UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.versusR. SARANGAPANI AND ORS. ETC. ETC.
- Citation
- 2000 INSC 148
- Decided
- 15 March 2000
- Disposal
- Disposed off
Holding
The Full Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras, correctly upheld the 1 January 1986 cut‑off date and the validity of the Government O.M.s, so the benefit cannot be extended to technicians appointed before that date.
Summary
The case concerned whether technicians appointed before 1 January 1986 were entitled to have their training period counted for salary increments under Government O.M.s dated 22 Oct 1990 and 31 Mar 1992. Different benches of the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) had given conflicting rulings, with the Bangalore, Jabalpur and Chandigarh benches allowing the benefit, while the Madras bench denied it. The Madras bench referred the matter to a Full Bench, which upheld the cut‑off date of 1 January 1986, holding it was linked to the Fourth Pay Commission and was justified on financial‑burden grounds, not on any violation of Article 14. The Supreme Court affirmed the Full Bench’s reasoning, dismissed the employees’ appeals and set aside the Bangalore CAT order, directing recovery of any extra increments paid, except where the employee had retired. The Court emphasized the need for uniformity across the department and held that the training period could not be treated as duty for those appointed before the cut‑off date.
Issues considered
- The validity of the cut‑off date of 1 January 1986 for counting training periods towards increments.
- Whether the Government O.M.s dated 22 Oct 1990 and 31 Mar 1992 are constitutionally valid and can be applied uniformly.
- Whether denying the benefit to technicians appointed before 1 January 1986 violates Article 14 of the Constitution.
- Whether the extra increments granted by various CAT benches must be recovered from the Union of India.
- Whether the training period can be counted as duty for the purpose of increments under FR 26 and Rule 9(6)(a)(i).
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 14
- Financial Ruless. 26
Subjects
Judgment
UNION OF INDIA AND ANR. A
v.
R. SARANGAPANI AND ORS. ETC. ETC.
MARCH 15, 2000
[M. JAGANNADHA RAO AND MRS. RUMA PAL, JJ.] B
Service Law :
Annual increment-Training period-Counting offor purpose of incre-
ment-:-Rules providing one year training for technical personnel and 3 months.
... training jor non-technical staff-Training period not counted for purpose of
increment-Central Government O.Ms. dated 22.10.I990 and 3I.3.I992-
c
Providing that training period undergone by a selected person before formally
taking over charge of the post would be taken into account for purpose of
annual increment-Cut-off date fixed as I. I: I 986-Petitions filed before differ-
ent Benches of Central Administrative Tribunal challenging the cut-off date- D
·Bangalore Bench allowing the claim-Similarly Jabalpur Bench and Chandigarh
Bench allowing the benefit-But Madras Bench declining to grant relie.f-
Matter referred to Full Bench at Madras-Full Bench upholding the decision
of Madras Bench and overruling decision of Bangalore Bench-Held, Full
Bench of Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras rightly held Government E
0.Ms. dated 22.JO.I990 and 3I.3.I992 valid-Cut-off date i.e. I.I.1986 is not
discriminatory-Principles decided by the Full Bench would also be applied in
respect of all employees of the department including those who went be.fore
Tribunals at Jabalpur and Chandigarh-Extra increment given to employees,
except those w.ho have retired, to be recovered-Constitution of India-Article
I4. F
Judgment-Conflicting decisions by different Benches of Central Admin-
istrative Tribunal-Matter referred to Full Bench of Central Administrative
Tribunal, Madras-Held, in order to maintain uniformity, inspite of concession
of counsel at different Benches, principles decided by the Full Bench would
apply-Practice and Procedure-Decision based on concession of counsel- G
Effect of
In the department concerned of the Government of Indi~ training
period for technical posts was one year and for non-technic:al posts it was
three months. The training period was not treated as duty for the purpose H
495
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] 2 S.C.R.
A of increments. Under FR 26, service on a post in a time scale would count
for increment in that time scale. On a demand made by the staff in the
National Council (JCM) it was observed that where training period was
long as in the case of technical personnel, the employees concerned were
put to perpetual disadvantage vis-a-vis the staff in non~t~chnical jobs who
were recruited along with the technical staff in 'the same scale of pay.
B
Keeping this in view, the Government issued 0.M. dated 22.10.1990 pro-
viding that if a selected person was required to undergo training before
formally taking over charge of the post, the training period undergone by
such personnel, whether on re; .;.aneration or stipend or otherwise, would
be treated at par for the purpose of drawing emoluments. Initially the
c benefit of the O.M. was given only from 1.10.1990. On further demand of
the staff in the JCM the matter was again considered, and by the Govern-
ment O.M. dated 31.3.1992, the benefit was allowed also to those govern~
ment servants who had undergone training OQ or after 1.1.1986. However,
in such cases the benefit of counting the training period for pay was made
D admissible on notional basis from 1.1.1986 and on actual basis from
1.10.1990.
Applications were filed before the Central Administrative Tribunal,
Bangalore Bench claiming that Technicians appointed prior to 1.1.1986
should also be given the benefit of the Go:vernment O.Ms. dated 22.10.1990
E and 31.3.1992. The Tribunal allowed the applications holding that fixation
of the date of increment as 1.1.1986 was discriminatory. Similar relief was
granted by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench and the
Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench. But when a contrary
view was taken by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras Bench, a
reference was made to a Full Bench of the Tribunal. The Full Bench of the
F Tribunal, by its judgment dated 22.1.1996, upheld the view of the Central
Administrative Tribunal, Madras Bench and overruled the view taken by
the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore Bench. Appeals were
filed before this· Court both by the Government as also by the affected
technical employees.
G
Allowing the appeals filed by the Government and dismissing those
filed by the employees, the Court
HELD : 1. The Full Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal,
Madras Bench, was right in holding that the Order of the government
H deciding the cut-off date as 1.1.1986 and implementing the Government
U.O.I. v. R. SARANGAPANI 497
O.Ms. dated 22.10.1990 and 31.3.1992 was entirely valid; that the appli· A
cants were not entitled to the relief; and that the judgment of the Central
Administrative Tribunal Bangalore was not correct. The Full Bench of the
Tribunal has held that the date 1.1.1986 had a nexus with the commence-
ment of the recommendations of the Fourth Pay Commission and it was a
relevant factor to be taken into consideration in finding out whether the
B
cut-off date 1.1.1986 was arbitrary or not. The second relevant aspect that
was taken into account by the Full Bench of the Tribunal was the extent of
financial burden which was involved if the benefit was to be extended even
to those who had undergone training prior to 1.11.1986. The reasons given
by the Full Bench of the Tribunal are correct. It was open to the Govern-
ment to decide, having regard to the budgetary provision, as to what c
extent it could go and whether it could fix a cut-off date which was co-
terminus with the commencement of the recommendation of the IV th Pay
Commission, namely, 1.1.86. On the peculiar facts of this case, th~,-said
date was perfectly valid because the only consideration was the financial
burden of the State and not any principle of equality. Further, in regard to D
those appointed prior to 1.1.1986, it would be too late for them to claim the
benefit of the training period prior to 1.1.1986. [501-B-F]
Union of India v. P.N. Menon & Ors., [1994] 4 SCC 68, relied on.
2. In view of the nature of the qualifications and nature of the posts,
E
functions and duties, no equality in the dates of accrual of the increments
could ever have been claimed by the technical personnel comparing them-
selves to the non-technical persons, by invoking Article 14 of the Constitu-
tion of India. The applicants who were appointed to the technical posts and
the other persons who were appointed to the non-technical posts are not on
the same footing. The nature of their jobs was different, the qualifications F
for appointment was different and the training period was to be longer for
the tecllnical staff. H, however, the Government thought it fit to bring some
sort oft:equalisation in the matter of commencement of their increments, it
was obv~ously by way of a sheer concession and was not as a matter of right
nor was it to avoid any violation of any principles of equality under Article G
14. [502-B-D]
D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, [1983] 2 SCR 165, held, inapplica~le~
3. The issue involved in these appeals relates to a class of persons
who are spread over the entire country in the same department, but H
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A different cases were disposed of by different Benches of Central Adminis-
trative Tribunal leading to conflicting decisions. Obviously, the counsel
for the Government had agreed before the two Tribunals at Jabalpur
Bench and Chandigarh Bench because at that time the Bangalore Bench
judgment was holding the field. But after the judgment of the Full Bench of
the CAT, Madras it is necessary that there is no discrimination between the
B technical personnel in different regions of the country in the same depart-
ment. It is a case where uniformity has to be maintained in the Department
in spite of the concession of counsel at Jabalpur and Chandigarh. There-
fore, the principles decided by the Full Bench of the Madras Tribunal has to
be applied even in respect of employees who went before the Tribunals at
c Jabalpur and Chandigarh. [503-H, 504-A-C]
4. The extra increment given pursuant to any judgment of the Tribu-
nal which has now been set aside, be recovered by the Union of India. It
would be open to the Government of India to recover the same or to absorb
the same in the future monthly salary spread over, month by month.
D However, if any such employee has retired, no recovery will be made from
his retiral benefits on the basis of this judgment. [505-E-F]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 4247-49 of
1998 Etc. Etc.
E From the Judgment and Qrder dated 7 .11.94 of the Central Adminis-
trative Tribunal, Hyderabad in 0.A. No. 1346 of 1994.
N.N. Goswami, Ms. Indira Sawhney, Mr. Anubha Jain, Hemant Sharma,
Rajiv Nanda, S.A. Matoo, P. Parameshwaran, Arvind Kumar Sharma, A.P.
Chhabra, Harinder Mohan Singh, Subramonium Prasad, Dr. Mahesh Babu
F
M.R., Amlan Kumar Ghosh, Niraj Sharma, H.V.P. Sharma, Ms. Kanupriya
Mittal, S.W.A. Qadri and K. Maruthi Rao for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G Delay condoned.
Leave granted in S.L.P. (C) 346/99.
In these batch of appeals, the Union of India and the concerned
Department are the appellants. The appeals raise common points. For the
H sake of convenience We shall take up Civil Appeal Nos. 4247-49/1988,
U:O.I. v. R. SARANGAPANI 499
. which are the appeals against the Judgment dated 8th March, 1995, of the A•
Central Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore Bench, in O.A. Nos. 1981/1994
& 1981-82 of 1994. Earlier to this, the said Tribunal rendered a Judgment
in O.A. No. 156 of 1992 on 26th March, 1993, taking the same view. The
Tribunal had held that Technicians appointed prior to 1.1.1986 would also
be entitled to the benefits of the orders passed in terms of the O.M. date<:f B
22.10.1990, as modified in the subsequent orders dated 31.3.1992. In
essence, the Tribunal held that for purpose of drawing increments, the
Technicians whose period of training was one year, should be on par with
the non-technical persons, whose training period was only three months, so
that both the technicians and non-technicians would be drawing the same
increment at the same intervals, if they were appointed on the same date.
c
r
As per the Government O.M. dt. 22.10.90 this benefit was given to the
technicians and was prospective in operation. It was to be granted only from
1.1.1990. Later on, by the O.M. dated 31.3.1992, this benefit was extended
notionally with effect from 1.1.1986. The result was that those technicians D
who were appointed prior to 1.1.1986 did not get the benefit of these two
O.Ms. issued by the Government. When they approached the Central Admin-
istrative Tribunal, Bangalore Bench, the said Tribunal in its two judgments,
one of 1993 and the other of 1995 above mentioned, came to the conclusion
that those technicians appointed prior to 1.1.1986 would also get the benefit
of these two O.Ms. This was on the ground that fixation of the date of E
increment, i.e. 1.1.86 was discriminatory.
It appears that the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras Bench had
taken an opposite view and this led to a Reference to. a Full Bench of the same
Tribunal, at Madras in 0.A. Nos. 1295/94 and 79/95. The judgment therein
was delivered on 22.1.1996 and in that judgment the view taken by the F
Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal was overruled and the view taken by the
Madras Bench of the Tribunal was upheld. The Union of India, therefore, in
its appeals filed in this Court against the judgment of the Bangalore Tribunal,
has strongly relied upon the subsequent judgment of the Full Bench of the
Madras Tribunal, dated 22.1.1996 above referred to, for contending that the G
view traken by the Full Bench is the correct one and therefore, for the reasons
given in that judgment, these appeals must be allowed and the judgment of the
Bangalore Tribunal dated 21.2.95 must be set aside.
In the Government O.M. dated 22.10.1990, it was stated that, under FR
26, service in a post on a time scale counts for increment in that time scale H
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A and that as per FR 9(6)(a)(i), the services as a probationer or apprentice was
treated as duty provided that service as such was followed by confirmation.
On that basis, the Government of India observed that training period under-
gone by the government servant "cannot" be treated as duty. However, on a
demand made by the Staff in the National Council, (JCM) it was decided that
where training period was long enough as in these cases, such technical
B
personnel were put to perpetual disadvantage vis-a-vis the staff in non-
technical job who were recruited along with the technical staff in the same
scale of pay. Therefore, the Government decided as follows :
the National Council (JCM) and it has been decided that in case where
c a person has been acted for regular appointment and before formally
take over charge of the post in which selected person is required to
undergo training, training period undergone by the Government
servant whether on remuneration of stipend or otherwise may be
treated at par for the purpose of drawing emoluments.
D These orders take effect from the 1st of the month in which this
OM is issued".
It will be noticed that initially the benefit of the above O.M. was
therefore, given only from 1.10.1990. Subsequently, further representations
appears to have been made by the staff and the Government came forward
E with the amendment on 31.3.1992. The Government of India observed that it
had earlier decided on 22.10.90 that the period spent on training was to be
treated as duty for the purpose of increments in cases where the person
selected for regular appointment, - before formally taking over charge of the
post for which he was selected - was required to undergo training and these
F orders were to take effect from 1.10.90. On further demand of the staff in the
National Council (JCM) the question was again examined and the President
of India, it. was stated was pleased to decide that the benefit of treatment of
such training as duty for the purpose of increments would be allowed also in
the case of those Government servants who had undergone such training on
or after 1.1.1986. However, in such cases, the benefit of counting the period
G
for pay would be admissible on notional basis from 1.1.86 and on actual basis
from 1.10.90.
Subsequently, it appears that some further anomaly arose in regard to
those who completed training immediately before 1.1.86, and an order was
H passed by the Government of India on 29.1.93. But we are not concerned with
U.0.1. v. R. SARANGAPANI 501
that order~ in the present batch of cases. A
The Full Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras had
therefore to decide the question whether the benefit given as per the
Government O.M. dated 31.3.1992 should also be extended to those appoint-
ees who were appointed to technical posts and who underwent a training
before 1.1.86. The Tribunal, after referring the various judgments of this
B
Court came to the conclusion that the date 1.1.86 had a nexus with the
commencement of the recommendations of the Fourth Pay Commission and
that that was a relevant factor to be taken into consideration in finding out
whether the cut-off date 1.1.86 was arbitrary or not. The second relevant
aspect that was taken into account was the extent of financial burden which c
was involved if the benefit mentioned above was to be extended even to
those who had training prior to 1.1.86. It was true that the claim of those
appointed prior to 1.1.86 was only that they could be given notional benefit
form 1.1.86 and actually from a later date. But even so, the net result would
be that one more increment would become payable to all those persons
D
appointed to technical posts earlier to 1.1.86. It was, therefore, held that these
factors were relevant circumstances to be taken into consideration for not
extending the benefit backward beyond 1.1.86. The Tribunal also considered
the question whether the cut-off date 1.1.86 could be held to be properly
selected or whether it could be said that it was picked out of a hat. It was
pointed out that the question of commencement of the date was discussed E
in the National Council (JCM) between the employees and the Government
and after taking into account various demands made by the employees, the
said date was arrived at. At first the decision was to give notional benefit
only from 1.10.90 and lateron, the decision was to grant it to those who had
undergone training after 1.1.86 but that they would get the benefit notionally F
from 1.1.90. The Tribunal relied upon a judgment of this Court in Union of
India v. P.N. Menon & Ors., [1994] 4 SCC 68, for holding that financial
burden was one of the relevant considerations. On the basis of the above
reasoning, the Full Bench of the Madras Tribunal finally stated that the order
of the Government deciding the cut off date as implementing the Govern-
ment O.M. dated 31.3.92 and the O.M. dated 22.10.90 was entirely valid and G
that that the applicants were not entitled to the reliefs and that the earlier
judgment of the Bangalore Tribunal was not correct.
We are of the view that the learned counsel for the Government of
India was right in relying strongly upon subsequent decision of the Full Bench H
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A · of the Central Administrative Tribunal Madras Bench dated 22.1.1996 and in
our opinion, the reasons given by the said Tribunal in the said Judgment, are
correct.
One more aspect which we want to emphasise is that the applicants who
were appointed to the technical posts and the other persons who were
B appointed to the non-technical posts are not on the s,ame footing. The nature
of their jobs was different, the qualifications for appointment was different
and the training period was to be longer for the technical staff. It was
obviously necessary that those who were to occupy the technical posts should
have a longer period of training than those who were to occupy the non-
c technical posts. The training period for the former was one year while the
training period for the latter was only three months. Naturally, the non-
technical personnel could therefore be appointed earlier to the technical
personnel even if both groups were selected at the same selection. Therefore,
in view of the nature of the qualifications and nature of the posts and functions
and duties, no equality in the dates of accrual of the increments could ever
D
have been claimed by the technical personnel comparing themselves to the
non-technical persons, by invoking Article 14.
If, however, the Government thought it fit to bring some sort of
equalisation, in the matter of commencement of their increments, it was
E obviously by way of a sheer concession and was not as a matter of right nor
was it to avoid any violation of any principles of equality under Article 14.
In fact, the very Official Memorandum of the Government dated 22.10.1990,
stated that under the FR 26 read with Rule 9(6)(a)(i) it was only in cases of
probationers and apprentices where such appointments were followed by a
confirmation that the said period of probation or apprenticeship would be
F
counted -for the purpose of scale of pay attached to the posts. This principle
would "not" as per the Rules be applicable to the training period. However,
during the meetings of the National Council (ICM) it was represented that
where the training period was long, as in the case of technical personnel, the
disparity would become perpetual. Therefore, it is obvious that the conces-
G sion was n0t based on Article 14 nor was it on the basis of any rule but was
clearly based only upon the fact that the training period of technical
personnel was longer and the disparity woiuld continue perpetually if these
groups were selected at the same time. Therefore Government considered
initially to bring their increment on par with effect from 1.1.90 and later on
H it felt that the grievance could be rectified with effect from 1.1.86 as
U.0.1. l( R. SARANGAPANI 503
mentioned above, the date of commencement of the recommendations of the A
4th Pay Commission. It is therefore, clear that the Government decided to
extend the benefit in the above said manner, even though parties had no right
to the same either under Article 14 or under the Rules and the date was
mainly based on the financial burden. It was open to the Government to
decide, having regard to the budgetary provision, as to what extent it could
B
go and whether it could fix a cut-off date which was co-terminus with the
commencement of the recommendation of the IVth Pay Commission,
namely, 1.1.86. On the peculiar facts of this case the said date was perfectly
valid because the only consideration was the financial burden of the State
and not any principle of equality.
c
t None of the principles stated in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, [1983]
2 SCR 1_65 are applicable to the. facts of the case. The difference arose in
the present case because the two categories were totally different from the
time when they were selected and sent for training. We are, therefore, of the
view that the Full Bench decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal,
D
Madras was justified in overruling the said decision.
For the aforesaid reasons, these appeals are allowed and the impugned
order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore Bench is set
aside.
E
C.A. No. 2583-8512000 @ S.L.P. (C) Nos. 15119-2111998
Delay condoned.
Leave granted. These S.L.Ps. arise from Judgment dated 15.11.1985 of
the Central Administrative Tribunal Jabalpur Bench. Similarly CA 4328/98 F
and C.A. 4446-47/98, arise from Punjab. These Tribunals followed the
judgment of the Bangalore Trib1:1nal and granted benefit of the increment to
the technical personnel recruited priod prior to 1.1. 86. It also appears from
what is stated in the judgments, that the counsel for the Government in those
cases agreed before the Tribunals that the judgment of the· Bangalore
Tribunal would apply. G
Here, we are concerned with a class of persons who are spread over
the entire country in the same department but the different cases were
disposed of by different Benches of Central Administrative Tribunal leading
to conflicting decisions. We are of the view that uniformity has to be H
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] 2 S.C.R.
A maintained in respect of grant of increments to all these technical persons
who belong to the same Department, though they are working in different r
parts of the country. Obviously, the counsel for the Government had agreed
before the these two Tribunals at Jabalpur and Chandigargh Bench because
at that time the Bangalore Bench judgment was holding the field. But after
B the judgment of the Full Bench of the CAT, Madras it is necessary that there
is no _discrimination between the technical personnel in different regions of
the country in the same department. We are of the view that it is a case where
uniformity has to be maintained in the Department in spite of the concession
of counsel at Jabalpur and Chandigarh. Therefore, the principles decided by
the Full Bench of the Madras Tribunal has to be applied even in respect of
c employees who went before the Tribunals at Jabalpur and Chandigarh.
Learned counsel appearing in these cases arising from the Jabalpur and
Chandigarh Bench of the Tribunal, made vehement submissions before us,
as to why the judgment of the Full Bench of the Madras Tribunal should not
D be accepted. Counsel contended that even in respect of those appointed prior
to 1.1.86 in the technical branch, the benefit could be given at least from
1.1.86. Counsel also pointed out that once the Government felt-apart from
Article 14 and the FR-that the benefit could be extended to those appointed
between 1.1.86 and 1.1.90, such benefit should have been extended even to
E those appointed earlier to 1.1.86. Otherwise, there would be anomaly
between the technical personnel appointed prior to 1.1.86 and those who
were appointed after 1.1.86. They would be drawing increments unevenly.
For the reasons which we have already given while disposing of the
appeals of the Union of India against the judgment of the · Bangalore
F Tribunal, these contentions are liable to be rejected. We have mentioned
earlier that the categories being different from the very start, no principle of
Article 14 applied. The parties not being probationers- or apprentices, the FRs
will not apply. It was only on the basis of the fact that the anomaly would
be running perpetually between technical and non-technical personnel se-
G lected at the same time by the Government that the Government extended
the benefit of one increment upto 1.1.86. While granting such concession it
was open to the Government, as already stated to take irito accou(lt the
financial burden of the Government. Further, the date has been made co-
terminus with the commencement of the recommendations of the Fourth Pay
H Commission with effect from 1.1.86. We do not find any anomaly or
U.0.1. v. R. SARANGAPANI 505
anything legally wrong in limiting the benefit to those who had undergone A
training after 1.1.86 and giving benefit notionally from 1.2.90. Further in
regard to those appointed prior to 1.1.86, it would be too late for them to
claim the benefit of the training period prior to 1.1.86.
For the aforesaid reasons, the appeals of the Union of India against the
Jabalpur and Chandigarh Bench judgments are allowed.
B
It appears in some of the cases, particularly in the case from the
Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur and Chandigarh and perhaps some
other places, the benefit granted by the Tribunals, which we are now setting
aside has been granted to the technical persons pending these appeals in this C
Court.
Learned counsel who appeared before us in the Jabalpur matters placed
before us a letter dated 20th June, 1996 which clearly stated that the
implementation of the judgment of the Tribunal at Jabalpur would be subject
to the result of any appeals that might be filed by the Union of India. Even D
in other cases, the position in our opinion would be the same, whether such
a letter was issued or not.
We, therefore direct that the· extra increment· given pursuant to any
judgment of the Tribunal which has now been set aside, be recovered by the
Union of India. It would be open to _the Government of India to recover the E
same or to absorb the same in the future monthly salary spread over, month
by month.
But there is one exception to this direction for recovery. In case where
any of these employees of the technical branch have received the benefit of
the increment because of the judgment which we have now set aside, in case
F
they have retired as of today, no recovery will be made from their retiral
benefits on the basis of the judgment which we have pronounced today.
The appeals are disposed of in the manner mentioned above. There
shall be no order as to costs. G
R.P. Appeals disposed of.
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