UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERSversusMETHU MEDA

                        [2021] 8 S.C.R. 657                             657


                UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS                               A
                                 v.
                          METHU MEDA
                  (Civil Appeal No. 6238 of 2021)
                        OCTOBER 06, 2021                                B
    [INDIRA BANERJEE AND J.K MAHESHWARI, JJ.]
       Service Law – Appointment – Acquittal from criminal case –
Nature of – Effect of – Respondent applied for the post of Constable
in Central Industrial Security Force – Provisionally selected – Found
                                                                        C
not eligible for appointment on account of a criminal case of
kidnapping for ransom against him, though acquitted – Held: If a
person is acquitted giving him the benefit of doubt, from the charge
of an offence involving moral turpitude or because the witnesses
turned hostile, like in the present case, it would not automatically
entitle him for the employment, that too in disciplined force – Mere    D
disclosure of the offences alleged and the result of the trial is not
sufficient – Employer cannot be compelled to give appointment to
the candidate – Impugned orders passed by Single Judge as well as
Division Bench set aside.
     Words & Expressions – ‘honourable acquittal’– Meaning of           E
– Discussed.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
      HELD: 1.1 The expressions ‘honourable acquittal’,
‘acquitted of blame’ and ‘fully acquitted’ are unknown to the Code
of Criminal Procedure or the Indian Penal Code. It has been             F
developed by judicial pronouncements. if the acquittal is directed
by the court on consideration of facts and material evidence on
record with the finding of false implication or the finding that the
guilt had not been proved, accepting the explanation of accused
as just, it be treated as honourable acquittal. If prosecution could
not prove the guilt for other reasons and not ‘honourably’ acquitted    G
by the Court, it be treated other than ‘honourable’, and
proceedings may follow. Acquittal giving benefit of doubt would
not automatically lead to reinstatement of candidate unless the
rules provide so. [Paras 11, 13 and 14][663-C-D-; 664-A-B, D-E]
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                                657
658           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 8 S.C.R.


A           Inspector General of Police & Another vs. Samuthiram
            (2013) 1 SCC 598:[2012] 11 SCR 174; State of Assam
            & Another vs. Raghava Rajgopalachari (1972) 7 SLR
            44; R.P. Kapur vs. Union of India AIR 1964 SC 787 :
            [1964] SCR 431; Reserve Bank of India vs. Bhopal
            Singh Panchal (1994) 1 SCC 541 : [1993] 3 Suppl.
B
            SCR 586 – relied on.
             1.2 If acquittal is not honourable, the candidates are not
      suitable for government service and are to be avoided. The
      relevant factors and the nature of offence, extent of his
      involvement, propensity of such person to indulge in similar
C     activities in future, are the relevant aspects for consideration by
      the Screening Committee, which is competent to decide all these
      issues. In the present case, the charges were framed against the
      respondent for the offences punishable under Sections 347/327/
      323/506(Part-II) and 364A IPC. He was acquitted after trial by
D     the Sessions Judge, Jhabua because the person kidnapped and
      also his wife have not supported the case of prosecution. As per
      prosecution, the complainant was beaten by the respondent and
      the said fact found support from the evidence of doctor. Therefore,
      it appears that the Committee was of the view that acquittal of
      the respondent, in the facts of the present case, cannot be termed
E     as ‘honourable acquittal’ and the said acquittal may be treated by
      giving benefit of doubt. The employer is having right to consider
      the suitability of the candidate as per government orders/
      instructions/rules at the time of taking the decision for induction
      of the candidate in employment. Acquittal on technical ground in
F     respect of the offences of heinous/serious nature, which is not a
      clean acquittal, the employer may have a right to consider all
      relevant facts available as to the antecedents, and may take
      appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee. Even
      in case, truthful declaration regarding concluded trial has been
      made by the employee, still the employer has the right to consider
G     antecedents and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.
      [Paras 15, 16 and 18][664-G-H; 665-A-C; 667-C-E]
            New Delhi and Another vs. Mehar Singh (2013) 7 SCC
            685: [2013] 13 SCR 432; Union Territory, Chandigarh
            Administration and Ors. vs. Pradeep Kumar and Anr.
H           (2018) 1 SCC 797: [2018] 1 SCR 112 - relied on.
        UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. METHU MEDA                        659


       1.3 The respondent who wishes to join the police force must     A
be a person of utmost rectitude and have impeccable character
and integrity. A person having a criminal antecedents would not
be fit in this category. The employer is having right to consider
the nature of acquittal or decide until he is completely exonerated
because even a possibility of his taking to the life of crimes poses
                                                                       B
a threat to the discipline of the police force. The Standing Order,
therefore, has entrusted the task of taking decisions in these
matters to the Screening Committee and the decision of the
Committee would be final unless mala fide. If a person is acquitted
giving him the benefit of doubt, from the charge of an offence
involving moral turpitude or because the witnesses turned hostile,     C
it would not automatically entitle him for the employment, that
too in disciplined force. The employer is having a right to consider
his candidature in terms of the circulars issued by the Screening
Committee. The mere disclosure of the offences alleged and the
result of the trial is not sufficient. In the said situation, the
                                                                       D
employer cannot be compelled to give appointment to the
candidate. Both the Single Bench and the Division Bench of the
High Court have not considered the said legal position in the
orders impugned. The impugned orders passed by the Single
Judge of the High Court in writ petition and Division Bench in
writ appeal are set-aside. [Paras 21-23][669-F-G; 670-A-C]             E
      Avtar Singh vs. Union of India and Others (2016) 8
      SCC 471 : [2016] 7 SCR 445; Commissioner of Police
      vs. Raj Kumar 2021(9) SCALE 713 – relied on.
      Commissioner of Police, State of Madhya Pradesh and
      Others vs. Abhijit Singh Pawar (2018) 18 SCC 733 :               F
      [2018] 13 SCR 1133; State of Rajasthan and Others
      vs. Love Kush Meena 2021(4) SCALE 634; Rahul Yadav
      vs CISF and another: 178 (2011) DLT 263; Panna
      Mehta vs. State of M.P. (2002) 4 M.P.H.T. 226; Robert
      Stuart Wauchope vs. Emperor (1934) 61 ILR Cal. 168               G
      – referred to.
                      Case Law Reference
[2012] 11 SCR 174             relied on              Para 7

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660            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2021] 8 S.C.R.


A     [2016] 7 SCR 445                relied on                Para 8
      [2013] 13 SCR 432               relied on                Para 8
      [2018] 13 SCR 1133              referred to              Para 8
      [1964] SCR 431                  relied on                Para 12
B     [1993] 3 Suppl. SCR 586         relied on                Para 14
      [2018] 1 SCR 112                relied on                Para 15
             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.6238 of
      2021
C          From the Judgment and Order dated 20.12.2013 of the High Court
      of Madhya Pradesh at Indore in Writ Appeal No.1090 of 2013.
            Ms. Madhvi Divan, ASG, Ms. V. Mohana, Sr. Adv., Parthiv
      Gowswamy, Ayush Puri, Nachiketa Joshi, B. Krishna Prasad, Advs. for
      the Appellants.
D            Avinash Sharma, Adv. for the Respondent.
             The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
             J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.
             1. Leave granted.
E
            2. Questioning the validity of the order passed in Writ Appeal No.
      1090 of 2013 on 20.12.2013 upholding the order of the learned Single
      Judge passed on 27.09.2013 in Writ Petition No. 3897 of 2013, this appeal
      has been preferred.
             3. The facts unfolded in the present case are that the respondent
F
      was found involved in an offence of kidnapping of Nilesh for demand of
      ransom. An FIR was registered against him on 22.8.2009. After
      investigation challan was filed, and he was tried before the Sessions
      Court, Jhabua, Madhya Pradesh in Sessions Case Serial No. 1 of 2010
      for the charge framed against him under Sections 347/327/323/506 (Part-
G     II) and 364A IPC. The Sessions Court acquitted him for the said charge
      because the complainant, who was abducted, turned hostile in the Court.
      Thereafter, respondent applied for the post of Constable in Central
      Industrial Security Force (for short “CISF”) and got selected through
      the Staff Selection Commission (for short “SSC”). An offer of
      appointment for provisional selection to the post of Constable/GD was
H
          UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. METHU MEDA                               661
                     [J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]

issued to the respondent on 30.3.2012, subject to the conditions given in       A
the agreement form. The respondent was required to furnish the
documents including attestation forms, certificate of character, character
and antecedent certificate from local Station House Officer. The
respondent, while submitting the attestation form, specified the registration
of above-said criminal case and acquittal from the charges in a trial by
                                                                                B
the competent court.
       4. As the offer of appointment was conditional, therefore, in terms
of the CISF Circular No. E-EG7023/TRG.SEC/ADM.I/CIRCULARS/
2010-1157 dated 31.03.2010. he was not allowed to join training. The
Ministry of Home Affairs vide letter No. I-45020/6/2010-Pers.II issued
the guidelines on 01.02.2012 for consideration of the cases of the              C
candidates against whom criminal cases were registered or tried by the
courts.
       5. In furtherance to the said guidelines, the case of the respondent
was referred to AIG(L&R), CISF Hqrs, New Delhi with an information
to IG/TS, CISF(TS) NISA, Hyderabad vide letter No.F37023/CISF/                  D
RTC(D)/Trg./CBG/2012/2656 dated 04.05.2012. The Standing Screening
Committee assembled on 27.07.2012 and examined the cases of 89
candidates including the respondent and on 15.10.2012 passed an order
that respondent was not eligible for appointment.
       6. Questioning the validity of the said action and asking for            E
consequential reliefs, Writ Petition No. 3897 of 2013 was filed before
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Indore Bench. The learned Single
Judge, vide order dated 27.09.2013, allowed the Writ Petition directing
the respondents therein to issue an order for sending the respondent
herein on training commencing with effect from 21.10.2013. The Court            F
further held that he would be entitled for all consequential benefits
including seniority, notional fixation of salary etc. but back wages were
denied. The said order was assailed before the Division Bench by filing
Writ Appeal, but it was also dismissed, which led to filing the present
appeal through the department.
                                                                                G
       7. The validity of the order passed by the learned Single Judge
and also by the Division Bench have been assailed, inter alia, contending,
until the respondent is honourably acquitted from the charge involving
moral turpitude and the decision of the Screening Committee is not passed
mala fide, interference in such decision is not warranted. Reliance is
placed on the decision of this Court in Inspector General of Police &           H
662             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 8 S.C.R.


A     Another vs. S. Samuthiram (2013) 1 SCC 598 to clarify the meaning
      of ‘honourable acquittal’.
             8. It is argued that merely making a disclosure of the criminal
      case in the attestation form is not sufficient. As per the Policy Guidelines
      dated 01.02.2012, in view of involvement of the respondent in heinous
B     offences including the offences under Sections 327/347/364A IPC, he
      would not be entitled for appointment until honourably acquitted. Even
      though, the respondent has been provisionally selected vide letter dated
      30.03.2012, issued by the Chairman of the Recruitment Board, but mere
      acquittal giving benefit of doubt, as the witnesses have turned hostile,
      would not make the candidate suitable for appointment. The impugned
C     orders passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh are contrary to the
      law laid down in the case of Avtar Singh vs. Union of India and Others
      (2016)8 SCC 471, Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and Another
      vs. Mehar Singh (2013)7 SCC 685, State of Madhya Pradesh and
      Others vs. Abhijit Singh Pawar (2018) 18 SCC 733, State of Rajasthan
D     and Others vs. Love Kush Meena 2021(4) SCALE 634 and
      Commissioner of Police vs. Raj Kumar 2021(9) SCALE 713. It is
      urged that acquittal in a criminal case is not conclusive for suitability of
      the candidate for appointment. Thus, unless the respondent is honourably
      acquitted in a criminal case, it would not automatically entitle him for
      appointment to the post.
E
             9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent contended that
      the Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court of
      Madhya Pradesh have considered the judgment of Delhi High Court in
      the case of Rahul Yadav vs CISFand another, 178(2011) DLT 263,
      where the High Court observed that the situation and background of the
F     candidates hailing from the rural areas were relevant factors for
      consideration. Mere registration of a criminal case and acquittal from
      the said charges, would not disentitle him from appointment. The special
      leave petition preferred against the said judgment has been dismissed by
      this Court on 05.10.2012. On the point of defining the ‘acquittal’, the
G     judgment in Panna Mehta vs. State of M.P. (2002) 4 M.P.H.T. 226 has
      been relied and urged that if the respondent has not concealed the material
      fact and specified details in the attestation form regarding the criminal
      case, trial and its result, it would not disentitle him from appointment to
      the post, in particular when in Bombay High Court, in the case of similarly
      situated person Ramesh has been sent on training. It is urged that the
H     impugned order passed by the High Court is in conformity to law. The
         UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. METHU MEDA                              663
                    [J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]

judgment in Panna Mehta (supra) is, however, distinguishable on facts         A
in that a similarly situated person had been sent on training.
       10. After having heard learned counsel for the parties at length,
the question which arises in the present appeal is whether the decision
of the Screening Committee rejecting the candidature of the respondent,
when there was no allegation of malice against the Screening Committee        B
and the respondent-writ petitioner had been acquitted of serious charges,
inter alia, of kidnapping for ransom as some prosecution witnesses had
turned hostile, ought to have been interfered with.
       11. While addressing the question, as argued the meaning of
expression ‘acquittal’ is required to be looked into. The expressions         C
‘honourable acquittal’, ‘acquitted of blame’ and ‘fully acquitted’ are
unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Indian Penal Code.
It has been developed by judicial pronouncements. In the case of State
of Assam & Another vs. Raghava Rajgopalachari, (1972) 7 SLR 44,
the effect of the word ‘honourably acquitted’ has been considered in the
context of the Assam Fundament Rules (FR) 54 (a) for entitlement of           D
full pay and allowance if the employee is not dismissed. The Court has
referred the judgment of Robert Stuart Wauchope vs. Emperor reported
in (1934) 61 ILR Cal. 168, in the context of expression ‘honourably
acquitted’, Lord Williams, J. observed as thus:
       “The expression “honourably acquitted” is one which is unknown         E
      to courts of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in courts
      martial and other extra judicial tribunals. We said in our judgment
      that we accepted the explanation given by the Appellant believed
      it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by
      the Government authorities and by the magistrate. Further we            F
      decided that the Appellant had not misappropriated the monies
      referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our
      judgment was that the Appellant was acquitted as fully and
      completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably,
      this is equivalent to what Government authorities term “honourably
      acquitted”. “                                                           G
       12. In the case of R.P. Kapur vs. Union of India AIR 1964 SC
787, it is observed and held by Wanchoo, J., as thus:
      “Even in case of acquittal, proceedings may follow where the
      acquittal is other than honourable.”
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664             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 8 S.C.R.


A            13. In view of the above, if the acquittal is directed by the court
      on consideration of facts and material evidence on record with the finding
      of false implication or the finding that the guilt had not been proved,
      accepting the explanation of accused as just, it be treated as honourable
      acquittal. In other words, if prosecution could not prove the guilt for
      other reasons and not ‘honourably’ acquitted by the Court, it be treated
B
      other than ‘honourable’, and proceedings may follow.
             14. The expression ‘honourable acquittal’ has been considered in
      the case of S. Samuthiram (supra) after considering the judgments of
      Reserve Bank of India vs. Bhopal Singh Panchal (1994)1 SCC 541,
      R.P. Kapur (supra), Raghava Rajagopalachari (supra); this Court
C     observed that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty
      by a criminal court and enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary
      proceeding is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of establishing
      guilt of the accused is on the prosecution, until proved beyond reasonable
      doubt. In case, the prosecution failed to take steps to examine crucial
D     witnesses or the witnesses turned hostile, such acquittal would fall within
      the purview of giving benefit of doubt and the accused cannot be treated
      as honourably acquitted by the criminal court. While, in a case of
      departmental proceedings, the guilt may be proved on the basis of
      preponderance and probabilities, it is thus observed that acquittal giving
      benefit of doubt would not automatically lead to reinstatement of
E     candidate unless the rules provide so.
             15. Recently, this Court in Union Territory, Chandigarh
      Administration and Ors. vs. Pradeep Kumar and Anr. (2018) 1 SCC
      797, relying upon the judgment of S. Samuthiram (supra) said that
      acquittal in a criminal case is not conclusive of the suitability of the
F     candidates on the post concerned. It is observed, acquittal or discharge
      of a person cannot always be inferred that he was falsely involved or he
      had no criminal antecedent. The said issue has further been considered
      in Mehar Singh (supra) holding non-examination of key witnesses leading
      to acquittal is not honourable acquittal, in fact, it is by giving benefit of
G     doubt. The Court said nature of acquittal is necessary for core
      consideration. If acquittal is not honourable, the candidates are not suitable
      for government service and are to be avoided. The relevant factors and
      the nature of offence, extent of his involvement, propensity of such person
      to indulge in similar activities in future, are the relevant aspects for
      consideration by the Screening Committee, which is competent to decide
H     all these issues.
         UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. METHU MEDA                             665
                    [J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]

       16. In the present case, the charges were framed against the          A
respondent for the offences punishable under Sections 347/327/323/
506(Part-II) and 364A IPC. He was acquitted after trial vide judgment
dated 19.03.2010 by the Sessions Judge, Jhabua because the person
kidnapped Nilesh and also his wife have not supported the case of
prosecution. As per prosecution, the complainant was beaten by the
                                                                             B
respondent and the said fact found support from the evidence of doctor.
Therefore, it appears that the Committee was of the view that acquittal
of the respondent, in the facts of the present case, cannot be termed as
‘honourable acquittal’ and the said acquittal may be treated by giving
benefit of doubt.
       17. The law with regard to the effect and consequence of the          C
acquittal, concealment of criminal case on appointments etc. has been
settled in the case of Avtar Singh (supra), wherein a
      three-Judge Bench of this Court decided, as thus:
      “38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain and
                                                                             D
      reconcile them as far as possible. In view of the aforesaid
      discussion, we summarize our conclusion thus:
      “38.1 Information given to the employer by a candidate as to
      conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case,
      whether before or after entering into service must be true and
      there should be no suppression or false mention of required            E
      information.
      38.2. While passing order of termination of services or cancellation
      of candidature for giving false information, the employer may take
      notice of special circumstances of the case, if any, while giving
      such information.                                                      F
      38.3. The employer shall take into consideration the Government
      orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the employee, at the time
      of taking the decision.
      38.4. In case there is suppression or false information of
      involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal had       G
      already been recorded before filling of the application/verification
      form and such fact later comes to knowledge of employer, any of
      the following recourse appropriate to the case may be adopted :
      38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had been
      recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or for a petty         H
666      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 8 S.C.R.


A     offence which if disclosed would not have rendered an incumbent
      unfit for post in question, the employer may, in its discretion, ignore
      such suppression of fact or false information by condoning the
      lapse.
      38.4.2 Where conviction has been recorded in case which is not
B     trivial in nature, employer may cancel candidature or terminate
      services of the employee.
      38.4.3 If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving
      moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical
      ground and it is not a 3 case of clean acquittal, or benefit of
C     reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all
      relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate
      decision as to the continuance of the employee.
      38.5. In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully
      of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to
D     consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the
      candidate.
      38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character
      verification form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial
      nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of the case, in its
E     discretion may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such
      case.
      38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect to
      multiple pending cases such false information by itself will assume
      significance and an employer may pass appropriate order
      cancelling candidature or terminating services as appointment of
F
      a 4 person against whom multiple criminal cases were pending
      may not be proper.
      38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known to the candidate
      at the time of filling the form, still it may have adverse impact and
      the appointing authority would take decision after considering the
G
      seriousness of the crime.
      38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service, holding
      Departmental enquiry would be necessary before passing order
      of termination/removal or dismissal on the ground of suppression
      or submitting false information in verification form.
H
          UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. METHU MEDA                                667
                     [J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]

       38.10. For determining suppression or false information attestation/      A
       verification form has to be specific, not vague. Only such
       information which was required to be specifically mentioned has
       to be disclosed. If information not asked for but is relevant comes
       to knowledge of the employer the same can be considered in an
       objective manner while addressing the question of fitness.
                                                                                 B
       However, in such cases action cannot be taken on basis of
       suppression or 5 submitting false information as to a fact which
       was not even asked for.
       38.11. Before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or suggestio
       falsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him.”
                                                                                 C
       18. In view of the above, in the facts of the present case, as per
paras 38.3, 38.4.3 and 38.5, it is clear that the employer is having right to
consider the suitability of the candidate as per government orders/
instructions/rules at the time of taking the decision for induction of the
candidate in employment. Acquittal on technical ground in respect of the
offences of heinous/serious nature, which is not a clean acquittal, the          D
employer may have a right to consider all relevant facts available as to
the antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance
of the employee. Even in case, truthful declaration regarding concluded
trial has been made by the employee, still the employer has the right to
consider antecedents and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.           E
        19. If we look into the facts of the present case, the instructions
of the Home Department dated 1.02.2012, prevalent at the time of
selection and appointment specify such candidate would not be considered
for recruitment. In Circular No. 2/2010 dated 31.03.2010, issued by the
Office of the Training Sector, National Industrial Security Academy,             F
Central Industrial Security Force (Ministry of Home Affairs), it is clarified
if a candidate is found involved in any criminal case, whether it is finalized
or pending, the candidate may not be allowed to join without further
instructions from the headquarter. After seeking instructions from the
headquarter, the Standing Committee has taken the decision on 15.10.2012
that because of acquittal giving benefit of doubt, the respondent-writ           G
petitioner was not considered eligible for appointment in CISF.
       20. In the aforesaid fact, guidance can further be taken from the
judgment of Mehar Singh (supra), in paras 23, 34, 35, this Court observed,
as thus:
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668      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 8 S.C.R.


A     23. A careful perusal of the policy leads us to conclude that the
      Screening Committee would be entitled to keep persons involved
      in grave cases of moral turpitude out of the police force even if
      they are acquitted or discharged if it feels that the acquittal or
      discharge is on technical grounds or not honourable. The Screening
      Committee will be within its rights to cancel the candidature of a
B     candidate if it finds that the acquittal is based on some serious
      flaw in the conduct of the prosecution case or is the result of
      material witnesses turning hostile. It is only experienced officers
      of the Screening Committee who will be able to judge whether
      the acquitted or discharged candidate is likely to revert to similar
C     activities in future with more strength and vigour, if appointed, to
      the post in a police force. The Screening Committee will have to
      consider the nature and extent of such person’s involvement in
      the crime and his propensity of becoming a cause for worsening
      the law and order situation rather than maintaining it. In our opinion,
      this policy framed by the Delhi Police does not merit any
D     interference from this Court as its object appears to be to ensure
      that only persons with impeccable character enter the police force.
      34. The respondents are trying to draw mileage from the fact that
      in their application and/or attestation form they have disclosed
      their involvement in a criminal case. We do not see how this fact
E     improves their case. Disclosure of these facts in the application/
      attestation form is an essential requirement. An aspirant is
      expected to state these facts honestly. Honesty and integrity are
      inbuilt requirements of the police force. The respondents should
      not, therefore, expect to score any brownie points because of this
      disclosure. Besides, this has no relevance to the point in issue. It
F     bears repetition to state that while deciding whether a person
      against whom a criminal case was registered and who was later
      acquitted or discharged should be appointed to a post in the police
      force, what is relevant is the nature of the offence, the extent of
      his involvement, whether the acquittal was a clean acquittal or an
G     acquittal by giving benefit of doubt because the witnesses turned
      hostile or because of some serious flaw in the prosecution, and
      the propensity of such person to indulge in similar activities in
      future. This decision, in our opinion, can only be taken by the
      Screening Committee created for that purpose by the Delhi Police.
      If the Screening Committee’s decision is not mala fide or actuated
H     by extraneous considerations, then, it cannot be questioned.
         UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. METHU MEDA                               669
                    [J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]

      35. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the great      A
      responsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in the
      society. People repose great faith and confidence in it. It must be
      worthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing to join the police
      force must be a person of utmost rectitude. He must have
      impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal
                                                                               B
      antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or
      discharged in the criminal case, that acquittal or discharge order
      will have to be examined to see whether he has been completely
      exonerated in the case because even a possibility of his taking to
      the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the police
      force. The Standing Order, therefore, has entrusted the task of          C
      taking decisions in these matters to the Screening Committee.
      The decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final
      unless it is mala fide. In recent times, the image of the police
      force is tarnished. Instances of police personnel behaving in a
      wayward manner by misusing power are in public domain and
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      are a matter of concern. The reputation of the police force has
      taken a beating. In such a situation, we would not like to dilute the
      importance and efficacy of a mechanism like the Screening
      Committee created by the Delhi Police to ensure that persons
      who are likely to erode its credibility do not enter the police force.
      At the same time, the Screening Committee must be alive to the           E
      importance of trust reposed in it and must treat all candidates
      with even hand.
       21. In view of the aforesaid, it is clear the respondent who wishes
to join the police force must be a person of utmost rectitude and have
impeccable character and integrity. A person having a criminal                 F
antecedents would not be fit in this category. The employer is having
right to consider the nature of acquittal or decide until he is completely
exonerated because even a possibility of his taking to the life of crimes
poses a threat to the discipline of the police force. The Standing Order,
therefore, has entrusted the task of taking decisions in these matters to
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the Screening Committee and the decision of the Committee would be
final unless mala fide. In the case of Pradeep Kumar (supra), this
Court has taken the same view, as reiterated in the case of Mehar
Singh (supra). The same view has again been reiterated by this Court in
the case of Raj Kumar (supra).
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670             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 8 S.C.R.


A            22. As discussed hereinabove, the law is well-settled. If a person
      is acquitted giving him the benefit of doubt, from the charge of an offence
      involving moral turpitude or because the witnesses turned hostile, it would
      not automatically entitle him for the employment, that too in disciplined
      force. The employer is having a right to consider his candidature in terms
      of the circulars issued by the Screening Committee. The mere disclosure
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      of the offences alleged and the result of the trial is not sufficient. In the
      said situation, the employer cannot be compelled to give appointment to
      the candidate. Both the Single Bench and the Division Bench of the
      High Court have not considered the said legal position, as discussed
      above in the orders impugned. Therefore, the impugned orders passed
C     by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 3897
      of 2013 and Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 1090 of 2013 are not
      sustainable in law, as discussed hereinabove.
            23. Accordingly, this appeal is hereby allowed and the impugned
      orders are set-aside. No order as to costs.
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      Divya Pandey                                                   Appeal allowed.




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