Holding

The Court held that there was no genuine urgency; the invocation of Section 17 was unjustified and the common notification is wholly quashed.

Summary

Fourteen properties requisitioned by the Union of India were later notified for acquisition under Sections 4 and 17(1)&(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The High Court had quashed the notification on the ground that there was no urgency and that the owners' right to object under Section 5A was denied. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the authorities had a real and genuine urgency justifying the use of the extraordinary powers in Section 17, and whether the common notification could be sustained after being invalidated in the earlier Banwari Lal and Shakuntala Gupta cases. The Court held that the authorities had ample time to acquire the lands in the ordinary manner, that no material facts supported a claim of urgency, and that the expression of urgency in a composite notification cannot be partially valid. It also affirmed that a tenant with a subsisting interest may challenge acquisition proceedings. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the quashing of the notification.

Issues considered

The existence of real urgency justifying the invocation of Section 17(1) and (4) of the Land Acquisition Act for the fourteen properties.
Whether a composite notification, already quashed in earlier cases, can be partially upheld.
Whether a tenant with a subsisting interest can challenge acquisition proceedings under Section 5A.
Whether non‑compliance with Section 17(3A) (payment of 80% compensation) vitiates the acquisition process.
Whether the appeals are barred by the doctrine of res judicata in view of the Banwari Lal and Shakuntala Gupta judgments.

Legislation cited

Defence of India Rules
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 17(1), s. 17(3A), s. 17(4), s. 4, s. 5A
Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952

Subjects

land acquisitionurgency clauseSection 17public purposetenant rightscompensationres judicatarequisition

Judgment

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. A
v.
KRISHAN LAL ARNEJA AND ORS.

APRIL 28, 2004

[SHIVARAJ V. PATIL AND D.M. DHARMADHIKARI, JJ.] B

Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Ss. 4 and 17(1)(4)/Requisitioning and
Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1953/Defence of India Rules:

Acquisition proceedings in respect of certain properties-Issuance of C
Notification-Challenge to-Quashed by High Court-On appeals, Held:
The property/properties could be acquisitioned by the Government on ground
of urgency-However, existence of exigency could be ascertained on the
basis of surrounding circumstances and available material on record and to
the subjective satisfaction of the authorities concerned-While applying D
urgency clause the State should indeed act with due care and responsibility--
Invoking of urgency clause cannot be a substitute or support for the laxity,
lethargy or lack of care on the part of the State Administration-There was
no material circumstances to support invoking of urgency clause by the
authorities concerned
E
Appeals filed in other connected matters on ground that facts and
circumstances are distinguishable-Held:-The Notification was common
and composite in respect of all the properties-Since facts and circumstances
in the connected cases are similar, the ratio ofthe decision could appropriately
be applied
F
Section 17-Acquisition of immovable properties on ground of urgency
-Exercise of extra-ordinary power-Held: It could be resorted to only in
exceptional case of real urgency for public purpose since it not only deprives
a land owner of his right to file objections in respect of the property proposed
to be acquisitioned but also dispenses with the inquiry under Section 5A. of G
the Act. .

Section 5(A)(3)-Acquisition proceedings-Tenants-Right to
challenge-Held: A tenant having sufficient subsisting interest in the land/
property could challenge it.
801 H
802 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A The properties in question were requisitioned by the appellants-Union
of India and Ors. under the Defence of India Rules and Requisitioning and
Acquisition of Immovable Property Act for the purposes of Offices and
residential quarters to its Officers. The provisions of the Act were to lapse
on March 10, 1987. The appellants instead of releasing the properties (14 in
number) notified them on March 6, 1987 for acquisition. Some of the owners
B of the properties challenged the validity of the Notification by filing Writ
Petitions. Notifications and also acquisition proceedings were quashed by the
High Court holding that there was no urgency whatsoever for invoking the
provisions of Section 17(1) and (4) of the Land Acquisition Act which denied
the owners of the properties of their rights of raising objections under Section
C S(A) of the Act; and that the authorities had no explanation for the non-
compliance of provisions of Law under Section 17(3A) of the Act by not making
payment of compensation in terms of Award passed by the Court in lieu of
acquisition of the properties. Aggrieved, Union of India filed appeals which
were dismissed, and later Review Petitions were also dismissed by this Court.
Union of India filed appeals in the present cases on the ground that the
D decisions in the decided connected matters are distinguishable and not
applicable to the facts and circumstances of the cases in these appeals.

It was contended by the appellants that the correctness of the decision
in Banwari Lal & Sons Pvt. Ltd v. Union ofIndia and Ors., DRJ (1991) Suppl.
317, one of the connected matters, was not considered in Union ofIndia and
E Ors. v. Shakuntala Gupta (Dead) by Lrs., (2002) 7 SCC 98, the other connected
matter, and that the decision in that case is distinguishable from the facts of
the present cases/appeals.

Respondents submitted that since decision in the connected matters fully
cover the case against the appellants. They cannot re-agitate on the same
F issue; and that the Notification as well as ground of urgency clause therein
was composite one in respect of all the 14 tJroperties sought to be
acquisitioned.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
G HELD: 1.1. The issue of urgency could be justified on the basis of the
surrounding circumstances and the records available at the time of subjective
satisfaction of authorities while invoking Section 17(1) and (4) of the Land
Acquisition Act. This Court had held in Shakuntala Gupta (Dead) by Lrs.,
one of the connected matters, that the expression of urgency in the common
notification being general to all the properties could not be sustained in
H respect of any particular property, on the ground that the expression of
..
-
U.0.1. v. K.L. ARNEJA 803
urgency being one and the same cannot be partly good and partly bad. Pursuant A
to the impugned notification, neither any award was passed nor any
compensation was determined and paid on the ground that the impugned
notification was quashed and set aside in Banwari Lal case. This only indicates
that even the appellants understood the impugned notification as a common
and composite notification in respect of all the properties. Since the ground B
of urgency also being common, it can not be accepted that the decision
rendered earlier in the cases of Banwari Lal or Shakunta/a Gupta on the
question-of urgency was properties specific. The decisions are binding as
precedents on question of validity of the notification. Hence, urgency claims
could not have been invoked on the facts and circumstances of the present
cases. [817-H; 818-A-B-C-D-E-F] C
Union of India and Ors. v. Shakuntala Gupta (Dead) by Lrs., [2002) 7
SCC 98 and Banwari Lal & Sons Pvt. Ltd v. Union of India and Ors., DRJ
[19911Suppl.317, relied on.

1.2. Section 17 of the Act confers extraordinary powers on the D
authorities under which it can dispense with the normal procedure laid down
under Section SA of the Act in exceptional case of urgency. Such powers
cannot be lightly resorted to except in case of real urgency enabling the
Government to take immediate possession of the land proposed to be acquired
for public purpose. A public purpose, however, laudable it may be, by itself is E
not sufficient to take aid of the Section to use this extraordinary power as
use of such power deprives a land owner of his right in relation to immovable
property to file objections for the proposes of acquisition and it also dispenses
with the inquiry under Section SA of the Act. The authorities must have
subjective satisfaction of the need for invoking urgency clause keeping in
mind the nature of the public purpose, real urgency that the situation demands F
and the time factor as to whether taking possession of the property can wait
for a minimum period within which the objections could be received from the
land owners and the inquiry under Section SA of the Act could be completed.
Normally urgency to acquire a land for public purpose does not arise suddenly
or overnight but sometimes such urgency may arise· unexpectedly, G
exceptionally or extraordinarily depending on situations where the delay is
likely to render the purpose nugatory or infructuous. A citizen's property
can be acquired in accordance with law but in the absence of real and genuine
urgency, it may not be appropriate to deprive an aggrieved party of a fair and
just opportunity of putting forth its objections for due consideration of the
acquiring authority. While applying the urgency clause, the State should H
804 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A indeed act with due care and responsibility. Invoking urgency clause cannot
be a substitute or support for the laxity, lethargy or lack of care on the part
of the State Administration. [822-D-E-F-G-H; 823-A)

1.3. There was no urgency of taking immediate possession nor there
was any immediate threat of dispossessing the appellants from the properties.
B At the most, after the lapse of the Requisition Act on 10.3.1987, appellants'
possession over the properties would have been unauthoriud, may be so long
they continued in unauthoriud possession of the properties, they were liable
to pay damages for their occupation for few months during which period they
could have completed acquisition proceedings in the normal course without
C resorting to provisions of Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act The submissfons
of the appellants -Union ofIndia and Ors., that they did not want to ·remain
in the unauthorized possession of the properties, is not convincing so as to
justify invoking of urgency clause to acquire the properties. [827-B-C-D)

HD. Vora v. State ofMaharashtra and Ors., [1984) 2 SCR 693, referred
D to.
1.4. The High Court was not right in holding that without expression of
urgency in the impugned notification itself, it could not be sustained, but then
the High Court did not rest its conclusion only on this. Having examined the
facts and circumstances of the case, it was found that there was no material
E and the circumstances even to have subjective satisfaction by the authorities
to invoke urgency clause. The finding of fact that there was no urgency for
invoking Section 17 of the Act, has become final. This finding holds good
even for thes_e appeals. Thus, having regard to the facts and circumstances
and the material available on record, the invocation of urgency clause was
without justification and untenable. 'Urgency' for invoking of the Section
F should be one arising naturally out of circumstances, which exist when the
decision to acquire the land is taken and not such, which is the result of
serious lapse or gross delay on the part of Acquiring Authority. However, ~he
position may be different where the delay is caused or occasioned by the
landowner himself. Failure to take timely action for acquisition by the
G authorities of the Union of India, cannot be a ground to invoke the urgency
clause to the serious detriment of the right of the landowners to raise
objections to the acquisition under Section SA of the Act.
(829-C-D-E; 831-F-G-HJ
Om Prakash and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors., (1998) 6 sec 1 and
H Narian Govind Gavate and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (1977) 1
sec 133, relied on.
U.0.1. v. K.L. ARNEJA 805
Union of India and Ors. v. Shakuntala Gupta (Dead) by Lrs., (2002) 7 A
SCC 98 and Banwari Lal & Sons Pvt. Ltd v. Union of India and Ors. DRJ
(19911Suppl.317, referred to.

Deepak Pahwa and Ors. v. Lt. Governor ofDelhi and Ors., (1984) 4 SCC
308; Chameli Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., (1996) 2 SCC 549 and
Union of India v. Ghanshyam Das Kedia, (1996) 2 SCC 285, distinguished. B
2. In the Objects and Reasons of the amended Act (Act No. 20of1985),
it is stated that all the properties which were requisitioned prior to the
amendment of the Act in 1970, were required to be released from requisition
or acquired by March 10, 1985. Thus, it is clear that the authorities were
aware that the properties were to be released or acquired and the maximum C
period was extended up to two years for the purpose. From the year 1985 to
1987, they had sufficient time to acquire the properties in question in the
usual course. They had enough time to provide opportunity for filing objections
and holding inquiry under Section SA of the Act There was no need to invoke
Section 17 of the Act. [827-F; G-H; 828-A) D
3. Since ground of delay was not raised by the appellants in the SLP,
the contention of the appellants that the writ petition ought to have been
dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, cannot be accepted. (832-C)

4. Since the order appointing arbitrator in the other connected cases of E
Banwari Lal and Shakuntala Gupta was upheld by this Court, there exists
no good reason to take a different view. (833-C)

5. It cannot be said that in no case, the tenant of the land which is sought
to be acquired under the provisions of the Act, could challenge the acquisition
proceedings. It is clear from Section 5A(3) of the Act that a person shall be F
deemed to be interested in land who would be entitled to claim an interest in
compensation if the land was acquired. In an appropriate case, a tenant having
sufficient subsisting interest in the land can challenge the acquisition
proceedings. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, single Judge
of the High Court did not dismiss the writ petition as not maintainable on the
ground that the tenant could not maintain the writ petition. The Division Bench G
of the High Court also affirmed the order of the Single Judge. This apart, the
very same notification being common was quashed at the instance of other
writ petitioners. Hence, at this stage the contention that the writ petition filed
by a tenant, was not maintainable, cannot be accepted. [834-B-C-DJ
H
806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development
Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Ors., (1996) 11 SCC 501, relied on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2735 of 2004.

From the Judgment and Order dated 22.3.2002 of the Delhi High Court
B in LPA No. 36/94.

WITH

Civil Appeal Nos. 2736, 2738 and 2739 of2004.

c Chandra,
Rajeev Dhawan, G.L. Singhvi, V.R. Reddy, R.F. Nariman and Sudhir
Ms. Geeta Luthra, D.N. Goburdhan, Ms. Pinky Anand, Sanjev Sahai,
Ms. Jhumjhum Sarkar, Amit Sharma, Vivek Sharma, Janesh Singh, Ms. Eliza
Rumthao, Siddartha Dave, Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, C. Mukund, Ashok
Kumar Jain, Panjak Jain, Bijoy Kumar Jai, Neeraj Malhotra, Nikhil Nayyar and
Achintya Dvivedi for the appearing parties.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, J. Leave granted.

In these appeals, common order dated 22.32002 passed in Letters Patent
E Appeals by the Olvision Bench of High Court of Delhi, is under challenge.
The facts leading to the filing of these appeals, in brief, are that:

In all, 14 properties including the properties in question in these appeals,
were notified for acquisition on 6th March, 1987, under the provisions of
Section 4 and Section 17(1) and (4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for
F short 'the Act'). Earlier these pr:operties were requisitioned by the appellants
under the Defence of India Rules. The provisions of the Requisitioning and
Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (for short '1952 Act') were
going to lapse on 10th March, 1987. These properties were occupied either
for offices or for providing residential quarters to the officers. Out of these
G 14 properties, Banwari Lal and Sons and Shakuntala Gupta had questioned
the. validity of acquisition proceedings pertaining to property no. 6, Ansari
Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi and property no'. 2, Underhill Road, Delhi,
respectively by filing separate writ petitions. The writ petitions were allowed
and acquisition proceedings were quashed including the above-mentioned
notification of 6th March, 1987. These matters attained finality having reached
H this Court. The respondents in these appeals filed writ petitions challenging ·
U.0.1. v. K.L. ARNEJA [PATIL, J.] 807
the acquisition of their properties under the very notification. Learned Single A
Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petitions. The appellants questioned
the correctness and validity of the orders made by learned Single Judge. in
the Letters Patent Appeals, which were dismissed by the impugned order
mainly following earlier judgments in the cases of Banwari Lal and Sons and
Shakuntala Gupta.
B
The learned senior counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary
objection as to the very maintainability of these appeals on the ground that
the controversy raised and the contentions sought to be urged in these
appeals are fully covered against the appellants by the judgment of this Court
in Union ofIndia and Ors. v. Shakuntala Gupta (Dead) by Lrs., [2002] 7 SCC C
98. The learned senior counsel for the appellants, however, did not agree and
sought to argue these appeals on merits raising various contentions stating
that the decisions in Shakuntala Gupta (supra) and Banwari Lal & Sons Pvt
Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., DRJ (1991) Suppl 317, are distinguishable on
•
facts and that certain questions of law, which go to the root of the matter,
were neither urged nor decided in the aforementioned two cases. Hence, we D
heard the learned counsel for the parties on either side at length.

The contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants were: ( 1) Banwari
La/'s fase was wrongly decided and further it was on its own facts being
property specific; Banwari Lal 's case was not a precedent as no reasoned
order was made by this Court inasmuch as the petition was dismissed at the E
SLP stage itself; (2) Non-mentioning of the nature and existence of urgency
in the notification issued under Sections 4 and 17 of the Act does not vitiate
the notification; subjective satisfaction as regards urgency could not be
determined solely on the basis of the expressions used in the notification and
such urgency could be gathered looking to the surrounding circumstances F
and the records which would show the urgency for the acquisition; (3) pre
and post notification delay would not affect the notification on account of
lethargy of the officers and such delay would not ren4er the exercise of power
to invoke urgency clause invalid where there was a grave urgency on account
of shortage of Government housing; (4) the High Court committed a serious
error in appointing the arbitrator to determine the damages in the absence of G
any arbitration agreement and there being no prayer in that regard in the writ
petition; (5) correctness of the order in Banwari Lal 's case was not considered
in Shakunta/a Gupta's case; paras 11, 12 and 15 in Shakuntala Gupta's case
in review must be read together to understand the correct legal position; and
(6) alternatively, notification as regards Section 17(1), could be quashed H
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A sustaining it only to the extent of Section 4(1) of the Act.

The learned senior counsel for the respondents made submissions
supporting the impugned judgment. They contended that Banwari Lal 's case
was correctly decided. The orders of this Court in Shakuntala Gupta affirm
the legal position stated in Banwari Lal. Hence the same result rightly
B followed in the writ petitions filed by the respondents in these appeals. The
High Court was right and justified in passing the impugned common judgment
affirming the order of the learned Single Judge having regard to the decision
already rendered in Banwari Lal's case in regard to the same common
notification; if a different view is taken at this stage, particularly after the
C decision in Shakuntala Gupta's case in the main appeal as well as in review,
it will lead to anomalous result leading to conflict of decisions, i.e., the very
same notification stands quashed in respect of some writ petitioners which
has attained finality by virtue of affirmation of the said order by this court
in Banwa,ri .Lal 's case and Shakuntala Gupta's case and in regard to other
writ petitions filed by the present respondents, it will have to be sustained.
D If that be so, it will result in treating similarly placed persons differently on
same set of facts. The learned senior counsel further urged that non-compliance
of Section l 7(3A) is_ yet another ground for quashing notification; strict
compliance of sub-section (3A) of Section 17 is mandatory. According to
them, in these cases even on the facts and circumstances found, there was
E neither material nor justification to invoke urgency clause; they f!lade
submissions distinguishing decisions relied on behalf of the appellants having
regard to the facts of those cases and the points that arose for consideration.
It was also their contention that the appellants having been in possession of
the properties, there was no reason to invoke .urgency clause to take immediate
possession; at best, after the expiry of the 1952 Act as amended by Act No.
F 20 of 1985, the appellants continuing in unauthorized possession, could be
made to pay damages or compensation for the period during which they
unauthorisedly continued to be in possession. They also submitted that this
Court sustained the appointment of arbitrator to determine the damages made
in earlier decisions and having taken note of the same, as can be seen from
the impugned common judgment in these appeals; almost after 17 years, it ·
G may not be just and equitable to direct the parties to approach civil court for
claiming damages. The learned counsel submitted that Shakunta,la Gupta's
case is concluded on facts and in law in relation to the very same notification
against the appellants. In SLP No. 9264/2003, the ground of delay in filing writ
petition is' not raised; the learned Single Judge did not find delay as a good
H \round for rejecting the writ petition on the facts and circumstances. The
U.0.1. v. K.L. ARNEJA [PATIL, J.] 809
Division Bench in the LPA agreed with the learned Single Judge. A
In reply, the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that non-
compliance of sub-section (3A) of Section 17 may affect the possession and
not the acquisition; on account of such non-compliance, party may be entitled
for interest under Section 23A of the Act; it would also not lead to returning
possession (}f the property. B
We have carefully considered the respective submissions made by the
learned counsel for the parties. The notification issued on 6.3.1987 which was
the subject matter of challenge in the writ petitions, reads :

"NOTIFICATION c
Dated 5.3.1987

No. F.7(9)/86-L&B: (l) Whereas it appears to the Governor of
Delhi that the lands/properties are likely to be required to be taken by
the government at the public expense for the following public purposes. D
It is hereby notified that the land in the locality described below is
likely to be required for the above purpose.

This notification is made under the provisions of Section 4 of the
Land Acquisition Act, to all whom it may concern.
E
In exercise of the powers conferred by the aforesaid section, the
Lt. Governor is pleased to authorize the officers for the time being
engaged in the undertaking with their servants and workmen to enter
upon and survey any land in the locality and do all other acts required
or permitted by that section.
F
The Lt. Governor, being of the opinion that the provisions of sub-
section ( l) of Section 17 of the said Act are applicable to this land,
is further pleased under sub-section 4 of the said section, to direct
that the provisions of Section 5A shall not apply.

SPECWICATION G
SI. Property Total Area Field or Purpose of
No. boundaries No. acquisition
2 3 4 5
1. 95, Lal Kothi 321 sq. mts. East Kutab Road, Residential use
IrI
810 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A Jatwara Mohalla West Hosue of of Govt.
Sh. Tej Ram, servants
North Gali, South
Shops.

2 8 A. Kamla Nagar 285 sq. mtrs. East Road, West Housing the
B Delhi G.T. Road, North govt. offices
Property No. 7A
South Property
No.9-A
3. 30I, OkhlaNew 106 sq. mtrs. East Gali West Setting up of
c Delhi Hosue No. 76/I, dispensary
Dispensary, North
Road, South
HouseNo. 30I-A
4. I5, Alipur Road Big - Bis Khasra No. 537 Housing the
D and Civil Station 7 - I2. Min. 7 bigha 6 I 0 govt. offices
Min. I2 Biswas
5. I Rajpur Road .10-I3· 98 I/500 big-bis Housing the
Civil Station 0- 05 govt. office &
I0-08 govt. servants
E 6. I 5 Rajpur road 475 I I - IO Housing the
Civi Station govt. offices

7. 2, Under Hill ll-740 sq. mts. East Kothi No. I6, Housing the
Road, Delhi Alipur Road, West govt. office
K. No. 4 Road,
F South K. No. 4 & 6
Under Hill Road

8. 6012 I, Ramjas. 475 sq. mts. East Ramjas Raod Residential use
Road, Delhi West 60/2, North of govt.
Street, South Road servant.
G 9. 30, Rohtak Road 1087 sq. mts. East Plot No. 29 Residential use
1087 Delhi West Plot No. 31 of govt.
North Road South servants.
Gali
10. I I , Lencer Road 1125 sq. mts. East K. No. 1 Housing the
H
U.O.l. v. K.L. ARNEJA (PATIL, J.] &11

Delhi West K. No. IO-A govt. offices A
North service
Land South Road

11. 3, Tilak Marg East Old Qila East Old Qila Road Housing the
Road, West West Tilak Marg govt. offices
Road North Police , B
Station South
Rajdootawas
Kothi No. 1

12. 6 Ansari Road, 5592 sq. yds. East Land, West Residential use
Daryaganj, Delhi Electric Transfonn~rs of govt. C
Station and Ansari servants
Road, North Masjid
Ghat Road, South
K.No.5
13. 97, Daryaganj 320 sq. yds. East Road, West for residential D
Delhi. Sham Lal Road use of govt.
North-Kothi No. 96 servants.
South-Kothi No. 98
14. M.C. No. 500 to 1595 sq. yds East-House, West Housing the
507, Ward No. Gali, North-Gali govt. offices
IX/6062, Gandhi South-Gali
E
Nagar (4 set of
Old Police Station,
Gandhi Nagar,
Seelarnpur)
By order F
Sd/-
(Mrs. Neeru Singh)
Joint Secretary (L&B)
Delhi Administration,
Delhi".
G
Under this notification, 14 properties were sought to be acquired.

Banwari Lal and Sons filed writ petition No. 2385/88 seeking quashing
of the aforesaid notification in respect of property 6, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj,
Delhi. The purpose of acquisition of this property was mentioned as for
"residential use of government servants". This property No. 6 Ansari Road, H
812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A Darya Ganj, measures 5592 sq. yds., with built up area of about 6,000 sq. ft.
It is situated in the main commercial centre of Delhi and was being used all
along for commercial purpose by Bharat Bank and then by the American
Embassy for running the United States Information Centre. On 27 .9.19.50, four
flats out of the said building were acquisitioned by the Delhi Administration
under the provisions of Requisitioning and Acquisition oflmmovable Property
B Act, 1952. Further on 13.3.1959, remaining building along with the garages,
warehouses and other structures was requisitioned by .the Administration
under the same Act. The building continued under the requisition till the said
Act lapsed on 10.3.1987. It may be recalled that notification under Section 4
read with Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act was issued on 6.3.1987 for acquiring
C 14 properties including this building, 6 Ansari Road, Darya Ganj, Delhi. On
10.3.1987, Delhi Administration issued notification under Section 6 of the Act
and issued a letter to the Collector to take possession of the property within
15 days. Thereafter the Administration proposed to the writ petitioners that
the building be given on lease and the negotiations for lease were continued
for long. The officers of the Administration continued to stay in the building
D for over 20 months. Suddenly, the Administration decided to proceed with
land acquisition after a period of 20 months. At that stage, the above-
mentioned writ petition was filed. On 25.11.1988, the High Court directed that
the possession of the building was not to be taken by the Administration
under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act but the acquisition proceedings
E could go on. Thereafter, award was passed fixing compensation at Rs.
77, 11,230.60. Petitioners were ready to receive the compensation under protest
but the Administration did not make the payment. It also did not offer the
payment of 80% of the proposed compensation under Section l 7(3A) of the
Act. Mainly three grounds were urged in the writ petition : (l) The notification
issued under Sections 4 and 17 did not indicate the urgency for taking
F possession and, therefor~, the same was vitiated in law; petitioners were
illegally deprived of their right to raise objections and inquiry under Section
5A of the Act; (2) the Administration could not acquire commercial building
for residential purpose; and (3) that the whole exercise of acquisition of the
building was a fraud on the powers under the Act. On behalf of the
G Administration, it was contended that the building was urgently needed for
the residence of the officers, the building was being used for residential
purpose for a long time and for payment of amount under sub-section (3A)
of Section 17, steps had been taken for securing the sanction. The High Court
dealing with the contentions raised in the said writ petition held that there
was no whisper in the notification as to what was the urgency to take
H immediate possession and to deny the right of raising objections under
U.0.I. v. K.L. ARNEJA [PATIL, J.] 813
Section 5A of the Act; the building was already in occupation of the officers A
of the Delhi Administration and the Administration knew that the Requisitioning
and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 was to lapse on I 0.3.1987;
they had sufficient time to make alternate arrangements for the residence of
the officers and that there was no urgency whatsoever for invoking the
provisions of Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act. The court also held that
Section 17(1) could not beiutilized to cover up the laxity and lethargy of the B
Administration in taking appropriate steps for securing alternate accommodation
for its officers. The notification was also held bad in law for non-compliance
of the requirement of Section l 7(3A) of the Act, in that the Collector did not
tender 80% of the compensation of the land as estimated by him before taking
possession of the land and that the Delhi Administration had no explanation C
for the non-compliance of Section l 7(3A) except saying that process of
sanction had been initiated by them. The High court also held that issuing
of notification under Section 17(1) was a fraud on the powers. In that view,
the notification was quashed and direction was given to hand over the
peaceful physical possession of the building to the petitioner. An arbitrator
also was appointed to determine the damages payable by Administration D
having taken note of the facts and to avoid further delay. The Union of India
and Ors., filed SLP No. 4458/91, aggrieved by this order of the High Court
dated 4.2.1991 made in the writ petition. The SLP was dismissed on 21.3.1991
by passing the following order : -

"In the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any good E'
ground to interfere with the impugned order of the High Court. The
Special Leave Petition is accordingly dismissed.

Although we have dismissed the petition but having regard to the
fact that public servants are residing in the premises in dispute and
their immediate dispossession may cause injury to public interest, we F
allow the petitioners to continue in possession till 31.3 .1993 9rovided
the petitioners file an undertaking in this Court within thr~e weeks
with usual conditions to hand over the vacant possession of the
premises including the servant quarters on or before 31.3.1993, we
further make it clear that the Arbitrator appointed by the High G
Court may give award and the same may be filed before the High
Court for appropriate orders. "

(emphasis supplied)

Shakuntala Gupta filed writ petition No. 894 of 1987 inter alia raising H
814 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A similar contentions as were raised in Banwari Lal case (supra). The High
Court allowed the said writ petition and quashed the notification following the
order made in the case of Banwari Lal and Sons aforementioned. The Union
of India and Ors., filed Civil Appeal No. 518 of 1998 before this Court by l
1
special leave. This Court disposed of the said appeal on 14.11.2000 observing
thus:-
B
"The High Court quashed the impugned notification by following its
earlier decision in Banwari Lal & Sons v. Union of India decided on
4th February, 1991 in which this very notification was quashed. It is
not in dispute that subject matter including the notification under
Land Acquisition were the same except that in Banwari Lal it was the
c government housing for the officers while in the present case it is
housing for the offices. The said deeision of the High Court stood
confirmed when this Court dismissed the SLP filed by the Union of
India. We do not find any sustainable ground raised in the present
appeal to make any distinct or difference from the one in the case of
D Banwari Lal and Sons. Accordingly, there is no error committed by
the High Court in making the decision and dismissing the same.
Accordingly the present appeal has no merits and it is dismissed."

Further Union ofIndia and Ors., fil~d a review petition (c) No. 74 of2001 in
aforementioned appeal No. 518/98. The review petition was disposed of on
E 27.8.2002 by a considered order in the light of contentions urged and arguments
advanced extensively. The said order is reported as Union of India and Ors.
v. Shakuntala Gupta (Dead) by Lrs., [2002] 7 SCC 98.

The learned counsel for the respondents heavily relied on this decision
and contended that it fully covers the case against the appellants; in view
F of the same, it is not open to the appellants particularly being the partfos to
the said decision, to re-agitate on the same issue again when the notification
being composite one in respect of all 14 properties sought to be acquired
under it and when the ground of urgency was also common in respect of all
the 14 properties. But according to the learned counsel for the appellants, the
G correctness of decision in Banwari Lal is not decided in this case and it is
clearly distinguishable in applying to the facts of the cases in these appeals.
In other words, the decision in Shakunta/a Gupta is confined to its own
facts. In the light of these submissions and that this decision will have great
bearing on the question in deciding these appeals whether urgency clause
could be invoked under Section 17( l) and (4) of the Act, the notification being
H
U.0.1. v. K.L. ARNEJA [PATIL, J.] 815

composite one in respect of all 14 properties including the properties which A
are the subject matter of these appeals, we will refer to the decision in greater
details. In the case of Shakuntala Gupta, part of the premises known as
Grand Hotel situated at No. 2, Underhill Road, Delhi, had been requisitioned
on 3.4.1980 under the Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property
Act, 1952, which lapsed on 10.3.1987. On 6.3.1987, the very same notification, B
which is also the subject matter of these appeals, was issued under Section
4 read with Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act. In this notification, 14 properties
were specified to which it applied. This notification also indicated purpose for
which each property was sought to be acquired, the purpose being either
"housing the Govt. office" or "for residential use of Govt. servants".
c
Shakuntala Gupta challenged the notification issued under Section. 4
read with Section 17(1) and (4) as well as the declaration made under Section
6 of the Act under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High
Court. As already stated above, Banwari Lal and Sons Pvt. Ltd., the owner
of one of the 14 properties specified in the notification, also filed writ petition D
in the High Court impugning the same notification inter alia urging that there
was no urgency to dispense with the right of the owner to file objections and
inquiry under Section SA of the Act. Banwari Lal's writ application was
allowed on 4.2.1991 quashing the impugned notification upholding the
contentions urged on behalf of Banwari Lal including the issue of urgency.
The SLP filed against the decision of the High Court in Banwari Lal case was E
dismissed by this Court on 21.3 .1991. The appellants vacated the Banwari
Lal's premises pursuant to the order of this Court made on 21.3.1991. The
Division Bench of the High Court disposed of Shakuntala Gupta's writ petition
following Banwari Lal's case quashing the impugned notification. In the SLP
filed against the said order by the appellants, leave was granted on 19.l.1998 F
and hearing of the appeal was expedited. The appeal was duly listed for
hearing from time to time and ultimately on 14.11.2000, the appeal was disposed
of by a reasoned order, relevant portion of which is already extracted in the
earlier paragraph. Later the appellants made an application for recalling the
order dismissing the appeal on the ground that it was disposed of without
hearing them. On 10.1.2001, accepting the request of the appellants, the G
application made for recalling the order dated 14.11.2000 was treated as a
review petition and the review petition was accordingly heard. In support of
the review petition, relying on the decisions of this Court in Ajlatoon and Ors.
v. Lt. Governor of Delhi a'ld Ors., [l 975] 4 SCC 285, Deepak Pahwa and Ors.
v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Ors., [1984] 4 sec 308, Satendra Prasad Jain H
816 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors., [1993] 4 SCC 369 and Chame/i Singh and
Ors. v. State ofU.P. andAnr., [1996] 2 SCC 549, it was urged thatthe principles
of Jaw enunciated in Banwari Lat's case no longer held the field. On that
basis, it was contended that the decision of the High Court quashing the
impugned notification by following Banwari Lal's decision was erronecus.
B Opposing the review petition, it was urged that the review petition itself was
not maintainable as there was no error apparent on the face of the record; the
same notification stood quashed in Banwari Lal 's casej since the impugned
notification had been quashed on a general ground which did not specifically
relate to a particular petitioner, the quashing of the notification must enure
to the benefit of all persons affected by ~hat notification. In support of this,
C reliance was placed on Abhey Ram (Dead) by LR. and Ors. v. Union ofIndia
and Ors., [1997] 5 SCC 421 and Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uhan
and Ors., [2000] 7 SCC 296. The review petition was disposed of on 27.8.2002
since reported in [2002] 7 SCC 98. To appreciate the rival submissions as to
the implication and understanding of this judgment, it is necessary to reproduce
D paras 12, 13 and 15 of the judgment which read:-

"12. The matter has been argued extensively. We therefore do not
propose to reject the application on the ground that the review
application should not at all be, entertained. It is also not necessary
to consider whether the decision in Banwari Lal (Banwari Lal &
E Sons (P) Ltd v. Union of India, DLJ 1991 Supp 317) correctly
enunciates the principles of law as to acquisitions under Section 17
of the Act as we are of the view that the order of this Court dated
14-11-2000 was, ir. the circumstances of the case, correct.

13. It appears that the petitioners have proceeded on the~ basis that
F the acquisition s~ught to be effected by the impugned notification
under Section 4 had been invalidated in respect of other specified
properties by the decision of this Court in Banwari Lal case. The
statement in the respondent's affidavit that several of the properties
covered by (he same notification have since been returned by the
petitioners to the original owners, has not. been disputed by the
G petitioners. Furthermore, the High Court in the decision impugned
before us has also noted:
"It is also not disputed that under the impugned notifications
neither an award has been made nor any compensation is
determined and paid. The reason being that the impugned
H notifications were quashed and set aside in Banwari Lal case.
U.OJ .. v. K.L: ARNEJA [PATIL, J.] 817
14 .................................................................... . A
15. In any event the order dated 14-11-2000 was not legally erroneous.
The notification under Section 4 was a composite one. The "opinion"
of the Lt. Governor that the provisions of Section 17(1) of the Act
were applicable, as expressed in the last paragraph of the impugned
notification, was relatable in general to the 14 properties specified B ·
in the notification. The impugned notification was quashed in Banwari
Lal case (Banwari Lal & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Union ofIndia, DLJ (1991)
Supp 317) inter alia on the ground that the "opinion" of the Lt.
Governor as expressed in the notification was insufficient for the
purpose of invoking the provisions of Section 17(1) of the Act. This C
ground was not peculiar to the premises in Banwari LOI case (Banwari
Lal & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, DLI 199I Supp 317) but
common to all fourteen properties. The urgency sought to be
expressed in the impugned notification cannot be held to be sufficient
for the purposes of Section 17(I) in this case when it has already
been held to be bad in Banwari Lal case. (Abhey Ram v. Union of D
India, [1997] 5 SCC 421; Delhi Admn. v. Gurdip Singh Uban, [2000]
7 SCC 296. The expression of urgency being one cannot be partly
good and partly bad like the curate's egg. It must follow that the
acquisition in respect of the respondent's premises as mentioned in
the notification which were sought to be acquired on the basis of E
such invalid expression of "urgency" cannot be sustained."

(emphasis supplied)

It is needless to repeat that a judgment need not be read and interpreted
as a statute and that a judgment should be read and understood in the context
of the facts of case and looking to the ratio. The sentence in paragraph 12, F
extracted above, that "It is also not necessary to consider whether the
decision in Banwari Lal correctly enunciates the principles of law as to
acquisitions under Section 17 of the Act as we are of the view that the order
of this Court dated 14.11.2000 was, in the circumstances of the case, correct",
has reference to enunciation of principles of law in relation to Section 17 as G
to the expression of urgency as stated in Banwari Lal, i.e., whether the
existence of urgency and expression of urgency must be specifically stated
in the notification issued under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(1) of the Act
and if not whether the notification is vitiated. In view of the later decisions
of this Court, even in the absence of stating as to the existence of urgency
or express statement as to urgency, the issue of urgency could be justified H
818 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A on the basis of the surrounding circumstances and the records available at
the time of subjective satisfaction of authorities to invoke the aid of Section
17(1) and (4). It is in that context that the statement is made in para 12 not
with regard to the validity of the impugned common notification in respect
of all the 14 properties which fact is abundantly clear from what is stated
specifically in para 15 of the judgment extracted above in relation to
B sustainability of the impugned notification or otherwise in respect of one or
other· property. On this basis, the court had held that the expression of
urgency in the common notification being general to all 14 properties could
not be sustained in respect of any particular property, on the ground that the
expression of urgency being one and the same cannot be partly good and
C partly bad. In the same para, the decision in Banwari Lal 's case that the
impugned common notification was ·bad, is accepted. As is evident from
paragraph 13 that pursuant to the impugned notification, neither any award
was passed nor any compensation was determined and paid on the ground
that the impugned notification was quashed and set aside in Banwari Lal's
case. This only indicates that even the appellants understood the impugned
D notification as a common and composite notification in respect of all the 14
properties. The ground of urgency also being common, it is not possible to
accept that the decision rendered in the cases of Banwarl Lal or Shakuntala
Gupta on the question of urgency was properties specific. The decision in
Banwari Lal and Shakuntala Gupta of this ·Court in relation to the same
E notification may not be binding on principle of res judicata. The argument,
however, cannot be accepted that those decisions are not binding being
'properties specific' in those cases. In our considered opinion, the decisions
are binding as precedents on question of validity of the notification, which
invokes urgency clause under Section 17 of the Act. We find ourselves in full
agreement with the ratio of the decisions in those cases that urgency clause,
F on the facts and circumstances, which are similar to the present cases, could
not have been invoked. The two decisions are, therefore, binding as precedents
of this Court. We are not able to find any distinction or difference as to the
ground of urgency in regard to the properties covered by these appeals.

In the order disposing of the appeal on 14.11.2000, it is clearly stated
G that the High Court quashed the impugned notification following its earlier
decision in Banwari Lal 's case; the subject matter including the notification
under the Act was the same ex<.;ept that in Banwari Lal 's case, it was the
Govt. housing for the officers while in the Shakuntala Gupta's case, it is
housing for the offices. No sustainable ground was found in the appeal to
H make any distinction or difference between the cases of Banwari Lal and
U.0.1. v. K.L. ARNEJA [PATIL, J.] 819
Shukuntala Gupta. In review, this order was not disturbed. In Banwari Lal's A
case on the facts found and looking to the circumstances in the background
of lapsing of the Requisitioning Act and taking note of laxity and lethargy
on the part of the officers, the Court concluded that there existed no urgency
to invoke Section 17(1) of the Act. This notification was struck down not
merely on the ground that the existence of urgency is not stated in the
impugned notification. The ground of urgency was common to all 14 properties. ~
It is not the case that the ground of urgency was different in respect of
different properties which fact is clear from the composite notification. Further
it was also not shown either in Banwari Lal 's case or in Shakuntala Gupta's
case if the ground of urgency was different in respect of different properties.
In this view and looking to what is stated in paragraph 15, extracted above, C
we find substantial force in the preliminary objec~ion raised on behalf of the
respondents. However, in the light of arguments advanced at length, we wish
to deal with them.

The provisions of the Act, to the extent they are relevant, are reproduced
hereunder :- D
"Section 4 - Publication of preliminary notification and powers of
officers thereupon - (l) Whenever it appears to the (appropriate
Government) that land in any locality (is needed or) is likely to be
needed for any public purpose (or for a company) a notification to
that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette (and in two daily E
newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be
in the regional language) and the Collector shall cause public notice
of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places
in the said locality (the last of the dates of such publication and the
giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date F
of the publication of the notification).

(2) Thereupon it shall be lawful for any officer, either generally or
specially authorized by such Government in this behalf, and for his
servants and workmen, -

to enter upon and survey and take levels of any land in such G
locality;

to dig or bore in the subsoil;

to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is
adapted for such purpose; H
820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to be taken and
the intended line of the work (if any proposed to be made thereon);

to make such levels, boundaries and. line by placing marks and
cutting trenches; and where otherwise the survey cannot be completed
and the levels taken and the boundaries and lines marked, to cut down
B and clear away any part of the standing crop; fence of jungle;

provided that no person shall enter into any building or upon any
other enclosed court or garden attached to a dwelling house (unless
with the consent of the occupier thereof) without previously giving
such occupier at least seven days' notice in writing of his intention
c to do so."

"Section SA - Hearing of objections - ( 1) Any person interested
in any land which has been notified under Section 4, sub-section (1 ),
as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a
company may, within thirty days from the date ofthe publication of
D the notification, object to the acquisition of the land or of any land
in the locality, as the case may be.

(2) Every objection under sub--section (1) shall be made to the Collector
in writing, and the Collector shall give the objector an opportunity of
being heard in person or by any person authorized by him in this
E behalf or by pleader and shall, after hearing all such objections and
after rnaking such further inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, either
make a report in respect of the land which has been notified under
Section 4, sub-Section ( l ), or make different reports in respect of
different parcels of such land, to the appropriate G~vernment,
containing his recommendations on the objections, together with the
F
record of the proceedings held by him, for the decision of that
Government. The decision of the Appropdate Government on the
objections shall be final.

(3) For the purpose of this section, a person shall be deemed to be
interested in land who would be entitled to claim an interest in
G
compensation if the land were acquired under this Act."

"Section 17 - Special powers i.n cases of urgency - ( l) In cases of
urgency, whenever the Appropriate Government so directs, the
collector, though no such award has been made may, on the expiration
H of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section
U.0.1. v. K.L. ARNEJA [PATIL, J.) 821
9, sub-section (1), [take possession of any land needed for a public A
purpose]. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government,
free from all encumbrances.

(2) Whenever owing to any sudden change in the channel of any
navigable river or other unforeseen emerg~ncy, it becomes ne'?essary
for any Railway Administration to acquire the immediate possession B
of any land for the maintenance of their traffic or for the purpose of
making thereon a river-side or ghat station, or of providing convenient
connection with or access to any such station, [or the appropriate
Government considers it necessary to acquire the immediate possession
of any land for the purpose of maintaining any structure or system C
pertaining to irrigation, water supply, drainage, road communication or
electricity,] the Collector may, immediately after the publication of the
notice mentioned in sub-section (I) and with the previous sanction of
the appropriate Government, enter upon and take possession of such
land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free
from all encumbrances: D
Provided that the Collector shall not take possession of any
building or part of a building under this sub-section without giving
to the occupier thereof at least forty-eighty hours' notice of his
intention so to do, or such longer notice as may be reasonably
sufficient to enable such occupier to remove his movable property E
from such building without unnecessary inconvenience.

(3) ............................... .

(3A) Before taking possession of any ·land under sub-section (I) or
sub-section (2), the Collector shall, without prejudice to the provisions F
of sub..:section (3), -

(a) tender payment of eighty per centum of the compensation for
such land as estimated by him to the persons interested entitled
thereto, and '··

(b) pay it to them, unless prevented by some one or more of the G
contingencies mentioned in section 31, sub-section (2), and where
the Collector is so prevented, the provisions of section 31, sub-
section (2), (except the second proviso thereto), shall apply as
they apply to the payment of compensation under that section.

(3B) ............................. . H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A (4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate
Government, the provisions of sub-section (I), or sub-section
(2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that
the provisions of section SA shall not apply, and, if it does so
direct, a declaration may be made under section 6 in respect of
the land at ~ny time after the date .of the publication of the
B notification under section 4, sub-section (I)." ·

These provisions clearly provide protection to a person whose land is
to be acquired by providing right to object to the proposed acquisition of any
land notified under Section 4; opportunity of hearing is also provided to show
that the proposal to acquire the land was unwarranted; such opportunity
C available under Section SA cannot be denied except in case of urgency.

Section l 7·confers extraordinary powers on the authorities under which
it can dispense with the normal procedure laid down under Section SA of the
Act in exceptional case of urgency. Such powers cannot be lightly resorted
D to except in case of real urgency enabling the Government to take immediate
possession of the land proposed to be acquired for public purpose. A public
purpose, however laudable it may be, by itself is not sufficient to take aid of
Section 17 to use this extraordinary power as use of such power deprives a
land owner of his right in relation to immovable property to file objections for
the proposed acquisition and it also dispenses with the inquiry under Section
E SA of the Act. The Authority must have subjective satisfaction of the need
for invoking urgency clause under Section 17 keeping in mind the nature of
the public purpose, real urgency that the situation demands and the time
factor, i.e., whether taking possession of the property can wait for a minimum
period within which the objections could be received from the land owners
F and the inquiry under Section SA of the Act could be completed. In other
words, if power under Section 17 is not exercised, the very purpose for which
the land is being acquired urgently, would be frustrated or defeated. Normally
urgency to acquire a land for public purpose does not arise suddenly or
overnight but sometimes such urgency may arise unexpectedly, exceptionally
or extraordinarily depending on situations such as due to earthquake, flood
G or some specific time-bound project where the delay is likely to render the
purpose nugatory or infructuous. A citizen's property can be acquired in
accordance with law but in the absence of real and genuine urgency, it may
not be appropriate to deprive an aggrieved party of a fair and just opportunity
of putting forth its objections for due consideration of the acquiring authority.
H While applying the urgency clause, the State should indeed act with due care
U.0.1. v. K.L. ARNEJA [PATIL, J.] 823
and responsibility. Invoking urgency clause cannot be a substitute or support A
for the laxity, lethargy or lack of care on the part of the State Administration.

Life of Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act,
1952, was extended from time to time by various amending Acts. Finally by
Act No. 20 of 1985, the period was extended to retain the properties under
the said Act for a maximum period of two years which expired on 10.3.1987. B
The Statement of Objects and Reasons of this Act - No. 20 of 1985 are as
follows:-

"According to the provisions of the Requisitioning and Acquisition
of Immovable Property Act, 1952 as these existed immediately before
the amendment of the Act by ordinance No. 2 of 1985, all the C
properties, which were requisitioned prior to the amendment of the
aforesaid Act in 1970, were required to be released from requisition
9r acquired by the 10th March, 1985. However, it was found that
some of the properties requisitioned under the abo_ve Act are required
to be retained by the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Works and p
Housing and also some other Ministry/Department and Delhi
Administration for public purposes. Although Government is
expeditiously implementing the policy of acquiring or releasing from
requisition the requisitioned properties, a number of them are
expected to be needed by the Government even after the 10th March,
1985, for public purposes. The Ministry of Defence is taking action E ·
for either releasing or acquiring the requisitioned properties
(including land). Similarly, in the case of Ministry of Works and
Housing, the need to continue the properties under requisition beyond
the aforesaid date is due to shortage of office accommodation for
various Ministry/Departments and also due to a few cases being F
under adjudication by courts of Jaw. The Ministry of Works and
Housing has constructed a new office building in Calcutta for the
Govt. offices located in requisitioned properties and, therefore, most
of the requisitfoned properties in Calcutta are expected to be released
from requisition shortly. An office building is nearing completion in
New Bombay also and the same is likely to be allotted as alternative G
accommodation to the eligible offices located in requisitioned
properties. It was, therefore, decided to extent the maximum period
for which properties could be retained under requisition by a period
of two years.

2................................. H
824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A 3. In the circumstances stated above, the Act was amended through
the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1985 (2 of 1985) so as to extend the period
for which the properties could be retained under requisition by two
years and to provide for revision of the ·recurring part of the
compensation."
B
(emphasis supplied)

This Court in the case of HD. Vora v·. State of Maharashtra and Ors.,
[ 1984] 2 SCR 693, dealing with the scope of Requisitioning and Acquisition
of Immovable Property Act, 1952, in relation to length of the period for which
c the properties requisitioned could be continued, has observed thus :-

"The two concepts, one of requisition and the other of acquisition are
totally distinct and ~ndependent. Acquisition means the acquiring of
the entire title of the expropriated owner whatever the nature and
extent of that title may be. The entire bundle of rights which was
D vested in the original holder passes on acquisition to the acquirer
leaving nothing to the former. Vide: Observations of Mukherjee, J. in
Chiranjit Lal case (Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India, [1950] SCR 869
and AIR ( 195 l) SC 41 ). The concept of acquisition has an air of
permanence, and finality in that there is transference of the title of the
E original holder to the acquiring authority. But the concept of requisition
involves merely taking of "domain or control over property without
acquiring rights of ownership" and must by its very nature be of
temporary duration. If requisitioning of property could legitimately
continue for an indefinite period of time, the distinction between
requisition and acquisition would tend to become blurred, because in
F that event for all practical purposes the right to possession and
enjoyment of the property which constitutes a major constituent
element of the right of ownership would be vested indefinitely without
any limitation of time in the requisitioning authority and it would be
possible for the authority to substantially take over the property
G without acquiring it and paying full market value as compensation
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. We do not think that the
Government can under the guise of requisition continued for an
indefinite period of time, in substance acquire the property, because
that would be a fraud on the power conferred on the government.
If the Government wants to take over the property for an indefinite
-H
U.O.I. v. K.L. ARNEJA [PATIL, J.] 825
period of time, the Government must acquire the property but it A
cannot use the power of requisition for achieving that object. The
power of requisition is exercisable by the Government only for a
public purpose which is of a transitory character. If the public purpose
for which the premises are required is of a perennial or permanent
character from the very inception, no order can be passed
requisitioning the premises and in such a case the order ofrequisition, B
if passed, would be a fraud upon the statute, for the Government
would be requisitioning the premises when really speaking they
want the premises for acquisition, the object of taking the premises
being not transitory but pennanent in character. Where the purpose
for which the premises are required is of such a character that from C
the very inception it can never be served by requisitioning the premises
but can be achieved only by acquiring the property which would be
the case where the purpose is of a permanent character or likely to
subsist for an indefinite period of time, the Government may acquire
the premises but it certainly cannot requisition the premises and
continue the requisitioning indefinitely. Here in the present case the D
order of requisition was made as far back as April 9, 1951 and even
if it was made for housing a homeless person and the appellant at that
time fell within the category of homeless person, it cannot be allowed
to continue for such an inordinately long period as third years. We
must therefore hold that the order of requisition even if it was valid E
when made, ceased to be valid and effective after the expiration of
a reasonable period of time. It is not necessary for us to decide what
period of time may be regarded as reasonable for the continuance of
an order of requisition in a given case, because ultimately the answer
to this question must depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case but there can be no doubt that whatever be the public purpose F
for which an order of requisition is made, the period of time for which
the order of requisition may be continued cannot be an unreasonably
long period such as thirty years. The High Court was, therefore, in
any view of the matter, right in holding that in the circumstances the
order of requisition could not survive any longer and the State G
Government was bound to revoke the order of requisition and
derequisition the flat and to take steps to evict the appellant from the
flat and to hand over vacant possession of it to the third respondent."

(emphasis supplied)
H
826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A In these appeals also, the properties in question had been under
requisition for a very long time. It appears, the Union Works and Housing
Minister on ·28.3.1985 assured the Lok Sabha that the Government would
return all requisitioned properties within two years or acquire it permanently
after paying compensation. This announcement came at the end of the debate
on the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property (Amendment)
B Bill, 1985 which later became Act. From the debate, it is also clear that the
National Conference Member mentioned about the difficulties faced by many
people whose properties were requisitioned for one purpose or the other. The
Minister infonned that he had written letter to the concerned for making
arrangements for vacating or pennanently acquiring the properties wiiliin next
C two years.

The Office Memorandum dated 9.7.1979 reads:-

"Delhi Administration, Delhi (Public Works Department)
Vikas Bhawan, New Delhi.
D No. F.l3/22n9-PWD/Allot/8397Dated 9.7.1979

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Due to amendment in the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immova~le
Property Act, 1952 and as per Decision of the Executive Council all
E the requisitioned/leased houses which are with the Administration
for more than JO years are to be released to their owners immediately.
As such it has since been decided by the Administration to compile
a priority list of the occupants of requisitioned/leased houses with a
view to allot them alternative accommodation on priority basis. All the
F occupants of requisitioned/leased houses are requested to furnish
the relevant information in the enclosed performa by 16. 7.1979
failing which, the officer concerned will be liable for eviction from
requisitioned house without provision for alternative
accommodations. This may please be noted

G (L.d. Gupta)
Under Secretary (PWD)
Shri K.K. Kamra,
Exchange Stores 13,
Alipur Road, Delhi
H
U.0.1. v. K.L. ARNEJA [PATIL, J.] 827
Despatcher, A
P.W.D./L.S.G Deptt.
Delhi Administration l.P. Estate, N .Delhi-11000 l"
(emphasis supplied)

One more aspect to be noticed is, as observed by the High Court, that B
the properties in question continued to be in possession of the appellants;
in other words, there was no urgency of taking immediate possession nor
til.ere was any immediate threat of dispossessing them from the properties. At
the most, after the lapsing of the Requisition Act on 10.3.1987, their possession
over the properties would have been unauthorized, may be so long they
continued in unauthorized possession of the properties, they were liable to C
pay damages for their occupation for few months during which period they
could have completed acquisition proceedings in the normal course without
resorting to provisions of Section 17 (1) and (4) of the Act. During the course
of the hearing, we specifically asked the learned counsel for the appellants
in this regard· and the only answer was that the appellants being Union of
India and Ors., did not want to remain in the unauthorized possession of the D
properties. We are not convinced by this reply so as to justify invoking
urgency clause to acquire the properties. Having regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case in these appeals, the authorities could have
completed acquisition proceedings in couple of months even after providing
opportunity for filing objections and holding inquiry under Section SA of the E
Act if they were really serious.

In the Objects and Reasons of Act No. 20 of 1985, it is stated that all
the properties which were requisitioned prior to the amendment of the Act in
1970, were r~quired to be released from requisition or acquired by March 10,
1985; although Government is expeditiously implementing the policy of F
acquiring or releasing from requisition the requisitioned properties, a number
of them are expected to be needed by the Government even after the l 0th
March, 1985 for public purposes; the Ministry of Defence is taking action for
either releasing or acquiring the requisitioned properties. It was, therefore,
decided to extend the maximum period for which the properties could be G
retained under requisition by a period of two years. Thus, it is clear that the
authorities were aware that the properties were to be released or acquired and
the maximum period was extended upto two years for the purpose. From 1985
to 1987 they had sufficient time to acquire the properties in question in the
usual course. They had enough time to provide opportunity for filing objections
and holding inquiry under Section SA of the Act. There was no need to H
828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A invoke Section 17 of the Act. The Office Memorandum dated 19.7.1979 extracted
above shows that the Executive Council took the decision in view of the
amendment in the Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act,
1952 with all the requisitioned/leased houses which were with the
Administration for more than l 0 years were to be released to their owners
immediately and all the occupants of requisitioned/leased houses were
B requested to furnish the relevant information by 16. 7.1979 failing which the
officer concerned will be liable for eviction from the requisitioned house
without provision for alternative accommodation. Here again, it is clear that
the authorities had knowladg of the situation in the year 1979 itself. Further
the minutes of the meeting held on 8.4.1985 in the room of Secretary (PWD/
C L&D), Delhi Admiilistration, Delhi show that the position regarding all the
requisitioned properties in Delhi which were requisitioned under the 1952 Act,
was reviewed. The said meeting was attended by (I) Secretary (PWD/L&D),
(2) Joint Director (Training), (3) Additional District Magistrate (Registration),
and Under Secretary (LA). In the said meeting, it was decided that all the pre-
1970 residential buildings which were partially requisitioned and ' were not in
D full occupation of Delhi Administration, should be de-requisitioned in stages.

It was noted that some of the requisitioned buildings which were fully
occupied for residential/office purposes by the .various departments of the
Delhi Administration and which buildings are essentially required for the
E functioning of such departments should, be acquired under the Act.

Shri V.N. Khanna pointed out that in cases where the buildings/properties
were to be acquired under the Act, 80% of the compensation was to be given
at the stage of notice itself.

F In this meeting, cases of requisitioned buildings were reviewed in details
and recommendations were made in respect of each property.

It was also noticed that the acquisition of buildings was going to be
prolonged affair; initially those properties which have been surveyed by
ADM (Requ.isition) and recommended for acquisition/de-requisitioning vide
G letter dated 27.3.1985 may be taken up.

Thus, from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act 20 of 1985,
Statement by the concerned Minister to Lok Sabha on 28.3.1985, the Office
Memorandum aforementioned and ttie minutes of meeting dated 8.4.1985, it
is sufficiently clear that the appellants were fully aware that they had to make
H arrangements either for acquiring t~e properties or de-requisitioning them by
U.0.1. v. K.L. ARNEJA [PATIL, J.) 829
making alternate arrangement within a period of two years i.e. upto 10.3.1987 A
inasmuch as no further extension of the Requisition Act was possible. Further
having regard to the observations made by this Court in the case of Vora
(supra), there would have been no justification for the appellants to continu.e
properties in question under the Requisitioning Act any more. If the appellants
were really serious in acquiring the properties in question, they had almost
2 years time even after taking the decision to acquire them or derequisition B
them within which time, acquisition proceedings could be completed in the
usual course without depriving the respondents of their valuable right to file
objections for acquisition and without dispensing with inquiry under Section
SA of the Act.

The High Court was not right in holding that without expression of
c
urgency in the impugned notification itself, it could not be sustained, but then
the High Court did not rest its conclusion only on this. Having examined the
facts and circumstances of the case, it was found that there was no material
and the circumstances even to have subjective satisfaction by the authorities .
to invoke urgency clause under Section 17 of the Act. This urgency was D
common in respect of all the 14 properties as already noticed above in the
cases of Banwari Lal as well as Shakuntala Gupta aforementioned. The
finding of fact that there was no urgency for invoking Section 17, has become
final. This finding holds good even for these appeals.

Having regard to the facts and circumstances and the material available .E
on record, we are of the view that invocation of urgency clause was without
justification and was untenable as held in cases of Banwari Lal and Shakuntala
Gupta. This Court in State of Punjab and Anr. v. Gurdayal Singh and Ors.,
[1980) 2 SCC 471, as to the use of emergency power under Section 17 of the
Act has observed that "it is fundamental that compulsory taking of a man's p
property is a seriot•s matter and the smaller the man the more serious the
matter. Heating him before depriving him is both reasonable and pre-emptive
of arbitrariness, and deniar of this administrative fairness is constitutional
anathema except for good reasons. Save in real urgency were public interest
does not brook even the minimum time needed to give a hearing land
acquisition ~uthorities should not, having regard to Articles 14 (and 19), G
burke an enquiry under Section 17 of the Act. Here a slumbering process,
pending for years and suddenly exciting itself into immediate forcible taking,
makes a travesty of emergency power."

In Om Prakash and Anr. v. State ofUP. and Ors., [1998] 6 SCC l H

_;I
830 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A referring to State of Punjab v. Gurdiyal Singh (supra), this Court in para 21
has observed that "according to the said decision, inquiry under Section SA
is not merely statutory but also has a flavour of fundamental rights under
Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution though right to property has no longer
remained a fundamental right, at least observation regarding Article 14 vis-
a-vis Section SA of the Land Acquisition Act would remain apposite." In the
B present appeals, the appellants have not been able to show before the High
Court any genuine subjective satisfaction depending upon any relevant
material available to the State authorities at the time when they issued the
impugned notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and dispensed with
Section SA inquiry taking aid of Section 17(4) of the Act. A bench of three
C learned Judges of this Court in Narian Govind Gavate and Ors. v. State of
Maharastra and Ors., [1977) l SCC 133 has expressed that Section 17(4)
cannot be read in isolation from Sections 4(1) and SA of the Act and has
expressed that having regard to the possible objections that may be taken by
the land owners challenging the public purpose, normally there will be little
difficulty in completing inquiries under Section SA of the Act very expeditiously.
D In the same judgment, it is also stated that "The mind of the officer or
authority concerned has to be applied to the question whether th\;re is an
urgency of such a nature that even the summary proceedings under Section
SA of the Act should be eliminated. It is not just the existence of an urgency
but the need to dispense with an inquiry under Section SA which has to be
E considered."
;
The various decisions cited on behalf of the appellants in support of
their submission that there was justification in invoking. urgency clause for
acquiring the properties in question, were on the facts of those cases where
either urgency was made out or where it was shown that relevant material and
F data was available at the time of issuing notification invoking urgency clause.
In the case of Deepak Pahwa and Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Ors.,
[ 1984] 4 sec 308 one of the grounds raised was that long period of 8 years
was spent in inter-departmental correspondence ~hich showed that there was
no urgency to invoke Section 17(4) of the Act. In that context, the Court
observed that "Very often persons interested in the land proposed to be
G acquired make various representations to the concerned authorities against
the proposed acquisition. This is bound to result in a multiplicity of enquiries,
communications and discussions leading invariably to delay in the execution
of even urgent projects. Very often the delay makes the problem more and
more acute and increases the urgency of the necessity for acquisition." The
H Court proceeded on the assumption that the pre-notification delay could have

r
U.0.1. v. K.L. ARNEJA [PATIL, J.] 831
been caused by representations made by the aggrieved parties but this case A
is not an authority to say that in the absence of material to justify urgency
clause and long delay in issuing the notification could be ignored or condoned
to uphold the validity of such notification. In Chame/i Singh and Ors. v. State
of U.P. and Anr., [1996] 2 SCC 549, the observations of the Court that larger
the delay, greater be the urgency was in the context of the facts of that case
having regard to the public purpose involved therein for invoking the urgency B
clause. In that case, the Court appeared to think that very often the officials
due to apathy in the implementation of the policies and programmes of the
Government themselves adopt dilatory tactics which leads the aggrieved
party to challenge the invocation of urgency. The Court took note of the fact
that urgency clause was invoked in that case for providing house sites to the C
dalits and the poor which is a national problem. This is not an authority to ,
condone or ignore the laxity or lethargy or carelessness on the part of the
authorities in mvoking urgency clause to exercise special powers under Section
17 of the Act to cover up their delay _and laches without there being any
justification or material justifying invoking of urgency clause. In the case of b
Union of India v. Ghanshyam Das Kedia, [1996] 2 SCC 285, this Court has
taken the view that the notification need not specifically recite the nature of
urgency and it is enough if the records disclosed the consideration by the
Government on the urgency for taking action under Section 17(1) and (4) of
the Act; This position was not disputed before the High Court and is also
not contested before us. The view of High Court in this regard that the E
notification itself must specifically state about the nature of urgency and in
its absence the notification gets vitiated, cannot be accepted. But .as already
observed above, the High Court did not quash the notification only on the
&round of non-mentioning of urgency in the impugned notification but it has
also independently considered and concluded that no material was placed
before the Court to show that material and circumstances were available F '
before the authorities at the relevant time to invoke the urgency clause to
exercise powers under Section 17 of the Act. 'Urgency' for invoking of
Section 17 of the Act should be one arising naturally out of circumstances,
which exist when the decision to acquire the land is taken and not such,
which is the result of serious lapse or gross delay on the part of Acquiring G
Authority. However, the position may be different where the delay is caused
or occasioned by the landowner himself. Failure to take timely action for
acquisition by the authorities of the Union of India cannot be a ground to
invoke the urgency clause to the serious detriment of the right of the landowner
to raise objections to the acquisition under Section 5-A.
H
832 SUPREME COURT !lEPORTS (2004) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A In Civil Writ. Petition No. 229/92 filed by Sudhir Choudhrie, (the
respondent in SLP No. 9264/2003), a contention was raised on behalf of the
appellants herein that the writ petitioner's case suffered from delay and
!aches. The learned Single Judge having regard to the facts and circumstances
of the case.concluded that the writ petition could not be dismissed on the
ground of delay holding that the writ petitioner had been pursuing his remedies
B in the court of law against the proposed action of the appellants. The Division
Bench ofthe'High Court in the order under challenge in regard to the delay
in filing the writ petition agreeing with the learned Single Judge, has stated
thus : - ~

"Before parting, we may however notice that the appellant had raised
c a question of delay in tiling the writ petition by the first respondent
iri writ petition No. 229/92 which is the subject matter ofLPA No. 10/
1995. However, the learned single Judge not only accepted the
explanation for the alleged delay but also entertained the writ petition
and decided the same on merits. We, therefore, are of the opinion that
D it is not a fit case where this court should interfere with the said
judgment on the afore-mentioned ground."

Ground of delay is not raised by the appellants in the SLP. In this view,
the contention urged on behalf of the appellants that the writ petition No. 229
of 1992 ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and !aches,
E cannot be accepted.

The argument advanced by the learned counsel on behalf of the
appellants that the arbitrator could not be appointed by the High Court in the
absence of any agreement for appointment of arbitrator to determine the
damages and there being no prayer in that regard in the writ petition, cannot
F be accepted. This Court dismissed the SLP No. 4458 of 1991 filed by the
appellants against the order dated 4.2.1991 made by the High Court in Banwari
Lal's case. While dismissing the said SLP on 22.3.1991, may be in the light
of the argument made on behalf of the appellants that arbitrator could not be
appointed, this Court expressly made it clear that the arbitrator appointed by
G the High Court may give award and the same may be filed before the High
Court for appropriate orders. Civil Appeal No. 518 of 1998 filed by the
appellants against the order made in the writ petition No. 894 of 1987 filed by
Shakuntala Gupta was disposed of by this Court on 14.11.2000 following
Banwari Lat's case which included appointment of arbitrator. In the said
order, this Court did not find any sustainable ground raised in the appeal to
H
U.0.1. v. K.L. ARNEJA [PATIL, J.] 833
make any distinction or difference fi:om the case of Banwari Lal and ors. A
Hence it follows that order of appointment of arbitrator made in Shakuntala
Gupta's case was also upheld by this Court. The learned Single Judge passed
the order in the writ petition appointing arbitrator to determine tlte damages
payable by the Delhi Administration instead of making the petitioners to run
to the civil court for that purpose after spending several years in the court.
In the impugned order, the Di;vision Bench of the High Court has upheld the B
same. Since the order appointing arbitrator in the cases of Banwari Lal and
Shakuntala Gupta is upheld by this Court, we have no good reason to take
a different view. On the other hand, we are in respectful agreement with the
same having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.

The alternative argument urged on behalf of the appellants that if the
c
impugned notification suffers from infirmity in relation to invoking urgency
I

clause, it can be quashed only to the extent of invoking the aid of Section
17 and the said notification can be sustained confining it to Section 4 of the
Act, cannot be accepted. Otherwise, the same common notification stands
quashed in respect of the few parties as in the cases of Banwari Lal and D
Shakuntala Gupta and it stands sustained in respect of others, i.e.,
respondents in these appeals leading to anomalous situation. Added to this,
if the argument, as advanced on behalf of the Union, is accepted, the
notification under Section 17 of the Act invoking urgency clause would stand
quashed but the landowner, would nonetheless be deprived of the possession E
of the property as also payment of 80% of compensation under Section
l 7(3A) of the Act. Such an unjust result cannot be allowed to happen by
quashing the notification in part only to the extent of Section 17 of the Act
and maintaining it for the purpose of Section 4 of the Act. Thus, having·
regard to the facts and circumstances brought on record in these appeals, it
is not possible to accept this argument particularly when the very foundation F
of invoking Section 17 was invalid and unjustified as upheld by this Court
in Banwari Lal and Shakuntala Gupta.

Since we are of the view that the decisions in Banwari Lal and
Shakuntala Gupta cover these appeals against the appellants, we do not
consider it necessary to deal with the contention that due to non-compliance G
of sub-section (3A) of Section 17 of the Act, the ent!re acquisition proceedings
were vitiated. Further when we are upholding the impugned common order on
other grounds, we do not wish to deal with this contention.

One more contention urged on behalf of the appellants in SLP (C) No.
B
834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A 5451/2003, namely, that the writ petition filed by the respondents being tenants
was not maintainable, is required to be dealt with. It does not appear that this
contention was urged before the Division Bench of the High Court. In the
light of the decision of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater
Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd and Ors., [1996
I I SCC 50 I, it cannot be said that in no case, the tenant of the land which
B is sought to be acquired under the provisions of the Act can challenge the
acquisition proceedings. It is clear from Section 5A(3) of the Act that for the
purpose of the said Section, a person shall be deemed to be interested in land
who would be entitled to claim an interest in compensation if the land were
acquired. In an appropriate case, a tenant having sufficient subsisting interest
C in the land, can challenge the acquisition proceedings. In view of the facts
and circumstances of the case, the learned Single Judge did not dismiss the
writ petition as not maintainable on the ground that the tenant ·could not
maintain the writ petition. The Division Bench of the High Court also did not
disturb the order of the learned Single Judge. This apart, the very same
notification being common is quashed at the instance of other writ petitioners.
D In this view, at this stage, the contention urged on behalf of the· appellants
that writ petition filed by a tenant, was not maintainable, cannot be accepted.

Thus, having regard to all aspects and for the reasons stated and
discussion made above, we do not find any merit in these appeals. Hence,
they are dismissed. No costs.
E
S.K.S.
'· 1.:....J.
Appeals dismissed.
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