonment and Sunder s/o Rajpal had undergone 11 months and 16
days of imprisonment.
8. The appellants argued that the High Court was wrong in inferring C
that the injuries were caused due to a sudden fight. Counsel highlighted
that the accused who were convicted concurrently, had deliberately gone
near the informant/victims’ house to cause deadly injuries- in fact, one
of the informant parties died as a consequence. Having regard to the
established facts, the object of the assembly was for use of such force, D
which resulted in death. Therefore, the sentencing in the present case
had to be fit and appropriate, and the impugned judgment gravely erred
in adopting the standard of sentence undergone, which resulted in widely
different and disparate results. At one end of the spectrum, one of the
accused (Sundar s/o Rajpal) suffered incarceration for a little over 11
months, whereas Krishan had undergone 09 years, 05 months and 04 E
days. The appellant informants urged that this court should adopt a
somewhat uniform sentencing standard when the role of each accused
was practically indistinguishable.
9. On behalf of the accused, it was pointed out that the High
Court had, in fact, gone by the salutary principles indicated by this F
court, in that the relative ages of the accused, their family
circumstances, the length of time they spent in custody, as well as the
length of time that had elapsed since the commission of the crime, all
were considered.
10. This court has, time and again, stated that the principle of G
proportionality should guide the sentencing process. In Ahmed Hussein
Vali Mohammed Saiyed v. State of Gujarat, 4 it was held that the
sentence should “deter the criminal from achieving the avowed object

4
2009 [8] SCR 719 H
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A to (sic break the) law,” and the endeavour should be to impose an
“appropriate sentence.” The court also held that imposing “meagre
sentences””merely on account of lapse of time” would be
counterproductive. Likewise, in Jameel v. State of U. P.,5 while advocating
that sentencing should be fact dependent exercises, the court also
emphasised that “the law should adopt the corrective machinery or
B deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation, sentencing
process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where
it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case,
the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and
committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of
C the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending
circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of
consideration.”
11. Again, in Guru Basavaraj v. State of Karnataka,6 the court
stressed that it “is the duty of the court to see that appropriate
D sentence is imposed regard being had to the commission of the crime
and its impact on the social order” and that sentencing includes
“adequate punishment”. In B.G. Goswami v. Delhi Administration7,
the court considered the issue of punishment and observed that punishment
is designed to protect society by deterring potential offenders as well as
prevent the guilty party from repeating the offence; it is also designed to
E reform the offender and reclaim him as a law-abiding citizen for the
good of the society as a whole. Reformatory, deterrent and punitive
aspects of punishment thus play their due part in judicial thinking while
determining the question of awarding appropriate sentences.
12. In Shyam Sunder v Puran & Anr8, the accused-appellant
F was convicted under Section 304 Part I IPC. The appellate court reduced
the sentence to the term of imprisonment already undergone, i.e., six
months. However, it enhanced the fine. This court ruled that sentence
awarded was inadequate. Proceeding further, it opined that: - “... The
court in fixing the punishment for any particular crime should take
into consideration the nature of the offence, the circumstances in
G which it was committed, the degree of deliberation shown by the
offender. The measure of punishment should be proportionate to
5
2009 [15] SCR 712
6
2012 [8] SCR 189
7
1974 (1) SCR 222
8
H 1990 Suppl [1] SCR 662
UGGARSAIN v. THE STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 81
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

the gravity of the offence. The sentence imposed by the High Court A
appears to be so grossly and entirely inadequate as to involve a
failure of justice. We are of opinion that to meet the ends of justice,
the sentence has to be enhanced...”. This court enhanced the sentence
to one of rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years. This court
has emphasized, in that sentencing depends on the facts, and the adequacy
B
is determined by factors such as “the nature of crime, the manner in
which it is committed, the propensity shown and the brutality
reflected” [Ravda Sashikala v State of Andhra Pradesh 9]. Other
decisions, like: State of M.P.v. Bablu10; Raj Kumar11 and State of Punjab
v. Saurabh Bakshi12 too, have stressed the significance and importance
of imposing appropriate, “adequate” or “proportionate” punishments. C
13. In the present case, the High Court noted the respective ages
of the accused-i.e., Krishan (61 years); Raju (40 years); Parveen (32
years); Sundar (39 years); Sandeep (25 years); Nar Singh (41 years)
and Sunder s/o Rajpal (36 years). The court noted that Bramhajit had
served in the army. Apart from these, the court noted the relative family D
circumstances: the number of children each accused had. It then adopted
a uniform rule, i.e., the period of sentence undergone by the accused, as
the appropriate sentence.
14. As noted earlier, all the accused were found concurrently guilty
under Section 148 IPC; they were armed with different kinds of E
implements and weapons, that were capable of inflicting deadly injuries.
The postmortem report of Subhash revealed at least six serious head
injuries, including fracture and haemorrhage in different places. Pawan,
Uggarsain and Sita Ram, others from the complainant party also
concededly suffered injuries. Though the High Court was of the opinion
that no explanation was given by the prosecution about the injuries on F
the accused, their nature does not seem to have been serious. At any
rate, the court did not find that sufficient reason to upset the sentence
under Section 149 read with Section 304 II IPC.
15. The sentencing in this case, to put it mildly, is inexplicable (if
not downright bizarre). On the one hand, Krishan underwent sentence G
for 9 years 4 months- at the other end of the spectrum, Sunder s/o
9
2017 [2] SCR 379
10
2014 [9] S.C.R. 467
11
2013 (5) SCR 979
12
2015 (3) SCR 590 H
82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A Rajpal underwent only 11 months. No rationale appears from the
reasoning of the High Court for this wide disparity. It is not as though the
court took note of the role ascribed to the accused (such a course was
not possible, given the nature of the evidence). If it were assumed that
the age of the accused played a role, then Krishan, at 61 years- who
B served 9 years and Brahmajit, who had served in the army, and was
detained for over 8 years got the stiffest sentence. On the other end of
the scale, younger persons were left relatively unscathed, having served
between 3 years and 11 months.
16. The impugned judgment, in this court’s opinion, fell into error
C in not considering the gravity of the offence. Having held all the accused
criminally liable, under Section 304 Part II read with Section 149 IPC
and also not having found any distinguishing feature in the form of
separate roles played by each of them, the imposition of the “sentence
undergone” criteria, amounted to an aberration, and the sentencing is
for that reason, flawed. This court is, therefore, of the view that given
D the totality of circumstances (which includes the fact that the accused
have been at large for the past four years), the appropriate sentence
would be five years rigorous imprisonment. However, at the same time,
the court is cognizant of the fact Krishan and Bramhajit served more
than that period. Therefore, the impugned judgment, as far as they are
E concerned, is left undisturbed. Consequently, the sentence of Raju,
Parveen, Sunder s/o Amit Lal, Sandeep, Nar Singh, and Sunder s/o Rajpal
is hereby modified; they are hereby sentenced to undergo Rigorous
Imprisonment for five years. They shall surrender and serve the rest of
their sentences within six weeks from today.
F 17. The appeals are partly allowed, in the above terms. No costs.

Ankit Gyan Appeals partly allowed.
(Assisted by : Kritika and Aarsh Choudhary, LCRAs)

G

H