Supreme Court of India
UNION OF INDIAversusPRABHAKARAN VIJAYA KUMAR & ORS.
- Citation
- 2008 INSC 577
- Decided
- 5 May 2008
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- H K SEMA
Holding
A passenger who falls while attempting to board a moving train is covered by the expression ‘accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers’ under s.123(c) of the Railways Act, 1989, making the incident an untoward incident for which the railway is strictly liable under s.124A.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined a claim for compensation under the Railways Act, 1989 after a bona‑fide passenger, Smt. Abja, fell onto the tracks while trying to board a moving train and was run over. The issue was whether such a fall fell within the expression “accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers” in s.123(c) and thus qualified as an “untoward incident” attracting liability under s.124A, which imposes strict, no‑fault liability unless the proviso exceptions apply. The Court adopted a liberal, purposive construction of the beneficial statute, holding that the expression includes accidents that occur while a passenger is attempting to board the train. Consequently, the incident was an untoward incident, the proviso did not apply, and the railway was strictly liable. The appeal challenging the High Court’s award of compensation was dismissed.
Issues considered
- The meaning of “accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers” under s.123(c) of the Railways Act, 1989.
- Whether an accident occurring while a passenger is trying to board a moving train falls within that definition.
- Whether the incident qualifies as an “untoward incident” attracting compensation under s.124A.
- Whether the proviso to s.124A (suicide, self‑inflicted injury, criminal act, intoxication, natural cause) excludes liability.
- Whether strict liability under s.124A applies irrespective of fault or contributory negligence.
Legislation cited
- Motor Vehicles Act, 1988s. 140, s. 163A
- Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991
- Railways Act, 1989s. 123(c), s. 124A
- Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923s. 3
Subjects
Railways Actuntoward incidentstrict liabilitystatutory interpretationbeneficial legislationcompensationaccidental fallingno‑fault liabilitytort law
Judgment
[2008] 7 S.C.R. 673
;.
r UNION OF INDIA A
v.
PRABHAKARAN VIJAYA KUMAR & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 6898 of 2002)
MAY 5, 2008
B
.... r [H.K. SEMA AND MARKANDEY KATJU, JJ.]
Railways Act, 1989 - SS. 124(A) and 123(c) -
Compensation on account of 'untoward incident' - Claim of -
Bonafide passenger fell on to railway track when trying to get c
into the moving train and run over by train - Held: Comes
within expression 'accidental falling of a passenger from a train
carrying passengers', hence an 'untoward incident' - Instant
case is covered bys. 124A - It cannot be said that there was
no fault on part of Railways or that there was contributory
D
negligence - Thus, order of High Court granting compensation
...; upheld - Interpretation of statutes .
Interpretation of statutes - Expression 'accidental falling
of a passenger from a train carrying passengers' - Two
constructions - First that a person has actually got inside the E
train and thereafter falls down from the train, while second that
a person is trying to board the train and falls down while trying
to do so - Held: Provision for compensation in the Act being a
beneficial piece of legislation, it should be given .liberal
interpretation and not a narrow one - Hence, second
F
interpretation which advances the object of the statute and
y serves its purpose to be preferred - Railways Act, 1989.
Torts - Principles of Strict liability-Applicability of- Held:
Applies to statutory authorities like railways, public
corporations or local bodies not working for private profit - It G
cannot be said that body which acts not for its own profit but for
the benefit of the community should not be.liable - Strict liability
has no element of moral censure.
""
Jurisprudence - Law - Law of strict liability de hors
673 H
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R.
A statutory provisions in view of MC Mehta's case should be
~ •
developed - With regard to cases on account of 'untoward
incident' new principles for fixing liability to be developed.
AB was holding a second class season ticket and a
railway identity card. She died in a train accident. She fell
B on to the railway track and was run over by train. AB's
husband, mother and minor son filed claim petition before
~ ...
the Railway Claims Tribunal. PW-2 deposed before the
tribunal that while he was at the railway station he found
that the deceased fell down from the compartment of the
c train when the train was moving and died on the spot.
However, the tribunal held PW-2 to be an interested
witness and disbelieved his evidence, though DW-1-
Station Master at the railway station corroborated the
evidence of PW-2. The tribunal held that it was not an
D 'untoward incident' within the meaning of the expression
in s. 123(c) of the Railways Act, 1989 as it was not an
accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying
passengers and rejected the claim. In appeal, the High
Court held that the deceased sustained injuries in her
E anxiety to get into the train which was moving, thus, came
within the expression 'accidental falling of a passenger
from a train carrying passengers' which is an 'untoward
incident', as defined ins. 123(c). It allowed the claim and
granted compensation of Rs. 2 lacs with interest @ 12%
F from the date of the petition till the date of payment was
granted. Hence, the present appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. It would not legally make any difference
whether the deceased was actu,C:lllY inside the train or
G
whether she was only trying to get into the train when
she fell down. In either case, it amounts to an 'accidental
falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers'. ~
Hence, it is an 'untoward incident' as defined ins. 123(c)
of the Railways Act. [Para 1O] [681-D-E]
H
UNION OF INDIA v. PRABHAKARAN VIJAYA KUMAR 675
& ORS.
2.1 If the words used in a beneficial or welfare statute A
are capable of two constructions, the one which is more
in consonance with the object of the Act and for the benefit
of the person for whom the Act was made should be
preferred. In other words, beneficial or welfare statutes
should be given a liberal and not literal or strict 8
=" r interpretation. [Para 12] [682-B]
Kuna/ Singh vs. Union of India (2003) 4 SCC 524; B. D.
Shetty vs. CEAT Ltd. (2002) 1 SCC 193; Transport Corporation
of India vs. ES/ Corporation (2000) 1 SCC 332; Alembic
Chemical Works Co. Ltd. vs. The Workmen AIR 1961 SC 647; C
Jeewanla/ Ltd. vs. Appel/ate Authority AIR 1984 SC 1642;
Lalappa Lingappa and others vs. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mi/ls
Ltd. AIR 1981 SC 852; S. M. Nilajkar vs. Telecom Distt.
Manager (2003) 4 SCC 27; Hindustan Lever Ltd. vs. Ashok
Vishnu Kate and others 1995(6) sec 326 - relied on. o
2.2 It is possible that two interpretations can be given
to the expression 'accidental falling of a passenger from
a train carrying passengers', the first being that it only
applies when a person has actually got inside the train
and thereafter falls down from the train, while the second E
being that it includes a situation where a person is trying
to board the train and falls down while trying to do so.
Since the provision for compensation in the Railways Act
is a beneficial piece of legislation, it should receive a
liberal and wider interpretation and not a narrow and F
technical one. Hence, the latter of the two interpretations
i.e. the one which advances the object of the statute
and serves its purpose should be preferred. [Para 11]
[681-F, G]
2.3 It is well known that in our country there are crores G
of people who travel by railway trains since everybody
cannot afford traveling by air or in a private car. By giving
a restrictive and narrow meaning to the expression
'accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying
passengers' ins. 123(c) of the Act, large number of victims H
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 7 S.C.R.
A of train accidents (particularly poor and middle class
people) would be deprived of getting compensation under
the Act. Hence, the expression 'accidental falling of a
passenger from a train carrying passengers' includes
accidents when a bona fide passenger i.e. a passenger
B traveling with a valid ticket or pass is trying to enter into a
railway train and falls down during the process. In other ·~ -
words, a purposive, and not literal, interpretation should
be given to the expression. [Para 14] [684-D-F]
3.1 In cases where the principle of strict liability
C applies, the defendant has to pay damages for injury
caused to the plaintiff, even though the defendant may
not have been at any fault. [Para 25] [687-H; 688-A]
MC. Mehta vs. Union of India AIR 1987 SC 1086 -
referred to.
0
Rylands v. Fletcher 1866 LRI Ex 265; National
Telephone Co. vs. Baker (1893) 2 Ch 186, Eastern and South
African Telegraph Co. Ltd. vs. Cape Town Tramways Co. Ltd.
(1902) AC 381, Hillier vs. Air Ministry (1962) CLY 2084;
E Rickards vs. Lothian (1913) AC 263; Read vs. Lyons (1947)
AC 156; Dunne vs. North Western Gas Boards (1964) 2 QB
806; Att. Gen. vs. Geothermal Produce (N.Z.) Ltd., (1987) 2
NZ1 R 348; Pearson vs. North Western Gas Board (1968) 2
All ER 669 - referred to.
F 'Tort' by Salmond, 6th Edn p.12; American
Jurisprudence, 2nd Edn Vol 74 p. 632; Torts by Michael
Jones, 4th Edn. p. 247, 267; 'Torts' by Fleming 6th Edn p.
302; 'Torts' by Clerk and Lindsel/, 14th Edn; Article by Prof
Clarence Morris titled 'Hazardous Enterprises and Risk
G Bearing Capacity' Yale Law Journal, 1952 p. 1172;
Restatement of the Law of Torts, vol 3, p. 41; 'Tort Law' by
Dias and Markesins 2nd Edn p. 355; Article 'Non-natural User
and Rylands vs. Fletcher,' Modern Law Review, 1961 vol
24, p 557; Tort by Winfield and Jolowicz, 13th Edn p. 442-
H 443 - referred to.
UNION OF INDIA v. PRABHAKARAN VIJAYA KUMAR 677
& ORS .
• ~
3.2 Section 124A of the Act lays down strict liability A
or no fault liability in case of railway accidents. Hence, if a
case comes within the purview of s. 124A it is wholly.
irrelevant as to who was at fault. The accident in which
AB died is clearly not covered by the proviso to 124A. The
',
accident did not occur because of any of the reasons B
)'
mentioneq in cl (a) to (e) of the proviso to s. 124A. Hence,
the instant case is clearly covered by the main body of s.
124A, and not its proviso. [Paras 16 and 17) [686-A-C]
3.3 The decision in M. C. Mehta's case related to a
concern working for private profit. However, tire same c
principle will also apply to statutory authorities (like the
railways), public corporations or local bodies which may
be social utility undertakings not working for private
profit. [Para 40) [692-C]
D
M. C. Mehta vs. Union of India AIR 1987 SC 1086 - relied
on.
3.4 It is true that attempts to apply the principle of
Rylands vs. Fletcher against public bodies have not on the
whole succeeded mainly because of the idea that a body e·
'
which acts not for its owll profit but for the benefit of the
community should not be liable. However, this idea is
based on a misconception. Strict li~bility has no element
of moral censure. It is because such public bodies benefit
the community that it is unfair to leave the result of a non- p
, negligent accident to lie fortuitously on a particular
individual rather than to spre11d it among the community
generally. [Para 41] [692-D-E]
Lairds vs. Nelms (1972) 406 US 797; Dalehite vs. U.S.
(1953) 346 US 15 - referred to. G
Administrative Law by PP Craig, 2nd Edn. p 446;
Administrative Law by Schwartz, 1984; "Government Liability
in Tort in the English and French Legal Systems" by C.J.
''
Hanson - referred to.
H·
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R
A 4.1 In India, it is the duty of the State under our .
Constitution, to function as a Welfare State, and look after
the welfare of all its citizens. In various social welfare
statutes the principle of strict liability has been provided
to give insurance to people against death and injuries,
B irrespective of fault. Thus, s. 3 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act 1923, s. 124A of the Railways Act 1989,
ss. 140 and 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Public
Liability ~nsurance Act, 1991 etc. incorporate the principle
of strict liability. [Para 44, 45, 46, 47 and 48] [693-A-E]
C 4.2 Apart froni the principle of strict liability ins. 124A
of the Railways Act and other statutes, the law of strict
liability de hors statutory provisions in view of the
Constitution Bench decision of this Court in M.C. Mehta's
case should be developed. New principles for fixing
D liability in cases like the instant have to be developed.
[Para 49] [693-F]
Jay Laxmi Salt works (P) Ltd. vs. The State of Gujarat JT
· 1994 (3) SC 492 - referred to.
E Ashby vs. White (1703) 2 Ld. Raym 938; Donoghue vs.
Stevenson (1932) AC 562 (619) (HL); Rookes vs. Barnard
(1964) AC 1129 (1169) (HL); Home Officer vs. Dorset Yacht
Co. Ltd (1970). 2 All ER 294 (HL) - referred to.
American Restatement of Torts, Art 1 - referred to.
F
5.1 The submission of appellant that there was 11'.l
fault on the part of the Railways, or that there was
contributory negligence, is based on a total
misconception and hence has to be rejected. [Para 55].
G [694-F]
5.2 There was no good reason to disbelieve PW-2
because there is nothing to show that he had any motive
to give false evidence, or that he was an interested
witness. Further, hts evidence could not have been
H discarded merely because he did not go to the spot and
UNION OF INDIA v. PRABHAKARAN VIJAYA KUMAR 679
& ORS. [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]
~
• help removing the dead body from the railway track. A
Moreover, merely because the police did not record his
statement does not mean that he was not present or gave
false evidence. It is common knowledge that in our country
often there is a large crowd on railway platforms, and it is
simply not possible for the police to take the statement of B
~
everyone there. [Para 7] [680-D-G]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
6898 of 2002.
' From the Judgment and Order dated 25.6.2001 of the High c
Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in MFA No. 1080/1998(B).
P.S. Patwalia, S. Wasim A Qadri and Anil Katiyar for the
A pellant.
B.V. Deepak for the Respondents.
D
.4 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MARKANDEY KATJU, J. 1. This appeal by special leave
has been filed against the impugned judgment of a Division
Bench of the Kera la High Court dated 25.6.2001 passed in MFA
E
No. 1080 of 1998-B.
2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
-
---'\
3. The facts of the case are that a claim petition was filed
before the Railway Claims Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench F
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Tribunal') by the husband, mother
and minor son of one Smt. Abja who died on 23.5.1996 in a
train accident at Varkala Railway station. The Claims Tribunal
disallowed the claim, but the appeal against the said decision
was allowed by the Kerala High Court by the impugned judgment G
dated 25.6.2001 and compensation of Rs. 2 lacs with interest
.. @ 12% from the date of the petition till the date of payment was
granted. Aggrieved, this appeal has been filed by the appellant.
·~
' 4. There is no dispute that Smt. Abja was a bona fide
H
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R.
A passenger holding a second class season ticket and an identity 1 ~
card issued by the Southern Railway. As per the forensic report
the cause of death was due to multiple injuries due to the
accident. The deceased fell on to the railway track and was run
over by train No.6349 Parasuram Express.
B 5. The Tribunal found that Smt. Abja was a bona fide
passenger traveling by the train.
6. Before the Tribunal PW-2, K. Rajan, deposed that while
he was at Varkala railway station he found one passenger falling
c from the Parasuram Express and that the train had stopped.
He further stated in his evidence that he went to the north side
of the platform and saw the injured lying on the platform. He
-
further stated that the person falling down was the lady who died
on the spot. He also stated that the deceased fell down from the
compartment of the train when the train was moving.
0
7. The Tribunal strangely enough held that PW-2 was an
interested witness because if he was present on the spot he
would have definitely helped the Station Master in removing the
dead body from the railway track. Further, the police would have
E definitely recorded his evidence. For this reason, the Tribunal
disbelieved the evidence of PW-2. We are, however, of the
opinion that there was no good reason to disbelieve PW-2
. because there is nothing to show that he had any motive to give
false evidence, or that he was an interested witness. Further.
F his evidence could not have been discarded merely because
he did not go to the spot and help removing the dead body from
the railway track. Moreover, merely because the police did not
record his statement does not mean that he was not present or
gave false evidence. It is common knowledge th.at in our country
G often there is a large crowd on railway platforms, and it is simply
not possible for the police to take the statement of everyone
there.
8. However. the evidence of DW-1, D. Sajjan. who was
the Station Master at the railway station corroborates the
H evidence of PW-2 DW-1 had deposed that he saw on~ girl
UNION OF INDIA v. PRABHAKARAN VIJAYA KUMAR 681
•,. t & ORS. [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J]
running towards the train and trying to enter the train and she fell A
down. He has further stated that the deceased Abja had
attempted to board the train and fell down from the running train.
For this reason. the Tribunal held that this was not an 'untoward
incident' within the meaning of the expression in Section 123(c)
of the Railways Act, 1989 as it was not an accidental falling of a B
passenger from a train carrying passengers.
9. In appeal, the Kera la High Court was of the view that the
. deceasedsustained injuries, even according to the respondents,
in her anxiety to get.into the train which was moving. Hence, the
High Court held that the deceased came within the expression c
'accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying
passengers' which is an 'untoward incident', as defined in
Section 123(c) of the Railways Act, 1989.
10. We are of the opinion that it will not legally make any
D
difference whether the deceased was actually inside the train
when she fell down or whether she was only trying to get into the
train when she fell down. In our opinion in either case it amounts
to an 'accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying
passengers'. Hence, it is an 'untoward incid_ent' as defined in
Section 123(c) of the Railways Act. E
11. No doubt, it is possible that two interpretations can be
given to the expression 'accidental falling of a passenger from
a train carrying passengers', t~e first being that it only applies
when a person has actually got inside the train and thereafter F
falls down from the train, while the second being that it includes
a situation where a person is trying to board the train and falls
down while trying to do so. Since the provision for compensation
in the Railways Act is a beneficial piece of legislation, in our
opinion, it should receive a liberal and wider interpretation and
G
not a narrow and technical one. Hence in our opinion the latter
of the abovementioned two interpretations i.e. the one which
-.. ... advances the object of the statute and serves its purpose should
be preferred vide Kuna/ Singh vs. Union of India (2003) 4 SCC
524(para 9), 8. D. Shetty vs. CEAT Ltd. (2002) 1 SCC 193
H
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R.
4
,.
~
A (para 12), Transport Corporation of India vs. ES/ Corporation
(2000) 1 sec 332 etc.
12. It is well settled that if the words used in a beneficial or
welfare statute are capable of two constructions, the one which
is more in consonance with the object of the Act and for the
B benefit of the person for whom th8 Act was made should be
preferred. In other words, beneficial or welfare statutes should "'
be given a liberal and not literal or strict interpretation vide
Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd. vs. The Workmen AIR 1961
SC 647( para 7), Jeewanlal Ltd. vs. Appellate Authority AIR
c 1984 SC 1842 (para 11), La/appa Lingappa and others vs.
Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills Ltd. AIR 1981 SC 852 (para 13), S.
M. Nilajkar vs. Telecom Distt. Manager (2003) 4 SCC 27(para
12) etc.
13. In Hindustan Lever Ltd. vs. Ashok Vishnu Kate and
D
others 1995(6) SCC 326 (vide para 42) this Court observed:
"In this connection, we may usefully turn to the decision of
this Court in Workmen vs. American Express International
Banking Corporation wherein Chinnappa Reddy, J. in para
E 4 of the Report has made the following observations:
The principles of statutory construction are well settled.
Words occurring in statutes of liberal import such as social
welfare legislation and human rights' legislation are not to
be put in Procrustean beds or shrunk to Lilliputian
F dimensions. In construing these legislations the imposture
of literal construction must be avoided and the prodigality
of its misappiication must be recognized and reduced.
Judges ought to be more concerned with the 'colour', the
'content' and the 'context' of such statutes (we have
G borrowed the words from Lord Wilberforce's opinion in
Prenn v. Simmonds). In the same opinion Lorq Wilberforce
pointed out that law is not to be left behind in some island
~
of literal interpretation but is to enquire beyond the
language, unisolated from the matrix of facts in which they ...-
H are set; the law is not to be interpreted purely on internal ...
UNION OF INDIA v. PRABHAKARAN VIJAYA KUMAR 683
& ORS. [MARKANDEY KATJU, J.]
,.
linguistic considerations. In one of the cases cited before A
us, that is, Surender Kumar Verma v. Central Govt Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Coort we had occasion to say:
"Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of
'bread and butter' statutes. Welfare statutes must. o~
necessity, receive a broad interpretation. Where B
legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds
of mischief, the Court is not to make inroads by making
etymological excursions."
Francis Bennion in his Statutory Interpretation Second f'
'-'
Edn., has dealt with the Functional Construction Rule in
Part XV of his book. The nature of purposive construction
is dealt with in Part XX at p. 659 thus:
"A purposive construction of an enactment is one which
gives effect to the legislative purpose by- D
~· (a) following the literal meaning of the enactment where
that meaning is in accordance with the legislative
purpose (in this Code callerl a purposive-and-literal
construction). or
E
(b) applying a strained meaning where the literal
meaning is not in accordance with the legislative
purpose (in the Code called a purposive and strained
~ construction)."
At p. 661 of the same book, the author has considered the F
topic of "Purposive Construction·· in contrast with literal
construction. The learned author has observed as under:
"Contrast with literal construction - Although the term
'purposive construction' is not new, its entry into fashion G
betokens a swing by the appellate courts away from literal
construction. Lord Diplock said in 1975: 'If one looks back
... to the actual decisions of the [House of Lords] on questions
of statutory construction over the last 30 years one cannot
fail to be struck by the evidence of a trend away from the
< H
·~
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 7 S.C.R.
A purely literal towards the purposive construction of •
statutory provisions'. The matter was summed up by Lord
Diplock in this way -
... I am not reluctant to adopt a purposive construction
where to apply the literal meaning of the legislative
B language used would lead to results which would clearly
defeat the purposes of the Act. But in doing so the task ~ ....
on which a court of justice is engaged remains one of
construction, even where this involves reading into the Act
words which are not expressly included in it."
c
(emphasis supplied)
14. In our opinion, if we adopt a restrictive meaning to the
expression 'accidenta . . ':11'.'ng of a passenger from a train
carrying passengers' ir. vection 123( c) of the Railways Act, we
D will be depriving a. largE.. number of railway passengers from
getting compensation in railway accidents. It is well known that
in our country there are crores of people who travel by railway
trains since everybcdy cannr·. afford traveling by air or in a
private car. By giving a restrictive and narrow meaning to the
E expression '!f'le will t>e depriving a large number of victims of
train accidents (particularly poor and middle class people) from
getting compensation under the Railways Act. Hence, in our
opinion, the expression 'accidental falling of a passenger from
a train carrying passengers' includes accidents when a bona
F fide passenger i.e. a passenger traveling with a valid ticket or
pass is trying to enter into a railway train and falls down during
the process. In other words, a purposive, and not literal,
interpretation should be given to the expression.
15. Section 2 (29) of the Railways Act defines 'passenger'
G to mean a person traveling with a valid pass or ticket. Section
123(c) of the Railways Act defines 'untoward incident' to include
the accidental falling of any passenger from a train carrying
passengers. Section 124A of the Railways Act with which we ~
are concerned states :
•H ~
,_
UNION OF INDIA v. PRABHAKARAN VIJAYA KUMAR 685
& ORS. [MARKANDEY KATJU, J.]
"124A. Compensation on account of untoward incident. A
- When in the course of working a railway an untoward
incident occurs, then whether or not there has been any
wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the railway
administration such as would entitle a passenger who··
has been injured or the dependant of a passenger who B
has been killed to maintain an action and recover damages
in respect thereof, the railway administration shall,
notwithstanding anything contained in any other Jaw, be
liable to pay compensation to such extent as may be
prescribed and to that extent only for loss occasioned by C
the death of, or injury to, a passenger as a result of such
untoward incident:
Provided that no compensation shall be payable
under this section by the railway administration if the
passenger dies or suffers injury due to - D
--< (a) suicide or attempted suicide by him;
(b) self-inflicted injury;
(c) his own criminal act;
E
(d) any act committed by him in a state of intoxication or
insanity;
(e) any natural cause or disease or medical or surgical
treatment unless such treatment becomes necessary due
to injury caused by the said untoward incident. F
, 1 Explanation - For the purposes of this section.
"passenger" includes -
(i) a railway servant on duty; and
G
(ii) a person who has purchased a valid ticket for traveling
by a train carrying passengers. on any date or a valid
platform ticket and becomes a victim of an untoward
incident".
(emphasis supplied) H
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 7 S.C.R.
A 16. The accident in which Smt. Abja died is clearly not
covered by the proviso to 124A. The accident did not occur
because of any of the reasons mentioned in clauses (a) to (e)
of the proviso to Section 124A. Hence, in our opinion, the present
case is clearly covered by the main body of Section 124A of the
8 Railways Act. and not its proviso.
17. Section 124A lays down strict liability or no fault liability
in case of railway accidents. Hence, if a case comes within the
purview of Section 124A it is wholly irrelevant as to who was at
fault.
c
18. The theory of strict liability for hazardous activities can
be said to have originated from the historic judgment of
Blackbum, J of the British High Court in Rylands v. Fletcher
1866 LRI Ex 265.
D 19. Before this decision the accepted legal position in
England was that fault, whether by an intentional act or )...
negligence, was the basis of all liability (see Salmond on 'Tort',
6th Edn p.12) and this principle was in consonance with the
then prevailing Laissez Faire Theory.
E 20. With the advance of industrialization the Laissez Faire
Theory was gradually replaced by the theory of the Welfare State,
and in legal parla'1ce there was a corresponding shift from
positivism to sociolog1cal jurisprudence.
F 21 It was realized that there are certain activities in
industrial society which though lawful are so fraught with
~
possibility of harm to others that the law has to treat them as
allowable only on the term of insuring the public against injury
irrespective of who was at fault. The principle of strict liability
G (also called no fault liability) was thus evolved, which was an
exception to the general principle in the law of torts that there is
no liability without fault, (vide American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edn
Vol 74 p. 632). As stated above, the origin of this concept of ,...
liability without fault can be traced back to Blackburn, J's historic
H decision in Rylands vs. Fletcher (supra).
UNION OF INDIA v. PRABHAKARAN VIJAYA KUMAR 687
& ORS. [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]
22. The facts in that case were t)1at the defendant, who A
owned a mill, constructed a reservoir to supply water to the mill.
This reservoir was constructed over old coal mines, and the mill
owner had no reason to suspect that these old diggings led to
an operating colliery. The water in the' reservoir ran down the
old shafts and flooded the colliery. Blackburn J. held the mill B
owner to be liable, on the principle that "The person who for his
own purposes brings on his land and collects and keeps there
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his
peril, and if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all
the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape" .. C
On appeal this principle of liability without fault was affirmed by
the House of Lords (per Cairns, J.) but restricted to non-natural
users vide (1868) ~ 3 HL 330.
23. Rylands vs. Fletcher (supra) in fact created a new
legal principle (the principle of strict liability in the case of D
hazardqus activities), though professing to be based on
analogies drawn from existing law. The judgment is noteworthy
because it is an outstanding example of a creative
generalization. As Wig more writes, this epoch making judgment
owes much of its strength to 'the broad scope of the principle E
announced, the strength of conviction of its expounder, and the
clarity of his exposition'.
24. Strict liability focuses on the nature of the defendants'
activity rather than, as in negligence, the way in which it is carried
on (vide 'Torts by Michael Jones, 4th Edn. p. 247). There are F
many activities which are so hazardous that they may constitute
a danger to the person or property of another The pr-inciple of
strict liability st<!ites that the undertakers of these activities have
to compensate for the damage caused by them irrespective of
any fa.ult on their part. As Fleming says "permission to conduct G
cost
. .
.such activity is in effect made conditional on its absorbing .the
of the accidents .it causes, as an appropriate item of its
overheads" (see Fleming on 'Torts' 6th Edn p 302).
25.. Thus .in cases where the prmciole
. of strict
. liability , H
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 7 S.C R
A applies, the defendant has to pay damages for injury caused to
the plaintiff, even though the defendant may not have been at J-
any fault.
26. The basis of the doctrine of strict liability is two fold (i)
The people who engage in particularly hazardous activities
8 should bear the burden of the risk of damage that their activities
generate and (ii) it operates as a loss distribution mechanism,
the person who does such hazardous activity (usually a
corporation) being in the best position to spread the loss via
insurance and higher prices for its products (vide 'Torts' by
C Michael Jones 4th Edn p. 267).
27. As pointed out by Clerk and Lindsell (see 'Torts', 14th
Edn) "The fault principle has shortcomings. The very idea
suggests that compensation is a form of punishment for wrong
doing, which not only has the tendency to make tort overlap with
0
criminal law, but also and more regrettably, implies that a
wrongdoer should only be answerable to the extent of his fault.
This is unjust when a wholly innocent victim sustains catastrophic
harm through some trivial fault, and is left virtually without
compensation".
E
28. Many jurists applaud liability without fault as a method
for imposing losses on superior risk bearers. Their argument is
that one who should know that his activity, even though carefully
prosecuted, may harm others, and should treat this harm as a
F cost of his activity. This cost item will influence pricing. and will
be passed on to consumers spread so widely that no one will
be seriously effected (vide Article by Prof. Clarence Morris
entitled 'Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity'
published in Yale Law Journal, 1952 p. 1172).
G 29. The rule in Rylands vs. Fletcher (supra) was
subsequently interpreted to cover a variety of things likely to do
mischief on escape, irrespective of whether they were dangerous
per se e.g. water, electricity, explosions, oil. noxious fumes,
colliery spoil, poisonous vegetation, a flagpole, etc (see 'Winfield
H and Jolowicz on 'Tort", 13th Edn p 425) vide National Telephone
UNION OF INDIA v. PRABHAKARAN VIJAYA KUMAR 689
& ORS. [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]
~ t
Co. vs. Baker (1893) 2 Ch 186, Eastern and South African A
Telegraph Co. Ltd. vs. Cape Town Tramways Co. Ltd. (1902)
AC 381, Hillier vs. Air Ministry (1962) CLY 2084, etc. In
America the rule was adapted and expressed in the following
words " one who carried on an ultra hazardous activity is liable
to another whose person, land or chattels the actor should B
recognize as likely to be harmed by the unpreventable
miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting thereto from that
• which makes the activity ultra hazardous, although the utmost
care is exercised to prevent the harm" (vide Restatement of the
Law of Torts, vol 3, p. 41). c
30. Rylands vs. Fletcher(supra) gave English Law one of
its most creative generalizations which, for a long time, looked
destin.ed to have a successful future. Yet, after a welcome start
given to it by Victorian Judges the rule was progressively
emasculated, until subsequently it almost became obsolete in D
England. According to Dias and Markesins (see 'Tort Law' 2nd
Edn p. 355) one reason for this may well be that as a
generalization justifying a shift from fault to strict liability it may
have come prematurely. The 19th Century had not yet fully got
over laissez faire, and it was only in the 20th Century that the E
concepts of social justice and social security, as integral parts
of the general theory of the Welfare State, were firmly established.
31. As already mentioned above, the rule of strict liability
laid down by Blackburn J. in Rylands vs. Fletcher (supra) was
restricted in appeal by Lord Cairns to non-natural users, the F
word 'natural' meaning 'that which exists in or by nature, and is
not artificial', and that was the sense in which it was used by
Lord Cairns. However, later it acquired an entirely different
meaning ie. that which is ordinary and usual, even though it
may be artificial' vide Rickards vs. Lothian (1913) AC 263 G
followed in Read vs Lyons (1947)AC 156. Thus the expression
'non-natural' was later interpreted to mean 'abnormal', and since
-1
-\ in an industrial society industries can certainly not be called
'abnormal' the rule in Rylands vs. Fletcher (supra) was totally
emasculated in these subsequent rulings. Such an interpretation, H
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R
1 ..
A as Prof. Newark writes, 'would have surprised Lord Cairns and
astounded Blackburn, J' (see article entitled 'Non-natural User
and Rylands vs. Fletcher,' published in Modern Law Review,
1961 vol 24, p 557).
32. In Read vs. Lyons (1947) AC 156) which was a case
B of injury due to a shell explosion in an ammunitions factory, Lord
Macmillan while rejecting the claim of the plaintiff made further
restrictions to the rule in Rylands vs. Fletcher (supra) by holding
that the rule "derives from a conception of mutual duties of
neighbouring landowners", and was therefore inapplicable to
c personal injuries. He also held that to make the defendant liable
there should be escape from a place under the defendant's
control and occupation to a place outside his occupation, and
since the plaintiff was within the premises at the time of the
accident the injury was not due to escape therefrom. In this way
D Read vs. Lyons (supra) destroyed the very spirit of the decision
in Rylands vs. Fletcher (supra) by restricting its principle to the
facts of that particular case, instead of seeing its underlying
juristic philosophy.
33. Apart from the above, some other exceptions carved
E out to the rule in Rylands vs. Fletcher (supra) are (a) consent of
the plaintiff; (b) common benefit; (c) Act of stranger; (d) Act of
God; (e) Statutory authority; (f) default of plaintiff etc.
34. In Dunne vs. North Western Gas Boards (1964) 2 QB
806 Sellers L.J. asserted that the defendant's tiability in Rylands
F
vs. Fletcher(1868) LR 3 HC 330 "could simply have been placed
on the defendants' failure of duty to take reasonable care", and
it seems a logical inference from this that the Court of Appeals
considered the rule to have no useful function in modern times.
As Winfield remarks, the rule in Rylands vs. Fletcher (supra),
G by reason of its many limitations and exceptions, today seldom
forms the basis of a successful claim in the Courts (see Winfield
and Jolowicz on Tort, 13th Edn p. 442), and it seems that the
,...
rule "has hardly been taken seriously by modern English Courts",
videAtt. Gen. vs. Geothermal Produce (N.Z.) Ltd., (1987) 2 NZ1 R
H 348.
·-
UNION OF INDIA v. PRABHAKARAN VIJAYA KUMAR 691
& ORS. [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]
.. ...
35. As Winfield remarks, because of the various limitations A
and exceptions to the rule "we have virtually reached the position
where a defendant will not be considered liable when he would
not be liable according to the ordinary principles of negligence"
(see Winfield on Tort, 13th Edn p. 443).
r 36. This repudiation of the principle in Rylands vs. Fletcher B
(supra) is contrary to the modern judicial philosophy of social
justice. The injustice may clearly be illustrated by the case of
Pearson vs. North Western Gas Board (1968) 2 All ER 669. In
that case the plaintiff was seriously injured and her husband
was killed by an explosion of gas, which also destroyed their c
home. Her action in Court failed, in view of the decision in Dunne
vs. North Western Gas Board (1964) 2 QB 806. Thus the
decline of the rule in Rylands vs. Fletcher (supra) left the
individual injured by the activities of industrial society virtually
without adequate protection. D
~ 37. However, we are now witnessing a swing once again
in favour of the principle of strict liability. The Bhopal Gas
Tragedy, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the crude oil spill in
1988 on to the Alaska coast line from the oil tanker Exxon
Valdez, and other similar incidents have shocked the E
conscience of people all over the world and have aroused
thinkers to the dangers in industrial and other activities, in
modern society.
38. In England, the Pearson Committee recommended the F
introduction of strict liability in a number of circumstances
i (though none of these recommendations have so far been
implemented, with the exception of that related to defective
products).
39. In India the landmark Constitution Bench decision of G
the Supreme Court in M. C. Mehta vs. Union of India AIR 1987
SC 1086 has gone much further than Rylands vs. Fletcher
....
. (supra) in imposing strict liability. The Court observed "if the
enterprise is permitted to carry on any hazardous or inherently
dangerous activity for its profit the law must presume that such H
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R.
A permission is conditional on the enterprise absorbing the cost
of any accident arising on account of such hazardous or
inherently dangerous activity as an appropriate item of its
overheads". The Court also observed that this strict liability is
not subject to any of the exceptions to the rule in Rylands vs.
B Fletcher (supra).
1 •
40. The decision in M. C. Mehta's case (supra) related to
a concern working for private profit. However, in our opinion the
same principle will also apply to statutory authorities (like the
railways), public corporations or local bodies which may be
C social utility undertakings not working for private profit.
41. It is true that attempts to apply the principle of Rylands
vs. Fletcher (supra) ag3inst public bodies have not on the whole
succeeded vide Administrative Law by P.P. Craig, 2nd Edn. p.
446, mainly because of the idea that a body which acts not for
0
its own profit but for the benefit of the community should not be
liable. However, in our opinion, this idea is based on a
misconception. Strict liability has no element of moral censure.
It is because such public bodies benefit the community that it is
unfair to leave the result of a non-negligent accident to lie
E fortuitously on a particular individual rather than to spread it
among the community generally.
42. lnAmerica the U.S. Supreme Court in Lairds vs. Nelms
(1972) 406 US 797, following its earlier decision in Dalehite
F vs. U.S. (1953) 346 US 15, held that the U.S. was not liable for
damages from supersonic booms caused by military planes as
no negligence was shown. Schwartz regards this decision as
unfortunate (see Schwartz · Administrative Law', 1984).
However, as regards private enterprises the American Courts
G award huge damages (often running into millions of dollars) for
accidents due to hazardous activities or substances
43. In France. the liability of the State is without fault, and
the principle of strict liability applies (see C .J. Hanson
"Government Liability in Tort in the English and French Lega:
H Systems")
UNION OF INDIA v. PRABHAKARAN VIJAYA KUMAR 693
& ORS. [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]
...
44. In India, Article 38(1) of the Constitution states '1he State A
shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing
and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which
justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the
institutions of the national life".
45. Thus, it is the duty of the State under our Constitution B
' to function as a Welfare State, and look after the welfare of all
its citizens.
46. In various social welfare statutes the principle of strict
liability has been provided to give insurance to people against c
death and injuries, irrespective of fault.
47. Thus, Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act
1923 provides for compensation for injuries arising out of and
in the course of employment, and this compensation is not for
negligence on the part of the employer but is a sort of insurance D
to workmen against certain risks of accidents.
A
48. Similarly, Section 124A of the ~ailways Act 1989,
Sections 140 and 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the
Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 etc. incorporate the principle
E
of strict liability.
49. However, apart from the principle of strict liability in
Section 124A of the Railways Act and other statutes, we can
and should develop the law of strict liability de hors statutory
provisions in view of the Constitution Bench decision of this Court F
in M.C. Mehta's case (supra). In our opinion, we have to develop
new principles for fixing liability in cases like the present one.
50. It is recognized that the Law of Torts is not stagnant but
is growing. As stated by the American Restatement of Torts, Art
1; vide D. L. Lloyd: Jurisprudence: G
"The entire history of the development of the tort law shows
a continuous tendency, which is naturally not uniform in all
common law countries, to recognize as worthy of legal
protection, interests which were previously not protected
H
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R.
A at all or were infrequently protected and it is unlikely that
this tendency has ceased or is going to cease in future."
51. There are dicta both ancient and modern that the known
categories of tort are not closed, and that novelty of a claim is
not an absolute defence. Thus, in Jay Laxmi Salt works (P) Ltd.
8 vs. The State of Gujarat. JT 1994 (3) SC 492 (vide para 7), the
1
Supreme Court observed:
"Law of torts being a developing law its frontiers are
incapable of being strictly barricaded".
C 52. In Ashby vs. White (1703) 2 Ld. Raym 938, it was
observed (vide Pratt C.J.):
"Torts are infinitely various, not limited or confined".
53. In Donoghue vs. Stevenson (1932)AC 562 (619) (HL),
D it was observed by the House of Lords (per Macmillan, L.J.):
''The conception of legal responsibility may develop in
adaptation to altering social conditions and standards.
The criterion of judgment must adjust and adapt itself to
the changing circumstances of life."
E
54. The above view was followed in Rookes vs. Barnard
(1964) AC 1129 (1169) (HL) and Home Officer vs. Dorset Yacht
Co. Ltd (1970) 2 All ER 294 (HL).
55. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the
F submission of learned counsel for the appellant there was no
fault on the part of the Railways, or that there was contributory
negligence, is based on a total misconception and hence has
to be rejected.
G 56. Thus, there is no force in this appeal wJ11th is
accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs ..
N.J. Appeal dismissed
H
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "Railways Act"Sign in to search