UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.versusVIKRAMBHAI MAGANBHAI CHAUDHARI

                        [2011) 6 S.C.R. 1096


A                  UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
                                v.
             VIKRAMBHAI MAGANBHAI CHAUDHARI
                 (Civil Appeal No. 2602 of 2006)

                            JULY 1, 2011
B
            [P. SATHASIVAM AND A.K. PATNAIK, JJ.]

       Service Law - Central Civil Services (Classification,
  Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 - r. 29 - Department of Posts
C - Disciplinary proceedings against respondent-Postal
  Assistant - Punishment imposed - Chief Post Master
  General vide notification dated 29.05.2001 took up the case
  of the respondent for review ulr. 29(1 )(vi) - Review
  proceedings challenged - Tribunal quashed notification dt.
D 29.05.2001 on the ground that it did not specify any time limit
  for review - Justification of - Held: Justified - Inasmuch as
  the Notification dated 29.05.2001 did not specify any time limit
  within which power under r.29(1)(vi) was exercisable by the
  authority specified, such Notification was not in terms with r.29
E and the Tribunal was fully justified in quashing the same.
        The respondent, a M.O. Postal Assistant in the
  Department of Posts, disobeyed the orders of his
  superiors by refusing to accept M.O. forms. Departmental
  action was initiated against the respondent and he was
F suspended by an order of the Superintendent of Post
  Office. However, later, the suspension order of the
  respondent was revoked and disciplinary action was
  initiated against him under Rule 16 of the Central Civil
  Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965
G whereupon the disciplinary authority awarded
  punishment of 'Censure' to the respondent.
      Subsequently, the Chief Post Master General vide
  notification dated 29.05.2001 took up the case of the
H                          1096
     UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. v. VIKRAMBHAI            1097
            MAGANBHAI CHAUDHARI
respondent for review under Rule 29(1 )(vi) of the Rules      A
and directed the Superintendent of Post Office to initiate
disciplinary proceedings against the respondent under
rule 14 of the Rules. Challenging the review proceedings,
the respondent filed application before the tribunal. The
Tribunal allowed the application and also quashed the         B
notification dated 29.05.2001 on the ground that it did not
specify any time limit for review. The order was upheld
by the High Court. Hence the instant appeal.

    Dismissing the appeal, the Court
                                                              c
    HELD:1. The contention raised by the ASG, that
there is no need to specify the period in the Notification
authorizing concerned authority to call for the record for
any enquiry and revise any order made under the Rules,
cannot be accepted. [Para 6] [1102-G]                         D
    2. Rule 29(1) of the Central Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 indicates
6 categories of revisional authorities. While no period is
mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of Rule 29(1 ), sub-     E
Clause (v) refers to a period of six months from the date
of order proposed to be revised in cases where the
appellate authority seeks to review the order of the
disciplinary authority. On the other hand, Clause (vi)
confers similar powers on such other authorities which
may be specified in that behalf by the President by a
                                                              F
general or special order and the said authority has to
commence the proceedings within the time prescribed
therein. Even though Rule 29(1)(vi) provides that such
order shall also specify the time within which the power
should be exercised, the fa~t remains that no time limit      G
has been prescribed in the Notification. The argument that
even in the absence of specific period in the Notification
in view of Clause (v), the other authority can also
exercise such power cannot be accepted. To put it clear,
sub-Clause (v) applies to appellate authority and Clause      H
    1098    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 6 S.C.R.

A (vi) to any other authority specified by the President by
  a general or special order for exercising power by the
  said authority under sub-Clause (vi). There must be
  specified period and the power can be exercised only
  within the period so prescribed. [Paras 6, 7] [1102-E-H;
B 1103-A-D]

        3. Inasmuch as the Notification dated 29.05.2001 has
    not specified any time limit within which power under
    Rule 29(1 )(vi) is exercisable by the authority specified,
    such Notification is not in terms with Rule 29 and the
C . Tribunal is fully justified in quashing the same. The High
    Court has also rightly confirmed the said conclusien by
    dismissing the Special Application of the appellants and
    quashing the Notification on the ground that it did not
    specify the time. limit. [Para 8] [1103-E-F]
D
        CIVIL APPELALTE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    2602 of 2006.
      From the Judgment & Order dated 12.8.2005 of the High
E Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Special Civil Application No.
  16575 of 2005.
        A.S. Chandhiok, ASG, S. Wasim A Quadri, Neha Rastogi,
    Saima Bakshi, A.K. Sharma, V.K. Verma for the Appellants.

F       Vishwajit Singh for the Respondent.

        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        P. SATHASIVAM, J. 1. This appeal by Union of India is
  directed against the final judgment and order dated 12.08.2005
G passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Special
  Civil Application No. 16575 of 2005 whereby the High Court
  dismissed the application of the appellants herein upholding the
  order of the Central Administrative Tribunal (in short 'the
  Tribunal') in O.A. No. 333 of 2004 wherein the Tribunal by its
H order dated 20.04.2005 had quashed and set aside
     UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. v. VIKRAMBHAI                  1099
    MAGANBHAI CHAUDHARI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

 Notification No. C-11011/1/2001-VP dated 29.05.2001.                A

      2. Brief facts:

       (a) On 08.06.2000, Vikrambhai Maganbhai Chaudhari, the
 respondent herein, while working as M.O. Postal Assistant,
 Bardoli, refused to accept M.O. forms along with the amounts        B
 tendered by Shri P.N. Singh, Shri H.K. Tiwari and Shri R.C.
 Pande for booking of money orders. Later, Mr. K.H. Gamit,
 Assistant Post Master, Bardoli and his immediate supervisor
 instructed him to accept the above said Money Orders in writing
 through office order book but the respondent did not obey the       C
 orders. Accordingly, departmental action was initiated against
 him and he was suspended by order of Superintendent of Post
 Office, Bardoli vide Memo No. B-1/PFNMC/2000.

      (b) However, on 23.06.2000, the suspension order of the        0
 respondent was revoked and disciplinary action was initiated
 against the respondent under Rule 16 of Central Civil Services
 (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter
 referred to as "the Rules"). Vide Memo No. P1/4(2)/05/01-02
 dated 17.10.2001, the disciplinary authority awarded                E
 punishment of 'Censure' to the respondent.                  ·

      (c) Thereafter, the case was taken up for review by the
 Chief Post Master General, Ahmedabad under Rule 29 of the
 Rules and he directed the Superintendent of Post Office,
 Bardoli to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the            F
 respondent under Rule 14 of the Rules and on completion send
 the matter to him for further action. Accordingly, a notice was
 issued to the respondent.

       (d) Challenging the proceedings, the respondent filed         G
  Original Application No. 333 of 2004 before the Tribunal,
  f.hmedabad Bench, Ahmedabad. By order dated 20.04.2005,
. the Tribunal allowed the application filed by the respondent.
  Aggrieved by the said order, the appellants herein filed Special
  Civil Application being No. 16575 of 2005 before the High          H
    1100    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 6 S.C.R.


A Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad. The High Court, by impugned
  order, dismissed the application filed by the appellants herein.
  Aggrieved by the said order and judgment, the appellants
  herein have filed this appeal by way of special leave petition
  before this Court.
B
        3. Heard Mr. A.S. Chandhiok, learned ASG for the
  appellants. Mr. Vishwajit Singh, learned counsel filed
  appearance on behalf of the respondent but none appeared at
  the time of hearing.

C      4. Mr. Chandhiok, learned ASG after taking us through
  Rule 29 of the Rules submitted that the Tribunal was not justified
  in quashing the Notification dated 29.05.2001 and the High
  Court has also committed an error in confirming the same. He
  further submitted that the High Court and the Tribunal ought to
D have appreciated that the Notification in question does not
  become bad merely because th~ time limit has not been
  provided and according to him, even though Rule 29(1)(vi)
  provides that such order shall also specify the time within which
  this power should be exercised in view of Clause (v) which
E provides six months' outer limit for reviewing the order, the
  ultimate conclusion of the Tribunal and the High Court cannot
  be sustained.

       5. Inasmuch as the Tribunal and the High Court granted
  relief in favour of the respondent on the basis of the
F interpretation of Rule 29(1 )(vi) and the Notification dated
  29.05.2001, it is desirable to refer the same. The Notification
    reads as under:-

                    "Ministry of Communications
G                      [Department of Posts]

                                   New Delhi, the 29th May, 2001
                           NOTIFICATION

H       No. So ..... In exercise of the powers conferred by Clause
 UNION OF INDIAAND ORS. v. VIKRAMBHAI                   1101
MAGANBHAI CHAUDHARI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
 (VI) of Sub Rule (1) of Rule 29 of the Central Civil Services   A
 (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, the
 President hereby specifies that in the case of a government
 servant serving in the Department of Posts, for whom the
 appellate authority is subordinate to the authority
 designated as the Principal Chief Postmaster General or         B
 the Chief Postmaster General (other than the Chief
 Postmaster General of Senior Administrative Grade) of a
 Circle, the said Principal Chief Postmaster General or the
 said Chief Postmaster General, as the case may be, shall
 be the revising authority for the purpose of exercising the     c
 powers under the said Rule 29.

 [No. C-11011/1/2001-VP]
                                                        Sd/-
                                              [B.P. Sharma]      0
                                              Director (VP)"
 The relevant clauses of Rule 29 are as under:-
 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these Rules.

 (i) the President; or                                           E

 (ii) The Comptroller and Auditor-General, in the case of a
 Government servant serving in the India Audit and Accounts
 Department; or
                                                                 F
 (iii) the Member (Personnel) Postal Services Board in the
 case of a Government Servant serving in or under the
 Postal Services Board and (Adviser (Human Resources
 Development), Department of Telecommunication) in the
 case of Government Servant serving in or under the              G
 Telecommunication Board); or
 (iv) the Head of a Department directly under the Central
 Government in the case of a Government Servant serving
 in a department or office (not being the Secretariat or the
                                                                 H
    1102     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 6 S.C.R.


A       Posts and Telegraphs Board) under the control of such
        head of a Department; or

        (v) the appellant authority, within six months of the date of
        order proposed to be (revised); or
B       (vi) any other authority specified in this behalf by the
        President by a general or special order, and within such
        time as may be specified in such general or special order;

        may at any time either on his or its own motion or
c       otherwise call for the records of any inquiry and revise any
        order made under these rules .....

        (2) No proceeding for revision shall be commenced until
        after

D       (i) the expiry of the period of limitation for an appeal, or

        (ii) the disposal of the appeal, where any such appeal has
        been preferred."

       6. As rightly observed by the Tribunal, the above sub-Rule
E (1) of Rule 29 indicates 6 categories of revisional authorities.
  If we go further it shows that while no period is mentioned in
  sub-clauses (i) to (iv), sub-Clause (v) refers to a period of six
  months from the date of order proposed to be revised. Since
  order was passed by exercising power under sub-Clause (vi),
F we have to see whether in the Notification specifying an
  authority a time limit has been mentioned or even in the
  absence of the same, the outer limit can be availed by
  exercising power under sub-Clause (v). According to learned
  ASG, there is no need to specify the period in the Notification
G authorizing concerned authority to call for the record for any
  enquiry and revise any order made under the Rules. We are
  unable to accept the said claim for the following reasons.

      7. It is to be noted that in cases where the appellate
H authority seeks to review the order of the disciplinary authority,
      UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. v. VIKRAMBHAI                      1103
     MAGANBHAI CHAUDHARI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

  the period fixed for the purpose is six months of the date of the       A
  order proposed to be revised. This is clear from sub-Clause
  (v) of sub-Rule 1 of Rule 29. On the other hand, Clause (vi)
  confers similar powers on such other authorities which may be
  specified in that behalf by the President by a general or special
  order and the said authority has to commence the proceedings            B
  within the time prescribed therein. Even though Rule 29(1)(vi)
· provides that such order shall also specify the time within which
  the power should be exercised, the fact remains that no time
  limit has been prescribed in the Notification. We have already
  pointed out that no period has been mentioned in the                    c
  Notification. The argument that even in the absence of specific
  period in the Notification in view of Clause (v), the other authority
  can also exercise such power cannot be accepted. To put it
  clear, sub-Clause (v) applies to appellate authority and Clause
  (vi) to any other authority specified by the President by a
                                                                          0
  general or special order for exercising power by the said
  authority under sub-Clause (vi). There must be specified period
  and the power can be exercised only within the period so
  prescribed.

       8. Inasmuch as the Notification dated 29.05.2001 has not           E
 specified any time limit within which power under Rule 29(1 )(vi)
 is exercisable by the authority specified, we are of the view that
 such Notification is not in terms with Rule 29 and the Tribunal
 is fully justified in quashing the same. The High Court has also
 rightly confirmed the said conclusion by dismissing the Special          F
 Application of the appellants and quashing the Notification on
 the ground that it did not specify the time limit. Consequently,
 the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. No order as to
 costs.
                                                                          G
 B.B.B.                                          Appeal dismissed.